ENFINGER v. DIXON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
RUSSELL ENFINGER,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv1433-MCR-HTC
RICKY DIXON,
Respondent.
_________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Russell Enfinger, proceeding pro se, filed a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254, 	challenging 	his 	2018 	and 	2019 	convictions 	and 	sentences 	in
Escambia County circuit court case number 2017-CF-6628. Doc. 1. The Secretary
moved to dismiss the petition as untimely (Doc. 7), and Enfinger filed a response
(Doc. 11). 	Upon consideration, the Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss should be
GRANTED, and the petition should be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.
I. 	Background
On October 25, 2018, Enfinger was charged by Amended Information with
three counts of attempted premeditated first degree murder of a law enforcement
officer in which a firearm was used and one count of being a felon in possession of
a firearm. Doc. 7-2 at 9. On November 1, 2018, he went to trial on only the first
three counts, and the next day a jury found Enfinger guilty on all three. Doc. 7-2 at
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3 & 12. 	Judgment and sentence on only the first three counts was entered on
November 8, 2018, with Enfinger being sentenced to three consecutive terms of life
imprisonment. Doc. 7-2 at 21. He filed a direct appeal to the First District Court of
Appeal (“First DCA”). Doc. 7-2 at 41; Case No.: 1D2018-4900.
On December 31, 2018, Enfinger entered a nolo contendere plea on Count 4,
and judgment on that count was entered on January 8, 2019. 	Doc. 7-2 at 32.
Enfinger filed a direct appeal with the First DCA. 	Doc. 7-2 at 109; Case No.:
1D2019-0525.
On October 21, 2019, before resolving the first appeal, the First DCA affirmed
per curiam and without written opinion the judgment and conviction on Count
4. Enfinger v. State, 282 So. 3d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Later, on March 17, 2020,
the First DCA affirmed per curiam and without written opinion the judgment and
conviction on Counts One, Two, and Three. Enfinger v. State, 291 So. 3d 925 (Fla.
1st DCA 2020).
Enfinger did not seek further review from the Florida Supreme Court or the
United States Supreme Court. 	Doc. 1 at 3-4. 	He did, however, file several state
postconviction motions, which are discussed more fully below. 	Enfinger filed the
instant federal petition on August 11, 2025. Doc. 1.
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II. 	Legal Standard
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a
federal habeas petition must be filed within one year from certain trigger dates. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In this case, the parties agree that the relevant trigger date is
“the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Also, the
parties agree that the conviction became final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) when
the time for pursuing direct review in the United States Supreme Court expired. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012).
Additionally, a properly filed post-conviction motion will toll the one-year
limitations period until the motion is fully resolved. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)
(“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”).
However, it cannot revive or toll the AEDPA time if the time had already expired
when the motion was filed. See Delguidice v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 351 F. App’x 425,
428 (11th Cir. 2009) (A state postconviction motion “filed after expiration of the
one-year AEDPA limitations period ... [can]not toll the limitations period, as the
limitations period had already expired.”).
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The one-year period may be equitably tolled “if a petitioner establishes both
extraordinary circumstances and due diligence.” 	Diaz v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr.,
362 F.3d 698, 702 (11th Cir. 2004). Equitable tolling applies only where a petitioner
“shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,
418 (2005)). 	“The petitioner has the burden of proving that circumstances justify
applying the equitable-tolling doctrine.” Id. (citing San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d
1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011)).
III. 	Discussion
The parties agree that Enfinger’s judgment became “final” for purposes of
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for pursuing direct review in the United States
Supreme Court expired. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 150.
They disagree, however, as to when that deadline expired.
Respondent argues the petition is untimely because Enfinger’s conviction
became final on June 16, 2020, and his first postconviction application for review
was not filed until more than a year later, on July 8, 2021. Doc. 7. Respondent is
correct that the petition is untimely but is incorrect about the date the judgment
became final.
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Typically, the time for filing a certiorari petition in the United States Supreme
Court expires ninety (90) days after entry of the judgment or order sought to be
reviewed. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1, 13.3. 	However, on March 19, 2020, the United
States Supreme Court temporarily extended the time to file a certiorari petition to
150 days instead of 90 days because of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Miscellaneous
Order Addressing the Extension of Filing Deadlines [COVID-19], 334 F.R.D. 801
(Mar. 19, 2020) (“Miscellaneous Order”). That Miscellaneous Order was in effect
from March 19, 2020, until July 19, 2021. 	See Miscellaneous Order Rescinding
COVID-19 Related Orders, 338 F.R.D. 801 (July 19, 2021). Thus, “in any case in
which the relevant lower court judgment, order denying discretionary review, or
order denying a timely petition for rehearing was issued prior to July 19, 2021, the
deadline to file a petition for a writ of certiorari remains extended to 150 days from
the date of that judgment or order.” Id. (emphasis added).
At the time of the March 19, 2020, Miscellaneous Order, Enfinger’s petition
for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court would have been due on
Monday, June 15, 2020. Thus, the 150-day rule applies to his case. 	See Poole v.
Dixon, No. 4:24-CV-23-MW-MJF, 2024 WL 3416604 (N.D. Fla. June 13, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:24CV23-MW/MJF, 2024 WL 3416271
(N.D. Fla. July 15, 2024) (because petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme
Court would have been due November 2, 2020, his conviction became final 150
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days, rather than 90 days, after the entry of the First DCA’s order denying rehearing,
even though Poole never filed a petition for writ for certiorari). 	Enfinger’s
conviction therefore became final on August 14, 2020, and he had until August 14,
2021, to file his federal habeas petition unless a properly filed application for
postconviction relief filed before that date tolled the time.
The first post-conviction motion filed by Enfinger was on January 12, 2021.
That motion, which was a motion for enlargement of time to file a habeas petition
filed in this district, did not toll the AEDPA deadline. See Enfinger v. Dep’t of Corr.
Sec’y, No. 3:21-CV-126-LC-MJF, 2021 WL 11678752 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2021),
report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	No. 	3:21-CV-126-LC-MJF, 	2021 	WL
11678751 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2021) (dismissing case for lack of jurisdiction to grant
an extension or stay without the filing of an actual habeas petition first); see also,
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001) (holding “that an application for
federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)” and thus, does not
toll the AEDPA statute of limitations).
On July 8, 2021, after 328 days had passed off the one-year limit, Enfinger
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Alleging Ineffective Assistance of
Appellate Counsel with the First DCA. 	Doc. 7-2 at 1331; Case No.: 1D2021-
2172. 	That petition tolled the one-year limit until the First DCA denied it on
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November 4, 2021. Because only 37 days remained on the one-year statute of
limitations, the deadline for Enfinger to file a federal habeas petition expired on
Monday, December 13, 2021.1
There were no pending motions for post-conviction relief that would have
tolled the statute of limitations period between November 4, 2021, and December
13, 2021. In fact, the next post-conviction motion Enfinger filed was a March 23,
2022, Motion for Postconviction Relief (3.850) (Doc. 7-2 at 243), after the AEDPA
one-year limit had already expired. See Delguidice, 351 F. App’x at 428 (A state
postconviction motion “filed after expiration of the one-year AEDPA limitations
period ... [can]not toll the limitations period, as the limitations period had already
expired.”).
In his Response, Enfinger appears to argue that a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for rehearing, which was untimely filed on November 22, 2021, with
the First DCA, extended the AEDPA deadline until the First DCA denied the motion
on November 29, 2021. 	Doc. 11 at 8 (referencing First DCA Order, Doc. 11-1 at
4). However, even if he were right, the AEDPA deadline would have expired on
January 5, 2022 (37 days after November 29, 2021), which is still more than two
months before his next potential tolling motion was filed.
1 Because the 37th day falls on a Saturday, the deadline expired the following Monday. See Chace
v. Att’y Gen., 2023 WL 8173849, at *1 (11th Cir. June 14, 2023) (“when a deadline falls on a
weekend or holiday, the deadline falls on the next weekday that is not a holiday”).
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Therefore, unless Enfinger is entitled to equitable tolling, the petition is
untimely. However, he is not. As explained more fully above, the AEDPA one-year
limitations 	period 	may 	be 	equitably 	tolled 	“if 	a 	petitioner 	establishes 	both
extraordinary 	circumstances 	and 	due 	diligence.” 	Diaz, 	362 	F.3d 	at 	702.
Furthermore, 	the 	“extraordinary 	circumstances” 	must 	be 	“both 	beyond 	[a
petitioner’s] control and unavoidable even with diligence.” 	Johnson v. United
States, 340 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003).
In the petition, Enfinger argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because all
the law libraries in the FDOC were closed from May 7, 2020, to January 7, 2021,
and he diligently sought a timely review of his judgment and sentence. Doc. 1 at
34. However, even if the library had been closed, Enfinger still had from January 7
to December 13, 2021, to prepare and file a federal petition. Doc. 11 at 19. Thus,
this case does not present the “rare and exceptional circumstances” justifying
equitable tolling. 	Indeed, rather than rare or exceptional, the circumstances he
complains of, such as having to initiate a callout to use the library, are typical for
incarcerated persons.
IV. Conclusion
Because the one-year limit expired more than three (3) years before Enfinger
filed this federal petition, the petition is untimely, and because he does not present
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extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling, the motion to dismiss
should be granted.
The undersigned finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. 	In
deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, this Court must consider “whether
such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,
which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” 	Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Here, whether the petition is untimely does
not turn on any contested factual issue. 	Therefore, an evidentiary hearing is not
warranted because it would not assist in determining whether Petitioner is entitled
to relief.
Also, no certificate of appealability is appropriate in this case. Rule 11(a) of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts
provides: “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when
it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court
must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must still be
filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule
11(b). 	After review of the record, the Court finds no substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-
84 (2000) (explaining how to satisfy this showing) (citation omitted). Therefore, it
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is also recommended that the district court deny a certificate of appealability in its
final order.
The second sentence of Rule 11(a) provides: “Before entering the final order,
the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should
issue.” Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If there is an objection to
this recommendation by either party, that party may bring such argument to the
attention of the district judge in the objections permitted to this Report and
Recommendation.
Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) be GRANTED and the Petition
(Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely.
2. 	That a certificate of appealability be DENIED.
3. 	That the clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 9 th day of March, 2026.
s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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