USA v. Scher

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREGORY SCHER,
Defendant.
_____________________________
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CR. NO. 15-00614 SOM
CIVIL NO. 20-00060 SOM-WRP
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255
TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR
CORRECT SENTENCE AND
DECLINING TO ISSUE
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255
TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE AND
DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION.
On February 12, 2018, Defendant Gregory Scher entered a
plea of guilty to one count of Social Security fraud. At the
plea hearing, Scher stated that no one had done anything to
coerce him into pleading guilty and that he was happy with the
performance of his attorney. This court sentenced him to 20
months in prison. Proceeding pro se, Scher now seeks to have his
conviction set aside under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His primary claims
are that his counsel provided ineffective assistance and coerced
him into pleading guilty. His assertions are unsupported by the
record. This court denies Scher’s motion and declines to issue a
certificate of appealability.
II. BACKGROUND.
On August 6, 2015, the grand jury returned an
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indictment charging Scher with four counts of Social Security
fraud. ECF No. 1. The grand jury later returned two superseding
indictments. The Second Superseding Indictment charged Scher
with nine counts of Social Security fraud. ECF No. 112. The
counts alleged that, for the purpose of obtaining Social Security
benefits, Scher had made various misrepresentations covering
topics such as Scher’s assets, income, ability to work, and
family status. Id.
As the case proceeded, Scher went through multiple
attorneys. He was initially represented by the First Assistant
Federal Defender, who withdrew on October 30, 2015. ECF No. 25.
The court then appointed Barry Edwards to represent Scher under
the Criminal Justice Act, but Edwards withdrew on January 4,
2017. The court appointed Brandon K. Flores to replace him. ECF
Nos. 130, 132. Scher quickly grew dissatisfied with Flores, and
he filed a motion to replace him on March 30, 2017. ECF No. 145.
The court granted the motion and replaced Flores with Lynn
Panagakos, Scher’s fourth attorney in this case. ECF Nos. 147-
149. Before sentencing, Panagakos moved to withdraw. The motion
was granted, and the First Assistant Federal Defender returned to
represent Scher. ECF Nos. 209, 215.
During the time Panagakos represented Scher, Panagakos
reviewed materials available to her. She concluded that Scher
had credible defenses to Counts 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Second
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Superseding Indictment, but that the Government was likely to
prevail on Counts 2, 3, and 8. See ECF No. 267-2, PageID # 1887,
1888, 1892. On January 28, 2018, Panagakos sent Scher an email
that indicated that, although he might have a defense to some of
the counts in the Second Superseding Indictment, the allegations
in Counts 2, 3, and 8 were “most troublesome.” ECF No. 267-2,
PageID # 1892. Panagakos later hired an expert, Ann J. Atkinson,
who confirmed her conclusions. In a pair of reports submitted on
March 28 and April 22, 2018, Atkinson opined that Scher was
innocent of the offenses charged in Counts 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9,
but guilty of committing the offenses charged in Counts 2, 3, and
8. ECF No. 250-4, PageID # 1785, see also ECF No. 250-3.
According to Panagakos, after she sent her email of
January 28, 2018, she had several productive and cooperative
discussions with Scher. ECF No. 267-2, PageID # 1888-89. Scher
then “instructed her to make a plea offer to the government,
which the Government ultimately accepted[.]” Id. at 1888. Under
the terms of that offer, Scher would plead guilty to only Count 8
(Social Security fraud in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(3)).
Id.
In seeking relief under § 2255, Scher characterizes his
interactions with Panagakos differently. According to Scher,
Panagakos “refused to have a quiet and calm discussion with
[him,]” and instead repeatedly screamed and him and berated him.
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ECF No. 250, PageID # 1671. Scher maintains that he agreed to
plead guilty “just to get away from Panagakos[.]” ECF No. 250-1,
PageID # 1681.
In any event, Scher pled guilty to Count 8 on February
12, 2018. At the guilty plea hearing, Scher admitted that a Work
Activity Report he submitted to the Social Security
Administration was incorrect because it did not state that he had
been employed by Kiewit Infrastructure West Company in 2014. ECF
No. 200, PageID # 979, 984. He said he had also falsely reported
being legally blind. Id. at 984-85. He lied because “he thought
if he told the truth, [his] benefits might go away.” Id. at 986.
Under oath during his guilty plea hearing, Scher stated
that no one had done anything to try to force him to enter a
guilty plea, and that he believed he was guilty and was
voluntarily saying so. Id. at 968. This was consistent with the
Memorandum of Plea Agreement that he signed. That document said,
“Defendant agrees that this plea is voluntary and not the result
of force or threats. Defendant enters this plea because he in
fact guilty . . . .” ECF No. 192, PageID # 937.
During the guilty plea colloquy, this court asked Scher
whether he was satisfied with Ms. Panagakos’s representation of
him in this case, and, again under oath, he answered, “Yes.”
When this court explained to Scher that, in his plea agreement,
he was not waiving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
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Scher responded, “I won’t be bringing that either.” Id. at 989.
He explained, “She’s done a good job. I’m happy.” Id.
After Panagakos had withdrawn as counsel, the case
proceeded to sentencing. Scher is now serving his 20-month
prison sentence.
On February 5, 2020, Scher filed the present motion to
set aside his conviction. The gist of his motion is that
Panagakos was ineffective.
III. ANALYSIS.
A federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or
correct his or her sentence if it “was imposed in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . the court
was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Scher’s guilty plea limits the arguments he can raise
under § 2255. “‘[W]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly
admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’” Mahrt v.
Beard, 849 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). Even after a guilty plea,
however, “claims of pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel
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are cognizable on federal habeas review when the action, or
inaction, of counsel prevents petitioner from making an informed
choice whether to plead.” Id. Assertions that “counsel rendered
pre-plea ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to
suppress” are also permitted. Id. at 1171. Claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel were expressly preserved for
Scher in his written plea agreement, which provided: “Defendant
also waives his right to challenge his conviction or sentence or
the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack,
including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2255, except that defendant may make
such a challenge based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.” ECF No. 192, PageID # 943.
Scher raises several ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Although those claims are not well organized, they all
fall within one of three broad categories: (1) assertions that
Panagakos was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty; (2)
claims that Panagakos was ineffective in failing to seek what he
calls “suppression” of the indictment (presumably meaning either
suppression of evidence or dismissal of the indictment) based on
alleged misstatements made in grand jury proceedings; and (3)
assertions that Panagakos was ineffective in having failed to
investigate claims that a witness had falsely held himself out as
an FBI officer. Scher also appears to be trying to argue that
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there was prosecutorial misconduct. He asserts that the
Assistant United States Attorney included in the indictment
charges that the AUSA knew he could not prove.
Scher is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on these
claims unless “his allegations, when viewed against the record,
do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible or
patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal.” United
States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation
marks omitted). An evidentiary hearing is not warranted here.
None of Scher’s assertions supports relief under § 2255.
A. Scher Does Not Show that Panagakos was Ineffective
In Advising Him to Plead Guilty (Grounds Two,
Three, and Four of Scher’s Motion).
Scher’s primary argument appears to be that his guilty
plea was involuntary because it flowed from what he alleges was
ineffective assistance by Panagakos. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, Scher must show that (1) his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). There is “a strong presumption” that counsel’s
conduct was reasonable and that counsel’s representation did not
fall below “an objective standard of reasonableness” under
“prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. Even if a
petitioner overcomes the presumption of effectiveness, the
petitioner must still demonstrate a “reasonable probability that,
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but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Because
“[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel’s assistance after conviction,” judicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Id. at 689.
Scher argues that Panagakos gave him bad legal advice
and pressured him to plead guilty. He fails to establish this.
1. Panagakos’s Recommendation that Scher Plead
Guilty was Reasonable.
Scher first challenges Panagakos’s substantive advice.
He appears to argue that Panagakos should not have counseled him
to plead guilty because she was in possession of an “exculpatory
document that . . . clearly shows that [Scher] acted properly and
did not commit the crime for which he pled guilty.” ECF No. 250-
1, PageID # 1681. Scher is apparently referring to the expert
reports that Ann J. Atkinson submitted to Panagakos. Atkinson	1
did opine that Scher was not guilty of the offenses charged in
Counts 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the Second Superseding indictment.
ECF No. 250-4, PageID # 1785, see also ECF No. 250-3. But she
also agreed with the Government’s expert that Scher was guilty of
the offenses charged in Counts 2, 3, and 8. ECF No. 250-4,
Scher refers to the document at issue as “Exhibit C.”	1
ECF No. 250-1, PageID # 1681. He did not submit an Exhibit C.
However, the third and final attachment to his motion, which he
labeled “Exhibit B,” is a copy of Atkinson’s report, and that
report appears to be the document he describes as Exhibit C.
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PageID # 1785.
Panagakos’s advice was consistent with Atkinson’s
conclusions. Panagakos told Scher that, while he might have a
defense against some of the charges he was facing, he was
unlikely to prevail on Counts 2, 3, and 8. ECF No. 267-2, PageID
# 1888; 1892. Atkinson’s report did not suggest that Scher was
innocent. To the contrary, it buttressed Panagakos’s own
determination that Scher was unlikely to prevail at trial on
several counts.
2. Scher Has Not Shown that he Pled Guilty
Because Panagakos Acted Unprofessionally.
Scher also asserts that Panagakos was ineffective in
treating him unprofessionally. According to Scher, he “was
screamed at, put down, discounted, and browbeaten by [Panagakos]
for years.” ECF No. 250-1, PageID # 1681. Of course, if what
Panagakos did was strenuously advise her client, that by itself
is not ineffective. In representing criminal defendants,
attorneys have a duty to be honest about their chances of
success, and attorneys may need to communicate firmly and even
loudly. Scher claims that Panagakos crossed the line. But even
if Scher and Panagakos differ in their accounts about counsel’s
demeanor, this court sees no need to resolve such a dispute. If
that were the determinative issue, this court would certainly
hold an evidentiary hearing, listening to and observing both
individuals before making a credibility finding. But, without
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making any finding on that point, this court concludes that, even
if Panagakos “screamed at, put down, discounted, and browbeat[]”
Scher, Scher’s assertion that he was thereby prejudiced by
feeling forced to plead guilty is patently implausible.
To begin, Scher’s claims that he pled guilty to get
away from Panagakos make no sense. In his petition, he asserts:
[Panagakos] refused to have a quiet and calm
discussion with me during the almost 3-years
of her appointment. We did not have even one
conversation that did not consist of her
screaming at me and berating me. After this
case had dragged out for almost 5-years, I
was left with no choice but to either-plead
guilty just to go to prison and get away from
her, or remain having her as my counsel
through trial and risk me physically doing
her bodily harm as a result of her shrieking
and screaming driving me to the breaking
point.
ECF No. 250, PageID # 1671. The motion in support of his
petition contains similar claims:
The so-called attorney-client relationship
was so broken that Movant was literally
forced to either: (A) plead guilty to
something, anything, just to get away from
Panagakos to be free from the onslaught of
non-stop screaming, or (B) Act out against
Panagakos in such a manner that would silence
the incessant screaming and shrieking.
Fortunately for Panagakos, the Movant chose
option (A).
ECF No. 250-1, PageID # 1681. Scher’s statements are internally
inconsistent. He says that he felt forced to give up his right
to trial and that he stated under oath that he had committed a
crime because otherwise he risked “physically doing [counsel]
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bodily harm.” Feeling driven to hurt Panagakos is inconsistent
with feeling coerced into pleading guilty.
Two other points are critical to this court’s
conclusion that Scher’s description is so implausible as not to
warrant an evidentiary hearing. The first and most important
point is that Scher’s reference to Panagakos’s alleged berating
of him is at total odds with his sworn statements during the
guilty plea colloquy. During the guilty plea hearing, Scher
affirmatively stated that no one had “done anything to try to
force [him] to enter a guilty plea.” ECF No. 200, PageID # 968.
He also indicated that he was not planning to assert ineffective
assistance of counsel and that Panagakos had done a good job. He
said he was “happy” with her work. Id. at 989. These statements
are entitled to considerable weight. See Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry
a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of
conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to
summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the
record are wholly incredible.”). Given his sworn statements,
this court cannot credit Scher’s present assertions that he pled
guilty to “get away from Panagakos.” Nor can the court credit
his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary.
The second point that is clear from the existing record
is that Scher has never been shy about ridding himself of an
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attorney and starting anew with another attorney. In this very
case, he ran through four attorneys before returning to the first
attorney he had had. Scher knew very well that he was not stuck
with an attorney with whom the relationship had broken down, and,
in fact, he ultimately got a replacement for Panagakos.
Panagakos was appointed because the court had granted Scher’s
motion to replace his previous attorney, Brandon K. Flores, who
had also been appointed under the Criminal Justice Act. See ECF
Nos. 145, 148. Before Flores, Scher had been represented in this
case by Edwards, and before that by the First Assistant Federal
Defender. Scher had more than passing experience with switching
attorneys. If Panagakos’s behavior had been as extreme as Scher
now alleges, he would surely have once again quickly sought new
counsel, instead of waiting, as he puts it, for years, allegedly
suffering all the while. What Scher alleges in his § 2255 motion
is completely at odds with the record in this case and therefore
does not support relief under § 2255.
B. Scher Does Not Show that Panagakos Was Ineffective
in Failing to Move To Suppress or Dismiss (Grounds
One, Five, Six, and Seven of Scher’s Motion).
Construed liberally, Scher’s second claim appears to be
that Panagakos was ineffective because she failed to conduct an
investigation that would have led her to move to suppress
evidence or to dismiss the indictment. According to Scher, the
grand jury proceedings were defective because a witness, Robert
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Rodriguez, told several lies during his testimony. See ECF No.
250, PageID # 1668, 1673; ECF No. 250-1, PageID # 1679-1681.
Scher seems to suggest that, if Panagakos had interviewed Cal
Gomez, she would have learned about these lies and brought an
appropriate motion. Scher’s argument fails at the first hurdle:
he cannot show that Rodriguez actually lied during his testimony.
A motion to dismiss a grand jury indictment can only be
sustained if the prosecutor knowingly permitted perjured
testimony. United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir.
2000) (“While we find it hard to understand why a prosecutor
would not resolve this discrepancy in some way prior to trial,
there is no evidence that the prosecutor knew that Inspector
Morris committed perjury in his testimony to the grand jury, as
opposed to making a misstatement, material as though that
misstatement appears to be.”). There is no evidence of such
conduct here. Scher has not even shown that Rodriguez made any
statements that were incorrect.
Scher appears to contend that Rodriguez made false
representations about Scher’s involvement with work on the
Honolulu rail project. ECF No. 250-1, PageID # 1680. The
parties agree on several basic facts. There is no dispute that,
while Scher worked for a construction company called CB&I in
2012, he was photographed sleeping in a crane. See id. at 1680.
There is no dispute that CB&I did not work on the rail project.
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Id. Similarly undisputed is that a different construction
company, Kiewit, did work on the rail project. See id. Scher
does not deny that he worked for Kiewit in 2014.
Scher appears to be arguing that Rodriguez falsely
suggested that the picture of Scher asleep in the crane was taken
while Scher was working on the rail project. Id. Scher
maintains that, because of long-running public controversy
surrounding the rail project, the belief that he was “sleeping on
the clock” could have created bias against him. Id. at 1681.
The grand jury transcript shows that Scher is mistaken.
Rodriguez told the grand jury that the photo of Scher sleeping in
the crane was taken in 2012, while he worked with CB&I:
So if you note, from approximately -- so when
he filed his application in October of 2012,
he told us I’m disabled as of July 15th,
2012, and I’m unable to work. So if you
notice, about July 15th, 2012, he’s actually
employed at that time by Chicago Bridge &
Iron, that’s going to be the fourth bar down,
and that was from July 2nd of 2012 to August
9th of 2012. In fact, when he makes that
statement, that week he gets paid by Chicago
Bridge & Iron, and the prior week he was
actually given a safety violation at CB&I for
sleeping in his cab of the crane and so
there’s a picture in the subpoena returns of
him sleeping in the cab of a crane four days
before he claims that he was entirely
disabled and could not work.
ECF No. 250-2, PageID # 1718. Rodriguez did discuss Scher’s work
on the rail project, but he indicated that he performed that work
for Kiewit, not CB&I:
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If I scroll down here, if you see that purple
line and go down and see Kiewit, he was
planning -- he had accepted the job for
Kiewit, and they were asking the Court to
allow him to serve something other than jail
time because it would be detrimental to his
work there and that would -- he was one of
the few crane operators certified for this
specific job and that it was for the rail
line that all of us, you know, will
eventually love and -- and ride smoothly,
right, but that it would be so detrimental
that it would -- it would actually affect the
community of Honolulu because this rail line
would be so much further behind than it
already is.
Id. at 1722. Nothing in the grand jury transcript substantiates
Scher’s claims that Rodriguez falsely told the grand jury that
Scher was “sleeping on the clock while on the rail project[.]”
See ECF No. 250-1, PageID 1681. Scher has therefore failed to
show that Panagakos could, or should, have moved to dismiss the
grand jury indictment based on testimony by Rodriguez.
Scher’s moving papers refer to Panagakos’s failure to
file a motion to “suppress” the indictment. To the extent Scher
is referring to a motion to suppress evidence, his argument
similarly fails. Scher does not establish that Rodriguez
unconstitutionally obtained evidence or presented such evidence
to the grand jury.
C. Panagakos’s Refusal to Interview Cal Gomez was not
Ineffective (Grounds One and Seven of Scher’s
Motion).
Scher’s third claim is that Panagakos’s refusal to
speak to Cal Gomez was ineffective because Gomez would have
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revealed that Rodriguez had falsely held himself out as an FBI
agent while interviewing Gomez. ECF No. 250-1, PageID 1679; ECF
No. 273, PageID # 1932. This court does not need to address
whether Panagakos’s failure to speak to Gomez was objectively
unreasonable because Scher has not shown that he was prejudiced.
In his reply brief, Scher seems to argue that, if	2
Panagakos had discovered Rodriguez’s alleged deception, she could
have filed a motion to suppress because “any information he
[acquired] becomes [the] fruit of the poisonous tree.” ECF No.
273, PageID # 1932. That assertion lacks merit. Scher does not
identify any constitutional or statutory violation that
implicates the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Nor does he
show that he has standing to challenge any such violation. See
generally United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980)
(“defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the
benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment
rights have in fact been violated”). Scher does not show that
interviewing Gomez would have led to the suppression of evidence.
Nor does Scher show that he suffered any other form of
prejudice. To establish prejudice, Scher must show a “reasonable
probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have
This argument also fails because Scher raised it for the	2
first time in a reply brief. See Local Rule 12.2(e) (“Any
argument raised for the first time in the reply may be
disregarded.”).
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been different” if Panagakos had spoken to Gomez. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. He therefore must demonstrate that her refusal
affected his decision to plead guilty. See generally Mahrt, 849
F.3d at 1170.
Scher does not make that showing. Scher never suggests
that his decision to plead guilty was affected by Panagakos’s
decision not to talk with Gomez. At most, he claims that he pled
guilty to “get away from Panagakos.” ECF No. 250, PageID # 1671.
Indeed, it would have been unreasonable for Scher to let this
issue affect his plea decision. The evidence against him was
overwhelming, and impeaching Rodriguez by showing that he had
misrepresented himself as an FBI agent would not have changed
that. Scher does not show that the outcome of this case would
have been different if Panagakos had spoken to Cal Gomez and had
learned that Rodriguez had held himself out as an FBI agent.
D. Scher is not Entitled to Relief Based on
Prosecutorial Misconduct (Ground Five of Scher’s
Motion).
Finally, in his reply brief, Scher raises what appears
to be an allegation that the Assistant United States Attorney
acted wrongfully in charging Scher with crimes he knew he could
not prove. Scher states that, at the end of his sentencing
hearing, the AUSA, after moving to dismiss all counts except for
the one count to which Scher had pled guilty, remarked that the
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Government “couldn’t have proved them anyway.” ECF No. 273,
PageID # 1931. This argument fails for numerous reasons.
First, this judge was present at the sentencing hearing
and heard no such statement.
Second, in his plea agreement, Scher waived all claims
under § 2255 other than those based on ineffective assistance of
counsel. ECF No. 192, PageID # 943. This particular matter is
not a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In fact, by
the time of the alleged statement, Panagakos was not Scher’s
attorney, and there is no suggestion by Scher that she somehow
should have known of the matter before she stopped representing
Scher.
Third, Scher raises the matter belatedly in his reply.
As noted earlier in this order, arguments raised for the first
time in a reply may be disregarded under Local Rule 12.2(e). The
way in which Scher raises the matter is particularly disturbing.
Scher says that it would be unjust to deny him access to a
sentencing transcript, suggesting that people are conspiring to
hide evidence of wrongdoing. In fact, it does not appear that
Scher had previously requested access to that transcript, so no
one was “denying” him access. As it happens, Scher has access to
the transcript. The transcript of the end of the sentencing
hearing, which is when Scher says the AUSA’s alleged statement
was made, is attached to the Government’s memorandum opposing his
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request for compassionate release. ECF No. 284-4. The
transcript includes nothing suggesting that the AUSA made the
alleged statement.
IV. THE COURT DECLINES TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY.
The court declines to grant Scher a certificate of
appealability. An appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals from a final order in a § 2255 proceeding “[u]nless a
circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). The court shall issue a certificate
of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a § 2255 petition on
the merits, a petitioner, to satisfy the requirements of
§ 2253(c)(2), “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). Reasonable jurists would not find this court’s
assessment of the merits of Scher’s constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.
V. CONCLUSION.
Scher’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 is denied, and the court declines to issue a certificate
of appealability. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter
judgment for the Government in Civil No. 20-00060 and to close
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that case.
It is so ordered.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, July 22, 2020.
/s/ Susan Oki Mollway
Susan Oki Mollway
United States District Judge
United States v. Scher, Cr. No. 15-00614 SOM; ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE AND DECLINING
TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
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