ENDRESS v. DIXON

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
JAMES ENDRESS,
Inmate # 091685
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:26cv72-MW-MAF
RICKY DIXON,
Defendant.
_______________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a third amended civil rights
complaint. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff previously paid the filing fee for this case,
ECF No. 4, but the complaint must still be reviewed as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. That statute directs the Court to review “a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). “On
review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint— (1) is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
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monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Therefore, regardless of the fact that Plaintiff paid the
filing fee, this Court is still required to review a civil complaint filed by a
prisoner, and dismiss the case for the reasons listed under § 1915A(b). 1
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint [hereinafter “complaint”] explains
that in May of 2023, he received a disciplinary report for possessing
contraband. ECF No. 12 at 5. He alleges that staff - Officer Suttle and
Captain Cherry - incorrectly believed that his earbuds contained “a
microphone - a prohibited property.” 	Id. 	Despite his efforts to show that
the device only included “an in-line volume control” and the manufacturer’s
invoice said “no microphone,” Plaintiff was placed in confinement pending a
disciplinary hearing. 	Id. at 6. He alleges he was denied his right to
produce evidence during the hearing and, as a result, he was found guilty
of the disciplinary report. 	Id. at 7. Plaintiff contends that his appeal was
rejected and he received “boilerplate” responses; he claims the reviewing
1 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 states: “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that— . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Greene v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
No. 25-10537, 2025 WL 2732607, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (affirming dismissal of
prisoner’s complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) in case in which
prisoner had paid the filing fee).
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prison officials failed to evaluate the evidence as required by Rule 33-
103.007(e). 	Id. at 8-9. He also asserts that the boilerplate denial
“establishes and demonstrates a custom and policy of the FDC.” 	Id. at 9.
Subsequently, the disciplinary report was deemed by the parole
commission to demonstrate “unsatisfactory institutional conduct” and
Plaintiff’s presumptive parole release date of 4-28-2024 was extended for
60 months. 	Id.
Plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated. 	Id. 	He alleged:
“If not for the failure of the FDC to follow the rules of the Florida
Administrative Code, the Defendant (Ricky Dixon) is responsible for,
Plaintiff would have been paroled out on 4-28-2024.” 	Id. 	“Instead, due to
the malicious acts of the Defendant, Plaintiff is still incarcerated for more
than two (2) years following his effective release date.” 	Id. 	As relief,
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages “for obvious malfeasance.” 	Id. at
11.
Plaintiff sues Defendant Dixon in his official capacity only. ECF No.
12 at 2. As Plaintiff was informed previously, see ECF Nos. 9 and 11, a
complaint brought against a state official in his official capacity generally
represents “only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
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which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-
166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985) (quoting Monell v.
New York City Dept. of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55, 98 S. Ct.
2018, 2035, n.55, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 1978)). An official-capacity action is
appropriate “when the entity itself is a ‘moving force’ behind the
deprivation.” Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S. Ct. at 3105 (quoting Polk
Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509
(1981)).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support the official capacity
claim against Defendant Dixon because he has not alleged that a policy or
custom of the Department of Corrections played a part in the alleged
violation of his right to due process. Although he did allege that the
“boilerplate denial” of his grievance showed a “custom and policy,” ECF
No. 12 at 9, that conclusory assertion is insufficient. Instead, “to
demonstrate a custom or policy, it is generally necessary that a plaintiff
‘show a persistent and wide-spread practice[;] ... [n]ormally random acts or
isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy.’” Depew
v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (alterations
added; citation omitted) (quoted in Donovan v. Rivadeneira, 557 F. Supp.
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3d 1236, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2021)); see also McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d
1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004) (reiterating that an “incident must result from a
demonstrated practice” and a custom is “a practice that is so settled and
permanent that it takes on the force of the law”) (citation omitted). 2 Plaintiff
did not allege facts which show a widespread practice. Thus, Plaintiff has
not alleged facts sufficient to support his contention that boilerplate
responses to grievances are the result of a policy of Defendant Dixon.
Because no other facts are presented which allege actions or inactions of
Defendant Dixon, the complaint fails to state a claim.
Additionally, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Dixon in his official
capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
bars suits against the State and its employees in their official capacity for
money damages unless waived by the State or Congress. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S. Ct. 900, 907, 79 L. Ed.
2d 67 (1984). The State of Florida has not waived its immunity, see
2 A recent case illustrates that for supervisory liability to exist, a plaintiff must show
the defendant was “on notice by a history of widespread abuse” that is persistent with
numerous prior incidents. See Bridges v. Poe, 155 F.4th 1302, 1314-15 (11th Cir.
2025) (finding that a “single report,” without more, is insufficient to “show that a custom
or policy resulted in deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights”). Plaintiff has
not alleged facts to support a supervisory claim against Defendant Dixon.
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Gamble v. Fla. Dep't Health and Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1520 (11th
Cir. 1986), and neither did Congress when enacting § 1983. Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974). Therefore,
because the Eleventh Amendment precludes Plaintiff from suing Defendant
Dixon in his official capacity for monetary damages, the complaint should
also be dismissed for seeking “monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 	See Bailey v.
Lopez-Rivera, No. 4:22-CV-169-AW-MAF, 2023 WL 8622347, at *1 (N.D.
Fla. Dec. 13, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Bailey v. Lopez-Rivera, No. 25-11327,
2026 WL 161319 (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (dismissing claim based on
Eleventh Amendment immunity and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)); Ballard
v. Cent. Alabama Drug Task Force, No. 2:22-CV-105-WKW-JTA, 2023 WL
8238898, at *3 (M.D. Ala. June 5, 2023) (finding that plaintiff’s claims were
barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and could not “survive review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)”).
One additional comment is warranted. Accepting Plaintiff’s
allegations as true, it is understandable that Plaintiff is frustrated by the
actions of Officer Suttle and Captain Cherry. According to Plaintiff, their
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mistaken belief that his earbuds were contraband resulted in the loss of his
property and, potentially, extended his incarceration. 3 Yet Plaintiff alleged
only that those officials were mistaken. ECF No. 12 at 5-6. The loss of
property which is based on a defendant’s negligence (ergo, mistake) is not
a viable claim. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L.
Ed.2d 662 (1986) (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not afford” a prisoner a remedy for a defendant’s
negligent conduct). Moreover, even if Plaintiff claimed that a prison official
intentionally caused the loss of his property, his claim would still be
foreclosed by Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541-44, 101 S. Ct. 1908,
1916-17, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981), and its progeny which “hold that a
deprivation of liberty or property is not cognizable under Section 1983
when a state’s post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim’s
3 Plaintiff contends that his presumptive parole release date was extended, but there
is no assurance that he would have been released on parole even without the
disciplinary report because parole “is a matter of Commission discretion.” Walker v. Fla.
Parole Comm'n, 299 F. App'x 900, 902 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Damiano v. Florida
Parole and Probation Comm'n, 785 F.2d 929, 932 (11th Cir. 1986)). Indeed, Florida law
provides that parole is an “act of grace.” Howard v. Coonrod, 134 F.4th 1136, 1149
(11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 947.002(5) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that
the decision to parole an inmate from the incarceration portion of the inmate's sentence
is an act of grace of the state and shall not be considered a right.”).
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procedural due process rights.” 4 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588
(9th Cir. 1989) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct.
3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)).
[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss
is available. For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of
property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete
until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable
postdeprivation remedy.
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S. Ct. at 3204 (footnote omitted); see also
Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (observing that
there is a remedy under Florida law for law enforcement’s seizure or
retention of personal property); Holt v. Givens, 757 F. App’x 915, 922 (11th
Cir. 2018) (finding no due process claim because the State of Alabama
provided adequate postdeprivation remedies).
Postdeprivation procedures satisfy due process for unauthorized
deprivations by state actors, whether intentional or negligent, because the
state cannot know in advance of the deprivation and therefore cannot
provide predeprivation process. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534, 104 S. Ct. at
4 This aspect of Parratt was not overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
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3204. It does not appear that Plaintiff has yet availed himself of relief in
state court as to such a claim, 5 but even if he had, a federal court:
...looks to the existence of an opportunity—to whether the state
courts, if asked, generally would provide an adequate remedy
for the procedural deprivation the federal court plaintiff claims to
have suffered. If state courts would, then there is no federal
procedural due process violation regardless of whether the
plaintiff has taken advantage of the state remedy or attempted
to do so. If state courts generally would not provide an
adequate remedy for that type of procedural deprivation, then
the federal court determines whether the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause requires such a remedy, and
if it does, the federal court remedies the violation.
Horton v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Flagler Cty., 202 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th
Cir. 2000); see also Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 347 F.3d 1232,
1238–39 (11th Cir. 2003). In Florida, the State of Florida has waived its
sovereign immunity in tort actions for the negligent or wrongful acts of
employees causing injury or loss of property. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1). The
existence of § 768.28 provides Plaintiff with a meaningful, post-deprivation
remedy to challenge the loss of property. There is no indication that
Florida’s statutory scheme is inadequate. Thus, Plaintiff does not have a
cognizable claim under § 1983 for the deprivation of his property.
5 Plaintiff alleged filing a state court mandamus action, but his claim was rejected.
ECF No. 12 at 9. A mandamus action was not the appropriate type of claim to be filed.
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RECOMMENDATION
For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, ECF No. 12 be DISMISSED for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. It is also
RECOMMENDED that the Order adopting this Report and
Recommendation direct the Clerk of Court to note on the docket that this
cause was dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on May 27, 2026.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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