USA v. Sullivan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEIHINAHINA SULLIVAN,
Defendant.
CR. NO. 17-00104 JMS
CR. NO. 21-00096 JMS
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TITLED “USSG AMENDMENT
82 RETROACTIVE AMENDED
(EXHIBIT 6) GUIDELINE RANGE
UNDER 1B1.10(b), 1B1.10(d) WHICH
AMENDS MY SENTENCE FROM 204
MONTHS TO 65 MONTHS (EXHIBIT 1)”
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TITLED “USSG
AMENDMENT 82 RETROACTIVE AMENDED (EXHIBIT 6) GUIDELINE
RANGE UNDER 1B1.10(b), 1B1.10(d) WHICH AMENDS
MY SENTENCE FROM 204 MONTHS TO 65 MONTHS (EXHIBIT 1)”
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Defendant Leihinahina Sullivan (“Sullivan” or “Defendant”)
filed a June 10, 2026 Motion titled “USSG Amendment 82 Retroactive Amended
(Exhibit 6) Guideline Range Under 1B1.10(b), 1B1.10(d) Which Amends My
Sentence From 204 Months to 65 Months (Exhibit 1),” ECF No. 1766 in Cr. No.
17-00104 JMS and ECF No. 352 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS (“Motion”).1 The
1 Sullivan was charged and pled guilty in two separate cases, Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS and
Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS. The Motion was filed in both cases, and the United States filed a
response on June 25, 2026. ECF No. 1771. Unless otherwise stated, all docket references in this
Order are to Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS.
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Motion is in two parts: First, it seeks this court’s recusal from Sullivan’s case, and
second, it seeks a sentence reduction. For the reasons set forth below, both
requests are without merit and DENIED.
II. DISCUSSION
This case has a long history, now spanning over 1700 entries in the
court’s electronic filing system in Cr. No. 17-00014 JMS. This Order does not
attempt to cover this history, but instead limits its discussion as necessary to rule
on the pending Motion. In doing so, the court first addresses the request for
recusal, and then turns to the request for reduction in sentence.
A. 	Motion for Recusal
Sullivan argues that this court should be disqualified based on its
previous rulings. Specifically, she claims:
The court will never believe under the § 3553(a) factors
and parsimony clause and never grant Defendant a
reduction of sentence as the Court continues to analyze
the § 3553(a) factors as frozen in time of sentencing on
March 28, 2023 and does not consider the significant
mitigation since the original sentencing, and continues to
commit error.
ECF No. 1766 at PageID.23945.
The applicable standards for disqualification of a federal judge are
found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. As provided in § 144:
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Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court
makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the
judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any
adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the
belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not
less than ten days before the beginning of the term at
which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall
be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party
may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating
that it is made in good faith.
Here, Sullivan submitted no affidavit, let alone a timely and sufficient one. Thus,
even liberally construed, Sullivan’s motion to recuse is not brought under § 144,
but instead is brought under § 455.
Section 455 provides in part:2
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party[.]
2 A § 455 motion must be decided by the judge whose impartiality is being questioned.
In re Bernard, 31 F.3d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1994). “Section 455 clearly contemplates that
decisions with respect to disqualification should be made by the judge sitting in the case, and not
by another judge.” Id. (quoting United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202–03 (7th Cir.
1985)). Thus, this court will rule on the request for recusal.
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“Under both . . . statutes, the substantive standard is whether a
reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038,
1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by Simmons v. Himmelreich, 578 U.S. 621 (2016).
“The ‘reasonable person’ is not someone who is hypersensitive or unduly
suspicious, but rather is a well-informed, thoughtful observer . . . who
understand[s] all the relevant facts and has examined the record and law.” United
States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). “The standard must not be so broadly construed that it
becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest
unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” Id. at 913 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the alleged bias or prejudice “must usually stem from an
extrajudicial source.” Pesnell, 543 F.3d at 1044. The Supreme Court has
explained:
First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. In and of
themselves . . . they cannot possibly show reliance upon
an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest
circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or
antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is
involved. Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for
appeal, not for recusal. Second, opinions formed by the
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judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring
in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Here, there is no basis for this court to disqualify itself. Sullivan’s
entire grounds for disqualification relate to this court’s prior rulings. See ECF No.
1766 at PageID.23945–23946. But as set forth above, “[u]nfavorable rulings
alone are legally insufficient to require recusal, even when the number of such
unfavorable rulings is extraordinarily high.” Matter of Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752
F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal citation omitted); see also Leslie v.
Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[Appellant’s] allegations stem
entirely from the district court judge’s adverse rulings. That is not an adequate
basis for recusal.”). And a judge’s opinions, formed “on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
In short, Sullivan’s disagreement with this court’s rulings is not a
valid ground for a motion to recuse.
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B. 	Motion to Reduce Sentence
Sullivan’s Motion requests that the court reduce her sentence for a
variety of reasons, none of which has any merit.3
First, Sullivan asks the court to consider proposed Sentencing
Guideline amendments that are not yet effective. See ECF No. 1766-6 (attaching
to the Motion Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines submitted to Congress
with a potential effective date of November 1, 2026). This the court will not do.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (requiring, in part, that a sentencing range be lowered
before a court can reduce a sentence); see also United States v. Sipai, 623 F.3d
908, 910 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating in part that before a court can consider a reduction
of sentence under § 3582(c)(2), the sentencing range must be reduced by the
Sentencing Commission); United States v. Javonillo, 2023 WL 5507849, at *2 (D.
Haw. Aug. 25, 2023); United States v. Valenzuela, 2023 WL 4975770, at *4 (D.
Idaho Aug. 3, 2023).4
3 As stated by the United States in its Opposition, Sullivan’s Motion “is muddled as to
what legal authority she is referring to and relying on.” ECF No. 1771 at PageID.24215. For
example, Sullivan repeatedly refers to Guideline Amendment 82, although that amendment was
effective November 1, 1989, and has no applicability to Sullivan’s case. See United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Appendix C, 41–42 (1989).
4 Further, it appears that the Sentencing Commission has decided not to make these
proposed amendments retroactive. See Proposed Priorities for Amendment Cycle, 91 Fed. Reg.
35802-01 (June 12, 2026).
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Second, Sullivan raises issues previously addressed—and rejected—
by the court. For example, she argues that under Guideline Amendment 821 her
criminal history category should be reduced because she received “status points” at
her original sentencing that are no longer applicable. ECF No. 1766 at
PageID.23947. The court denied a previous motion seeking the exact same relief,
ECF No. 1658, and the denial was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. See United
States v. Sullivan, 2025 WL 2092841 (9th Cir. July 25, 2025).
Third, Sullivan seeks a reduction based on alleged errors at the
original sentencing. For example, she argues that she should not have received a
sophisticated-means adjustment. This argument, however, is barred absent some
statutory framework (such as § 3582(c)(2)) that would permit the court to reduce a
sentence. See United States v. Ceballos, 671 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that a district court lacks inherent authority to reduce a sentence).
Sullivan also seeks a reduction in her restitution order. “A sentence
that imposes an order of restitution is a final judgment,” even though it can be
corrected or amended in certain limited circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o); see
also United States v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 2017). Here, there is
no authority for the court to reduce Sullivan’s restitution obligation.5
5 This same issue was previously rejected by the court, see ECF No. 1641:
(continued . . . )
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Finally, Sullivan claims that the aggravated identity theft claim
charged in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS is barred by the statute of limitations, and that
this is a “jurisdictional defect.” ECF No. 1766 at PageID.23949. There is no legal
basis for the court to review this as a stand-alone claim. Further, the court rejected
this very argument raised in Sullivan’s § 2255 Motion:
Sullivan also argues that the 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)
aggravated identity theft charge violated the statute of
limitations, which she refers to as a jurisdictional
requirement that cannot be waived. ECF No. 269 at
PageID.4780–4781. Contrary to this assertion, a defense
based on the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and
may be waived. See United States v. Akmakjian, 647
F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
a defendant’s claims that a conviction is barred by the
statute of limitations “is foreclosed by his plea”). Here,
Defendant Leihinahina Sullivan has filed two motions: (1) “Motion
for Leave to Reduce Restitution to $0 from $3,300,960.00,” ECF
No. 1640 [in Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS; ECF No. 254 in Cr. No. 21-
00096 JMS]; and (2) “Motion to Reduce Restitution From
$3,395,985.15 to $0 as I am Destitude (sic),” ECF No. 1639 [in Cr.
No. 17-00104 JMS; ECF No. 253 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS].
Both motions are denied. Defendant’s restitution order is governed
by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3663A, 3664. Under the MVRA, an order imposing restitution
constitutes a final judgment, § 3664(o), and Defendant has not
provided the court with any authority that would permit it to
change the restitution amount set forth in the final judgment.
Further, even if the court had such authority, under § 3664(f)(1)(A)
imposition of restitution is mandatory “without consideration of
the economic circumstances of the defendant.” See also United
States v. Hankins, 858 F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 2017) (“When
ordering restitution, the court must assign to each victim ‘the full
amount of each victim’s losses’ without regard to the defendant’s
economic situation.”).
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Sullivan knowingly and voluntarily waived any statute of
limitation defense in her plea agreement. ECF No. 1203
at PageID.12421 (stating, in the plea agreement, that
Sullivan “waives any statute of limitation defense to the
offense charged in the Information.”).
ECF No. 1688 at PageID.22134 n. 29.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Sullivan’s Motion (ECF No. 1766 in Cr. No.
17-00104 JMS and ECF No. 352 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15, 2026.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
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