CARLAN v. TEGNA INC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JAMES THOMAS CARLAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEGNA INC. and 13WMAZ TV,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:25-cv-00480-TES
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff James Thomas Carlan filed a Complaint [Doc. 1] for defamation,
negligence, and deprivation of constitutional rights against Virginia-based broadcast
and digital media company TEGNA Inc. and its Georgia-based affiliate 13WMAZ TV.
[Doc. 1, p. 1]. Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) [Doc. 3]. The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s request
to proceed IFP and then turns its attention to the claims asserted in his Complaint.
A. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP
District courts may allow a plaintiff to file a lawsuit without prepaying fees and
costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This statute states:
[Generally], 	any 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security
therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of
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all assets such prisoner possesses1 that the person is unable to pay such fees
or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action,
defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A plaintiff’s application is sufficient to warrant a waiver of filing
fees if it “represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the
court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his
dependents.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004).
After reviewing the statements Plaintiff makes in his application, see generally [Doc. 3],
the Court GRANTS his Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 3].
B. 	Frivolity Review
Having granted Plaintiff IFP status, § 1915(e) requires the Court to review his
Complaint and determine whether it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Eleventh Circuit has determined that
Ҥ 1915(e), which governs [IFP] proceedings[,] generally permits district courts to
dismiss a case ‘at any time’ if [a] complaint ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.’” Robinson v. United States, 484 F. App’x 421, 422 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam). The Court can also dismiss an action at any time if it determines that the claims
sought in it are frivolous or malicious or seek monetary relief against a defendant who
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all
persons requesting leave to proceed [IFP].” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii).
The proper contours of the term “frivolous,” have been defined by the Supreme
Court to encompass complaints that, despite their factual allegations and legal
conclusions, lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). These types of complaints are subject to sua sponte dismissal by a
district court. Id. at 324 (noting that dismissals under § 1915(e) “are often made sua
sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the
inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints”). More specifically, to
survive this initial review, a claim must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on
the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). Operating on the assumption that the factual
allegations in the complaint are true, such dismissal procedure streamlines litigation by
dispensing with unnecessary discovery and factfinding. Id. However, a complaint will
survive under Rule 12(b)(6) if it alleges sufficient factual matter (accepted as true) that
states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324,
1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79).
Frivolity review under § 1915(e), on the other hand, has a separate function.
Section 1915(e) is designed to discourage the filing of—and waste of judicial and private
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resources upon—baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate due to
filing costs and the potential threat of sanctions associated with filing such a lawsuit.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. “To this end, the statute accords judges not only the authority to
dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual
power to pierce the veil of [a] complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims
whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. Even though Rule 12 and § 1915(e)
both counsel dismissal and share “considerable common ground” with each other, one
dismissal standard does not invariably encompass the other. Id. at 328. “When a
complaint raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is
correctly resolved against [a] plaintiff, dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds is
appropriate, but dismissal on the basis of frivolousness is not.” Id.
C. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint
Courts must construe complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs liberally and hold their
allegations to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). The underlying factual allegations
for Plaintiff’s lawsuit stem from his arrest on November 3, 2024, at a public political
rally for then-presidential candidate Donald Trump in Macon, Georgia. [Doc. 1, p. 2]. In
his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he carried a cardboard sign with a message that was, in
his opinion, “too vague to offend anyone.” [Id.]; see also [Doc. 2, (Exhibit A; Video
Footage of Event)]. Plaintiff’s Complaint doesn’t disclose what was written on the sign,
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but according to a screenshot he submitted when he filed his Complaint, the sign’s
message read, “My Abuse Should Be On the News.”2 See, e.g., [Doc. 2-1, p. 1].
To provide some context for Plaintiff’s claims, that same screenshot also notes
that “[w]hile signs are commonplace at rallies, the Trump campaign did not allow
‘unapproved signage,’” but Plaintiff “was able to smuggle [one] in.” [Id.]. The article
published by 13WMAZ on November 4, 2024, states that when a security guard for the
private security company hired by the Trump campaign “told [Plaintiff] to remove the
sign, the [Bibb County Sheriff’s Office] said [Plaintiff] refused and that’s when the [Bibb
County Sheriff’s Office] said he struck the guard.” [Doc. 2-1, p. 1]. In his Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that 13WMAZ’s article falsely stated that he “had been arrested for
‘assaulting an officer’ and for ‘sneaking contraband’ into the rally.” [Doc. 1, p. 2].
However, the very screenshot of the article Plaintiff submitted with his Complaint
belies the specifics of that allegation. Quite plainly, the 13WMAZ article states that
Plaintiff was “arrested for assaulting [a] security guard”—not an officer. See, e.g., [Doc. 2-
1, p. 1]; [Doc. 2-2, p. 1 (emphasis added)]. Semantics aside, it appears Plaintiff’s
defamation claims aren’t predicated on who he supposedly assaulted—be it a security
2 See Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming that courts may consider documents
outside a complaint if the document is “central to [a] plaintiff’s claims” and “undisputed”); accord Ravan
v. Talton, No. 21-11036, 2023 WL 2238853, at *3 n.5 (11th Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (“At the pleading stage, courts
may consider (or ‘incorporate by reference’) documents that are not attached to the complaint so long as
those documents are (1) referred to in the complaint, (2) central to [a] plaintiff’s claims, and (3) of
undisputed authenticity.”).
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guard or a law enforcement officer—but whether he assaulted anyone at all. He, of
course, says he didn’t “strik[e]” anyone. [Doc. 1, p. 2]; see, e.g., [Doc. 2-1, p. 1]. Plaintiff
alleges that 13WMAZ’s fabricated news article recounting his “arrest[] for assaulting [a]
security guard” damaged his reputation, lost him clients, and destroyed his business
credibility within the community. [Doc. 1, pp. 2–3].
D. 	Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states that the bases for the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction arises under federal-question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, respectively. [Id. at p. 1]. Federal courts can only
adjudicate cases as “authorized by Constitution and statute.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013).
In other words, unless Article III of the Constitution provides the jurisdictional basis,
federal courts simply have no authority to act without a statutory grant of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 409; Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 2001).
1. 	Federal-Question Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot, based on the allegations from his
Complaint, sustain claims for alleged deprivations of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights against TEGNA or 13WMAZ. See, e.g., [Doc. 1, p. 4]. The exclusive
means for bringing damages suits in the federal courts for constitutional violations is
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through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is a federal statute under which federal courts
may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331, this Court has already
informed Plaintiff in another lawsuit that “[t]o employ § 1983 as a remedy for a
deprivation of constitutional rights, [he] must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under the color of state law—that is, by a state actor.”
Carlan v. Flint Energies, No. 5:25-cv-00338-TES, 2025 WL 2472582 at *4 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 27,
2025) (citing Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)). Without more,
purely private conduct—such as conduct by broadcasting companies and media
outlets—is not within the reach of § 1983. The requirement that a party must have acted
act under color of state law necessarily excludes “merely private conduct, no matter
how discriminatory or wrongful” from § 1983’s reach. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)).
Only in rare circumstances can a private party be viewed as a “state actor” for purposes
of liability under § 1983. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992).
To determine whether a private party acts under color of state law, the United
States Supreme Court uses three tests. The first test is the public-function test which
limits state action to instances where private actors are performing functions
“traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Commc’n
Workers of Am., AFL–CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1988). Second, the state-
compulsion test limits state action to instances where the government “has coerced or at
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least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution.” Id.
(citations omitted). And third, the nexus- or joint-action test applies where “the state
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party]
that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” Id. at 1026–27 (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not demonstrate that either TEGNA or
13WMAZ acted under color of state law because it presents no allegations indicating
that either TEGNA or 13WMAZ performed a traditional state function, that they were
coerced by the Bibb County Sheriff’s Office, or that they were joint participants with the
Bibb County Sheriff’s Office in a business enterprise. See generally [Doc. 1]. Thus, the
Court concludes that neither TEGNA nor 13WMAZ are state actors. Consequently,
Plaintiff’s constitutional-deprivation claims brought against TEGNA and 13WMAZ
pursuant to § 1983 lack an arguable basis in law, Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326, and the Court
DISMISSES them without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted pursuant § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See, e.g., Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1233–34
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding the television news reporter and the company that owns the
television station were not state actors); Nichols v. Hendrix, No. CIV 2:98–CV–161–WCO,
1999 WL 727233, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (finding that media defendants did not act under
color of state law); Williams v. Savannah Morning News, No. CV407–066, 2007 WL
2302327, at *1 (S.D. Ga. 2007) (finding a newspaper is not a state actor and cannot be
liable for publishing the news, and noting that a defamation claim is not recognized
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under § 1983).
Given the dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against TEGNA and 13WMAZ,
Plaintiff’s Complaint presents no other federal statute under which the Court may
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331. Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 409.
Therefore, for the Court to be able to adjudicate this case, it must have subject-matter
jurisdiction under § 1332’s diversity jurisdiction. See id.
2. 	Diversity Jurisdiction
Diversity jurisdiction permits federal courts to hear matters unrelated to the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States where “the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between citizens of different States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). This type of jurisdiction requires “complete diversity,” meaning that
no defendant can be a citizen from the same state as a plaintiff. Triggs v. John Crump
Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires
complete diversity; every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant.”).
In this case, Plaintiff’s two defendants are business entities. [Doc. 1, p. 1]. He
alleges that Virginia-based corporation, TEGNA, is the parent company of 13WMAZ
operating out of Macon, Georgia. [Doc. 1, p. 1]. With respect to his citizenship, Plaintiff
quite clearly alleges that he “is a citizen of the State of Georgia.” [Id.]. Thus,
notwithstanding the Court’s serious concerns regarding the amount in controversy—
namely Plaintiff’s ability to recover lost wages from 2020–2025 for defamation and
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negligence claims that didn’t even arise until November 4, 2024—it appears that
diversity jurisdiction is present. See [Doc. 1, p. 5 (detailing alleged annual income for
2025 at $134,364)], in connection with [Doc. 2-1, p. 1].
E. 	Order Directing Service
As for the only remaining claims in this lawsuit (Plaintiff’s claims for defamation
and negligence under Georgia law against TEGNA and 13WMAZ), they are sufficient to
survive frivolity review. In short, Plaintiff claims that 13WMAZ published an article
stating that “[h]e was charged with battery and was booked in the Bibb County jail.”3
[Doc. 2-1, p. 1]. According to Plaintiff’s version, “public court records . . . showed no
assault charge.” [Id.]. Now, this could be for a couple of reasons. One, law enforcement
could have merely “charged” Plaintiff with assault on an informal basis on November
3, 2024, at the time they arrested him. Two, the “charge” may not have yet been picked
up by the District Attorney to formally charge Plaintiff with assault at the time
13WMAZ published its article on November 4, 2024. [Doc. 2-2, p. 1]. Nevertheless, as
pled, Plaintiff’s allegations—that TEGNA and 13WMAZ made false, and thus,
defamatory, statements concerning him—are sufficient to survive frivolity review
3 Plaintiff also mentions that at the time of his arrest he was “charged with battery, not assault,” to
seemingly provide additional support for his defamation and negligence claims against TEGNA and
13WMAZ. [Doc. 1, p. 2]. While it’s true that the crime of “simple battery” requires an offensive touching
or physical harm, O.C.G.A. 16-5-23, and “simple assault” does not, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20, media reports
discussing “battery” are often characterized as “assaults” for stylistic reasons. That, of course, is a
discussion for another day.
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under § 1915(e). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that service be made by the United
States Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3).
F. 	Conclusion
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [Doc. 3] and ORDERS that service be made on TEGNA
Inc. and 13WMAZ TV.4 Plaintiff’s claims against TEGNA and 13WMAZ for
constitutional deprivations are DISMISSED without prejudice for the reasons
discussed above, but his state-law defamation and negligence claims shall proceed for
further factual development.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of November, 2025.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 TEGNA and 13WMAZ are reminded of their duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses as discussed in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1). Plaintiff should also review this rule since it allows him to “notify
[TEGNA and 13WMAZ] that an action has been commenced” against them and “request that [they]
waive service of a summons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
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