FAIRCLOTH v. SIMMONS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
STEVEN TODD FAIRCLOTH, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-439 (MTT)
)
Deputy PAUL SIMMONS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
__________________ 	)
ORDER
On October 7, 2025, plaintiff Steven Faircloth, proceeding pro se, filed his
complaint. ECF 1. That same day, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). ECF 2. For the reasons stated, Faircloth’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is
GRANTED. However, Faircloth’s complaint lacks important factual allegations that
Faircloth may have omitted because of his pro se status. Thus, the Court ORDERS
Faircloth to amend his complaint by November 26, 2025.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Proceed IFP
Motions to proceed IFP are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), which provides:
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal,
or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets
such prisoner possesses1 that the person is unable to pay such fees or
give security therefor.
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all
persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2004).
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 1 of 7

-2-
When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only
determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy
the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely destitute.” Id.
(quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). Rather,
“an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty,
is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for
himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP motion without first
comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether he has
satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x
916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307-08).
However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.”
Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Section 1915(a) “conveys only
a privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs
without undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4,
2014) (citations omitted). District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a
plaintiff can proceed IFP, and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil
cases for damages. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306 (citation omitted).
Faircloth’s IFP affidavit establishes that he cannot pay the court fees. ECF 2.
Thus, the Court finds that Faircloth is unable to pay the costs of this proceeding without
undue hardship and therefore his motion for leave to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is
GRANTED.
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 2 of 7

-3-
B. Frivolity Review
Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions.
“Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the
court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the
asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (internal quotation marks,
alterations, and citation omitted). When allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court
shall dismiss the case if the Court determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or
malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it
appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’
or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is
governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).”2 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Faircloth
is proceeding pro se, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). But “[d]espite the
2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
specific factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss,
“all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 3 of 7

-4-
leniency afforded pro se plaintiffs, the district court does not have license to rewrite a
deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
Faircloth filed this action against Houston County, Georgia, as well as several
employees of the Houston County Sheriff’s Office, including Deputy Paul Simmons,
Major Brian Blanton, Captain Gregor Runyon, Michelle Westbrook, and Houston
County, Ga. ECF 1 at 1. Faircloth asserts four claims: (1) excessive force against
Deputy Simmons; (2) supervisory liability and failure to intervene against Major Blanton,
Captain Runyon, and Westbrook; (3) municipal liability against Houston County, and (4)
state law claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against “defendants.” Id. at 2.
Faircloth’s claims arise out of a September 2023 detention in the Houston County
Detention Center. Id. at 1. He alleges that he was “improperly placed in solitary”
confinement and that while he was in solitary confinement, he was deprived of food,
water, a mattress, and clothing. Id. at 1-3. Faircloth also alleges that while he was in
solitary confinement, Deputy Simmons threatened Faircloth with a taser and slammed
his head against the wall. Id. After his release, Faircloth alleges he “filed a formal
complaint … and … spoke directly with Major Blanton.” Id. at 2. According to Faircloth,
he also emailed Major Blanton and Captain Runyon to follow up on his complaint. Id.
Here, while Faircloth likely states a claim against Deputy Simmons, his
allegations against the remaining defendants are largely conclusory and lack essential
information. Faircloth’s only allegations against Major Blanton and Captain Runyon are
that they did not respond appropriately to complaints Faircloth lodged after he was
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 4 of 7

-5-
released from detention. Id. at 2. That is not enough to state a claim for supervisory
liability or failure to intervene. See Keith v. Dekalb Cnty., Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1047
(11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]o hold a supervisor liable a plaintiff must show that the supervisor
either directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection
exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.”);
Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.20 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The law of this
circuit is that ‘an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable
steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable
for his nonfeasance.’”) (citation modified)). As for Westbrook, Faircloth does not allege
that she had any role in the alleged constitutional violations, apart from a conclusory
allegation that Westbrook “failed to intervene or meaningfully discipline Simmons.” ECF
1 at 2. Finally, Faircloth has not stated a claim for municipal liability because he does
not plausibly allege that Houston County has either an official or unofficial custom or
practice that violates the Constitution. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.’s, 436 U.S. 658,
694-95 (2018).
Thus far, Faircloth’s allegations appear thin, and the Court is unable to conduct a
thorough frivolity review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) (stating that a court is required
to dismiss a case brought by a pro se plaintiff if it (1) is frivolous, or malicious; (2) fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief). It is not clear whether this deficiency is
because of the manner in which the allegations have been pled, or whether they simply
lack substance. However, given Faircloth’s pro se status, the Court will afford him an
opportunity to amend his complaint to state viable claims. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F.
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 5 of 7

-6-
App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s
complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court should give the
pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it.”).
For these reasons, Faircloth is ORDERED to amend his complaint to include all
facts that he wishes to make a part of these proceedings and cite the appropriate
statutory or constitutional authority for bringing his claims. Faircloth shall have until
November 26, 2025 to file his amended complaint.
In the “statement of claims” section of his amended complaint, Faircloth must link
any claims he makes to a named defendant. If Faircloth fails to link a named defendant
to a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Faircloth makes no allegations in the body of
his complaint against a named defendant, that defendant will be removed from the
action.
Faircloth must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate that each
defendants’ actions or omissions resulted in the violation of his rights under a specific
law. It is also recommended that, when drafting his “statement of claims,” Faircloth list
numbered responses to the following questions (to the extent possible) along with the
name of each defendant:
(1) What did each defendant do (or not do) to violate his rights?
(2) When did each action occur?
(3) How was Faircloth injured as a result of each defendant’s actions?
The amended complaint will take the place of and supersede Faircloth’s original
complaint. Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 F. App’x 845, 847-48 (11th Cir. 2013).
Faircloth may not refer to, or incorporate by reference, his previous complaint. The
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 6 of 7

-7-
Court will not look back to the facts alleged in the original complaint once the amended
complaint is filed; the Court will only consider the facts in the amended complaint when
it conducts the frivolity review required by § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811
F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an amended pleading renders
the previous pleading a “legal nullity”).
II. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and for the reasons set forth above, Faircloth’s
motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED, and Faircloth is ORDERED to amend his
complaint no later than November 26, 2025.
SO ORDERED, this 12th day of November, 2025.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Case 5:25-cv-00439-MTT Document 3 Filed 11/12/25 Page 7 of 7