Auld-Susott, et al. v. Galindo, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
EVAN AULD-SUSOTT, as Trustee for
(1) IRREVOCABLE LIFE INSURANCE
TRUST OF JOHN L. SUSOTT AND
KATHRYN C. SUSOTT UAD 8/17/1988
AS RESTATED, EXEMPT TRUST FBO
DANIEL C. SUSOTT, and
(2) IRREVOCABLE LIFE INSURANCE
TRUST OF JOHN L. SUSOTT AND
KATHRYN C. SUSOTT UAD 8/17/1988
AS RESTATED, NON-EXEMPT TRUST
FBO DANIEL C. SUSOTT; and
JOHN L. SUSOTT,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LAURYN GALINDO and DANIEL C.
SUSOTT,
Defendants.
CIVIL 20-00270 LEK-RT
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ ADDITIONAL MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE
LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI, [FILED 9/26/23 (DKT. NO. 190)]
On September 26, 2023, Defendants Lauryn Galindo and
Daniel C. Susott (collectively “Defendants”) filed their
Additional Motion to Disqualify Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi
(“Motion to Disqualify”). 	[Dkt. no. 190.] 	The Motion to
Disqualify is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455(a). 	The Court
has considered the Motion to Disqualify as a non-hearing matter
pursuant to Rule LR7.1(d) of the Local Rules of Practice for the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii (“Local
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Rules”). 	Further, it is not necessary for Plaintiffs Evan Auld-
Susott, as Trustee for (1) Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust of
John L. Susott and Kathryn C. Susott UAD 8/17/1988 as Restated,
Exempt Trust FBO Daniel C. Susott, and (2) Irrevocable Life
Insurance Trust of John L. Susott and Kathryn C. Susott UAD
8/17/1988 as Restated, Non-Exempt Trust FBO Daniel C. Susott;
and John L. Susott (collectively “Plaintiffs”) to respond to the
Motion to Disqualify. 	Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify is
hereby denied for the reasons set forth below.
The instant matter has had a long history, including
an appeal, and Defendants have repeatedly sought to delay and
otherwise prolong the litigation in the manner best described by
Charles Dickens in his novel, Bleak House. 	However, at least
for this trial court, the litigation has run its course and,
despite Defendants’ attempt to prolong their time in the federal
district court, their next course of action, if any, lies with
the appellate circuit court. 	As Defendants themselves
recognize, they previously raised the exact generalized
complaints about this Court’s rulings on appeal and to no avail.
See Motion to Disqualify, Mem. in Supp. at PageID 2748. 	Their
arguments in the Motion to Disqualify consist largely of a “cut
and paste” from their opening brief in the appeal where the
appellate court rejected their claim of judicial bias. 	See
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generally Auld-Susott v. Galindo, No. 21-17078, 2023 WL 2929317,
at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023).
Defendants disagree and are dissatisfied with this
Court’s rulings. 	“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (citing United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). 	While
Defendants apparently believe that, by adding an allegation that
this Court has antagonism toward them, the current Motion to
Disqualify is somehow more complete or different from their
prior motion (which was denied) or what was raised on appeal, it
is not. 	The rulings are insufficient for a finding of bias or
prejudice necessary to merit recusal. 	Defendants’ disagreement
with the rulings may be more properly the basis for an appeal,
but do not serve as a reason for granting recusal.
The standard for recusal is “[a]ny justice, judge, or
magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 	28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 	Reasonableness is the key to
any determination involving recusal, and an objective standard
is applied:
In 1974 Congress amended the section to replace
the subjective test of the previous version of
the section with an objective test based on
public perception. 	The Supreme Court discussed
this change in Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
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Acquisition Corp., explaining that, “The goal of
section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of
partiality. 	If it would appear to a reasonable
person that a judge has knowledge of facts that
would give him an interest in the litigation then
an appearance of partiality is created even
though no actual partiality exists.” 	486 U.S.
847, 860, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 100 L. Ed. 2d 855
(1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	We
have restated § 455(a) and ask “whether a
reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts
would conclude that the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” 	Clemens v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
cf. United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993
(10th Cir. 1993) (articulating a similar
standard). 	“Section 455(a) asks whether a
reasonable person perceives a significant risk
that the judge will resolve the case on a basis
other than the merits.” 	In re Mason, 916 F.2d
384, 385 (7th Cir. 1990). 	The “reasonable
person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or
unduly suspicious,” but rather is a “well-
informed, thoughtful observer.” 	Id. at 386. 	The
standard “must not be so broadly construed that
it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that
recusal is mandated upon the merest
unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or
prejudice.” 	Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993.
United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008)
(footnote omitted). 	Disqualification is fact-driven and must be
determined by “‘an independent examination of the unique facts
and circumstances of the particular claim at issue.’” 	Id. (some
citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d
221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Looking at the specific facts involved in the rulings,
this Court concludes that recusal is not warranted because a
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reasonable observer with knowledge of “the unique facts and
circumstances” of this case would not “perceive[] a significant
risk that [this Court] will resolve the case on a basis other
than the merits.” 	See id.
In short, Defendants’ unhappiness with the Court’s
rulings cannot serve as a valid basis for recusal. 	See Liteky,
510 U.S. at 555.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of a reasonable factual basis for
recusal, this Court has a duty to hear all assigned cases,
including this one. 	See Holland, 519 F.3d at 912. 	This Court
FINDS that there is no reasonable factual basis for recusal and
HEREBY DENIES the Motion to Disqualify.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, October 2, 2023.
EVAN AULD-SUSOTT, ETC., ET AL. VS. LAURYN GALINDO, ET AL; CV 20-
00270 LEK-RT; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ ADDITIONAL MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY JUDGE LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI, [FILED 9/26/23 (DKT. NO.
190)]
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