Barjaktarovic v. State of Hawaii et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
MILICA BARJAKTAROVIC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII, 	et al.,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 24-00249 LEK-WRP
ORDER: DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, EXCEPT AS TO THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WHICH ARE DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; RESERVING RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS AND ON
PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO PARTICIPATE IN
ELECTRONIC FILING; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OTHER MOTIONS AS MOOT
On January 21, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Milica
Barjaktarovic (“Plaintiff”) filed an amended complaint. [Dkt.
no. 34.] Plaintiff filed a document on February 17, 2026, which
presents additional arguments and purports to correct certain
factual allegations made in the amended complaint. [Dkt.
no. 43.] This Court liberally construes docket number 34 as
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and docket number 43 as
Plaintiff’s Supplement to the Amended Complaint (“Supplement”).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).
This Court considers the Supplement alongside the Amended
Complaint.
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Also on January 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed: a document
requesting various forms of relief (“1/21 Motion”); a motion
requesting a temporary restraining order (“1/21 TRO Motion”); an
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs (“IFP Application”); and an Application for Permission
to Participate in Electronic Filing (E-File) (Pro Se Non-
Prisoner) (“E-Filing Application”). [Dkt. nos. 35, 38, 36, 37.]
On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed the “Motion to Accept My
Ammended [sic] Complaint Mailed on January 20, 2026 and Received
on January 21, 2026” (“1/23 Motion”). [Dkt. no. 39.] On
February 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed the “Urgent Motion to
Intervene” (“2/17 Motion”). [Dkt. no. 41.] Plaintiff filed a
second “Urgent Motion to Intervene” on March 4, 2026 (“3/4
Motion”). [Dkt. no. 45.] On March 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed a
motion seeking, among other things, this Court’s intervention in
various proceedings, a temporary restraining order, and an
injunction (“3/18 Motion”). [Dkt. no. 47.]
For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint
is dismissed without prejudice, except as to Plaintiff’s claims
against the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which
are dismissed with prejudice. In other words, Plaintiff will be
given the opportunity to file a second amended complaint to try
to cure the defects in the Amended Complaint that are identified
in this Order. Plaintiff, however, will not be allowed to assert
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claims against the DOJ in the second amended complaint. This
Court will rule on the IFP Application and the E-File
Application if any portion of the second amended complaint
survives the screening process. Plaintiff’s other motions are
denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint names the following parties as
defendants: the State of Hawai`i (“the State”); the Association
of Apartment Owners of Mokuleia Surf (“AOAO”); current and past
AOAO board members Kateryna Nezhura, Lorne Jackson, Richard
Yniguez Jr., and Joannie Lum Torio; All Community Management LLC
(“ACM”); ACM’s sole proprietor, Bryn James; Porter Kiakona
Kopper LLP (“PKK”); PKK attorneys, Kapono F.H. Kiakona,
Michael C. Biechler, Jamie Mariaga, Dallas Walker, Noele B.
Guerrero, and Sara M. Nakayama; Roeca Luria Shin LLP (“RLS”);
RLS attorneys, James Ferguson, James Shin, and Jodie Roeca;
Dispute Prevention and Resolution Inc. (“DPR”); DPR arbitrator,
Gail Nakatani (“Nakatani”); Commissioner Wayne K.T. Mau; and Doe
Defendants 1-50 (collectively “Defendants”). [Amended Complaint
at PageID.3394-99.]
On June 25, 2024, this Court issued an order that
stayed the instant case and denied then-pending motions as moot
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(“6/25/24 Order”). [Dkt. no. 15. 1 ] The instant case was
administratively closed by an entering order filed on June 27,
2024. [Dkt. no. 16.] The stay was lifted on November 21, 2025.
See Minute Order – EO: Order Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Plaintiff’s Requests in Plaintiff’s Letter Filed on
November 10, 2025, filed 11/21/25 (dkt. no. 31) (“11/21/25 EO”),
at PageID.3386.
The 6/25/24 Order also dismissed certain claims in the
Complaint for a Civil Case (“Complaint”), [filed 6/7/24 (dkt.
no. 1),] including claims against the DOJ, and granted Plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint to amend her claims against
the DOJ. See 6/25/24 Order at 16. In an entering order filed on
December 19, 2025 (“12/19/25 EO”), this Court set a January 16,
2026 deadline for Plaintiff to file in an amended complaint.
[Dkt. no. 33 at PageID.3392.]
On July 18, 2025, while the instant case was stayed,
Plaintiff filed a new complaint in this district court. See
Barjaktarovic v. State of Hawai`i, et al., CV 25-00299 LEK-RT
(“CV 25-299”), dkt. no. 1. On August 27, 2025, this Court issued
an order ruling that CV 25-299 was duplicative of the instant
action, and dismissed CV 25-299 without prejudice to the pursuit
of the claims that Plaintiff attempts to assert in the current
1 The 6/25/24 Order is also available at 2024 WL 3164704.
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action, but without leave to file an amended complaint in CV 25-
299 (“CV 25-299 8/27/25 Order”). See id., dkt. no. 19. 2 Because
of the similarities in the claims alleged in the instant action
and in CV 25-299, this Court incorporates the background from
the 6/25/24 Order and the CV 25-299 8/27/25 Order and
supplements the background in this Order as necessary.
Plaintiff’s litigation history against Defendants is
extensive, complex, and spans multiple years. See Amended
Complaint at PageID.3403-04 (providing an overview of cases that
Plaintiff has brought against some of the Defendants). The
litigation has taken place in state and federal court, at both
trial and appellate levels, and has also involved arbitration
proceedings. See 6/25/24 Order at 3-5 (summarizing some of
Plaintiff’s various actions against Defendants); see also
11/21/25 EO at PageID.3386 (discussing the Hawai`i Supreme
Court’s rejection of Plaintiff’s application for a writ of
certiorari). Plaintiff purports to present “new, related claims
that have arisen since 2024” in the Amended Complaint. See
Amended Complaint at PageID.3401.
Plaintiff allegedly owns two units at the Mokuleia
Surf condominium complex: Unit 104, which she claims to have
owned since 2004; and Unit 301, which she claims to have owned
2 The CV 25-299 8/27/25 Order is also available at 2025 WL
2466668.
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since 2017. See id. at PageID.3404. The core controversy regards
physical modifications made to Unit 301. See, e.g., id. at
PageID.3418-36 (allegations related to issues concerning and
arising out of the modifications to Unit 301 and the litigation
over those issues). Plaintiff alleges that the original
modifications to Unit 301 were completed in 2002 by a previous
owner, Michael Raab (“Raab”), a former AOAO board member. [Id.
at PageID.3440.] Plaintiff asserts that the AOAO did not
challenge the modifications to Unit 301 throughout the occupancy
of Raab and three other different owners that lived in the unit
before she purchased it. [Id.]
Plaintiff claims that the AOAO challenged the
modifications after she purchased the unit because of her status
as a “whistleblower.” [Id. at PageID.3441.] She also claims
that, while she was targeted for these pre-existing
modifications, the AOAO ignored or approved similar
modifications in at least six other units, which were owned by
AOAO board members or their supporters. [Id. at PageID.3441-42.]
Plaintiff further claims that, on December 6, 2010, the AOAO
board “officially allowed” most of the modifications to Unit 301
to remain. See id. at PageID.3441. Plaintiff asserts that in
March 2018, the AOAO owners voted to “grandfather” the
modifications to Unit 301 and that this vote was recorded in
meeting minutes. [Id. at PageID.3442 (emphasis omitted).] She
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contends that the AOAO board fraudulently concealed or ignored
these minutes in order to pursue litigation against her for the
modifications. See id.
In 2020, the AOAO filed an action against Plaintiff in
the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawai`i
(“circuit court”), challenging the modifications to Unit 301
(“Modification Lawsuit”). See id. at PageID.3413-14; see also
Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic,
Case No. 1CCV-20-0000850 (Hawai`i Cir. Ct.), 3 Final Judgment,
filed 11/15/22 (dkt. no. 231) (“Circuit Court Final Judgment”).
Plaintiff characterizes the Modification Lawsuit as a secretly
filed, frivolous SLAPP action 4 initiated by the AOAO’s attorneys,
PKK, without proper approval from the AOAO’s board. See, e.g.,
Amended Complaint at PageID.3406-07; id. at PageID.3413-14.
The Modification Lawsuit was submitted to arbitration
before Nakatani. See id. at PageID.3403. Plaintiff describes the
arbitration as an “inquisition” or “slave trial” characterized
by bias, corruption, fraud, and procedural misconduct. See id.
at PageID.3407-08. Nakatani issued an award in favor of the AOAO
3 The Modification Lawsuit circuit court case docket will be
referred to as AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, Case
No. 1CCV-20-0000850.
4 A SLAPP action is a strategic lawsuit against public
participation. Ohana Mil. Cmtys., LLC v. Barber, CIVIL NO. 18-
00042 KJM, 2018 WL 11536391, at *9 (D. Hawai`i Nov. 30, 2018)
(citing HRS § 634F-1).
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that Plaintiff states included approximately $277,331 in
attorney’s fees. [Id. at PageID.3407-08.] Plaintiff alleges the
amount “was generated ‘out of thin air,’” [id. at PageID.3405,]
but she also claims the amount “matched the value of [her] condo
Unit 301 at that time,” [id. at PageID.3414].
Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, but
the circuit court confirmed the arbitration award in its Final
Judgment. See Circuit Court Final Judgment at pg. 2. Plaintiff
alleges that the circuit court “rubberstamped” the arbitration
award 5 and entered the Circuit Court Final Judgment without
properly examining her evidence. [Amended Complaint at
PageID.3408.] She claims Judge Lisa Cataldo and Judge John
Tonaki, both of whom presided over the Modification Lawsuit,
“copycatted” arguments from the AOAO’s attorneys’ briefing and
intentionally violated state law. [Id. at PageID.3408.]¶
Plaintiff subsequently appealed the Circuit Court
Final Judgment to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of the State
of Hawai`i (“ICA”). See Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Mokuleia
5 At some parts in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges
that the Circuit Court Final Judgment award was $277,311. See,
e.g., Amended Complaint at PageID.3405. At other parts,
Plaintiff alleges that the Circuit Court Final Judgment award
was $277,331. See, e.g., id. at PageID.3406. The Circuit Court
Final Judgment award was $277,330.99. [Circuit Court Final
Judgment at 3.] Thus, this Court will refer to $277,331 as the
amount awarded in the Circuit Court Final Judgment.
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Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. CAAP-23-0000018. 6 On June 30, 2025,
the ICA issued its Summary Disposition Order affirming the
Circuit Court Final Judgment, and on September 4, 2025, the ICA
entered its final judgment in favor of the AOAO (“ICA Final
Judgment”). [AOAO of Mokuleia Surf, No. CAAP-23-0000018 (dkt.
nos. 473, 491).] Plaintiff alleges that the proceedings before
the ICA were unlawful because the proceedings were presided over
by Judge Keith Hiraoka (“Judge Hiraoka”), whom she alleges was a
former partner at RLS. See Amended Complaint at PageID.3458. She
asserts that Judge Hiraoka should have recused himself due to
his affiliation with RLS and that his refusal to recuse himself
presents a conflict of interest, which “invalidates all
proceedings” before the ICA. See id. at PageID.3458-59. She
claims the ICA was biased, ignored her evidence, and affirmed
the circuit court’s judgment based on, among other things,
“fraudulent justification.” See id. at PageID.3458-62.
Plaintiff petitioned the Hawai`i Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari. She alleges that the Hawai`i Supreme Court
ignored her objections that the AOAO had submitted a “fraudulent
opposition” to her petition. [Id. at PageID.3423.] On
6 The ICA case docket of the Modification Lawsuit will be
referred to as AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. CAAP-
23-0000018.
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November 4, 2025, the Hawai`i Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff’s
petition. See 11/21/25 EO at PageID.3386 (citation omitted).
As the proceedings before the ICA and the Hawai`i
Supreme Court were taking place, the AOAO initiated foreclosure
proceedings against Plaintiff (“Foreclosure Lawsuit”). See Ass’n
of Apartment Owners of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. 1CCV-
23-0001047. 7 On June 23, 2025, the circuit court filed an order,
which granted summary judgment in favor of the AOAO, and that
directed a decree of foreclosure and an order of sale be entered
as final judgment in the AOAO’s favor (“Foreclosure Order”).
[Id., dkt. no. 485, at 12-13.]
The Foreclosure Lawsuit is presided over by
Judge James H. Ashford (“Judge Ashford”). See id. at 17 (Judge
Ashford’s signature on the Foreclosure Order). Plaintiff alleges
a series of illicit acts occurred during the Foreclosure
Lawsuit. First, she claims the AOAO filed a “Motion to Examine
Judgment Debtor” in the Modification Lawsuit to conduct a “theft
probe” of Plaintiff’s assets. Amended Complaint at PageID.3424;
see also AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, Case No. 1CCV-
20-0000850, Ex Parte Motion for Examination of Judgment Debtor
Milica Barjaktarovic, filed 4/22/24 (dkt. no. 414) (“Examination
7 The Foreclosure Lawsuit circuit court case docket will be
referred to as AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, Case
No. 1CCV-23-0001047.
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Motion”). The circuit court granted the Examination Motion,
which Plaintiff claims “served as a substitute for serving
foreclosure summons,” and led to “illicit garnishing” of her
assets. Amended Complaint at PageID.3415; see also AOAO of
Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, Case No. 1CCV-20-0000850, Order
Granting Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for Examination of Judgment
Debtor Milica Barjaktarovic, filed 8/20/24 (dkt. no. 486)
(“Foreclosure Lawsuit 8/20/24 Order”). Plaintiff claims that
“[t]he Foreclosure Court ignored the illicit garnishing”
effectuated through the grant of the Examination Motion,
continued with the Foreclosure Lawsuit “by serving summons via
publication,” and denied Plaintiff’s objections asserting
defective service of the summons. [Amended Complaint at
PageID.3424.]
Second, Plaintiff alleges that Judge Ashford granted
the AOAO’s Motion for Summary Judgment by “by using fraud and
procedural misconduct, accusing [Plaintiff] of not having
evidence, and ignoring the Counterclaim.” [Id. at PageID.3425.]
Plaintiff also alleges there were other irregularities in the
Foreclosure Lawsuit that rendered the foreclosure invalid. See
id. at PageID.3408-09.
Third, Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Ashford and
Mau conspired to sell Unit 301 at an artificially low price of
$100,000 by selling the unit through a non-credit bid process,
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with the AOAO as the only registered bidder, and without hosting
open houses. See, e.g., id. at PageID.3409, PageID.3427.
Plaintiff claims that these actions, and others, amount to
fraud. See id. at PageID.3425-26.
Finally, she claims this low bid created an
“artificial deficiency” of approximately $300,000, see id. at
PageID.3427, which she speculates the AOAO intends to satisfy by
seizing and selling Unit 104, see id. at PageID.3416. Plaintiff
has appealed the Foreclosure Order. See AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v.
Barjaktarovic, Case No. 1CCV-23-0001047, Notice, filed 7/22/25
(dkt. no. 559); see also Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Mokuleia
Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. CAAP-25-0000522. 8
Plaintiff characterizes these events and judicial
proceedings as the orchestrated efforts of an organized crime
and racketeering group. See Amended Complaint at PageID.3428,
(“The implicated do not act in the interest of the law, but in
self-serving interest. They act in conspiracy and collaboration
to obstruct evidence, ignore the law, deny civil rights and due
process under the color of law, and extort property and assets.
They engage in civil racketeering acts, and act as an organized
crime and racketeering group.”). She alleges that the AOAO,
8 The ICA case docket of the Foreclosure Lawsuit will be
referred to as AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. CAAP-
25-0000522.
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members of the AOAO board, property managers, attorneys, a
state-funded agency, Nakatani, and state judges have formed this
criminal enterprise to steal approximately “$1.5 million under
the pretense of the law.” [Id. at PageID.3405.]
The Amended Complaint is convoluted; it is difficult
to discern the exact relief that Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff
does, however, clearly seek injunctive relief to stop the
Foreclosure Lawsuit. See id. at PageID.3401 (“I request an
Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) so that the Federal District Court stops
the foreclosure.”). Liberally construing the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff also appears to seek: 1) injunctive or declaratory
relief to vacate, dismiss, or void orders made by the state
courts, including the Circuit Court Final Judgment; see id. at
PageID.3410, PageID.3423; 2) monetary damages; see id. at
PageID.3410 (“[T]his Complaint asks for compensation.”); and
3) any other appropriate relief; see id. at PageID.3411.
STANDARD
“Federal courts can authorize the commencement of any
suit without prepayment of fees or security by a person who
submits an affidavit that demonstrates he is unable to pay.”
Smallwood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CV. NO. 16-00505 DKW-
KJM, 2016 WL 4974948, at *1 (D. Hawai`i Sept. 16, 2016) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)).
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The Court subjects each civil action
commenced pursuant to Section 1915(a) to
mandatory screening and can order the dismissal
of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious,
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeking monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but
requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
claim);[ 9 ] Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845
(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not
limited to prisoners”).
Id. at *3.
In addition, the following standards apply in the
screening analysis:
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently,
the court liberally construes her pleadings.
Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir.
1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the
federal courts to liberally construe the
‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.” (citing
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam))). The court also recognizes that
“[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no
amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se
litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s
deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to
dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of
Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th. [sic]
Cir. 2000).
Despite the liberal pro se pleading
standard, the court may dismiss a complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on its own motion. See Omar v.
9 Lopez has been overruled, in part, on other grounds by
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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Sea–Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.
1987) (“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua
sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal
may be made without notice where the claimant
cannot possibly win relief.”); see also Baker v.
Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that district court may
dismiss cases sua sponte pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) without notice where plaintiff
could not prevail on complaint as alleged). . . .
“Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” United
States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). The assumption is
that the district court lacks jurisdiction. See
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Accordingly, a “party
invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction has the
burden of proving the actual existence of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99
F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).
Flores v. Trump, CIVIL 16-00652 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 125698, at *1
(D. Hawai`i Jan. 12, 2017) (some alterations in Flores) (some
citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Amended Complaint
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently
stated:
Established by Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923)
and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed.
2d 206 (1983), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
provides that “a federal district court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct
appeal from the final judgment of a state court.”
Noel [v. Hall], 341 F.3d [1148,] 1154 [(9th Cir.
2003)].
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Rooker-Feldman also prohibits federal
district courts from considering “de facto
appeals” — suits in which “the adjudication of
the federal claims would undercut the state
ruling.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898
(9th Cir. 2003). Thus, “Rooker-Feldman looks to
federal law to determine ‘whether the injury
alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from
the state court judgment itself or is distinct
from that judgment.’” Id. at 900 (quoting Garry
v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996)).
And when the federal action constitutes a
forbidden de facto appeal of a state court
judgment, the federal court “must also refuse to
decide any issue raised in the suit that is
‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved
by the state court in its judicial decision.”
Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158. “Our circuit has
emphasized that ‘[o]nly when there is already a
forbidden de facto appeal in federal court does
the ‘inextricably intertwined’ test come into
play.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 778 (9th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “occupies
‘narrow ground’ and applies only in ‘limited
circumstances.’” Brown v. Duringer Law Grp. PLC,
86 F.4th 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Exxon [Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.],
544 U.S. [280,] 284, 291, 125 S. Ct. 1517
[(2005)]. “Namely, it ‘is confined to . . . cases
[1] brought by state-court losers [2] complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments
[3] rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and [4] inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.’”
Id. at 1254 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, 125
S. Ct. 1517); see generally Miroth v. County of
Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1148-51 (9th Cir. 2025).
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Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2025) (some
alterations in Searle). 10
“Proceedings end for Rooker-Feldman purposes when
the state courts finally resolve the issue that
the federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate
in a federal forum, even if other issues remain
pending at the state level.” Mothershed [v.
Justs. of Sup. Ct.], 410 F.3d [602,] 604 n.1
[(9th Cir.), as amended on denial of reh’g
(July 21, 2005)]. In addition, courts “pay close
attention to the relief sought by the federal-
court plaintiff” in determining whether his
action functions as a de facto appeal. Hooper v.
Brnovich, 56 F.4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777–78
(9th Cir. 2012)).
Plotkins v. Cnty. of Kaua`i, Fin. Div. Real Prop. Assessment,
CIV. NO. 24-00019 JMS-KJM, 2024 WL 1885791, at *2 (D. Hawai`i
Apr. 30, 2024). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, while invoking
Title 42 United States Code Section 1983, see, e.g., Amended
Complaint at PageID.3403, and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), Title 18 United States Code
Sections 1961, et seq., see, e.g., id. at PageID.3400-02, is in
substance a direct attack on the final judgments of the state
courts.
Under the first prong of the Rooker-Feldman analysis,
this Court examines whether the instant action was “brought by
state-court losers.” Searle, 148 F.4th at 1128 (quotation marks
10 Pro se Petitioner Peyman Roshan’s petition for certiorari
before the United States Supreme Court was docketed on
January 15, 2026. See Roshan v. Searle, No. 25-961.
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and citation omitted). Plaintiff admits that she lost the
Modification Lawsuit, the appeal of the Modification Lawsuit
before the ICA, her attempt to seek supreme court review of the
ICA Final Judgment, and the Foreclosure Lawsuit. See, e.g.,
Amended Complaint at PageID.3406-09; PageID.3436-38. The first
Rooker-Feldman prong is therefore satisfied.
The second Rooker-Feldman prong requires that
Plaintiff’s federal court action complain of injuries caused by
state court judgments. See Searle, 148 F.4th at 1128. The
Amended Complaint is replete with Plaintiff’s complaints
concerning alleged injuries caused by the state courts. Indeed,
nearly every injury Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint
flows directly from the judgments and orders of the state
courts. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that she was
“irreparably and significantly harmed” by the Circuit Court
Final Judgment because it “enabl[ed] the foreclosure of
[Plaintiff’s] condo” as a result of the $277,331 judgment
assessed against her. See Amended Complaint at PageID.3457.
Plaintiff speculates that she may lose Unit 104 as a result of
the Foreclosure Lawsuit 8/20/24 Order and the Foreclosure Order.
See id. at PageID.3416. In short, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is that the state court judgments have
unlawfully deprived her of her property rights. The injuries she
identifies are the direct legal consequences of these state
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court adjudications. Thus, the second Rooker-Feldman prong is
also satisfied.
The third prong of the Rooker-Feldman analysis
examines the timing of when the party who lost in state court
filed the complaint in federal district court. See Searle, 148
F.4th at 1128. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that, for
purposes of the Rooker-Feldman analysis, state proceedings
conclude when the state court resolves the issue that the
federal court plaintiff seeks to relitigate. Mothershed, 410
F.3d at 604 n.1. A federal court plaintiff “may not avoid
Rooker-Feldman’s bar and obtain review of adverse state court
decisions in federal district court just because at least one of
their cases remains pending on appeal in state court.” Eicherly
v. O’Leary, 721 F. App’x 625, 627 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing
Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1986)); see also Marciano v. White, 431 F. App’x 611, 613
(9th Cir. 2011) (applying Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff had
filed an action challenging a state decision before the state
court of appeals had issued a ruling); Spindler v. City of Los
Angeles, No. CV 17-250-JLS(E), 2018 WL 6164796, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 2, 2018) (“Rooker-Feldman does not permit a litigant
pursuing an appeal in state court to attempt to hedge his or her
bets by filing an eleventh hour federal lawsuit challenging the
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same state court judgment at issue in the state appeal.”
(collecting cases)).
“At the core of the instant case, Plaintiff appears to
be contesting the outcome of the Modification Lawsuit.” [6/25/24
Order at 4-5 (citations omitted).] Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
confirms that she wishes to contest the outcome of the
Modification Lawsuit. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at
PageID.3450-52; PageID.3456-57 (alleging various errors by the
circuit court and arguing that this Court should void the
Circuit Court Final Judgment); id. at PageID.3423 (asserting the
Circuit Court Final Judgment “is invalid and must be voided”).
Because the Circuit Court Final Judgment was filed on
November 15, 2022, [Circuit Court Final Judgment at 3,] and the
Complaint was filed on June 7, 2024, [dkt. no. 1,] the third
prong of the Rooker-Feldman analysis is satisfied with respect
to Plaintiff’s claims challenging the outcome of the
Modification Lawsuit.
The Amended Complaint also challenges the Foreclosure
Lawsuit, and ultimately the Foreclosure Order, which authorized
the auction of Plaintiff’s property. See, e.g., Supplement at
PageID.3661-65 (alleging various errors by the circuit court and
arguing that this Court should void the Foreclosure Order);
Amended Complaint at PageID.3401 (requesting “that the Federal
District Court stop[] the foreclosure” because it is allegedly
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“based on fraud” and “violates [Plaintiff’s] federal due process
rights”). The Foreclosure Order was filed on June 23, 2025. The
Amended Complaint was filed on January 21, 2026, and, unlike the
Complaint, challenges the Foreclosure Order. Compare generally
Complaint, with Amended Complaint at PageID.3401. Plaintiff’s
appeal of the Foreclosure Order does not bar the application of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Eicherly, 721 F. App’x at 627.
Accordingly, the third prong of the Rooker-Feldman analysis is
also satisfied with respect to Plaintiff’s claims challenging
the outcome of the Foreclosure Lawsuit.
Finally, this Court turns to the fourth prong of the
Rooker-Feldman analysis. This prong scrutinizes the relief that
the losing plaintiff requests from the federal district court.
See Searle, 148 F.4th at 1128. The relief sought by the federal
court plaintiff is a special consideration in determining
whether the federal court action constitutes a de facto appeal
of a state court judgment. See Hooper, 56 F.4th at 624. Here,
Plaintiff requests that this Court vacate the arbitration award,
[Amended Complaint at PageID.3423,] void the Circuit Court Final
Judgment, [id.,] void the Foreclosure Lawsuit 8/20/24 Order,
[id. at PageID.3462,] and “stop[] the foreclosure,” [id. at
PageID.3401]. Plaintiff is therefore inviting this Court to
review the various rulings of the state courts. Such an
invitation constitutes a de facto appeal of state court
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decisions. See Lucas v. Wamu Mortg. Pass Through Certificates
Series 2005-AR19 Tr., Case No. EDCV 20-1366 JGB (KKx), 2021 WL
1556523, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants committed fraud on
various state courts as a de facto appeal of the state court’s
foreclosure judgments). 11 Because a ruling in Plaintiff’s favor
would require this Court to determine that the state courts’
decisions were erroneous or invalid, her claims in the Amended
Complaint are inextricably intertwined with the state courts’
decisions. See Hooper, 56 F.4th at 624-25 (“Claims are
inextricably intertwined if the relief requested in the federal
action would effectively reverse the state court decision or
void its ruling.” (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff’s invitation constitutes
the very review of state court judgments that Rooker-Feldman
forbids. Because all four prongs of the Rooker-Feldman analysis
are met, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant
action.
Plaintiff argues that “Rocker-Feldman [sic] . . .
do[es] not hold here because there is a 6-year consistent,
underlying pattern of intentional systemic state-wide
corruption, bad faith, fraud and procedural misconduct, and
11 Lucas was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 2023 WL 2570394
(Mar. 20, 2023).
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collusion of many players in abuse of their Oath of Office, code
of conduct and mandatory laws to do unconstitutional transfer of
property and extort under pretense of law, by denial of civil
rights.” [Amended Complaint at PageID.3402-03 (emphases
omitted).] Plaintiff offers no legal support for the proposition
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply when a federal
plaintiff alleges a multi-year conspiracy between private and
public actors, nor is this Court aware of any authority
supporting such a proposition. There are, however, a few
exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As this district
court has explained:
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not apply to a
general constitutional challenge, meaning one
that does not require review of a state court
decision. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair,
805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986). That said, if
the federal constitutional claim is “inextricably
intertwined” with a state court’s judgment, the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine does apply to bar the
party’s claim. See Doe & Associates Law Offices
v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.
2001) (“If the federal constitutional claims
presented to the district court are “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court’s judgment,
then Doe is essentially asking the district court
to review the state court’s decision, which the
district court may not do.”).
Another exception to the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine is where a plaintiff alleges a cause of
action for extrinsic fraud on a state court. See
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41
(9th Cir. 2004). “Extrinsic fraud is conduct
which prevents a party from presenting his claim
in court.” Id. at 1140 (quoting Wood v. McEwen,
644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Extrinsic
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fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error
by that court. It is, rather, a wrongful act
committed by the party or parties who engaged in
the fraud.” Id. at 1141. The exception does not
apply to allegations of intrinsic fraud. Dixon v.
State Bar of California, 32 Fed. Appx. 355, 356–
357, 2002 WL 461719, at *1 (9th Cir. 2002).
Intrinsic fraud is fraud that goes to the heart
of the issues that were before the state court.
See Green v. Ancora–Citronelle, 577 F.2d 1380,
1384 (9th Cir. 1978) (extrinsic fraud “prevents a
party from having an opportunity to present his
claim or defense in court”; it is not fraud that
“goes to the very heart of the issues contested
in the state court action”).
Guinn v. Apartment Owners Ass’n of Makaha Valley Towers Bd. of
Dirs., Civ. No. 14-00474 HG-RLP, 2015 WL 855151, at *7 (D.
Hawai`i Feb. 27, 2015). Neither exception, however, applies in
the instant action.
Plaintiff claims that “[f]or 6 years, the State
system-wide racketeers intentionally conducted an improper
process based on systemic denial of civil rights to due process
and free speech, fraud, corruption, and procedural and other
misconduct.” [Amended Complaint at PageID.3406-07 (emphasis
omitted).] At other times, Plaintiff claims that she “was denied
due process in the state system. Practically all orders are
against [Plaintiff] and in manifest disregard of the law.
[Plaintiff] demand[s] relief from the federal court.” [Id. at
PageID.3411 (emphasis omitted).] Plaintiff’s claims concerning
her due process and other constitutional rights are premised
entirely on the assertion that the state court judgments
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25
themselves deprived her of her rights. Plaintiff is therefore
not mounting a general constitutional challenge. She is instead
asking this Court to review and void state court judgments which
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits. See Doe & Assocs. L.
Off., 252 F.3d at 1029.
Although Plaintiff argues the extrinsic fraud
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, [Amended
Complaint at PageID.3437-38,] her allegations amount only to
allegations of intrinsic fraud. Extrinsic fraud involves conduct
that prevents parties from presenting their claims in court,
whereas intrinsic fraud goes to the very heart of the issues
contested in the state action. See Iyeke v. Gardiner, Case
No. CV 23-1454 FMO (RAO), 2023 WL 4092441, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
June 20, 2023) (citing Pellegrini v. Fresno Cnty., 742 F. App’x
209, 211 (9th Cir. 2018)). Here, Plaintiff asserts “fraud upon
the court,” alleging, among other things, that the AOAO
submitted false evidence, withheld evidence, and misrepresented
evidence regarding the approval of her condominium
modifications. [Amended Complaint at PageID.3436-38.] She
further alleges that the state courts “blindly copied falsities”
from the AOAO’s briefs and committed procedural misconduct and
fraud in ruling against her. See id. at PageID.3430-31 (emphasis
omitted). Plaintiff also alleges that the state courts are
involved in the conspiracy against her. See, e.g., id. at
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PageID.3399 (“[W]e are dealing with a Judicial conspiracy to
deny [Plaintiff] civil rights under color of law for the purpose
of extorting her property under pretense of law. The implicated
Judges are from the First Circuit Court, Appellate Court and
Federal District Court.”). Even if Plaintiff’s allegation of a
conspiracy is proven, it would not show that Plaintiff was
prevented from accessing the state courts or presenting her
defense; in fact, the record reflects that she actively
participated in the state court proceedings by filing answers,
counterclaims, and motions to reconsider, among other things.
See generally AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, Case
No. 1CCV-20-0000850 (Modification Lawsuit case docket); AOAO of
Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. CAAP-23-0000018 (ICA case
docket for the Modification Lawsuit); AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v.
Barjaktarovic, Case No. 1CCV-23-0001047 (Foreclosure Lawsuit
case docket); AOAO of Mokuleia Surf v. Barjaktarovic, No. CAAP-
25-0000522 (ICA case docket for the Foreclosure Lawsuit).
Because Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud center on the
submission of false evidence and the state courts’ evaluation of
the record, they constitute intrinsic fraud and do not trigger
an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Mayes v.
Campbell, No. 1:14-cv-02042-CL, 2015 WL 1931643, at *4 (D. Or.
Apr. 28, 2015) (finding that the plaintiffs’ allegation of a
conspiracy involving the state court “challenge[d] the very
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basis of the state judiciary’s decisions,” which “[i]f true,
. . . undoubtedly amounts to intrinsic fraud”).
In sum, no exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies. Thus, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant action. The
Amended Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.
This Court, however, will provide Plaintiff a final
opportunity to amend her claims. If Plaintiff chooses to file a
second amended complaint must remedy the deficiencies identified
in this Order. To do so, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
must explain, at the very least: 1) the constitutional,
statutory, or other legal rights she believes were violated;
2) each defendant’s precise actions or inactions; 3) when each
defendant acted or failed to act; 4) how each defendant’s
actions or inactions are connected to the alleged violations of
Plaintiff’s rights; 5) the specific injuries that Plaintiff
suffered as a result of the defendants’ conduct; and 6) the
basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Failure to affirmatively
allege that each defendant’s conduct is connected to a specific
injury Plaintiff suffered will likely result in such allegations
being dismissed for failure to state a claim. Additionally,
Plaintiff must explain how her claims and her alleged injuries
are independent of the state court judgments and why the relief
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she seeks does not constitute a de facto appeal of those state
court judgments under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended
complaint, she cannot incorporate any part of her original
Complaint or her Amended Complaint into the second amended
complaint by merely referring to portions of the original
Complaint or the Amended Complaint. Further, Plaintiff may not
add new claims to the second amended complaint, unless the new
claims relate to the claims alleged in the Amended Complaint.
New claims that are not related to the claims in the Amended
Complaint are subject to dismissal. Plaintiff is warned that,
although she is proceeding pro se, she must nevertheless comply
with all applicable rules, including but not limited to: Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and (d)(1), which state that a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “[e]ach
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct”; and this
Court’s orders. Failure to comply with Rule 8 or this Order may
result in the dismissal of the second amended complaint. See Lee
v. Delta Air Lines Inc., Case No. 20-8754-CBM-(JEMx), 2022 WL
2101730, at *4-5 & n.2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022) (dismissing a
pro se plaintiff’s third amended complaint that did not comply
with Rule 8 after previously giving the pro se plaintiff notice
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of the requirements of Rule 8 and ordering the pro se plaintiff
to comply with Rule 8 if she filed another amended complaint).
Plaintiff is cautioned that, if she chooses to file a
second amended complaint, she must do so by the deadline set in
this Order, unless she obtains an extension of the deadline from
this Court. If no second amended complaint is filed by the
deadline, the Amended Complaint, which was dismissed without
prejudice, will be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff would
then have no remaining claims in this case, and the Clerk’s
Office would be directed to close the case.
Plaintiff is also cautioned that, if she files a
second amended complaint, the claims in the second amended
complaint may be dismissed with prejudice if the second amended
complaint fails to cure the defects identified in this Order.
II. 	Claims Against the DOJ
Although Plaintiff will be allowed to file a second
amended complaint, she will not be allowed to pursue any claims
against the DOJ. Plaintiff was instructed to amend her claims
against the DOJ by January 16, 2026. See 12/19/25 EO at
PageID.3392. The Amended Complaint neither contains allegations
against the DOJ nor names the DOJ as a defendant. See, e.g.,
Amended Complaint at PageID.3394-99. This district court has
stated:
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[A] court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte
provided the court “give[s] notice of its
intention to dismiss and afford[s] plaintiffs an
opportunity to at least submit a written
memorandum in opposition . . . .” Reed v.
Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v.
Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he district court must give notice of its
sua sponte intention to dismiss . . . .”);
Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir.
2015) (“A frivolous action clogs the system and
drains resources regardless of whether the
plaintiff pays the filing fee or proceeds in
forma pauperis.”).
Kahoopii v. Hawai`i, CIV. NO. 25-00019 JMS-KJM, 2025 WL 238879,
at *1 (D. Hawai`i Jan. 17, 2025) (some alterations in Kahoopii).
Because Plaintiff has not named the DOJ as a defendant
in the Amended Complaint, this Court has the discretion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against the DOJ in the original
Complaint with prejudice. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191
F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with a minute order setting forth the deadline
to file the amended complaint gave the district court the
discretion to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)), 12
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Russell
v. United States, Case No.: 21cv1029-LL-MDD, 2023 WL 2919319, at
12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states, in
pertinent part: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move
to dismiss the action or any claim against it.”
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*3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2023). After weighing the five dismissal
factors set forth in Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788
(9th Cir. 2011), 13 this Court finds that the public interest in
the expeditious resolution of the claims against the DOJ and
this Court’s interest in managing the docket strongly outweigh
the policy favoring disposition of claims on the merits.
Moreover, the DOJ will not be prejudiced by the dismissal with
prejudice because it has neither been served nor made an
appearance in this case, and there are no less drastic
alternatives available at this time.
III. IFP Application
This Court reserves ruling on Plaintiff’s IFP
Application in light of the dismissal of the Amended Complaint
without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to file a second amended
complaint, and if any portion of the second amended complaint
survives the screening process, this Court will then rule upon
13 The Ninth Circuit has
identified five factors that a district court
must consider before dismissing a case . . . :
(1) the public’s interest in expeditious
resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to
the other party; (4) the public policy favoring
the disposition of cases on their merits; and
(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.
Dreith, 648 F.3d at 788 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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the IFP Application and address whether Plaintiff is entitled to
proceed in this case without prepaying fees and costs. If
Plaintiff either chooses not to file a second amended complaint
or if all of the claims in the second amended complaint are
dismissed with prejudice, the IFP Application will be denied as
moot.
IV. 	E-Filing Application
Because this Court has reserved ruling on Plaintiff’s
IFP Application, this Court also reserves ruling on Plaintiff’s
E-Filing Application. For the reasons previously stated,
Plaintiff will not be allowed to utilize the district court’s
electronic filing system unless this Court grants Plaintiff’s
IFP Application. See 11/21/25 EO at PageID.3386-87.
V. 	The Remaining Motions
In light of the dismissal of the Amended Complaint
without prejudice, this Court denies the 1/21 Motion, 1/21 TRO
Motion, 1/23 Motion, 2/17 Motion, 3/14 Motion, and 3/18 Motion
as moot. 	This Court makes no findings or conclusions regarding
the issues raised in those motions. The denial of those motions
is without prejudice to the filing of similar motions, if such
motions later become appropriate based on the posture of the
instant case.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, filed on January 21, 2026 and supplemented on
February 17, 2026, is DISMISSED. The dismissal is WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to the filing of a second amended complaint that cures
the defects identified in this Order. If Plaintiff chooses to
file a second amended complaint, she must do so by May 19, 2026.
The second amended complaint must comply with the terms of this
Order. Plaintiff is CAUTIONED that, if she fails to file a
second amended complaint by May 19, 2026, the Amended Complaint
will be dismissed with prejudice on May 20, 2026.
Plaintiff’s claim against the United States Department
of Justice in the Complaint, filed on June 7, 2024, that was
previously dismissed without prejudice, is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. In other words, Plaintiff may not include a claim
against the DOJ in the second amended complaint.
In addition, this Court RESERVES RULING on Plaintiff’s
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Costs, filed on January 21, 2026, and Plaintiff’s Application
for Permission to Participate in Electronic Filing (E-File) (Pro
Se Non-Prisoner), also filed on January 21, 2026. If Plaintiff
chooses to file a second amended complaint, and at least a
portion of it survives the screening process, the merits of the
applications will be addressed.
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Finally, this Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s
January 21, 2026 filing requesting various forms of relief and
Plaintiff’s January 21, 2026 motion requesting a temporary
restraining order. This Court also DENIES AS MOOT: Plaintiff’s
“Motion to Accept My Ammended [sic] Complaint Mailed on
January 20, 2026 and Received on January 21, 2026,” filed on
January 23, 2026; Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion to Intervene, filed
on February 17, 2026; and Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion to
Intervene, filed on March 4, 2026. Plaintiff’s motion requesting
various forms of relief, which was filed on March 18, 2026, is
also DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, March 20, 2026.
MILICA BARJAKTAROVIC VS. STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL; CV 24.-00249
LEK-WRP; ORDER: 	DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, EXCEPT AS TO THE CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WHICH ARE DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; RESERVING RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN THE DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS
AND ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO PARTICIPATE IN
ELECTRONIC FILING; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OTHER MOTIONS AS MOOT
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