Naki v. County of Maui

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JULIEANN NAKI, Individually
and as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Nathaniel
Joshua Na Wa’e Wa’e Makala Ka
Kai Naki; RAYMOND K. NAKI, SR.;
RAYMOND K. NAKI, JR.; ANTHONY
NAKI; JESSE NAKI; TERINA NAKI;
PALMER NAKI,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
COUNTY OF MAUI; DOE POLICE
OFFICERS in their individual
and official capacities as
police officers for the County
of Maui; DOE INDIVIDUALS 1-10;
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 1-10;
DOE ENTITIES 1-10,
Defendants.
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CIV. NO. 23-00383 HG-WRP
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF MAUI’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF No. 11)
Plaintiffs are relatives of Nathaniel Joshua Na Wa’e Wa’e
Makala Ka Kai Naki (“Decedent”) who are attempting to bring
claims on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the Decedent’s
estate against the Defendant County of Maui and several unnamed
Maui County police officers.
The First Amended Complaint asserts federal constitutional
and state law claims against the Defendant County of Maui and
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unnamed police officers arising from a shooting on April 30,
2023.
According to the First Amended Complaint, Maui County Police
Officers responded to a call regarding an alleged violation of a
Temporary Restraining Order. Unnamed Defendant Officers
responded to the call and approached the Decedent on a public
road. They observed that the Decedent possessed a machete and
demanded that he drop the weapon. According to the First Amended
Complaint, unnamed Defendant Officers shot the Decedent and he
died as a result.
The First Amended Complaint attempts to allege the following
causes of action:
Cause of Action 1: for violations of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Hawaii State
Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Cause of Action 2: for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Hawaii
State Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983;
Cause of Action 3: for municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983;
Cause of Action 4: for wrongful death pursuant to Hawaii state
law;
Cause of Action 5: for intentional infliction of emotional
distress pursuant to Hawaii state law;
Cause of Action 6: for negligent infliction of emotional
distress pursuant to Hawaii state law;
Cause of Action 7: for negligence against the County of Maui
pursuant to respondeat superior pursuant to
Hawaii state law;
Cause of Action 8: for negligence pursuant to Hawaii state law.
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Defendant County of Maui filed a Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint. The Defendant County of Maui asserts that the
Plaintiffs failed to state a federal law cause of action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendant County of Maui requests that
the Court dismiss the federal law causes of action and decline
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Hawaii state law
causes of action.
Defendant County of Maui’s Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs are given PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND consistent with
the rulings set forth in this Order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 14, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint. (ECF
No. 1).
On October 13, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 9).
On October 25, 2023, Defendant County of Maui filed a Motion
to Dismiss First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 11).
On November 16, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Opposition.
(ECF No. 14).
On December 7, 2023, Defendant County of Maui filed its
Reply. (ECF No. 15).
The Court elects to decide the Motion without a hearing
pursuant to District of Hawaii Local Rule 7.1(c).
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BACKGROUND
According to the First Amended Complaint:
On April 30, 2023, unnamed Maui County Police Officers
responded to a call alleging a violation of a Temporary
Restraining Order on the island of Molokai. (First Amended
Complaint at ¶¶ 15-16, ECF No. 9). The unnamed Officers
approached Nathaniel Joshua Na Wa’e Wa’e Makala Ka Kai Naki who
had a machete tucked under his arm. (Id. at ¶ 17).
The unnamed Officers demanded that Mr. Naki put down the
machete. (Id. at ¶ 18). According to Plaintiffs, “Defendant
Police Officers opened fire with their weapons at point blank
range” and Mr. Naki died hours later. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint as a matter of law
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where it
fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
presume all allegations of material fact to be true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Pareto
v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). Conclusory
allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to
defeat a motion to dismiss. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
The complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of
underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing
party to defend itself effectively” and “must plausibly suggest
an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require
the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery
and continued litigation.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of
Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. NAMED PLAINTIFFS
The Plaintiffs named in the First Amended Complaint are as
follows:
(1) Julieann Naki, individually and as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Nathaniel Joshua Na Wa’e
Wa’e Makala Ka Kai Naki, who is the Decedent’s mother
(First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 2-3, ECF No. 9);
(2) Raymond K. Naki, Sr., the Decedent’s father (Id. at ¶
4); and
(3) Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina
Naki; and Palmer Naki, the Decedent’s siblings (Id. at
¶ 5).
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II. NAMED DEFENDANTS
The following Defendants are named in the First Amended
Complaint:
(1) County of Maui;
(2) Doe Police Officers in their individual and official
capacities as police officers for the County of Maui;
(3) Doe Individuals; Doe Partnerships; Doe Corporations;
Doe Governmental Entities; Doe Entities.
III. FEDERAL LAW CAUSES OF ACTION
Cause of Action 1: Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Hawaii Constitution
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A plaintiff may challenge actions by government officials
that violate the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create any substantive
rights. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 978 (9th
Cir. 2004).
To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
establish that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States was violated and that the violation was committed
by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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The allegations in Cause of Action 1 attempt to bring a
Section 1983 claim based on alleged excessive force in violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as set
forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
A. Standing
The Complaint does not precisely specify which Plaintiffs
are bringing Cause of Action 1 against which Defendants.
In Section 1983 actions, the survivors of an individual who
allegedly died as a result of an officer’s excessive use of force
may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that individual’s behalf
if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action.
Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th
Cir. 1998).
Hawaii law permits the decedent’s “legal representative” to
pursue his tort claims. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-7. The term
“legal representative,” as used in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-7, is
limited to one who stands in the place of the deceased and
represents his interest, either by the decedent’s act or by the
operation of law. Agae v. United States, 125 F.Supp.2d 1243,
1248 (D. Haw. 2000) (citing Mutual Life Ins. v. Armstrong, 117
U.S. 591, 597 (1886)).
In this case, the First Amended Complaint states that the
Decedent’s estate is represented by Julieann Naki. (First
Amended Complaint at ¶ 3, ECF No. 9). Plaintiff Julieann Naki,
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as Special Administrator of the Estate of the Decedent, has
standing to assert a Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim
against an individual pursuant to Section 1983 on the Decedent’s
behalf.
The remaining Plaintiffs: Julieann Naki in her individual
capacity; Raymond K. Naki, Sr.; Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony
Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki do not have
standing to pursue the Decedent’s Fourth Amendment claim pursuant
to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-7. Agae, 125 F.Supp.2d at 1248; Ryder
v. Booth, Civ. No. 16-00065 HG-KSC, 2016 WL 2745809, *5 (D. Haw.
May 11, 2016) (finding that only one plaintiff had standing to
pursue the decedent’s Section 1983 claim on behalf of the
decedent’s estate).
The only eligible Plaintiff with standing as to Cause of
Action 1 for Excessive Force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution is Plaintiff Julieann Naki, in
her capacity as Special Administrator of the Estate of the
Decedent.
Cause of Action 1 as brought by the remaining Plaintiffs
Julieann Naki, individually; Raymond K. Naki, Sr.; Raymond K.
Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Section 1983 Does Not Permit State Constitutional
Claims
In the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff Julieann Naki, as
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Special Administrator for the Estate of the Decedent, alleges the
Defendants violated the Decedent’s rights under both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Hawaii
Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (First Amended
Complaint at ¶ 27(b), ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff is unable to assert a Section 1983 claim pursuant
to a violation of the Hawaii State Constitution. Section 1983 is
a remedy for violations of federal rights. Violations of state
law, including a state constitution, are not cognizable pursuant
to Section 1983. Maizner v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ., 405 F.Supp.2d
1225, 1240 (D. Haw. 2005) (citing Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Ove v. Gwinn, 264
F.3d 817, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff’s claim in Cause of Action 1 as a violation of the
Hawaii State Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Individual and Official Capacities
Plaintiff Julieann Naki, as Special Administrator for the
Estate of the Decedent, asserts Cause of Action 1 against unnamed
Maui Police Officers in both their official and individual
capacities.
A suit against a police officer in his or her official
capacity is the equivalent of naming the government entity itself
as the defendant. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-67
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(1985); Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 966-67
(9th Cir. 2010).
The Defendant County of Maui is already a named defendant in
Cause of Action 3 seeking municipal liability pursuant to Section
1983. Duplicative Section 1983 claims may not be brought against
both the municipality itself and against the individual
government officials in their official capacities. Hollandsworth
v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 440 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1183-84 (D.
Haw. 2020); Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996
(N.D. Cal. 1996); see Lawman v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco,
159 F.Supp.3d 1130, 1143 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim in Cause of Action 1 against
unnamed Maui Police Officers in their official capacities is
duplicative of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the
Defendant County of Maui. Hollandsworth, 440 F.Supp.3d at 1183-
84; Carnell v. Grimm, 872 F.Supp. 746, 752 (D. Haw. 1994).
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim for Excessive Force in Cause
of Action 1 against unnamed Maui Police Officers in their
official capacities is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as duplicative of
the Section 1983 claims against the Defendant County of Maui.
Plaintiff is given LEAVE TO AMEND to properly identify Doe
Officers in order to state a Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim
against them in their individual capacities.
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D. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Identify The Acts Of Any
Individual Officers
The allegations in the First Amended Complaint are
insufficient to state a claim against any individual officer.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to clearly
and fully set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on
what theory, with enough detail to guide discovery.” McHenry v.
Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); see OSU Student All.
v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs have engaged in impermissible “shotgun” pleading.
See Ye Jiang v. Zhong Fang, 20-cv-00100 JAO-KJM, 2021 WL 2895681,
*5 (D. Haw. July 9, 2021). Shotgun pleading occurs when one
party pleads that multiple parties did an act, without
identifying which party did what specifically, or when one party
pleads multiple claims, and does not identify which specific
facts are allocated to which claim. Hughey v. Camacho, 2014 WL
5473184, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2014).
The First Amended Complaint engages in both types of
impermissible pleading here. The First Amended Complaint alleges
that multiple parties did an act. It states generally that “the
officers pointed their service pistols at Nathaniel....Defendant
Police Officers opened fire with their weapons.” (First Amended
Complaint at ¶¶ 18-19, ECF No. 9).
In addition, the First Amended Complaint does not specify
any individual it claims to have engaged in excessive force.
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Rather, it attempts to assert multiple claims against unnamed Doe
Officers collectively. In order to state an Excessive Force
claim pursuant to Section 1983, Plaintiff must identify each
officer individually, provide facts to support her theory as to
why the force was excessive, and provide enough detailed
allegations to plausibly state a claim. See Graham, 490 U.S. at
395; Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 481 n.12 (9th
Cir. 2007).
To state a claim pursuant to Graham, Plaintiff must provide
sufficient facts to establish that the use of force was excessive
given the type and amount of force inflicted, the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect was
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. Est. of Strickland v. Nevada Cnty., 69 F.4th 614, 619-20
(9th Cir. 2023).
Here, the First Amended Complaint does not provide any
information about the nature of the Temporary Restraining Order,
how many officers were involved, the amount of force inflicted,
or the severity of any crime they suspected Mr. Naki committed.
Nor does the First Amended Complaint indicate whether Mr. Naki
refused to drop the machete as instructed by officers or whether
he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.
See id. (upholding the district court’s finding that plaintiffs
failed to state a claim against police officers pursuant to
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Graham when the facts alleged by the plaintiffs demonstrated that
the use of force was reasonable).
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim for Excessive Force in Cause
of Action 1 against unnamed Maui Police Officers in their
individual capacities is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Cause of Action 2: Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Hawaii Constitution
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Just as in Cause of Action 1, the First Amended Complaint in
Cause of Action 2 does not specify which Plaintiffs are bringing
the Fourteenth Amendment claim against which Defendants.
“Plaintiffs” allege the “Defendants” engaged in conduct that
violated “Nathaniel’s Fourteenth Amendment’s due process right to
life and liberty.” (First Amended Complaint at ¶ 27(c), ECF No.
9).
A. The Estate Does Not Have Standing
Plaintiff Julieann Naki, in her capacity as Special
Administrator for the Estate of the Decedent, may not bring a
Fourteenth Amendment claim where the Decedent’s Estate’s claims
are more specifically covered by the Fourth Amendment. Est. of
Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Torres, 105 F.Supp.3d 1148, 1162-63 (S.D.
Cal. 2015). The Estate’s proper claim is brought in Cause of
Action 1 for excessive force pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
Cause of Action 2 for a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment under Section 1983 as brought by Plaintiff Julieann
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Naki, as Special Administrator of the Estate of the Decedent, is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. Parents Have Standing To Bring A Fourteenth Amendment
Claim But Siblings Do Not
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that
certain family members have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest in familial companionship and society. Wilkinson v.
Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010); Tokuda v. Calio, Civ.
No. 13-00202 DKW-BMK, 2014 WL 5580959, *9 (D. Haw. Oct. 31,
2014).
The Decedent’s mother, Julieann Naki in her individual
capacity, and his father, Raymond K. Naki, Sr., have standing to
pursue their Fourteenth Amendment claims for their personal
liberty interests as parents of the Decedent. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has ruled that the parents of a person alleged
to have been killed by law enforcement officers may assert a
substantive due process claim based on the deprivation of their
liberty interest arising out of their relationship with the
deceased. Moreland, 159 F.3d at 371.
The Decedent’s siblings, however, Plaintiffs Raymond K.
Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer
Naki, do not have standing to bring such a claim. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that siblings of a decedent
lack standing to bring familial association claims pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ward
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v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1991).
Cause of Action 2 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment
under Section 1983 as brought by Plaintiffs Raymond K. Naki, Jr.;
Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
C. Section 1983 Does Not Permit State Constitutional
Claims
In the Second Cause of Action, Plaintiffs Julieann Naki,
individually, and Raymond K. Naki, Sr. allege the Defendants
violated the Decedent’s rights under both the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Hawaii
Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (First Amended
Complaint at ¶ 27(c), ECF No. 9).
As explained above, Plaintiffs are unable to assert a
Section 1983 claim pursuant to a violation of the Hawaii State
Constitution. Maizner, 405 F.Supp.2d at 1240.
Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim in Cause of Action 2 as an
alleged violation of the Hawaii State Constitution pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Individual and Official Capacities
Plaintiffs again attempt to bring their Section 1983 claim
in Cause of Action 2 pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment against
the Doe Officers in both their official and individual
capacities.
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As explained above, the Defendant County of Maui is already
a named defendant. Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the
Doe Officers in their official capacities are duplicative of
their claims against the Defendant County of Maui.
Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim in Cause of Action 2 against
unnamed Maui Police Officers in their official capacities is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as duplicative of the Section 1983
claims against the Defendant County of Maui.
E. Plaintiffs Have Failed To State A Claim Pursuant To the
Fourteenth Amendment To The United States Constitution
A substantive due process violation requires demonstrating
that a law enforcement officer’s conduct “shocks the conscience”
when he responded to an emergency or an escalating situation.
Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008).
In order to plausibly state a claim, the Decedent’s parents
must demonstrate that the purpose of the Defendant Officers’
conduct was “to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object” of
seizure. Id. at 1140 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 836 (1998)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that a purely
reactive decision to use force to seize a suspect does not shock
the conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855. Situations that shock
the conscience are “rare situations where the nature of an
officer’s deliberate physical contact is such that a reasonable
factfinder would conclude that the officer intended to harm,
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terrorize or kill.” Porter, 546 F.3d at 1141 (citing Davis v.
Township of Hillside, 190 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient allegations of any
specific conduct by any individual officers to state a Fourteenth
Amendment claim. The First Amended Complaint lacks particularity
as to what deliberate physical contact each individual officer
had with the Decedent that was so extreme such that it “shocks
the conscience.” Id.
The First Amended Complaint does not specify who shot the
Decedent, how many times he was shot, or provide sufficient
information concerning the nature and circumstances of the
encounter to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim on behalf of
the Decedent’s parents.
Plaintiffs Julieann Naki, individually, and Raymond K. Naki,
Sr.’s Due Process Claim in Cause of Action 2 as an alleged
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND.
Cause of Action 3: Municipal Liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983
A. Standing
As previously explained, Plaintiff Julieann Naki, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of the Decedent, has standing to
assert a Section 1983 claim on the Decedent’s behalf that is
premised on the Government’s use of force against the Decedent.
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The remaining Plaintiffs: Julieann Naki in her individual
capacity; Raymond K. Naki, Sr.; Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony
Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki do not have
standing to pursue a Section 1983 claim against a municipality on
behalf of the Decedent pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Agae, 125 F.Supp.2d
at 1248.
The only remaining Plaintiff as to Cause of Action 3 for
municipal liability under Monell pursuant to Section 1983 is
Plaintiff Julieann Naki, as Special Administrator of the Estate
of the Decedent.
Cause of Action 3 as brought by the remaining Plaintiffs
Julieann Naki, individually; Raymond K. Naki, Sr.; Raymond K.
Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. The First Amended Complaint Has Not Sufficiently
Alleged A Monell Claim
Pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), a municipality may be liable under
Section 1983 if the governmental body itself subjects a person to
a deprivation of rights or causes a person to be subjected to
such deprivation. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011).
In order to recover, a plaintiff must establish that the action
pursuant to an official municipal policy caused her injury. Id.
at 60-61.
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To plead a Monell claim, a plaintiff must comply with the
standard set forth in Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir.
2011). A.E. v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir.
2012) (explaining that the pleading standard set forth in Starr
v. Baca extends to Monell claims).
A plaintiff asserting a Monell claim, including a claim
based on an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom, must
provide sufficiently detailed factual allegations to give fair
notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
effectively. Estate of Mendez v. Cty. of Ceres, 390 F.Supp.3d
1189, 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2019).
1. Unconstitutional Policy Or Custom
A municipality may be held liable pursuant to Section 1983
for injuries caused by its unconstitutional policies or customs.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2003). A plaintiff may bring a Monell claim based on an
unconstitutional policy or custom by providing sufficient
allegations:
(1) that he was deprived of a constitutional right;
(2) that the municipality had a policy;
(3) that the policy amounted to deliberate indifference to
his constitutional right; and
(4) the policy was the moving force behind the
constitutional violation.
Mabe v. San Bernadino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d
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1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001).
A municipality may be liable if it has a policy of inaction
and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional
rights, but only if that policy of inaction is the result of a
conscious or deliberate choice made from among various
alternatives. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th
Cir. 2001).
In order to identify the relevant policy, the plaintiff must
provide sufficient allegations:
(1) showing a longstanding practice or custom which
constitutes the standard operating procedure of the
local government entity;
(2) showing that the decision-making official was, as a
matter of state law, a final policymaking authority
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
the official policy in the area of decision; or
(3) showing that an official with final policymaking
authority either delegated that authority to, or
ratified the decision of, a subordinate.
Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005).
Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on
isolated or sporadic incidents, but it must be founded upon
practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that
the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out
policy. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).
The First Amended Complaint does not provide any allegations
to support a Monell claim based on unconstitutional policy or
custom. The allegations do not cite to any specific policy,
custom, or practice for which the Defendant County of Maui may be
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liable pursuant to Monell. The First Amended Complaint’s general
allegations fail to identify any particular policy, custom, or
practice at issue, the content of any policy, or the alleged
deficiencies of any policy. Andrews v. Hawaii Cnty., Civ. No.
13-00046 JMS-KSC, 2013 WL 5274369, at *6 (D. Haw. Sept. 17,
2013); Herd v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 311 F.Supp.3d 1157, 1167
(C.D. Cal. 2018).
The First Amended Complaint further fails to explain how any
policy, custom, or practice amounted to deliberate indifference
to the Decedent’s particular constitutional rights. Merely
alleging generally that the Decedent’s rights were violated and
that “Defendants” acted unreasonably is conclusory and
insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff has failed to specify
how any policy, custom, or practice was likely to cause
constitutional injury and how it caused injury to the Decedent.
Herd, 311 F.Supp.3d at 1168. It is insufficient to allege
generalized injuries to “Plaintiffs” caused by “Defendants” in
order to plausibly state a Monell claim.
2. Failure To Train
A municipality may be held liable under Section 1983 for a
failure to train its employees. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). A municipality’s culpability under
Section 1983 is at its “most tenuous” where a claim turns on a
failure to train. Connick, 563 U.S. at 60-61.
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In order to establish municipal liability for a failure to
train, the municipality’s training must be so deficient that it
amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons
with whom the untrained employees come into contact. Id. at 61;
Kaahu v. Randall, Civ. No. 14-00266 HG-RLP, 2018 WL 472996, at
*14 (D. Haw. Jan. 18, 2018). Mere negligence in training does
not give rise to a Monell claim. Dougherty v. City of Covina,
654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011).
To succeed on a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that “policymakers are on actual or constructive
notice that a particular omission in their training program
causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights.” Connick 563 U.S. at 61. “The issue is whether the
training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether such
inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent
municipal policy.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,
1186 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a Monell claim based on
a failure to train. The First Amended Complaint alleges that the
Defendant County of Maui failed to properly train its police
officers. (First Amended Complaint at ¶ 50, ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding the training that
officers received and does not explain why that training was
inadequate. The First Amended Complaint fails to provide any
facts to plausibly allege why the failure to train was likely to
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result in the constitutional violation alleged here.
Allegations setting forth the pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily
necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of
failure to train. Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. “Without notice that
a course of training is deficient in a particular respect,
decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a
training program that will cause violations of constitutional
rights.” Id.
The First Amended Complaint’s allegations of a general
failure to train by the Defendant County of Maui are insufficient
to establish municipal liability under a failure to train theory.
Cause of Action 3 seeking municipal liability against the
Defendant County of Maui under Monell pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH PURSUANT TO HAWAII LAW
Cause of Action 4: Wrongful Death pursuant to Hawaii state law
Hawaii’s wrongful death statute allows recovery where “the
death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or
default of any person.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-3. Under Hawaii
law, a wrongful death action can be brought by the deceased’s
legal representative, mother, father, children, surviving spouse,
and any person wholly or partly dependent upon the deceased
person. Id.
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A. Standing
Plaintiffs Julieann Naki, individually and as the Special
Administrator of the Decedent’s Estate, and Raymond K. Naki, Sr.
have standing to bring a wrongful death action pursuant to
Hawaii’s wrongful death statute.
The remaining Plaintiffs: Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony
Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki have not pleaded
any facts to establish a basis for standing pursuant to Haw. Rev.
Stat. 663-3.
Cause of Action 4 for Wrongful Death as stated by Plaintiffs
Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and
Palmer Naki is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. These Plaintiffs
must assert facts to establish a basis for standing in order for
them to bring a wrongful death claim pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 663-3.
B. Failure To State A Claim
The First Amended Complaint generally alleges that
Defendants caused the Decedent’s death. (First Amended Complaint
at ¶¶ 38-41, ECF No. 9). The generalized allegations against the
collective “Defendants” are insufficient.
Plaintiffs must assert sufficient facts setting forth the
specific conduct by each Defendant in order to plausibly state a
claim against each Defendant they seek to sue.
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Cause of Action 4 for Wrongful Death is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND.
V. REMAINING STATE LAW CAUSES OF ACTION
Cause of Action 5: Intentional Infliction Of Emotional
Distress
Cause of Action 6: Negligent Infliction Of Emotional
Distress
Cause of Action 7: Negligence Pursuant To Respondeat
Superior
Cause of Action 8: Negligence
A. Standing
Hawaii law permits the decedent’s “legal representative” to
pursue his tort claims. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-7. Plaintiff
Julieann Naki in her capacity as Special Administrator of the
Decedent’s estate is the Decedent’s legal representative. She is
entitled to bring state law tort claims on behalf of the
Decedent. All other Plaintiffs are barred from bringing state
law tort claims on behalf of the Decedent.
B. The First Amended Complaint Contains Insufficient Facts
to Plausibly State A Hawaii State Law Tort Claim
Plaintiff Julieann Naki, in her individual capacity, as well
as the other individual capacity Plaintiffs, may only bring state
law tort claims to the extent they can state a claim that
outlines the factual and legal basis for their claims and
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includes facts concerning their own injuries that were caused by
the individual Defendants.
Plaintiffs’ state law claims generally assert conclusory
allegations that Defendants’ wrongful conduct caused Plaintiffs
harm. (See First Amended Complaint at pp. 10-17, ECF No. 9).
Vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a
plausible claim. Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
(9th Cir. 2009) (explaining pleading standard following Iqbal and
Twombly). Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice
to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Each plaintiff must
set forth specific facts supporting his or her individual claims
and must allege facts showing a causal link between each
defendant and each plaintiff’s injury or damage. Id. at 679.
For the negligence causes of action, the complaint must set
forth:
(1) a duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring
the defendant to conform to a certain standard of
conduct for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks;
(2) a failure on the specific defendant’s part to conform
to the standard required;
(3) a reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury to the plaintiff; and
(4) actual loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff.
Molfino v. Yuen, 339 P.3d 679, 682 (Haw. 2014).
The First Amended Complaint’s conclusory allegations are
insufficient to state a plausible negligence or other state law
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tort claim on behalf of any Plaintiff. Pantastico v. Dep’t of
Educ., 406 F.Supp.3d 865, 881 (D. Haw. 2019).
C. Conditional Privilege For State Law Claims
Hawaii law provides non-judicial government officials with
conditional privilege for tortious actions made in the
performance of their public duties. Towse v. State of Hawaii,
647 P.2d 696, 702 (Haw. 1982); Kaahu v. Randall, Civ. No.
14-00266 HG-RLP, 2018 WL 472996, at *12 (D. Haw. Jan. 18, 2018).
Conditional privilege does not apply where there is clear and
convincing evidence that government officials acted with malice.
Id. Malice is defined as “the intent, without justification or
excuse, to commit a wrongful act, reckless disregard of the law
or of a person’s legal rights, and ill will; wickedness of
heart.” Awakuni v. Awana, 165 P.3d 1027, 1042 (Haw. 2007)
(internal quotations omitted); Bartolome v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu, Civ. No. 06-00176 SOM-LEK, 2008 WL 942573, at *10 (D.
Haw. Apr. 8, 2008).
Plaintiffs’ state law claims do not plausibly allege
sufficient facts to establish that any specific individual acted
with malice. Conclusory allegations that the County or Doe
Officers acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively are
insufficient to plausibly state a claim.
Cause of Action 5 for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, Cause of Action 6 for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
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Distress, Cause of Action 7 for Negligence based on Respondeat
Superior, and Cause of Action 8 for Negligence are DISMISSED WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND.
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
It is well established that a municipality is immune from
punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as
pursuant to Hawaii state law. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); Lauer v. YMCA, 557 P.2d 1334,
1342 (Haw. 1976).
The First Amended Complaint’s request for punitive damages
against Defendant County of Maui is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
To obtain punitive damages for a violation of Section 1983,
a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was
malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard of the
plaintiff’s rights. Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 2005). An award of punitive damages pursuant to Hawaii
state law requires a plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted “wantonly or oppressively or
with such malice as implies a spirt of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations; or where there has been some
wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise
the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.”
Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 572 (Haw. 1989)
(internal quotations omitted).
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The First Amended Complaint fails to provide sufficient
allegations to recover punitive damages. To the extent a
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from an individual Defendant,
the Complaint must set forth the specific factual and legal basis
for punitive damages against each individual Defendant from whom
punitive damages are sought by each individual Plaintiff.
The First Amended Complaint’s request for punitive damages
is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
CONCLUSION
Defendant County of Maui’s Motion to Dismiss the First
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO
AMEND.
THE FOLLOWING CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND AS
FOLLOWS:
Cause of Action 1: Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Cause of Action 1 for Excessive Force as brought by Julieann
Naki in her individual capacity; Raymond K. Naki, Sr.;
Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki;
and Palmer Naki is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Cause of Action 1 for Excessive Force as brought pursuant to
the Hawaii State Constitution is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Cause of Action 1 for Excessive Force as brought against Doe
Defendants in their official capacities as police officers
for the County of Maui is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The only remaining Plaintiff as to Cause of Action 1 for
Excessive Force is Julieann Naki, in her capacity as Special
Administrator of the Decedent’s Estate.
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Cause of Action 1 for Excessive Force as stated by Plaintiff
Julieann Naki, as Special Administrator of the Decedent’s
Estate, against Doe Officers in their individual capacities
is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Cause of Action 2: Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
Cause of Action 2 for Due Process as brought by Plaintiff
Julieann Naki, as Special Administrator of the Decedent’s
Estate, and the Plaintiff siblings of the Decedent: Raymond
K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and
Palmer Naki is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Cause of Action 2 for Due Process as brought against Doe
Defendants in their official capacities as police officers
for the County of Maui is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Cause of Action 2 for Due Process as brought pursuant to the
Hawaii State Constitution is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Cause of Action 2 for Due Process as stated by the parents
of the Decedent: Plaintiff Julieann Naki, individually, and
Plaintiff Raymond K. Naki, Sr., against Doe Officers in
their individual capacities is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND.
Cause of Action 3: Municipal Liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983;
Cause of Action 3 for municipal liability pursuant to Monell
as brought by Julieann Naki in her individual capacity;
Raymond K. Naki, Sr.; Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki;
Jesse Naki; Terina Naki; and Palmer Naki is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Cause of Action 3 for municipal liability pursuant to Monell
as brought by Julieann Naki as Special Administrator of the
Decedent’s Estate is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Cause of Action 4: Wrongful Death pursuant to Hawaii state law;
Cause of Action 4 for wrongful death is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE
TO AMEND.
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Cause of Action 5: Intentional Infliction Of Emotional
Distress
Cause of Action 6: Negligent Infliction Of Emotional
Distress
Cause of Action 7: Negligence Pursuant To Respondeat
Superior
Cause of Action 8: Negligence
Causes of Action 5, 6, 7, and 8 are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND.
Punitive Damages
Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages against Defendant
County of Maui is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs are given LEAVE TO AMEND their request for
punitive damages against individually named Defendants.
//
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LEAVE TO AMEND:
Plaintiffs are given PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND and may file a Second
Amended Complaint on or before Friday, March 1, 2024. The Second
Amended Complaint must conform to the rulings contained in this
Order.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is limited to the causes of
action that were dismissed with leave to amend pursuant to this
Order. Plaintiffs may not allege any new causes of action.
Plaintiffs are given LEAVE TO AMEND to properly identify
Defendant Doe Officers in their individual capacities who are
alleged to have participated in the April 30, 2023 shooting.
Plaintiffs may not add any additional Defendants in the Second
Amended Complaint.
Failure to file a Second Amended Complaint on or before Friday,
March 1, 2024, will result in automatic dismissal with prejudice
of the First Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 18, 2024, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Julieann Naki, Individually and as Special Administrator of the
Estate of Nathaniel Joshua Na Wa’e Wa’e Makala Ka Kai Naki;
Raymond K. Naki, Sr.; Raymond K. Naki, Jr.; Anthony Naki; Jesse
Naki; Terina Naki; Palmer Naki v. County of Maui; Doe Police
Officers in their individual and official capacities as police
officers for the County of Maui; Doe Individuals 1-10; Doe
Partnerships 1-10; Doe Corporations 1-10; Doe Governmental
Entities 1-10; Doe Entities 1-10; Civil No. 23-00383 HG-WRP;
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF MAUI’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND (ECF No. 11)
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