Megladon, Inc. v. Village of Pinecrest

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 21-cv-22819-ALTMAN/Reid
MEGLADON, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE OF PINECREST,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
After our jury rendered its verdict in this case, see Jury Verdict [ECF No. 315], we entered final
judgment in favor of the Defendant—the Village of Pinecrest (the “Village”)—as to Count I of the
Second Amended Complaint (the “SAC”) [ECF No. 77]. See Final Judgment [ECF No. 325]. We also
entered judgment for the Plaintiff, Megladon, Inc. (“Megladon”), as to Count II of the SAC, awarding
Megladon $409,437.50 in damages. See also Order Denying Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law [ECF No. 364]. Megladon now seeks $49,923.71 in taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See
Motion for Award of Taxable Costs (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 329].1 After careful review, we
GRANT in part and DENY in part the Motion.
T HE L AW
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, a prevailing party may receive costs, apart from
attorney’s fees.” Coleman v. Morris-Shea Bridge Company, Inc., 2026 WL 144791, at *9 (11th Cir. Jan. 20,
2026); see also FED . R. C IV . P. 54(d)(1). Indeed, “[t]he presumption is in favor of awarding costs.”
Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). But “federal
1 Megladon has also filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees [ECF No. 349]. We’ll resolve that
motion—along with the Corrected Motion for Judicial Notice [ECF No. 359] and the Motion to
Disregard [ECF No. 360]—in a separate order.
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courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” Ibid. And § 1920 allows “[a] judge or
clerk of any court of the United States [to] tax as costs” six categories of expenses: “[f]ees of the clerk
and marshal”; “[f]ees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in
the case”; “[f]ees and disbursements for printing and witnesses”; “[f]ees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case”;
“[d]ocket 	fees” 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1923; 	and 	“[c]ompensation 	of 	court 	appointed 	experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1828.
A NALYSIS
Megladon seeks $49,923.71 in taxable costs. That sum reflects four categories of fees: (1) $932
in Clerk fees; (2) $615 in subpoena and service fees; (3) $36,178.71 in transcripts fees; and (4) $12,198
in exemplification and copy-making fees. See Motion at 4. Though it “concedes that it is not the
prevailing party in this action,” the Village contends that “Megladon seeks a number of costs that are
not, in fact, recoverable under . . . § 1920.” Response to Motion (the “Response”) [ECF No. 344] at
1–2. Specifically, the Village challenges portions of the subpoena and service fees; the transcript fees;
and the exemplification and copy-making fees. See id. at 2 (“[T]he costs should be reduced to
$16,465.72.”). We address each challenge in turn.
I. 	The Subpoena and Service Fees
The Village first objects to the fact that “[a]ll the subpoenas issued by Megladon were issued
with rush or priority services,” given that “Megladon provides no reasoning as to why expedited
service was necessary.” Id. at 3. It thus asks that we adjust the costs associated with “rush service”—
which it says exceed the “U.S. Marshal’s rate”—from $1,547 to $1,141. Id. at 4; see also ibid. (challenging
the costs of service for Carlos Marin, Mark Spanioli, Chad Friedman, JGS Properties, Inc., and Weiss
Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L.). In reply, Megladon makes no mention of those costs and
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instead “primarily stands on its [M]otion and the presumption in favor of awarding costs.” Reply in
Support of Motion (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 348] at 1.
“[P]rivate process server fees may be taxed pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] §§ 1920(1) and 1921.” U.S.
E.E.O.C. v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000). While the Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] not
resolved whether ‘rush service’ from private processors are compensable,” it has declined to find an
abuse of discretion when a district court has withheld such costs if “a permissible reading of th[e]
record” indicates that “service . . . could have been served in advance.” Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th
1254, 1288 n.65 (11th Cir. 2022). Given that Megladon hasn’t offered any explanation for the rush and
priority services, we’ll award $1,141 in subpoena and service fees. See Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A., 564
F. App’x 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When a party fails to respond to an argument or otherwise address
a claim, the Court deems such argument or claim abandoned.” (cleaned up)); see also Loranger v. Stierheim,
10 F.3d 776, 784 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We find that the burden rests with Ray to submit a request for
expenses that would enable the district court to determine what expenses were incurred on the federal
litigation.”).
II. 	The Transcript Fees
The Village next argues that “several of the costs” for “the transcription of deposition and
trial testimony . . . contain charges that lack support or are otherwise not recoverable.” Response at 4.
It specifically objects to two types of costs: one, expedited costs—for “expedited transcripts,”
“condensed transcripts, exhibits, rough drafts, and litigation support items”—that Megladon requests
“without any explanation,” id. at 4–6; and two, “costs related to depositions that were both transcribed
and videotaped,” since the Motion (the Village says) “fails to provide any justification for requiring
both video and transcription of the depositions of Raul Pino, Chad Friedman, Leandro Ona, Frank
Guyamier, Dennis Kerbel, and Stephen Olmstead.” Id. at 6–7. All told, the Village asks that we grant
$15,324.72—not $36,178.71—in transcripts fees.
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Melgadon in turn explains that the expedited deposition transcripts “were virtually all taken in
October 2022, shortly before deadlines set by this Court’s pretrial orders for the filing of summary
judgment papers.” Reply at 2; see also ibid. (“The parties filed their summary judgment motions and
related statements of material fact shortly thereafter on November 21, 2022. The subject depositions
were lengthy, and transcripts needed to be obtained and reviewed on an expedited basis by all parties.
Several were referenced in the statements of material fact and others filed with the Court in support
of the November 2022 summary judgment papers.” (citations omitted)). And Megladon further
maintains that the expedited trial transcripts “were necessary given significant oral rulings on motions
in limine and on Daubert motions at the outset of the trial, the deposition of Village Manager Galiano
ordered during the trial, and for general use at trial.” Ibid.; see also Exhibit B [ECF No. 348-2]
(documenting an email chain that uses rough transcripts to confirm which exhibits were admitted at
trial).
Section 1920 allows for a judge to tax as costs “fees for printed or electronically recorded
transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case.” § 1920(2) (emphasis added). “However, simply because
taxation of deposition transcript costs is authorized does not mean that taxation of such costs is
automatic.” Salvador v. Brico, LLC, 796 F. App’x 654, 656 (11th Cir. 2020). Instead, “[w]here the
deposition costs were merely incurred for convenience, to aid in thorough preparation, or for purposes
of investigation only, the costs are not recoverable.” W&O, 213 F.3d at 620.
We’re satisfied by Megladon’s account of the expedited deposition- and trial-transcript costs.
“[U]se of a deposition at trial or in a summary judgment motion tends to show that the deposition
was necessarily obtained for use in a case.” Watson v. Lake Cnty., 492 F. App’x 991, 996 (11th Cir.
2012). And “even where a deposition is not ultimately used as part of a prevailing party’s case, we have
held that the costs of the deposition are taxable under § 1920 where no evidence shows that the
deposition was unrelated to an issue in the case at the time it was taken.” Id. at 996–97; see also In re
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Fundamental Long Term Care, Inc., 753 F. App’x 878, 882 (11th Cir. 2019) (“There is no requirement in
the statutory text that the transcripts must be used later in a proceeding or motion, or that they be
cited in the dispositive order.”); Shed v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs., 2025 WL 1540573, at *7 (11th Cir.
May 30, 2025) (“The district court was permitted to award costs for the deposition even though the
deposition was not later used because Mr. Shed’s deposition was related to the issues of the case[.]”);
Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 740 F. App’x 708, 709 (11th Cir. 2018) (deeming a deposition transcript
“necessarily obtained for use in the case” because the “testimony was clearly pertinent” to the defense
and because the defendant “relied heavily on [the transcript] to support its arguments on summary
judgment”). Given Megladon’s reasonable explanation, we find that the Village has “failed to show
that the depositions were unrelated to an issue in the case.” Paylan v. Teitelbaum, 798 F. App’x 458, 468
(11th Cir. 2020).
We’ll note, however, that Megladon leaves unanswered the Village’s objection to the costs
related to the depositions “that were both transcribed and videotaped.” Response at 6. So, given
Megladon’s failure to clarify the need to both transcribe and videotape the depositions of Pino,
Friedman, Ona, Guyamier, Kerbel, and Olmstead, we’ll deduct those costs—which amount to
$6,596.25, see Response at 7–8—from the $36,178.71 Megladon requests. See Gary Brown & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 F. App’x 837, 846 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to find an abuse of discretion
when the district court determined “that a general $4,602.90 charge for deposition transcripts lacked
the requisite specificity” (emphasis added)); see also Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a party “abandons a claim when he either makes only passing reference
to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner”).
III. 	The Exemplification and Copy Fees
Finally, the Village objects to the “recovery of apparently thirty-three enlarged exhibits in the
amount of $12,198.00,” noting that “Megladon has entirely failed to identify the specific items on
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which it seeks recovery.” Response at 10; see also ibid. (“[T]he Village is left pondering what these
enlarged exhibits were, especially given the fact that there were thirty-three of them.”). In turn,
Megladon lists the specific exhibits at issue, see Reply at 3, and maintains that “all [were] enlargements
of listed documentary exhibits that Megladon anticipated may be useful at trial”—and that “[m]any of
them were indeed shown to the jury,” ibid.
Section 1920 allows for a judge to tax as costs “[f]ees for exemplification and costs of making
copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.” § 1920(4) (emphasis
added). As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “[u]se of information contained in a file is not a
prerequisite to finding that it was necessary to copy the file.” W&O, 213 F.3d at 623 (cleaned up).
“Rather, like with depositions, in evaluating copying costs, the court should consider whether the
prevailing party could have reasonably believed that it was necessary to copy the papers at issue.” Ibid.
We therefore find that Megladon is entitled to the recovery of these fees, given its representation that
the exhibits at issue were used at—or at least made for—trial. See Watson, 492 F. App’x at 997 (“In
evaluating copy costs, a district court should consider whether the prevailing party could have
‘reasonably believed’ that it was necessary to copy the documents at issue.”).
C ONCLUSION
After careful review, therefore, we ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:
1. 	Megladon’s Motion for Award of Taxable Costs [ECF No. 329] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
2. 	We enter an award in favor of Megladon for $42,921.46 in taxable costs. We also award post-
judgment interest on that sum.
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DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on October 12, 2026.
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
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