ROBINSON v. DOLAN et al

4:25-cv-00411FlndMar 18, 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
LATAVIUS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-411-RH-MJF
IAN C. DOLAN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	five 	Defendants 	violated 	the 	Fair 	Debt
Collection Practices Act when they attempted to collect a mortgage debt
and initiated foreclosure proceedings against Plaintiff. Defendants move
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Docs. 19 & 26. Plaintiff opposes the motions. Docs. 23 & 28. Because
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the District
Court should grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
B ACKGROUND
In his fifth amended complaint, Plaintiff sues five Defendants:
• 	The law firm of Diaz Anselmo & Associates, P.A. (“DAA”);
• 	Roy Diaz—an attorney formerly employed by DAA;
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• 	Lisa Woodburn—an attorney employed by DAA;
• 	Ian Dolan—an attorney employed by DAA; and
• 	Gregg Dreilinger—an attorney employed by DAA.
Doc. 17 at 2.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq in multiple ways.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants attempted to collect a debt
by sending dunning letters and instituting a foreclosure action. Doc. 17
at 9–11. According to Plaintiff, Defendants repeatedly represented that
Plaintiff was indebted to United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC. Plaintiff
contends that these representations were deceitful because “the loan had
been assigned.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. Id. at 11–12.
STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes defendants to
move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be 	granted.” Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	12(b)(6). For 	a 	claim 	to 	survive
dismissal, the “complaint 	must 	contain sufficient 	factual 	matter,
accepted as true,” to state a facially plausible claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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556 	U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 	Atl. 	Corp. 	v. Twombly, 	550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference 	that 	the 	defendant 	is 	liable 	for 	the 	misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
D ISCUSSION
The FDCPA “imposes civil liability on debt collectors for certain
prohibited debt collection practices.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 576 (2010) (cleaned up). But the Act
requires plaintiffs to initiate a civil action for any violation of the Act
within one year of the violation. Specifically, the Act states:
(d) Jurisdiction
An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter
may be brought in any appropriate United States district
court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any
other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the
date on which the violation occurs.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added). Under this provision, an FDCPA
claim generally accrues when the alleged violation occurs, not when a
plaintiff discovers the violation. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 10 (2019).
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Plaintiff initiated this civil action on September 29, 2025. Doc. 1.
Thus, § 1692k(d) bars any claim for any violation that occurred prior to
September 29, 2024.
In his fifth amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
violations of the FDCPA occurred prior to September 29, 2024—with one
violation purportedly continuing through October 2025.1 Doc. 17 at 9–12.
Indeed, in Plaintiff’s response to one of the motions to dismiss, with one
caveat, Plaintiff does not explicitly dispute that the violations alleged in
Plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint occurred prior to September 29, 2024.
Doc. 28 at 4.
Plaintiff 	attempts 	to 	extricate 	himself 	from 	the 	statute 	of
limitations by arguing that one Defendant—Dreilinger—committed two
violations of the FDCPA on October 22, 2024. Id. at 4. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that in a foreclosure action pending in a Florida court,
1 Under the continuing violation doctrine, “each overt act that is part of
the violation and that injures the plaintiff . . . starts the statutory period
running again . . . .” Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 189 (1997).
But the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to FDCPA claims.
Moore v. Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf LLP, 2025 WL
2731003 (3d Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (unpublished); Brown v. Transworld
Sys., Inc., 73 F.4th 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2023); Boyue v. Bruce, 61 F.4th
485, 490 (6th Cir. 2023).
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Dreilinger filed: (1) a sworn certification from Woodburn; and (2) a loan
transaction history. Id.
But Plaintiff never alleged these purported violations in his fifth
amended complaint. True, Plaintiff alleged that from “June 2024 through
October 	2025 Defendant 	Gregg R. 	Dreilinger continued 	prosecuting
foreclosure proceedings on behalf of United Wholesale Mortgage despite
notice that the loan had been assigned.” Doc. 17 at 10. But that is not
equivalent to alleging the FDCPA violations Plaintiff now seeks to assert
for the first time in his response to one of the motions to dismiss.
Plaintiff’s 	vague 	allegation 	that 	“Dreilinger 	continued 	prosecuting
foreclosure proceedings”—considered in conjunction with his entire fifth
amended complaint—does not constitute “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s allegation that “Dreilinger continued prosecuting
foreclosure proceedings” is simply too vague to apprise Dreilinger and the
District 	Court 	that 	Plaintiff 	actually 	was 	alleging 	that 	Dreilinger
violated the FDCPA on October 22, 2024 when Dreilinger filed in a
Florida court a sworn certification from Woodburn and a loan transaction
history.
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Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot amend his complaint through a
response to a motion to dismiss. Burgess v. Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc., 600
F. App’x. 657, 665 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d
962, 967 (11th Cir. 2009)). So Plaintiff’s response does not save him from
his failure to allege in his fifth amended complaint that Dreilinger
violated the FDCPA on October 22, 2024.
Finally, 	even 	if 	Plaintiff 	had 	included 	in 	his 	fifth 	amended
complaint the allegations that he seeks to assert in his response, Plaintiff
still would have failed to state a claim under the FDCPA. As Plaintiff
alleges, 	Dreilinger’s 	actions 	were 	“simply 	a 	continuation 	of 	the
foreclosure case,” and “involved no more than reaffirming the legitimacy
of 	the 	foreclosure 	suit,” 	and 	because 	of 	that, 	they 	are 	are 	“not
independently actionable under the FDCPA.” Delia v. Ditech Fin., LLC,
2023 WL 8018575 at *1, 4 (11th Cir. Nov. 20, 2023).
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	are 	barred 	by 	the 	statute 	of
limitations.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
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1. 	GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
2. 	DISMISS this action.
3. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 18th day of March 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. An objecting party must serve a copy
of the objections on all other parties. A party who fails
to 	object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and
recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to 	challenge 	on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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