CHASE v. ARBOR PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT INC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
LINDA C. CHASE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:24-cv-158-MW-MJF
ARBOR PROPERTIES
DEVELOPMENT INC., et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff asserts two claims against three Defendants regarding
Defendant 	Arbor 	Properties’ 	denial 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	residential 	lease
application: (1) the denial constitutes retaliation in violation of the Fair
Housing Act; and (2) an email from Defendant Jill Hewitt to Plaintiff
constitutes defamation in violation of Florida law. Defendants move to
dismiss this civil action because: (1) Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
is an impermissible “shotgun” pleading; and (2) Plaintiff failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 42. Plaintiff opposes the
motion. Doc. 44. The District Court should dismiss this civil action
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because Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is a “shotgun” pleading
and Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B ACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff’s Residence at Arbor Trace Apartments
Between April 2018, and August 2021, Plaintiff and her husband
resided at the Arbor Trace Apartments, which was a property owned or
operated by Defendant Arbor Properties Development, Inc. (“Arbor”). See
Doc. 41 at 8–9; Doc. 44 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that on at least three
occasions 	starting 	on 	November 	23, 	2020, 	unidentified 	individuals
entered Plaintiff’s apartment without her permission. Doc. 41 at 7–8.
Plaintiff 	confronted 	employees 	of 	Arbor 	about 	these 	unauthorized
entries, and Arbor employees advised Plaintiff to file police reports.
On June 25, 2021, Arbor Trace Apartments notified Plaintiff that it
did not intend to renew its lease with Plaintiff and her husband. In
response, Plaintiff states she filed the fair housing complaint on August
28, 2021, with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, in which
Plaintiff alleged that Arbor discriminated against Plaintiff based on her
disability. Doc. 41 at 10; Doc. 44 at 2.
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B. 	Plaintiff’s Lease Application at Arbor Landing Mill Bayou
On June 14, 2022, Plaintiff and her husband applied for tenancy at
Arbor Landing Mill Bayou in Panama City, Florida, which is another
property owned or operated by Arbor.1 Doc. 41 at 6. On June 15, 2022,
Plaintiff emailed property manager Defendant Jill Hewitt and assistant
property manager Dajana Shufford concerning her lease application. Id.
On June 16, 2022, Hewitt sent an email to Plaintiff in which Hewitt
stated that Arbor denied Plaintiff’s lease application because of Plaintiff’s
hostile conduct while Plaintiff resided at the Arbor Trace Apartments.
Id.
C. 	This Civil Action
Plaintiff initiated this civil action on June 14, 2024, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. That court
transferred this case to the Northern District of Florida.
Plaintiff’s initial complaint was a so-called “shotgun pleading” that
also appeared not to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc.
1 In her amended complaint, Plaintiff refers to the property as “Mills
Bayou,” but it appears that the correct name is “Mill Bayou.”
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1. 	The 	undersigned, 	therefore, 	struck 	the 	complaint 	and 	provided
detailed instructions to Plaintiff to enable her to state a claim. Doc. 29.
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against three
Defendants: (1) Arbor Properties Development, Inc.; (2) Jill Hewitt; and
(3) Gordon Thames. Id. at 1, 4–5. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts claims of:
(1) retaliation in violation of the Fair Housing Act because Defendants
denied Plaintiff’s application for tenancy at Arbor Landing Mill Bayou;
and (2) defamation in violation of Florida law. Doc. 41 at 6, 10, 12.
STANDARD
Determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief
can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Mitchell
v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The District Court must
accept all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and
must evaluate all reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d
1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1994). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
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relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
DISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Is a “Shotgun” Pleading
“A district court has the ‘inherent authority to control its docket and
ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits,’ which includes the ability to
dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v.
Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Weiland v.
Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)). A
district court that receives a shotgun pleading must sua sponte give a
plaintiff “one chance to replead.” Id. at 1296. But once a pro se litigant
has 	been 	given 	that 	opportunity 	to 	remedy 	the 	deficiencies 	and
squanders 	the 	opportunity 	by 	filing 	another 	shotgun 	pleading, 	the
district court has the authority to dismiss the complaint on shotgun
pleading grounds. Id. at 1295; Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133 (11th
Cir. 2001); see also Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d
1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Federal courts possess an inherent power
to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a court order.”) (citations
omitted).
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A civil complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 thus requires “clarity and brevity”
in pleading. Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (cleaned
up). Rule 8 prohibits complaints that contain “immaterial facts not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d
at 1322.
Despite the 	undersigned specifically 	informing Plaintiff of her
obligations under Rule 8 and Rule 10, Plaintiff ignored the undersigned’s
order and again filed an impermissible “shotgun” pleading. Specifically,
Plaintiff’s amended complaint digresses into a morass of extraneous facts
that are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s complaint contains
long diatribes irrelevant to the two claims she purports to assert in her
complaint. Federal “district courts have neither the manpower nor the
time to sift through a morass of irrelevant facts in order to piece together
claims . . . .” Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1327–28 (11th Cir.
2021) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
Because Plaintiff failed to comply with the undersigned’s order to
amend her complaint to comply with Rule 8 and Rule 10 of the Federal
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Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court should dismiss this civil
action.
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim
The District Court should dismiss this civil action for a second,
independent reason: Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
1. 	Plaintiff Fails to State an FHA Retaliation Claim
The Fair Housing Act makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or
on account of that person having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right
granted or protected by” the Fair Housing Act. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(b);
Philippeaux v. Apartment Inv. & Mgmt. Co., 598 F. App’x 640, 645 (11th
Cir. 2015). This proscribes retaliating against any person that has made
a complaint under the Fair Housing Act or any person that “has reported
a 	discriminatory 	housing 	practice 	to 	a 	housing 	provider 	or 	other
authority.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(5)–(6).
To state a claim of retaliation under the FHA, a plaintiff must
allege:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity;
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(2) the defendant subjected the plaintiff to an adverse action; and
(3) the plaintiff’s protected activity caused the defendant to take the
adverse action.
Philippeaux, 598 F. App’x at 645.
Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	plausible 	claim 	because 	she 	has 	not
sufficiently alleged a causal connection between her filing of the fair
housing discrimination complaint and the denial of her application for
tenancy at Arbor Landing Mill Bayou. That is, in her second amended
complaint, Plaintiff does not include any facts to support an inference
that Arbor denied Plaintiff’s application to lease an apartment because
Plaintiff previously complained of discrimination.
As Plaintiff outlines in her second amended complaint and the
documents attached thereto, on June 25, 2021, Arbor notified Plaintiff
that it had decided not to renew its lease with Plaintiff (i.e., that Arbor
no longer wanted Plaintiff as a lessee). Doc. 41-1 at 10. Thus, on June 25,
2021—long before August 28, 2021, when Plaintiff complained to the
Florida Commission on Human Relations—Arbor indicated that it did
not want Plaintiff as a lessee. Indeed, Plaintiff admits in her second
amended complaint that it was Arbor’s decision not to renew her lease
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that prompted her to file a fair housing complaint in the first place. Doc.
41 at 10. Because already on June 25, 2021, Arbor indicated that it did
not want Plaintiff as a lessee, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that
Plaintiff’s filing of a complaint on August 28, 2021, caused Arbor to
retaliate against Plaintiff by declining to lease an apartment to Plaintiff
in June 2022.
Indeed, in a document that Plaintiff attached to her complaint,
Arbor informed Plaintiff that Arbor “is unable to accept” Plaintiff’s
“application for residency with any of the Arbor Properties communities
due to the hostility and harassment displayed by you [Plaintiff] during
your residency at Arbor Trace Apartments” in 2021. Doc. 41-1 at 1; Doc.
41 at 7. Because—according to Plaintiff’s allegations and documents
attached to her second amended complaint—Arbor already decided in
June 2021 not to lease an apartment to Plaintiff, long before Plaintiff
filed her complaint of discrimination, Doc. 41-1 at 10, Plaintiff’s act of
filing a complaint of discrimination against Arbor obviously did not cause
Arbor not to lease an apartment to Plaintiff. The temporal sequence
alleged by Plaintiff not only fails to allege facts consistent with causation,
it also irrefutably negates causation.
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Additionally, according to Plaintiff’s allegations, there was a ten-
month gap between August 28, 2021 (the date Plaintiff filed her fair
housing complaint) and June 15, 2022 (the date Plaintiff applied for
tenancy at Arbor Landing Mill Bayou). Without additional facts that
suggest 	causation, 	alleging a ten-month gap between the 	protected
activity and the adverse action is insufficient to state a claim. See Fisher
v. SP One, Ltd., 559 F. App’x 873, 878 (11th Cir. 2014); Reese v. Park
Place Condo. Homeowners Ass’n I, 2023 WL 5833678, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept.
8, 2023). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a Fair Housing Act
retaliation claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Defamation Claim
To state a defamation claim under Florida law, a plaintiff must
allege at least the following elements:
(1) the defendant published a statement;
(2) the 	statement 	defendant 	published 	was: 	(a) 	false, 	and 	(b)
defamatory;
(3) the defendant acted at least negligently (regarding defamation
of someone who is not a public figure); and
(4) the plaintiff suffered actual damages.
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Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008).
“A defamatory statement does not become actionable . . . until it is
published or communicated to a third person; statements made to the
person alleging the defamation do not qualify.” Hullick v. Gibraltar Priv.
Bank 	& 	Tr. 	Co., 	279 	So. 	3d 	809, 	812 	(Fla. 	Dist. 	Ct. 	App. 	2019).
Furthermore, when the defendant is a corporation, courts have applied
an intra-corporate communications exception to publications. See id.
(Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007)). When a corporation is accused of defamation, “statements made
to corporate executive or managerial employees of that entity are, in
effect, being made to the corporation itself, and thus lack the essential
element of publication.” Bush v. Raytheon Co., 373 F. App’x 936, 941
(11th Cir. 2010).
(a). 	Plaintiff 	Fails 	to 	Allege 	that 	Defendants
Published a Statement
Plaintiff alleges that Arbor, through Jill Hewitt—acting in her role
as the property manager for Arbor Landing—made defamatory remarks
to Plaintiff and to the assistant property manager of Arbor Landing.
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As to any remarks Hewitt made to Plaintiff, under Florida law,
uttering 	defamatory 	remarks 	to 	a 	plaintiff 	does 	not 	constitute
“publication.” Hullick, 279 So. 3d at 812.
As to any remarks Hewitt made to a fellow Arbor employee, “[w]hen
a corporation is accused of defamation, ‘statements made to corporate
executive or managerial employees of that entity are, in effect, being
made to the corporation itself, and thus lack the essential element of
publication.’” Bush, 373 F. App’x at 941. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not
alleged an essential element of a defamation claim—that any Defendant
published a defamatory statement.
(b). 	Hewitt’s 	Communication 	was 	Protected 	by 	a
Qualified Privileged
There is a second independent reason to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim
for defamation: Hewitt’s statement was protected by a qualified privilege.
A plaintiff fails to state a claim of defamation when the utterance
of the allegedly defamatory statement is protected by a privilege or
qualified privilege. Solis v. Okeechobee Shooting Sports, LLC, No. 19-
14440-CIV, 2020 WL 3089094, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-CV-14440, 2020 WL 3089091 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 20, 2020). A “communication made in good faith on any subject
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matter by one having an interest therein, or in reference to which he has
a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest
or duty, even though it contains matter which would otherwise be
actionable[.]” 	Warner v. Hillsborough Cnty. Clerk of Cts., 2024 WL
553482, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2024) (quoting Nodar v. Galbreath, 462
So. 2d 803, 809 (Fla. 1984)). “Statements made by employees to other
employees 	fall 	within” 	this 	qualified 	privilege. 	Glynn 	v. 	City 	of
Kissimmee, 383 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Hewitt—an employee of Arbor acting in
her role as the property manager for Arbor—made defamatory remarks
to the assistant property manager of Arbor Landing (who also is an
employee of Arbor) in conjunction with processing Plaintiff’s application
for tenancy. Doc. 41 at 7. Any such statements by Hewitt, therefore, are
protected by a qualified privilege. See generally Geddes, 960 So. 2d at 834;
Glynn, 383 So. 2d at 776. Accordingly, for this reason as well, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim of defamation.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
recommends the District Court:
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1. 	GRANT 	Defendant’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	Doc. 	42, 	and
DISMISS this civil action because Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
violates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 9th day of January 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to this report
and 	recommendation 	(“R&R”) 	must 	be 	filed 	within
fourteen days of the date of this R&R. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is
for the court’s internal use only and does not control.
An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections
upon all other parties. A party who fails to object to the
magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or 	recommendations
contained in this R&R waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;
28 U.S.C. § 636.
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