Jewish Voice for Peace, South Florida v. City of Miami Beach et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-24126-RAR
JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE,
SOUTH FLORIDA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER DENYING EXPEDITED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Expedited Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (“Motion”), [ECF No. 40]. 	Plaintiff Jewish Voice for Peace, South Florida (“JVP”)
seeks a preliminary injunction against Defendant City of Miami Beach to protest on the public
sidewalk outside the Miami Beach Convention Center during Art Basel on December 6, 2025.1
See generally Mot. On November 12, 2025, Defendant filed a response opposing the preliminary
injunction (“Response”), [ECF No. 44], to which Plaintiff replied on November 14, 2025
(“Reply”), [ECF No. 52]. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion on November 14,
2025 (“Hearing”), [ECF No. 53]. For the following reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Expedited Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff JVP is the South Florida Chapter of a national organization that “mobilize[s]
1 In its Motion, Plaintiff does not provide a specific date for the protest. However, as stated on the record
at the November 14, 2025 Hearing, [ECF No. 53], Plaintiff seeks to protest on Saturday, December 6, 2025.
See Transcript of Hearing (“Hearing Tr.”), [ECF No. 63] at 76:16–76:17.
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Jewish communities to advocate for a just society in Palestine and Israel rooted in human rights
rather than oppression.” 	Compl., [ECF No. 1] ¶ 14. 	Since October 2023, “[m]embers of the
Plaintiff organization . . . have joined [] protests [against Israel’s actions] in South Florida,
including in the City of Miami Beach.” Id. ¶ 2.
On September 10, 2025, JVP filed its Complaint, alleging four causes of action, all of
which allege violations of JVP’s First Amendment rights. The first, second, and fourth causes of
action relate to an ordinance “that authorizes the police to order any protester standing on a public
sidewalk to move from the sidewalk,” id. ¶ 8, and allege that this ordinance is invalid because it is
overbroad, vague, and has been enforced against Plaintiff due to Defendants’ hostility towards
JVP’s views about Israel. 	Id. ¶¶ 88–90; 92. 	The third cause of action alleges that Defendants
“have limited Plaintiff’s right to protest by ordering that they move from public places at which
they have a right to be.” Id. ¶ 91. In furtherance of this right to protest, on November 7, 2025,
Plaintiff filed an Expedited Motion for Preliminary Injunction “to secure its First Amendment right
to protest peacefully on the public sidewalk outside the Miami Beach Convention Center during
2025 Art Basel, which will be held from December 5 to 7.” Mot. at 1.2
Art Basel is “one of the world’s largest art fairs.” 	Mot. at 3. 	Held each year in Miami
Beach, “thousands of attendees pass[] through the Convention Center, Miami Beach’s largest
meeting venue.” Resp. at 13. As Art Basel has become increasingly popular and attendance has
grown, the event has “evolved outside of the convention center[,]” becoming a “weeklong
collective of art-centric events across the area” known as “Miami Art Week.” Shayne Benowitz,
History of Art Basel Miami Beach, GREATER M IAMI CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU (Oct. 5,
2025), https://www.miamiandbeaches.com/events/art-basel/history-of-art-basel-miami-beach.
2 In the event of any discrepancy between the page numbers in the footer of a document and those in the
CM/ECF heading, the page numbers used herein refer to the page number reflected in the CM/ECF heading.
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Indeed, “concomitant shows” include Art Miami and Design Miami, as well as numerous
smaller shows throughout the greater Miami area. 	Harriet Powell, The Impact of Global Art,
GLOBAL M IAMI (March 4, 2024), https://globalmiamimagazine.com/2024/03/04/the-impact-of-
global-art/. In 2025, Miami Art Week is anticipated to have at least twenty fairs. Quick Guide to
Miami Art Week Fairs, GREATER M IAMI CONVENTION & VISITORS B UREAU (Oct. 4, 2025),
https://www.miamiandbeaches.com/events/art-basel/miami-art-week-fairs.
In 2024, Art Basel generated an estimated $547 million in economic activity and attracted
over 75,000 attendees. 	Art Basel Miami Beach 2024: Art, Culture, and Global Connections,
M IAMI BEACH (Dec. 2024), https://www.miamibeachfl.gov/art-basel-miami-beach-2024-driving-
economic-and-cultural-growth. 	As Art Basel has risen in notoriety, so too have its attendees.
Every year, thousands of celebrities, artists, and dignitaries flock to Miami to participate in the art
fair and the festivities surrounding it.3 	Given both the scale and the high-profile nature of the
event, “Art Basel is subject to its own careful event planning and coordination and is closely
monitored by law enforcement and security staff for threats to the safety and security of attendees,
such as suspicious packages and terrorist or other violent threats.” Resp. at 13.
Since October 2023, JVP has protested at Art Basel, and at other high-profile events in
Miami Beach. Plaintiff and Defendant offer competing characterizations of these prior protests.
Defendant City of Miami Beach alleges that the first large JVP demonstration was held on
Veteran’s Day, November 11, 2023. 	Resp. at 4. 	Defendant determined that police monitoring
would be necessary given the number of participants, and, despite “initially agree[ing] to stay on
the beachwalk, rather than the main Ocean Drive sidewalk for safety and security reasons, the
crowd [which grew to 500 people] eventually covered the full width of Ocean Drive itself.” Id.
3 Former Mayor of Miami Beach Dan Gelber has remarked that “More private jets show up to Art Basel
than to the Super Bowl.” See infra Powell, The Impact of Global Art.
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Defendant further alleges that as the crowd began to move down Ocean Drive, police were forced
to temporarily close a portion of the road, as the protest “reached a point of contention, with JVP
protesters on the road and pro-Israel counter-protesters on the side, and only a small number of
police officers keeping them separated.” Id. Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant’s allegations
regarding this Veteran’s Day protest in its Reply, but at the Hearing noted that it was “the [police]
officers [who] came to the conclusion that they wanted to close off Ocean Drive. But it wasn’t the
protestors that caused that. It was the officers because they were not sure whether anybody had
weapons . . . [,] anticipated potential safety [concerns] . . . [, and] were trying to protect against []
potentially a conflict between the protestors and counter-protestors.” Hearing Tr. at 14:10–20.
Another protest took place at Art Basel on December 8, 2023, where JVP members
“gathered on the sidewalk in front of the Miami Beach Convention Center to protest Israel’s
actions in Gaza.” Compl. ¶ 6; Mot. at 3. Throughout the duration of this protest, JVP members
stood on the sidewalk in front of the entry and exit point to the Convention Center, held signs
including a 60-foot-long banner with the words “Let Palestine Live,” and “handed out leaflets
expressing their opposition to Israel’s actions in Gaza and urging officials from the City of Miami
Beach and Miami-Dade County to divest from Israel Bonds.” 	Mot. at 3. 	Despite having made
security plans “to direct protestors to an area across the street from the Convention Center as they
arrived,” Defendant determined that “it would risk creating more conflict to get the demonstrators
to relocate and decided to allow them to remain where they were set up on the sidewalk in front of
the Convention Center.” Resp. at 5. Defendant therefore employed police officers “both inside
and outside of the crowd, with some floating to help keep pedestrian traffic flowing and to try to
prevent verbal confrontations from becoming physical altercations.” Id. Plaintiff acknowledges
there was a “large police presence” at this protest and that it ultimately resulted in two arrests.
Mot. at 3; Reply at 3. 	Specifically, according to Plaintiff, “a young man approached the
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demonstration, and [was arrested] after a brief exchange with a police officer.” 	Clauss Reply
Decl., [ECF No. 52-1] ¶ 7. And after “[h]is sister came to help him [] she too was arrested.” Id.
Defendant also alleges that the day after the 2023 Art Basel Protest, JVP protestors
participating in a “death in” demonstration marched along 17th Street toward South Beach and
were met with hecklers and counter-protestors. Resp. at 6. When “the crowd eventually overcame
police” the officers were forced “to deploy pepperballs to disperse the crowd.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff
maintains that “[i]t is not true that JVP organized that demonstration.” Clauss Reply Decl., [ECF
No. 52-1] ¶ 8.
On March 11, 2024, JVP once again sought to protest on the sidewalk in front of the
entrance and exit to the Convention Center at the Aspen Ideas Climate Conference. 	Mot. at 4.
Given the 2,000 individuals in attendance, many of which included “high-level government
officials, foreign dignitaries, and celebrities[,]” the Miami Beach Police established “a Security
Zone for the convention, pursuant to which officers closed certain streets and sidewalks
surrounding the Convention Center to pedestrian and vehicular traffic and only those holding
entrance credentials were permitted to enter the Security Zone at designated checkpoints.” Resp.
at 5. As part of this plan, JVP was permitted to protest in a designated area, located at the corner
of nearby Pride Park.4 Mot. at 4–5; Resp. at 6–7. Dissatisfied with this location, JVP protestors
“moved to the corner of 17th Street, to the east side of City Hall, and across from the Convention
Center.” Resp. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that, even after moving to this location, “they could not
interact with, or hand pamphlets to, those people who came and went to the conference via other
4 While Defendant alleges that protestors “could be seen and heard by many attendees when traveling to
and from the Climate Convention[,]” Resp. at 7, Plaintiff contends that this zone “was so far from the
Convention Center that the protesters could neither be seen nor heard by conference attendees.” Mot. at 4–
5.
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routes, nor with those people who came out of the conference and stood on the sidewalk during
breaks.” Mot. at 5.
At Art Basel last year, JVP sought to demonstrate, as it had in 2023, on the sidewalk in
front of the Convention Center. Mot. at 7. In light of concerns “including [prior] conflicts between
protesters and counter-protesters that had resulted in road closures, arrests, and deployment of
pepperballs, and the crowding of the Convention Center entrance[,]” Miami Beach Police “created
a designated Event Zone [to] minimize[] the opportunity for congregating on sidewalks and high
traffic areas surrounding the Convention Center and prohibited all commercial activity, loitering,
and activity that would increase the volume of pedestrians and reduce the ability of law
enforcement to identify potential security threats.” 	Resp. at 7–8. 	A “Designated Protest Area”
was created adjacent to the Event Zone, where police officers directed protestors, including JVP
members, airline pilots, and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Mot. at 7–8; Resp. at 8. Defendant alleges that
despite being advised that the demonstration would be static, JVP members marched towards and
along Lincoln Road, at which point “there were conflicts and physical altercations between
protesters and hecklers/counter-protesters, and a demonstrator and counter-demonstrator were
each arrested for battery.” Resp. at 8.
JVP now files its Motion, seeking to protest, as it did in 2023, on the sidewalk directly in
front of the Convention Center on December 6, 2025. 	Defendant opposes the Motion, citing
concerns such as interferences with “the ingress and egress of event attendees entering and leaving
Art Basel” and “the ability of officers to conduct security surveillance that is standard for an event
the size of Art Basel.” Resp. at 2. Defendant filed its 2025 Special Event Action Plan (“Event
Plan”) under seal on November 21, 2025, along with two supplemental declarations and a
supplemental memorandum. 	See [ECF No. 60]. 	The Event Plan creates an “Event Zone”
surrounding the Convention Center and its periphery, and offers protesters a “Reasonable Time,
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Place, and Manner (RPTM) protest area,” (“Designated Protest Area”) in the same location
as 2024—the corner of 17th Street and Convention Center Drive. Event Plan, [ECF No. 60-1]
at 3–5.
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless
the movant clearly establishe[s] the ‘burden of persuasion’ for each prong of the analysis.”
Am.’s Health Ins. Plans v. Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319, 1329 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Siegel v.
LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). The Court will not issue an
injunction unless “the movant demonstrates all of these elements: (1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) that the preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the preliminary injunction would
cause the other litigant; and (4) that the preliminary injunction would not be averse to the public
interest.” Chavez v. Fla. SP Warden, 742 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Parker v. State
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (11th Cir. 2001)). The failure to meet even
one of these requirements “dooms” any request for injunctive relief. See Wreal, LLC v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, “[where] the plaintiffs have
not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, [the Court] need not consider
the remaining factors in the preliminary injunction test.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 788 F.3d 1318, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015).
ANALYSIS
The Court begins by addressing whether Plaintiff has met its high burden of establishing a
likelihood of success on the merits. See Pine v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., No. 13-80577, 2013
WL 5817651, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2013) (“In the First Amendment context, the question [of
whether a district court may grant injunctive relief] is [often] reduced to the question of
whether
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the Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits[.]”). In a public forum, like the sidewalk on which
Plaintiff seeks to protest, “the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place,
or manner of protected speech, so long as the restrictions ‘[1] are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, . . . [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and . . . [3] leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”
Pine v. City of W. Palm Beach, FL, 762 F.3d 1262, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). The Court examines each of these factors in
turn.
I. 	Defendant’s Event Plan is Content Neutral
Content neutral restrictions are those that “serve[] purposes unrelated to the content of the
expression . . . [and are] justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward,
491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 	Defendant contends that its
Event Plan is content neutral as it “restrict[s] all persons congregating on sidewalks and high traffic
areas surrounding the Convention Center.” Resp. at 12. Indeed, the record shows that at least two
other 	protest 	groups—airline 	pilots 	and 	Jehovah’s 	Witnesses—were 	also 	directed 	to 	the
Designated Protest Area during Art Basel in 2024. 	Diaz Decl., [ECF No. 44-1] ¶ 46. 	The
restriction therefore applies equally to all protestors, without regard for the content of any
particular message. See, e.g., Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta,
219 F.3d 1301, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The [] Ordinance applies equally to all festivals of any
kind without regard to the content of any message the festival sponsor might convey.”). Further,
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant’s actions were content-based in its Motion and Reply, and
conceded the content neutrality prong at the Hearing. Hearing Tr. at 43:4–18.5 Thus, “[b]ecause
5 Plaintiff, in its Opposition to Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum, contests the content neutrality
prong of this inquiry, arguing that although “the City’s exclusion of JVP from the Convention Center by
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the parties do not dispute that the [restriction] is content neutral, we examine the second and third
prongs.” Pine, 762 F.3d at 1269.
II. 	Defendant’s Restriction is Narrowly Tailored in Furtherance of a Significant
Governmental Interest
“For a content-neutral time, place or manner regulation to be narrowly tailored, it must not
‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate
interests.’” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). This
inquiry is generally conducted in two steps. Courts first consider the legitimacy and significance
of the stated governmental interests, then determine “whether there is a ‘reasonable fit’ between
those interests and the [restriction], as the [government’s] chosen means for serving them.” Coal.
for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1318 (quoting City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993)). And while the regulation must “promote[] a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation[]” it
does not have to be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of furthering the interest. Ward,
491 U.S. at 798–99 (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also Pine, 762 F.3d at 1269.
Thus, a Court “cannot invalidate a regulation simply because it ‘concludes that the government’s
interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.’” 	McDonald v.
City of Pompano Beach, Fla., 556 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (quoting Ward, 491
U.S. at 800).
means of an ‘Event Plan’ is, on its face, neutral, several factors make it clear that its purpose is not.”
Plaintiff’s Supp. Resp., [ECF No. 62] at 5. However, Courts “consider[] whether a law is content neutral
on its face before turning to the law’s justification or purpose.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S.
155, 166 (2015). And “[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791–92 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Here, because the restriction is content neutral, it is “subject to a lower
level of scrutiny”, and the Court need not inquire into the legislative purpose. See Reed, 576 U.S. at 166.
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i. 	Defendant has advanced legitimate and significant governmental interests
Defendant offers three governmental interests as justification for not permitting Plaintiff to
protest on the sidewalk in front of the Convention Center: (1) its “significant interest in public
safety and security during major events such as Art Basel” and its related “interest in maintaining
the orderly flow of pedestrian traffic and allowing the safe ingress and egress of Convention Center
attendees”; (2) its “significant interest in protecting high-level government officials attending
conferences against potential threats”; and (3) its “significant interest in the safety and security
issues that may arise, and have arisen, during the demonstrations, including potential conflicts
between protesters and counter-protesters and even passersby.” Resp. at 13–16.6 	In support of
these interests, Defendant submits a declaration from Lieutenant Raymond Diaz, [ECF No. 44-1]
(“Diaz Decl.”), Lieutenant of Police in the Technical Operations Division of the City of Miami
Beach Police Department. Diaz Decl. ¶ 2.
The Court finds that each of Defendant’s stated interests are substantial matters of
legitimate public interest. First, “ensuring public safety and order [and] promoting the free flow
of traffic on streets and sidewalks” are legitimate governmental interests. McCullen, 573 U.S. at
487 (internal quotation and citation omitted) ; see also Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170,
1183 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We recognize that police may properly limit the exercise of free speech
where necessary for the safety and protection of protestors and the community.”); Int’l Caucus of
Lab. Committees v. City of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1997) (“It is well settled
6 In Defendant’s Supplemental Memorandum in support of its Event Plan, it proffers at least two additional
interests: (1) that “[r]ecent changes to Florida’s open carry laws also necessitate a more controlled
environment to ensure public safety”; and (2) that “early voting for City elections will be taking place at
the City Hall campus” during JVP’s protest. See Def.’s Supp. Mem., [ECF No. 60] at 4. Given that these
additional grounds were neither advanced in Defendant’s Response nor at the Hearing, the Court declines
to consider them.
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that a State’s interest in protecting the safety and convenience of persons using a public forum is
a valid governmental objective.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
Here, Defendant has an interest in safety and security, given that Art Basel is “closely
monitored by law enforcement and security staff for threats to the safety and security of attendees,
such as suspicious packages and terrorist or other violent threats.” Diaz Decl. ¶ 20. Thus, “[t]he
presence of additional people congregating in large groups around the Convention Center—and
particularly its entrance—increases the number of people and movement for law enforcement to
monitor and reduces their ability to identify potential safety threats.” Id. And Plaintiff’s 2023 Art
Basel protest near the entrance of the Convention Center, “interfered with the ingress and egress
of event attendees as well as with the ability of officers to conduct security surveillance that is
standard for an event of this size[],” according to Lieutenant Diaz. Diaz Decl. ¶ 25. Thus, public
safety and security are of tantamount concern to Defendant, especially considering the nature of
the event and the volume of visitors. See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1238–1239 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“[C]onsideration of a forum’s special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a
regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the
characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved.” (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc.
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650–51 (1981)).
Second, Defendant has a legitimate interest in providing security to Art Basel’s high-profile
attendees. 	Indeed, at the 2024 Aspen Climate Conference, to protect the approximately 2,000
high-level government officials, foreign dignitaries, and celebrities in attendance from “attacks
involving explosives and weapons” as well as to “ensure unobstructed emergency access into and
out of the Convention Center Campus [] and to preserve orderly traffic flow into and around the
Convention Center[,]” Defendant established a Security Zone around the Convention Center and
created a Designated Protest Area. Diaz Decl. ¶¶ 28–31. In support of this interest, Defendant
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relies on Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, where the Court upheld a security
zone pursuant to a NATO conference, finding that “there can be no doubt that the City’s interest
in providing security to a gathering of defense officials is of the highest order.” 477 F.3d 1212,
1221 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1183 (11th Cir. 2009)
(discussing Citizens for Peace in Space, noting that “the court [in that case] held that these
restrictions were permissible in light of the significant government interest in preventing terrorist
attacks at the NATO meeting[.]”). Defendant also cites to Marcavage v. City of New York, where
the Court upheld a “no-demonstration” zone during the Republican National Convention, due to
the “extraordinary” security challenge presented by the 50,000 attendees, including the Vice
President, President, and “a host of other government officials.” 689 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2012);
see also Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Bos., 378 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding designated
“demonstration zone” at the Democratic National Convention and noting “there can be no doubting
the substantial government interest in the maintenance of security at political conventions.”).
Plaintiff responds that such cases are distinguishable “because they involve concerns about
the safety of high-level government officials” and posits that Defendant cites “no cases involving
art exhibits[, which] are hardly an issue of national security.” Reply at 1–2. 	But while Art Basel
may have started as a mere art exhibition, it has become the most renowned international art
festival in the world, attended by thousands of high-profile individuals from all walks of society.
To conclude, as Plaintiff suggests, that the security interest present at Art Basel is that of a normal
art exhibit is tantamount to analogizing the World Cup to a children’s soccer tournament. And the
mere fact that Art Basel is not inherently “political” or “governmental” in nature, like a NATO
conference or a political party convention, does not suggest the absence of serious security
concerns. 	On the contrary—given Art Basel’s size, scope, and stature, it is no surprise that
heightened security measures are required. See Int’l Caucus of Lab. Committees, 111 F.3d at 1551
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(“To demonstrate the significance of its interest . . . the City is entitled to advance its interests by
arguments based on appeals to common sense and logic.” (internal quotation and citation
omitted)).
Third, Defendant asserts its “significant interest in the safety and security issues that may
arise, and have arisen, during the demonstrations, including potential conflicts between protesters
and counter-protesters and even passersby.” Resp. at 15. As evidence of the types of conflicts
that may arise, Defendant cites “prior event history involving [JVP]” which resulted in “physical
altercations, a handful of arrests, the deployment of pepperballs after the crowd overcame police,
and, at another event, the temporary closure of Ocean Drive.” Id. at 15–16 (citing Diaz Decl. ¶¶
36, 44). Plaintiff dismisses such concerns as “speculative,” contending that Defendant “has never
offered any factual basis for those concerns.” Reply at 2; Mot. at 11. But “a governmental entity,
charged 	with 	the 	well-being 	of 	its 	citizens, 	shouldn’t 	have 	to 	wait 	for 	accidents 	to
happen . . . before it can implement the regulations it believes are necessary to promote the general
welfare.” 	McDonald, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 1360 (citing Evans v. Sandy City, 944 F.3d 847, 858
(10th Cir. 2019) (noting that the First Amendment “does not require the government to wait for
accidents to justify safety regulations”)). Governments are also entitled to “us[e] past experience
to plan for future events[.]” 	Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13–14 (discussing how the
government’s use of past experience to plan for future events “is consistent with the approach
adopted in the Court’s time-place-manner jurisprudence.” (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
728–729 (2000) and Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 796–97)).
The Court considers only the limited record provided by the parties at this stage of the
proceedings. 	It is without question that Lieutenant Diaz’s declaration, proffered by Defendant,
indicates that prior protests generated some unrest. 	Diaz Decl. ¶ 36. 	And Plaintiff’s Reply
Declaration of Jenneva Clauss, [ECF No. 52-1], does not refute the fact that such demonstrations
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have generated a level of unrest requiring heightened security—and may do so again. 	Further,
even assuming the protests do not demonstrate an imminent threat to public safety and security, a
protest at Plaintiff’s desired location would require significant police presence and monitoring to
ensure the safe ingress and egress of event attendees. Diaz Decl. ¶ 39. This “reduces the ability
of law enforcement and security staff to identify potential threats to the safety and security of
attendees” in this critical area. Diaz Decl. ¶ 37.
Given this record before the Court, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s concerns are
“merely speculative.” See Plaintiff’s Supp. Resp., [ECF No. 62] at 2 (citing Flanigan’s Enters.,
Inc. of Georgia v. Fulton Cty, 242 F.3d 976, 986 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “where the right
to free speech is at issue, the government bears the burden of showing that the articulated concern
has more than merely speculative factual grounds.”)). Nor has Plaintiff established its entitlement
to preliminary injunctive relief. See Wreal, LLC, 840 F.3d at 1247 (“[Movant] bears the burden
of persuasion to clearly establish all four of the[] [preliminary injunction] prerequisites.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)). Instead, Plaintiff merely points to cases like Flanigan’s Enters.,
Inc. of Georgia and Buehrle v. City of Key W., 813 F.3d 973, 980 (11th Cir. 2015), in an effort to
dispel Defendant’s legitimate governmental interest. But these cases were decided at the summary
judgment stage with the benefit of a complete record. See Pine, 762 F.3d at 1276 (noting that “this
matter is before the Court only on the question of the extraordinary and drastic remedy of a
preliminary injunction [and that] Appellants remain free on a full record to pursue [] other relief.”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)).
The Court is not in a position to second guess the security concerns presented by Defendant
and supported by Lieutenant Diaz’s declaration. Plaintiff is correct that courts have “an obligation
to carefully examine a government’s claim that it has an interest in imposing speech restrictions.”
Reply at 6. 	But Defendant has presented sufficient evidence at this stage of the proceedings to
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support its substantial and significant interests in promoting public and event safety, protecting its
attendees, and allocating its resources and personnel in a way that furthers these interests.
ii. 	A reasonable fit exists between Defendant’s interests and the restriction
Finding 	that 	Defendant’s 	“stated purposes 	for 	the [restriction] 	are legitimate and
significant,” the Court turns to “whether there is a reasonable fit between those interests and [the
restriction], as the City’s chosen means for serving them.” Coal. for the Abolition of Marijuana
Prohibition, 219 F.3d at 1318 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Here, the inquiry turns on
whether Defendant’s substantial interests “would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation” and whether “the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve
the government’s interest.” Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 11 F.4th
1266, 1295 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799–800). That said, a restriction will not
be invalidated “simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be
adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; see also
Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs, 11 F.4th at 1296 (“[T]he mere availability of less restrictive
alternatives will not cause a regulation to fail narrow tailoring scrutiny . . . .”).
As explained above, Defendant’s substantial interests in public safety and event security
would be achieved less effectively if JVP and other protest groups were permitted to demonstrate
directly in front of the entry and exit to the Convention Center. 	The Event Plan creates a
Designated Protest Area around the perimeter of the convention center and the surrounding area
to “facilitate safe ingress and egress within Art Basel and Design Miami, . . . minimize the risk of
unreasonable congestion in high-traffic areas” and ensure “law enforcement and security staff’s
ability to identify potential threats to attendee safety and security.” Event Plan, [ECF No. 60-1] at
4. Plaintiff posits that Defendant’s interests would not be impacted by permitting JVP to protest
in front of the Convention Center because, as in past protests, the presence of an “ample number
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of police” will have “little difficulty keeping order.” 	Mot. at 11. 	Plaintiff further explains that
“[i]f there were a large number of protesters on the Convention Center’s 30-foot-wide sidewalk
that actually did cause congestion or block entrances, then the police could merely require that the
protesters move away from the entrances or spread out over a greater portion of the 1000-foot-
long sidewalk.” Plaintiff’s Supp. Resp., [ECF No. 62] at 4.
But these arguments underscore why Defendant’s interests may be undermined if the City
of Miami Beach cannot implement its Event Plan. It is true that police may be able to effectively
diffuse any potential conflict or unrest and order protesters to spread out along the sidewalk should
congestion increase. But the fact that law enforcement officers stationed directly in front of the
Convention Center would need to direct their attention and resources towards protest groups
lessens their efficacy in ensuring traffic and event safety for those entering and exiting the event.
Further, Plaintiff’s assurances that the protest will be peaceful—and that any past unrest was
caused by protestors unaffiliated with JVP, see Clauss Reply Decl., [ECF No. 52-1] ¶¶ 7–8—is of
no moment. 	The Event Plan’s restrictions apply to all individuals seeking to protest directly
outside the Convention Center and security risks remain regardless of protestor affiliation. 	See
Marcavage, 689 F.3d at 107 (“The policy ‘should not be measured by the disorder that would
result from granting an exemption solely to [Plaintiffs]’ because if these two plaintiffs were
allowed a dispensation, ‘so too must other groups,’ which would then create ‘a much larger threat
to the State’s interest in crowd control’ and security.” (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992)).
In sum, should JVP and other protest groups be permitted to protest directly in front of the
Convention Center, it would lessen the efficacy of Defendant’s safety and security protocols, as
well as negatively impact law enforcement’s allocation of resources. Diaz Suppl. Decl., [ECF No.
60-2] ¶ 5 (identifying factors that the Miami Beach Police have considered in preparing the Special
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Event Action Plan); see also Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1224 (noting, in response to
plaintiff’s argument that “officer staffing levels [] were adequate to assure the peacefulness of their
demonstration” that “security planning is necessarily concerned with managing potential risks,
which sometimes necessitates consideration of the worst-case scenario.”).
Next, the Court must consider whether Defendant’s chosen means are substantially broader
than necessary to achieve their governmental interests. Plaintiff argues that the location of
the Designated Protest Area—the corner of 17th Street and Convention Center Drive,
directly adjacent to the Event Zone—excessively moves JVP some 150 yards or 450 feet from
their desired protest location at the entrance and exit to the Convention Center. Plaintiff’s Supp.
Resp., [ECF No. 62] at 1. At the Hearing, Plaintiff directed the Court to two cases in support
of its position that this restriction is not narrowly tailored. In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network
of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997), Plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court struck down a
regulation moving protestors 35 feet away from the entrance of an abortion clinic. Hearing Tr. at
26:3–8. However, the Supreme Court did no such thing.7 While it struck down the
“floating [15–foot] buffer zones[,]” it upheld the “fixed buffer zones around the doorways,
driveways, and driveway entrance [as] necessary to ensure that people and vehicles trying to enter
or exit the clinic property or clinic parking lots [could] do so.” Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377–80.
And in Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., a case that Schenck relies on, the Court upheld the
“36-foot buffer zone as applied to the street, sidewalks, and driveways ‘as a way of ensuring
access to the clinic.’” Id. at 373 (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
768–69 (1994)). In any event, the Court finds
7 Upon review of the relevant case law and the record, it appears that Plaintiff may have intended to cite
McCullen v. Coakley, where the Court found that a 35-foot buffer zone was not narrowly tailored. 573 U.S.
at 495. Specifically, the Court found that the government “ha[d] not shown that it seriously undertook to
address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it.” Id. at 494. The Court also finds this
case distinguishable, not only due to the differing safety concerns between an abortion clinic and Art Basel,
but also because Defendant here has provided evidence that it considered and rejected various alternatives
for the location of the Designated Protest Area. See Diaz Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 11–14.
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these cases to be inapposite. While there may be safety concerns when entering and exiting an
abortion clinic, the number of people who do so daily pales in comparison to the number of
individuals who will enter Art Basel through the Convention Center. And, in any event, Schenck
and Madsen did find certain buffer zones designed to provide access to the clinics to be narrowly
tailored.
Plaintiff also directed the Court to Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, where protesters were
impermissibly cordoned 50 to 75 yards away from their desired protest area. 559 F.3d at 1181;
Hearing Tr. at 26:9–14. Relying on Amnesty Int’l, USA, Plaintiff maintains that “the mere presence
of a large number of people in [an] area” is insufficient to justify the “complete deprivation of
[Plaintiff’s] right to pass out literature.” Id. at 77:24–78:4 (quoting Amnesty Int’l, USA, 559 F.3d
at 1181–82). Yet the facts here are readily distinguishable. The Free Trade Association Meeting
at issue in Amnesty Int’l, USA included “hundreds of people”—not the thousands expected at Art
Basel—and the demonstrators there were entirely “prevent[ed] [] from . . . passing out literature.”
559 F.3d at 1181. 	Here, significantly more is at stake given the nature of Art Basel. 	It is not
simply “a large number of people in [an] area,” but an international large-scale event attended by
thousands of celebrities, artists, and dignitaries. Id. at 1182. And, as noted below, Defendant has
not entirely deprived Plaintiff of its right to communicate with Art Basel attendees, pass out
literature in support of its message, and urge attendees to sign a petition.
The Court finds cases like Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, Marcavage, and Citizens for Peace in Space
instructive in its analysis. In these cases, the First, Second, and Tenth Circuits upheld plans similar
to, if not more restrictive than, the one designed by Defendant. See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378
F.3d at 10–12, 14 (upholding denial of preliminary injunctive relief to modify the city’s
demonstration zone which put protestors in “an enclosed space [akin] to a pen” that was located
on the edge of the “highly secure hard zone in the area immediately surrounding the [Convention]
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Center[,]” noting that although the city’s measures were “extreme” they were “nonetheless
narrowly tailored” and “[not so] unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”); Citizens
for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1218 n.2, 1220 (finding city’s security plan, where plaintiffs were
permitted to conduct their protest at Checkpoint 1, approximately 310 yards from the front of the
conference center, to be “narrowly tailored to advance its significant security interest because the
security zone . . . directly and effectively protected the conference from the threat of terrorism,
explosives, and violent protests.”); Marcavage, 689 F.3d at 106 (“The no-demonstration zone was
narrowly tailored to achieve significant government interests. The restricted zones were confined
to a two-block stretch of Seventh Avenue and were in place only during the four days of the
Convention. And the policy was tailored to meet the congestion and security challenges that the
Convention presented.”).
The common thread in these cases is the authorization of an event security zone, where
protestors were allowed to demonstrate in an area outside of—but adjacent to—the zone, given the
substantial governmental interest in security associated with a large-scale, high-profile event. This
makes sense, in light of the fact that “the significance of the government interest bears an inverse
relationship to the rigor of the narrowly tailored analysis.” Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d
at 1221. 	Plaintiff contends that narrow tailoring here “requires that the City avail itself of the
simple expedient of setting up checkpoints at Convention Center entrances where police officers
can examine handbags, backpacks and the like.” Plaintiff’s Supp. Resp., [ECF No. 62] at 4. But
this argument “assumes a standard far more strict than that at play here[,]” where only a reasonable
fit is required. Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1223.
The Court finds that the Designated Protest Area is reasonable in light of the heightened
security concerns. 	And Defendant presents evidence that a number of other protest areas were
considered and rejected for legitimate reasons. 	Diaz Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 11–14 (discussing
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considerations such as leaving clear designated areas for emergency evacuation, ensuring the safe
and orderly flow of traffic in the ride share and shuttle drop-off zone, and obstructing public access
to outdoor art installations). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant’s chosen means, while
not perfect, are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve its significant interests.
III. 	Defendant’s Restriction Leaves Open Ample Alternatives for Communication
Given that Defendant’s restriction is content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, the final issue for the Court’s consideration is whether
Defendant’s restriction fails to leave open ample alternatives for communication. Ward, 491 U.S.
at 802. While “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable
method of communication at all times and in all places,” Defendant’s restriction “may be invalid
if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.” Members of City Council of City of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (citing Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647).
“The ample alternative channels analysis cannot be conducted in an objective vacuum, but instead
it must give ‘practical recognition’ to the facts giving rise to the restriction on speech.” Citizens
for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1226 (noting that “[t]o treat the ample alternative channels analysis
as wholly independent disconnects it from reality and diminishes the emphasis courts have
traditionally placed on the importance of the government interest.”).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant has denied “Plaintiff its First Amendment right to be seen
and heard by, and interact with, its intended audience.” Mot. at 12. In support of this contention,
Plaintiff offers a declaration from a protestor who states that the Designated Protest Area is “too
far away from the entrance to the Convention Center for our signs to be seen and our chants to be
heard by attendees of Art Basel.” Saper Decl., [ECF No. 40-4] ¶ 16. And because of the location,
“[JVP] also could not ask the people passing by the convention center if they would sign our
petition.” 	Id. 	Defendant presents its own characterization of the Designated Protest Area,
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highlighting that it “provides a clear line of sight and sound to the venue[,] . . . borders the only
sidewalk used by pedestrians traveling northbound from where most attendees who drive will
park[,] [and] is a highly trafficked area where many pedestrians going to Art Basel walk directly
past.” Diaz Supp. Decl. ¶ 10.
In light of these competing characterizations, the Court considers how significantly the
Designated Protest Area limits Plaintiff’s speech, and the adequacy of alternative modes of
communication. “[T]he law is well-settled that the alternative channel ‘does not have to be the
speaker’s first choice.’” McDonald, 556 F. Supp. 3d at 1360 (quoting Weinberg v. City of Chicago,
310 F.3d 1029, 1041 (7th Cir. 2002)). 	Plaintiff contends that in the Designated Protest Area,
“[t]hey no longer have access to their intended audience.” Hearing Tr. at 25:22–23. But JVP is
still in a position to be seen by thousands of Art Basel attendees and will have the ability to ask
these attendees to sign their petitions. The potential loss of audience members as a result of being
confined to the Designated Protest Area is not the same as being completely deprived of an
audience. Thus, like Citizens for Peace in Space, this is “not a case where [Plaintiff is] wholly
deprived of their ability to communicate effectively . . . They [are] not wholly cut off from their
intended audience[.]” Amnesty Int’l, USA, 559 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Citizens for Peace in Space,
477 F.3d at 1226). And, unlike the protesters in Amnesty Int’l, USA, Plaintiff is not “completely
prevented from communicating its message to anyone[.]” Id.
Plaintiff has also failed to explain why it cannot access its intended audience in areas other
than the sidewalk in front of the Convention Center. Art Basel is not just a one-day, single location
event. Miami Art Week lasts a full seven days, with at least nineteen art fairs apart from Art Basel,
as well as hundreds of exhibitions and galleries taking place throughout the city. “[T]he regulation
does not prohibit [protesting] on other public properties . . . In short, only [protesting within the
event security zone] is proscribed; all other methods of communication are left open.” Int’l Caucus
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of Lab. Committees, 111 F.3d at 1552. 	Plaintiff has a multitude of other ways it can access,
communicate with, and interact with its intended audience, other than on the sidewalk directly in
front of the Convention Center. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) (“[T]he limited
nature 	of 	the 	prohibition 	[here] 	makes 	it 	virtually 	self-evident 	that 	ample 	alternatives
remain . . . .”).
In short, that Defendant’s “limitations [] may reduce to some degree the potential audience
for [Plaintiff’s] speech is of no consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining
avenues of communication are inadequate.” 	Ward, 491 U.S. at 802. 	Thus, for purposes of
preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiff has failed to establish that its message will be improperly
impacted under the First Amendment. 	Nor has Plaintiff been left without ample adequate
opportunities to communicate. Art Basel is not limited to the Convention Center, and Plaintiff has
been provided a visible, highly trafficked location in which to protest—even if it is not Plaintiff’s
preferred location.
CONCLUSION
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes that Defendant’s restriction is content
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leaves open ample
alternative channels for communication. 	Thus, because Plaintiff “ha[s] not shown a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits, [the Court] need not consider the remaining factors in the
preliminary injunction test.” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1329; see also Bloedorn, 631
F.3d at 1242 (“In as much as [Plaintiff] has failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits as to any of his claims, we need not, and do not, examine whether he has suffered
irreparable harm, or whether a balance of the hardships weighs in his favor, or, finally, whether
the public interest would support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”).
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Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Expedited
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, [ECF No. 40], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 1st day of December, 2025.
_________________________________
RODOLFO A. RUIZ II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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