HOKAMA v. DAVIS et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
STEPHANIE HOKAMA,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No.: 3:25cv2612/TKW/ZCB
TONYA DAVIS,
et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this
case by filing a complaint. 	(Docs. 1, 8). 	The Court informed Plaintiff of
deficiencies in her initial complaint and instructed her to file an amended
complaint. 	(Doc. 10). 	Plaintiff has now filed an amended complaint.
(Doc. 13).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (Doc. 8), the Court
must review the amended complaint to determine whether this action is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Having reviewed the amended complaint,
the Court believes dismissal is warranted for failure to state a claim upon
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which relief may be granted and because it seeks monetary relief against
defendants who are immune under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).1
I. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations2
Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against numerous state officials who
were involved in the removal of her minor children from her custody.
(Doc. 	13). 	The 	defendants 	include 	two 	state 	court 	judges, 	several
Department of Children and Family and Families First Network officials,
and her children’s guardian ad litem. This is the third case Plaintiff has
filed in this Court regarding the removal of her children and state
dependency 	proceedings. 	See 	Hokama 	v. 	Williams, 	Case 	No.
3:25cv460/MCR/HTC (dismissing claims without prejudice at screening
stage); 	Hokama 	v. 	Fla. 	Dep’t 	of 	Children 	& 	Families, 	Case 	No.
3:25cv542/MCR/HTC (dismissing case without prejudice because it was
1 As previously mentioned, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend
her complaint when a prior version was found deficient. 	(Doc. 10).
Although Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, it is also deficient.
Thus, dismissal is warranted. 	See Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d
1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[o]rdinarily, a party must be
given 	at 	least 	one 	opportunity 	to 	amend 	before 	the 	district 	court
dismisses the complaint”).
2 Since this case is at the pleading stage, the Court assumes the truth of
Plaintiff’s allegations. 	DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 288 n.1 (2024).
And because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court “liberally construe[s]
his pleadings.” 	Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2022).
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duplicative).
Plaintiff brings claims for unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, procedural due process violations under the Fourteenth
Amendment, state-created danger/conditions of confinement under the
Fourteenth Amendment on behalf of her children, and a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 	(Doc. 13 at 16-20). 	She seeks monetary damages and injunctive
relief. (Id.).
II. 	Statutory Screening Standard
To survive dismissal at the screening stage, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (cleaned up). The plausibility standard is met only where the facts
alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	Plausibility means
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 	Id. 	(internal quotation marks
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omitted). 	“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” 	Id. at 679.
III. 	Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The 	crux 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	is 	her 	displeasure 	with 	the
outcome of her state court dependency proceedings. 	As Plaintiff was
previously told (Doc. 14 at 2), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a complaint “brought by
state-court 	losers 	complaining 	of 	injuries 	caused 	by 	state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” 	Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 	The
doctrine applies where “the source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state
court-judgment itself.” Efron v. Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2024). 	“The doctrine extends not only to constitutional claims
presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are
inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment.” 	Goodman ex rel.
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).
Moreover, the doctrine applies “whether the plaintiff admits to filing a
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direct appeal of the judgment or tries to call the appeal something else.”
Behr v. Campbell, 4 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	was 	the 	loser 	in 	prior 	state 	court 	dependency
proceedings. 	Now, Plaintiff is complaining of injuries she has allegedly
suffered because of those state court proceedings.3 Although she tries to
disclaim that she is appealing the state court judgments, she asks this
Court to review and reject the state court judgments. And the arguments
she makes in this Court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court judgments. This case, therefore, is covered by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 	As a result, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
provide Plaintiff the relief she seeks. 4
B. Absolute judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants Williams and Harris.
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in
3 To the extent Plaintiff requests this Court interfere with ongoing state
court dependency proceedings, her claims are barred by the Younger
abstention doctrine. 	(Doc. 	10 at 6-8) (explaining why Plaintiff’s claims
are barred by Younger to the extent the state court proceedings are
ongoing).
4 While the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if a party did not
have 	a 	“reasonable 	opportunity 	to 	raise 	his 	federal 	claim 	in 	state
proceedings,” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009),
Plaintiff has made nothing but conclusory allegations that she did not
have a reasonable opportunity to bring her federal claims in state court.
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their judicial capacities unless they acted “in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” 	Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000)
(cleaned up). 	Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in a
judicial 	capacity 	depends 	on 	whether: 	(1) 	the 	act 	complained 	of
constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the
judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case
pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out
of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity. 	Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d
1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, “[t]he conduct of which [P]laintiff complains”—Defendants
presiding 	over, 	and 	making 	decisions 	in, 	the 	child 	dependency
proceedings in state court—“is a function normally performed by a
judge.”5 	Clark v. Duncan, No. 3:17cv428, 2017 WL 3758980, at *2 (N.D.
Fla. Aug. 4, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 3749835 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2017).
5 See Fla. Stat. § 39.013(2) (“The circuit court has exclusive original
jurisdiction of all proceedings under this chapter, of a child voluntarily
placed 	with 	a 	licensed 	child-caring 	agency, 	a 	licensed 	child-placing
agency, 	or 	the 	department, 	and 	of 	the 	adoption 	of 	children 	whose
parental rights have been terminated under this chapter. 	Jurisdiction
attaches 	when 	the 	initial 	shelter 	petition, 	dependency 	petition, 	or
termination of parental rights petition, or a petition for an injunction to
prevent child abuse issued pursuant to s. 39.504, is filed or when a child
is taken into the custody of the department.”).
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And Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants were acting
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
“Alongside judicial immunity from damages, judges also receive
protection from declaratory and injunctive relief.” 	Tarver v. Reynolds,
808 F. App’x 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2020). 	“To receive declaratory or
injunctive relief against a judicial officer under Section 1983, the judicial
officer must have violated a declaratory decree or declaratory relief must
otherwise be unavailable.” 	Id. 	Additionally, “there must also be an
absence of an adequate remedy at law.” 	Id. (cleaned up). 	“A state
appellate process is an adequate remedy at law.” 	Id.
In addition to monetary relief, “declaratory and injunctive relief is
also improper because there is no suggestion that [Defendants] violated
a declaratory decree, and because [Plaintiff] has an adequate remedy at
law: appeal through the state-court system.” 	Id. at 755. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief against Defendants Williams
or Harris.
C. Plaintiff cannot bring claims on her children’s behalf.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated her children’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Doc. 13 at 19). As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff cannot
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bring claims on behalf of her minor children. See Whitehurst v. Wal-Mart,
306 F. App’x 446, 449 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “a non-lawyer
parent has no right to represent a child in an action in the child’s name”);
see also L.R. v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 4:18cv72, 2019 WL 1177996, at
*7 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2019) (stating that a “pro se parent does not have
the legal right or authority to sue on behalf of a minor child because a
non-attorney cannot act as legal counsel for another person”).
D. Plaintiff fails to state an ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 	To state a
claim under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) that he is a qualified individual with
a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or
denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities,
or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that
the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the
plaintiff’s disability.” 	Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083
(11th Cir. 2007); see also Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
2005) (listing the elements of a claim under the Rehabilitation Act).
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Plaintiff provides nothing but conclusory allegations in support of
her ADA and § 504 claims. 	For example, Plaintiff claims only that she
has “mental and cognitive disabilities” but does not provide any other
detail about her claimed disabilities. (Doc. 13 at 10). She complains that
Defendant Webb “ignored disability accommodation requests” (Doc. 13 at
4-5) 	and 	that 	Defendant 	Sigler 	“refused 	ADA-appropriate
accommodations,” but she never describes what those accommodation
requests were.
And Plaintiff provides nothing 	but 	conclusory 	allegations that
Defendants discriminated against her based on her disability. 	Plaintiff
also fails to specify which Defendants her ADA and § 504 claims are
brought against. 	She simply alleges that “Defendants DCF, FFN, and
GAL 	staff 	failed 	to 	provide 	reasonable 	accommodations, 	ignored
disability-related needs, and used bias-based investigative methods and
retaliated 	when 	Plaintiff 	sought 	compliance.” 	(Doc. 	13 	at 	19-20).
Accordingly, her ADA and § 504 claims warrant dismissal. 	See Mack v.
City of High Springs, 486 F. App’x 3, 7 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Accepting as
true 	the 	allegations 	that 	Mr. 	Mack 	is 	disabled 	and 	that 	he 	was
discriminated against, Mr. Mack failed to allege facts suggesting that the
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defendants’ actions . . . were due to his disability.”) (emphasis added); see
also Petrano v. Labarga, 709 F. App’x 590, 592 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming
dismissal of ADA claims because plaintiffs’ allegations were “vague and
conclusory”).
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	be 	DISMISSED 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted and because it seeks monetary relief against defendants who
are immune.
2. 	The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
At Pensacola, Florida this 16th day of March 2026.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
Notice to the Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
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unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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