ROBINSON v. UNITED WHOLESALE MORTGAGE LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
LATAVIUS ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-14-RH/MJF
UNITED WHOLESALE MORTGAGE,
LLC,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage LLC and
other unidentified persons violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act. Doc. 1. Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage LLC filed
a motion to dismiss. Doc. 11. Plaintiff responded in opposition. Doc. 12.
Because Plaintiff’s initial complaint violates the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the District Court
should grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss this civil action.
BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this civil action. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant and other unidentified persons violated RICO, 18
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U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint because
Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief and the complaint
violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 12. Before a court may
dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim for relief,
the court must afford a pro se litigant at least one chance to replead his
claim. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.
2018). Therefore, the undersigned afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to
replead. Doc. 13.
On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first amended complaint. Doc.
Doc. 	14. 	In 	that 	amended 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	add 	seven
Defendants and claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts all
claims 	as 	“the 	Trustee 	of 	the 	Evader 	Trust” 	and 	Plaintiff 	disavows
asserting any claims “individually.” Doc. 14 at 3. On November 13, 2025,
the 	undersigned 	struck 	Plaintiff’s 	first 	amended 	complaint 	because
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, impermissibly asserted claims as the
trustee of a trust. Doc. 25.
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proposed second amended
complaint, Doc. 15, and a motion for leave to file the proposed second
amended complaint, Doc. 16. Because Plaintiff’s proposed second amended
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complaint violated Rule 8 and Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
the complaint. Doc. 17.
On 	October 	27, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	proposed 	third 	amended
complaint, Doc. 18, and a motion for leave to file Plaintiff’s proposed third
amended complaint, Doc. 20. On November 13, 2025, the undersigned
denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file Plaintiff’s proposed third amended
complaint 	because 	Plaintiff, 	who 	is 	appearing 	pro 	se, 	impermissibly
asserted claims as the trustee of a trust. Doc. 20; see J.J. Rissell, Allentown,
PA Tr. v. Marchelos, 976 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] nonlawyer
trustee has no authority to represent a trust in court.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s
original complaint remains the operative pleading.
STANDARD
Determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief
can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The court accepts all well-
pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and evaluates all
reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable
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to the plaintiff. Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir.
1994). To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint Violates the Federal Rules
“A district court has the ‘inherent authority to control its docket and
ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits,’ which includes the ability to
dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v.
Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Weiland v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015)). A district
court that receives a shotgun pleading must sua sponte give a plaintiff “one
chance to replead.” Id. at 1296. But once a pro se litigant has been given
that opportunity to remedy the deficiencies and squanders the opportunity
by filing another shotgun pleading, the district court has the authority to
dismiss the complaint on shotgun pleading grounds. Id. at 1295; Byrne v.
Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Foudy v. Indian River
Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2017).
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On October 16, 2025, the undersigned informed Plaintiff that his
complaint was a shotgun pleading. Specifically, the undersigned informed
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff’s “factual allegations” are not set forth in numbered
paragraphs. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations are found in a single
paragraph that spans four pages.
Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	also 	is 	“replete 	with 	conclusory 	[and]
vague” 	allegations. 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	clearly 	identify 	the
claim(s) he intends to bring, or which facts support each claim.
Thus, the complaint violates the rules of civil procedure (Rule 8
or 10 or both) and fails to give Defendant adequate notice of the
claim(s) against it and the grounds upon which each claim rests.
Doc. 13 at 3. The undersigned included detailed instructions on how to
remedy these defects in an amended complaint and afforded Plaintiff an
opportunity to file an amended complaint that corrected these defects. Id.
at 4, 12–14. 	Despite this opportunity, Plaintiff filed a proposed first
amended complaint, a proposed second amended complaint, and a proposed
third amended complaint, each of which failed to correct the identified
deficiencies. Accordingly, for this reason alone, the District Court should
dismiss this civil action.
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B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Under RICO
There is a second, independent reason for the District Court to
dismiss this civil action: Plaintiff fails to state a claim under RICO. To state
a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that would allow the district court to
plausibly infer that Defendant:
(1) operated, managed, or conducted the affairs of;
(2) an enterprise;
(3) through a pattern;
(4) of racketeering activity;
(5) which caused;
(6) injury to plaintiff’s business or property.
Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972 F.3d 1204, 1211 (11th Cir. 2020); Crawford’s
Auto Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2019).
Furthermore, “Civil RICO claims, which are essentially a certain
breed of fraud claims, must be pled with an increased level of specificity.”
Ambrosia Coal & Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th
Cir. 2007); Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc., 945 F.3d at 1158. That is, a plaintiff
must allege: (1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations
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made; (2) the time and place of and person responsible for the statement;
(3) the content and manner in which the statements misled the Plaintiff;
and (4) what Defendants gained by the alleged fraud.1 Ambrosia Coal &
Const. Co., 482 F.3d at 1316; see generally United States ex rel. Atkins v.
McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[p]articularity means that
‘a plaintiff must plead facts as to time, place, and substance of the
defendant’s 	alleged 	fraud, 	specifically the 	details of the 	defendant[’s]
allegedly 	fraudulent 	acts, 	when 	they 	occurred, 	and 	who 	engaged 	in
them.’”).
Plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim in at least three ways.
1. 	Plaintiff Fails to Allege the Existence of an Enterprise
An enterprise is defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Plaintiff
states that Defendant formed an “associated-in-fact” enterprise. See Doc. 1
at 3. An “association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that
1 While Plaintiff is entitled to some leniency with respect to the complaint
as he is proceeding pro se, he is still required to comply with Rule 9’s
pleading 	standard, 	which 	requires 	that 	plaintiffs 	plead 	fraud 	with
particularity.
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functions with a common purpose.” Cisneros, 872 F.3d at 1211. To plead an
association-in-fact enterprise, a plaintiff must allege “that a group of
persons share three structural features: (1) a purpose; (2) relationships
among those associated with the enterprise; and (3) longevity sufficient to
permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Id. at 1211
(quoting Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir.
2017)).
Instead of providing specific facts regarding the existence of an
enterprise, Plaintiff relies on conclusions:
• 	“In 	naming 	United 	Wholesale 	Mortgage 	LLC, 	Latavius
Robinson has established that an enterprise exists which undeniably
affects interstate commerce.” Doc. 1 at 4;
• 	“Robinson has perfected a RICO claim by showing the existence
of a RICO enterprise.” Id.;
• 	“The enterprise to which all the defendants belong is evident to
a high degree and it is also evident to a high degree that associates
such as John Does and Jane Does 1-10, act as a continuing unit.” Id.
at 6.
A complaint that contains nothing more than mere conclusions devoid of
facts fails to state a claim for relief and cannot withstand a motion to
dismiss. Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir.
2003). 	Because 	Plaintiff 	provides 	nothing 	more 	than 	unadorned
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conclusions that an enterprise exists, Plaintiff fails to state a RICO claim.
For this reason, too, the District Court should dismiss this civil action.
2. 	Plaintiff 	Fails 	to 	Allege 	a 	Pattern 	of 	Racketeering
Activity
RICO defines “racketeering activity” to encompass “dozens of state
and federal offenses, known in RICO parlance as predicates.” RJR Nabisco
Inc. 	v. 	European 	Cmty., 	579 	U.S. 	325, 	329–30 	(2016). 	“A 	pattern 	of
racketeering activity under RICO requires” a plaintiff to allege “at least
two qualifying predicate acts, each of which must constitute a violation of
one 	of 	the 	state 	or 	federal 	laws 	described 	in 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1961(1).”
Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc., 945 F.3d at 1158; see H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1989).
Additionally, to “plead a pattern of racketeering activity, ‘a plaintiff
must demonstrate a relationship between the predicate acts as well as a
threat of continuing activity’—a standard known as the ‘continuity plus
relationship’ test.” Menzies v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 943 F.3d 328, 337 (7th
Cir. 2019) (quoting DeGuelle v. Camilli, 664 F.3d 192, 199 (7th Cir. 2011));
see H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
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Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	unidentified 	individuals 	sent 	him
correspondence 	on 	five 	dates 	between 	April 	11 	and 	June 	11, 	2024.
According to Plaintiff “defendants have used the United States Mail
Service for purposes of fraud and extortion.” Doc. 1 at 7. This conclusory
allegation of of “fraud” and “extortion” is insufficient to state a claim.
Plaintiff 	also 	alleges that 	the 	unidentified individuals 	sent 	this
correspondence over a two-month period—which ended in June 2024.
Plaintiff, 	therefore, 	does 	not 	allege 	a 	threat 	of 	continuing 	activity.
“Congress was concerned in RICO with long-term criminal conduct.” H.J.
Inc., 492 U.S. at 242; Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d
1250, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, predicate “acts extending over a few
weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct” does not
constitute a pattern of racketeering activity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
True, Plaintiff alleges that a pattern “will likely continue” unless abated,
but he provides no facts to support a claim that there is ongoing criminal
conduct or a threat of future criminal conduct. Thus, he has not alleged a
threat of continuing activity. For this second, independent reason, Plaintiff
fails to state a civil RICO claim.
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3. 	Plaintiff Fails to Allege Causation
The “RICO statute provides a cause of action for ‘[a]ny person injured
in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.’” Ray v.
Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c)) (emphasis added). “The Supreme Court has been clear
that a party is only entitled to recover under RICO ‘to the extent that[] he
has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting
the violation.’” Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
496 (1985)). Stating a civil RICO claim, therefore, requires a plaintiff to
plead facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the claimed
activity was the “but-for” and proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries.
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	again 	relies 	solely 	on 	conclusory 	allegations.
Specifically, he states:
• 	“Robinson has demonstrated that [he] has sustained injuries as
proximate result of the pattern of frauds by the defendants.” Doc. 1
at 4;
• 	“The cause-in-fact that but-for the chicanery of the enterprise
members including United Wholesale Mortgage, LLC, et al., Latavius
Robinson 	would 	have 	not 	been 	deprived 	of 	business 	interests,
business opportunities, and property interests and would not have
incurred tangible losses.” Id.
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Plaintiff does not allege how any purported pattern of racketeering activity
injured his property or business, when it did so, or the extent to which a
pattern of racketeering activity damaged his business or property. In this
respect, too, Plaintiff fails to state a civil RICO claim.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
recommends that the District Court:
1. 	GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 11;
2. 	DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant; and
3. 	DIRECT the clerk of this court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 13th day of November 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. §
636(b); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to this report and
recommendation must be filed within 14 days of the date
of the report and recommendation. A party who fails to
object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and
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recommendation waives the right to challenge on appeal
the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. §
636.
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