WRIGHT v. FITZPATRICK

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
ROBERT LEE WRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-491-AW-MJF
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, initiated this civil action by filing a
document titled “Report and Recommendation” in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Doc. 1. The Northern
District of Georgia construed Plaintiff’s filing as a civil-rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and transferred the action to the Northern
District of Florida. Doc. 2. The undersigned recommends that the District
Court dismiss this case with prejudice on several grounds, including (1)
Plaintiff is a “three-striker” who failed to pay the filing fee; (2) this
lawsuit is malicious because it is duplicative of a prior lawsuit Plaintiff
filed; (3) this lawsuit is frivolous because it is barred by absolute judicial
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immunity; and (4) Plaintiff has been enjoined from filing cases related to
IRS vouchers or tax returns.
P LAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections
(“FDC”) housed at the Taylor Correctional Institution. Doc. 1. Plaintiff’s
DC Number is “U01281.”
Plaintiff is attempting to resurrect or relitigate a prior lawsuit he
filed against Magistrate Judge Martin Fitzpatrick. See Doc. 1 (identifying
Wright 	v. 	Fitzpatrick, 	No. 	4:24-cv-132-TKW-MJF 	(N.D. 	Fla. 	2024)
(“Wright I”)). In Wright I, Plaintiff sued Judge Fitzpatrick for $1 trillion
in damages for acts Fitzpatrick took in his judicial capacity in Plaintiff’s
prior 	lawsuit 	against 	Internal 	Revenue 	Service 	officials 	(Wright 	v.
McHenry, No. 4:24-cv-6-MW-MAF (N.D. Fla. 2024)). The district court
summarily dismissed Wright I with prejudice for failure to state a claim
on which relief may be granted because Fitzpatrick had absolute judicial
immunity. See Wright v. Fitzpatrick, 2024 WL 1936257 (N.D. Fla. Apr.
30, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2024 WL 3841257 (11th Cir. June 14, 2024),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1087 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2025), second appeal dismissed
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sub nom. Wright v. U.S. Magistrate Judge, No. 25-12996 (11th Cir. Sept.
26, 2025).
As indicated in the introductory paragraph of this report and
recommendation, the Northern District of Georgia construed Plaintiff’s
current filing as a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That
construction of Plaintiff’s filing is appropriate. Plaintiff’s filing cannot be
construed as an amended complaint (or a proposed amended complaint)
in Wright I, because a final judgment for the defendant was entered long
ago in that case, and Plaintiff has not been granted relief from that
judgment.1 See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344–45
(11th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350
1361 & n.22 (11th Cir. 2006); Czeremcha v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO, 724 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984); see
also Freeman v. Rice, 399 F. App’x 540, 544 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The
1 Plaintiff attached to his present filing a “Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint” in Wright I. See Doc. 1-3. The motion to amend
seeks to add defendants and claims relating to IRS tax vouchers and tax
returns that were the subject of Wright v. McHenry, No. 4:24-cv-6-MW-
MAF. See Doc. 1-3.
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dismissal of a complaint by a district court terminates the plaintiff’s right
to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).”).
D ISMISSAL U NDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner is prohibited from
proceeding in forma pauperis in a civil action if the prisoner previously
filed three or more actions or appeals, while incarcerated, that were
dismissed for frivolity, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez,
590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2022). A prisoner who is barred from
proceeding in forma pauperis must pay the filing fee at the time the
prisoner initiates the prisoner’s lawsuit, and failure to do so warrants
dismissal of the case. See Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2002) (an action must be dismissed without prejudice when an
inmate who is subject to § 1915(g) does not pay the filing fee at the time
the inmate initiates suit); Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324
(11th Cir. 2001). The only exception is if the prisoner alleges that the
prisoner is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g); see also Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004).
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A. 	Plaintiff Has Accrued At Least Three “Strikes”
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court takes judicial
notice that Plaintiff filed the following civil actions while incarcerated in
the FDC that were dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim
on which relief may be granted:
• 	Wright v. Fitzpatrick, No. 4:24-cv-132-TKW-MJF, 2024 WL
1936257 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2024) (civil action dismissed for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted because
action was barred by absolute judicial immunity);
• 	Wright v. Brown, No. 4:24-cv-314-WS/MAF, 2024 WL 4443779
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2024) (civil action dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g) and because it was frivolous);
• 	Wright v. Lyublanovits, No. 4:24-cv-351-TKW/MAF, 2024 WL
4434813 	(N.D. 	Fla. 	Oct. 	7, 	2024) 	(civil 	action 	dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and because it was frivolous,
malicious and failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted);
• 	Wright v. USA, No. 4:24-cv-370-TKW/MAF, 2024 WL 4495504
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2024) (civil action dismissed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and because it was frivolous and failed to
state a claim on which relief can be granted).
These cases qualify as “strikes” under § 1915(g). These cases are
attributable to Plaintiff insofar as they bear his name and FDC number
(U01281).
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Because Plaintiff has accrued at least three strikes, he may not
litigate this case in forma pauperis and was required to pay the filing fee
at case initiation, unless his allegations demonstrate that he is “under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to Satisfy the Imminent-Danger Exception
In determining whether a prisoner has proved imminent danger of
serious physical injury, the court “looks to the complaint, construing it
liberally and accepting its allegations as true.” Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d
1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2021). Plaintiff’s allegations—that Magistrate
Judge Fitzpatrick should have disqualified himself from Plaintiff’s prior
case against IRS officials, Case No. 4:24-cv-6—do not show that Plaintiff
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Doc. 1.
Because Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis and
failed to pay the filing fee at the time he initiated this lawsuit, the
District Court should dismiss this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See
Dupree, 284 F.3d at 1236. Ordinarily, a dismissal under § 1915(g) would
be 	without 	prejudice. 	However, 	because 	this 	civil 	action 	also 	is
duplicative 	of 	Wright 	I 	and 	is 	barred 	by 	judicial 	immunity, 	the
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undersigned recommends that this case be dismissed with prejudice for
maliciousness and frivolity.
D ISMISSAL U NDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
A district court also must dismiss a civil action filed by a prisoner
if the court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
The Eleventh Circuit uses the legal definition of “malicious” found in
Black’s Law Dictionary. See Daker v. Bryson, 841 F. App’x 115, 121 (11th
Cir. 	2020). 	Black’s 	Law Dictionary 	defines the 	term 	“malicious” 	as
“[w]ithout just cause or excuse.” Malicious, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019). Black’s defines “malicious abuse of process” as “the improper .
. . use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is
either unlawful or beyond the process’s scope.” See Malicious Abuse of
Process, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Abuse of Process,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
Repetitious and duplicative cases qualify for dismissal as malicious
under the screening provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. See Daker, 999 F.3d at 1305–06
(dismissing 	prisoner 	case—as 	an 	abuse 	of 	the 	judicial 	process 	and
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malicious—because the prisoner’s complaint knowingly made the same
or substantially similar challenges to a prison policy that the prisoner
made 	in 	two 	other 	active 	federal 	cases 	against 	many 	of 	the 	same
defendants); Daker, 841 F. App’x at 120–21 (dismissing the bulk of a
prisoner’s claims as malicious because they were duplicative of claims
prisoner made in prior lawsuit). “[R]epetitious litigation of virtually
identical causes of action is subject to dismissal . . . as malicious.” Bailey
v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988); Van Meter v. Morgan,
518 F.2d 366, 367 (8th Cir. 1975).
A. 	This Case Is Malicious Because It Is Duplicative of Wright I
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate his claims against
Judge Fitzpatrick in Wright I for acts Fitzpatrick took in his judicial
capacity in Wright v. McHenry, No. 4:24-cv-6-MW-MAF (the IRS case),
this lawsuit is duplicative of Wright I. Plaintiff is asserting the same
claims against the same Defendant based on the same underlying facts.
At the time Plaintiff submitted his present filing to the Northern
District of Georgia, he knew that Wright I had been dismissed with
prejudice 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	based 	on 	judicial 	immunity.
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Plaintiff’s 	appeals 	from 	the 	final 	judgment 	in 	Wright 	I 	establish
Plaintiff’s knowledge of that final judgment and the basis for dismissal.
Plaintiff’s filing of this new civil action meets the legal definition of
“malicious.” 	Plaintiff 	knowingly 	filed 	this 	complaint 	containing
duplicative claims against Fitzpatrick that Plaintiff already asserted in
Wright I. There is “no just cause or excuse” for this duplicative filing. It
is an “improper” use of the judicial process to file a new lawsuit to
relitigate claims that were dismissed with prejudice due to lack of facial
plausibility.
Plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process has forced the undersigned
and the District Court to expend judicial resources to the detriment of
other litigants. The appropriate sanction for Plaintiff's malicious abuse
of the judicial process is dismissal of this case with prejudice under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
B. 	This Case Is Frivolous Because It Is Barred By Judicial
Immunity
A 	judge 	enjoys 	absolute 	judicial 	immunity 	from 	an 	award 	of
damages for acts taken in a judicial capacity, unless the judge acted in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239
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(11th Cir. 2000). The “absence of all jurisdiction” means “a complete
absence of subject matter jurisdiction.” Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942,
947 (11th Cir. 1985). A judge does not lose immunity “because the action
he took was in error,” or “was in excess of his authority.” Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Here, Wright’s allegations involve judicial functions, namely, Judge
Fitzpatrick issuing orders and making recommendations to the district
court in Case No. 4:24-cv-6-MW-MAF. See Doc. 1 at 2. These acts are
normal judicial functions and were performed in Fitzpatrick’s capacity as
the 	magistrate 	judge 	assigned 	to 	Wright’s 	case. 	Judge 	Fitzpatrick,
therefore, acted within his judicial capacity in taking the actions of which
Wright complains. Judge Fitzpatrick did not act in the clear absence of
subject-matter jurisdiction. 	Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239. Because Judge
Fitzpatrick is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from this damages
action—a defense that is apparent from the face of Wright’s complaint—
this case must be dismissed.2
2 Although Plaintiff’s present filing does not state a specific demand for
relief, Doc. 1, Plaintiff indicates that he is seeking the same relief he
sought in Case No. 4:24-cv-132-TKW-MJF, which was $1 trillion in
damages. See Doc. 1-2.
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D ISMISSAL U NDER COURT-I MPOSED F ILING SANCTION
To the extent Plaintiff filed this civil action not only to relitigate
Wright I, but also to add claims relating to the IRS vouchers or tax
returns that were the subject of Wright v. McHenry, No. 4:24-cv-6-MW-
MAF, see Doc. 1 at 2, this civil action still is subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff was sanctioned under Rule 11 and the All Writs Act. See
Wright v. Brown, 2024 WL 4443779, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2024). The
district court also barred Plaintiff from filing future federal cases about
IRS vouchers or tax returns until he fully paid the $400 sanction imposed
by the court. According to the injunction:
3. 	Plaintiff is SANCTIONED under Rule 11 and the All
Writs Act as recommended by the magistrate judge in his
report and recommendation (ECF No. 4), namely:
PLAINTIFF 	IS 	PROHIBITED 	FROM 	FILING
ANY FUTURE FEDERAL CASES RELATING TO
IRS 	‘VOUCHERS’ 	OR 	IRS 	TAX 	RETURNS
UNLESS 	IT 	IS 	A 	NEW 	OR 	NOVEL 	CLAIM
RELATIVE TO ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN 	SUBJECT 	OF 	A 	PREVIOUSLY 	FILED
ACTION 	AND 	IT 	IS 	FILED 	THROUGH 	AN
ATTORNEY LICENSED TO PRACTICE IN THIS
JURISDICTION. PLAINTIFF SHALL PAY THE
CLERK 	OF 	COURT 	$400 	AS 	A 	SANCTION
PRIOR TO BEING ALLOWED TO FILE ANY
FURTHER ACTION.
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Wright, 2024 WL 4443779, at *1.
Plaintiff 	has 	not 	paid 	the 	$400 	sanction. 	Plaintiff 	cannot
circumvent the sanction by filing suit in another federal judicial district
and simultaneously requesting that the suit be transferred. See Doc. 1 at
3. That is yet another form of Plaintiff’s malicious abuse of the judicial
process that warrants dismissal of this case with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Wright v. WS, 2025 WL 604520 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2025) (dismissing case
with prejudice because Wright had not paid the sanction, was a three-
striker under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and because his claims were frivolous
and barred by judicial immunity).
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS this civil action with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because Plaintiff is a three-striker
and failed to pay the filing fee; this civil action is a malicious abuse of the
judicial process and is frivolous; and Plaintiff has been enjoined from
filing cases relating to IRS vouchers or tax returns until he pays the
court-ordered sanction.
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2. 	DIRECT the clerk of court to close this case file.
At Panama City, Florida, this 2nd day of December, 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636. The parties also are
advised 	that 	if 	they 	dispute 	the 	accuracy 	of 	any
judicially-noticed fact, or if they otherwise wish to be
heard on the propriety of the District Court taking
judicial notice of that fact, they must raise this issue in
an objection to this report and recommendation.
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