Eunice Murray

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
EUNICE MURRAY, 	Case No. 25-24862-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 7
______________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEBTOR’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Debtor Eunice Murray – representing herself – requests that the Court dismiss
her voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case because she has instead chosen to work with
her creditors outside of court to resolve her debts.1 For the reasons discussed below,
the Court will grant her request.
Because she is unrepresented, the Court must liberally construe Ms. Murray’s
motion to discern the legal basis for the relief she seeks.2 Under the Bankruptcy Code,
1 Dkt. No. 15.
2 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on February 9, 2026.
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there are only two statutory bases to dismiss a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case
– 11 U.S.C. §§ 707 and 305.3
Section 707(a) provides that the court can dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy case
“only after notice and a hearing and only for cause.”4 The term “cause” is not defined,
but 	the 	statute 	lists 	three 	examples 	of 	cause: 	(1) unreasonable 	delay 	that 	is
prejudicial to creditors; (2) nonpayment of statutory fees; and (3) the debtor’s failure
to timely file certain lists, schedules, statements, and other required documents.5
Only the United States trustee, however, may seek dismissal under subsection
(a)(3).6 Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), on the other hand, are both silent as to who can
move for dismissal on those bases.
Even if Ms. Murray could seek dismissal of her own chapter 7 case under
section 707(a), she does not claim here that any unreasonable delay on her part is
prejudicing her creditors. And as of the date of her motion, she was current on her
filing fee obligations.7 So neither subsection (a)(1) nor subsection (a)(2) would apply.
But the statute says “cause” includes the three examples listed in subsections (a)(1),
(a)(2), and (a)(3). Under the Bankruptcy Code’s rules of construction, when the
Bankruptcy Code uses the term “includes” or “including,” those terms are not
3 In chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, on the other hand, unless the case had previously been converted
from chapter 7, 11, or 12 to chapter 13, the debtor has the right to dismiss her case “at any time.” 11
U.S.C. § 1307(b).
4 11 U.S.C. § 707(a).
5 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007.
6 The United States trustee has not moved to dismiss this case.
7 The Court had granted Ms. Murray leave to pay her filing fee in installments. Dkt. No. 10. Her second
installment payment of $169.00 is due by February 17, 2026. Id. Her failure to timely make this second
installment payment would constitute cause for dismissal under section 707(a)(2).
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limiting.8 Thus, “cause” for dismissal of a chapter 7 bankruptcy case can include a
reason other than the three specifically listed in section 707(a).9
It is questionable, however, whether an individual’s “debtor’s remorse” – i.e., a
debtor after filing for bankruptcy decides she would rather not have done so – could
constitute cause for dismissal under section 707(a). This is due to the nature of
individual chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. Individual chapter 7 cases essentially proceed
on dual tracks. Track one is the debtor’s pursuit of a discharge of her debts – usually
the goal of an individual who files a chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Track two is the
trustee’s collection, liquidation, and distribution of the debtor’s property to pay her
creditors. If after filing for bankruptcy a debtor wishes to get off track one – i.e., no
longer pursue a discharge – there is a mechanism to do so that does not require
dismissal of the case. Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), a debtor can voluntarily waive
her discharge.
An individual debtor’s request to abandon track two, however, presents more
complex issues. This is because upon the filing of a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, a
debtor surrenders to the trustee all non-exempt property she owned as of the petition
date.10 The 	trustee 	is 	then 	charged with 	liquidating 	those 	assets 	to 	pay 	her
creditors.11 Accordingly, except in those rare cases where there are sufficient assets
8 11 U.S.C. § 102(3).
9 Section 707(b) also provides for dismissal of a chapter 7 bankruptcy case filed by an individual debtor
with primarily consumer debts, but only for abuse of the provisions of chapter 7. There has been no
argument or evidence that granting Ms. Murray relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code would
constitute an abuse of its provisions. So subsection (b) would not apply here either.
10 See In re Calixto, 648 B.R. 119, 123 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2023); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541.
11 See Calixto, 648 B.R. at 123; see also 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1). In most individual chapter 7 cases,
however, there are insufficient non-exempt assets available for a trustee to liquidate for the benefit of
creditors. See U.S. C OURTS, Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, https://www.uscourts.gov/court-
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to pay all creditors in full (with interest) and there is residual value left to return to
the debtor,12 a chapter 7 debtor will normally lack standing to raise any issues with
respect to how a trustee proceeds with track two.13 In other words, since the trustee
is charged with administering the debtor’s assets upon filing a chapter 7 bankruptcy
case, the debtor normally does not have a say in how – or whether – the trustee does
so. The Court therefore concludes that in this case – where there is no evidence of a
surplus sufficient to pay all creditor claims in full – Ms. Murray’s desire to dismiss
her case does not constitute “cause” under section 707(a).
While section 707(a) therefore cannot be used as a basis to dismiss her case,
there is another provision of the Bankruptcy Code that on its face, under the facts of
this case, would permit Ms. Murray to seek – and the Court to grant – dismissal. That
is section 305(a)(1). Section 305(a)(1) provides that “[t]he court, after notice and a
hearing, may dismiss a case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case
under this title, at any time if . . . the interests of creditors and the debtor would be
better served by such dismissal or suspension.”14
programs/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics 	(“Most 	chapter 	7 	cases
involving individual debtors are no asset cases.”) (last visited on Feb. 2, 2026); U.S. D EP ’ T OF JUSTICE,
U.S. 	TRUSTEE 	PROGRAM, 	The 	U.S. 	Trustee’s 	Role 	In 	Consumer 	Bankruptcy 	Cases,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/bankruptcy-fact-sheets/us-trustees-role-consumer-bankruptcy-cases 	(“In
most Chapter 7 cases, no assets are available for distribution to creditors.”) (last visited Feb. 2, 2026).
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6).
13 See In re Mack Indus., Ltd., 606 B.R. 313, 320 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing In re Andreuccetti,
975 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992) (debtors had standing to appeal only because of the possibility of a
surplus); In re Rybka, 339 B.R. 464, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (debtors lack standing to object to fee
applications unless there will be a surplus estate giving them a pecuniary interest in the matter); In
re Drost, 228 B.R. 208, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998) (debtor lacks standing to object to trustee’s
proposed disposition of an asset unless there will be a surplus estate and he will be adversely affected
by the proposed disposition)).
14 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1).
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It is true that many cases discussing section 305(a)(1) call it “an extraordinary
remedy.”15 There is nothing in the text of the statute, however, that supports this
construction.16 The statute simply says that after notice and a hearing, the Court
may dismiss a bankruptcy case if the interests of both the debtor and creditors would
be better served by dismissal. Nothing in the statute imposes any higher standard to
apply it than any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Here, Ms. Murray states
that she has chosen to work with her creditors to resolve her debts outside of
bankruptcy court. None of her creditors nor the chapter 7 trustee have objected to her
request for dismissal. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the interests of creditors
and the debtor would be better served by dismissal of her case. It is therefore
ORDERED that:
1. 	The motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
2. 	This case is DISMISSED.
# # #
Copies furnished to all interested parties by the Clerk of Court.
15 See, e.g., In re Eastman, 188 B.R. 621, 624 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); In re Northshore Mainland
Services, Inc., 537 B.R. 192, 203 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015); In re L & M Video Prods., 2007 WL 1847387,
at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Cincinnati Gear Co., 304 B.R. 784, 785 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003);
In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A., 303 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
16 Those cases characterizing dismissal under section 305(a)(1) as an extraordinary remedy often point
to subsection (c), which provides that an order under subsection (a) dismissing or suspending a case,
or deciding not to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by the court of appeals. An order under
subsection (a) is not unappealable, though. It just may not be appealed to the court of appeals. It can
be appealed to the district court or (in those circuits that have one) to the bankruptcy appellate panel.
See 28 U.S.C. § 158; see also Eastman, 188 B.R. at 624; In re Axona International Credit & Commerce
Ltd., 924 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Borelli, 132 B.R. 648, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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