SCOTT v. BATCHELOR

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
JOHN WILLIAM SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv973-MCR-HTC
BEA BATCHELOR,
Defendant.
___________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff John William Scott, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendant Bea Batchelor, acting in her
official capacity as an investigator for the Department of Children and Families
(“DCF”), 	violated 	his 	Fourth 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights 	during 	the
implementation of a child safety plan in a DCF case. Doc. 1. Batchelor moved to
dismiss the complaint and after reviewing the complaint (Doc. 1), the motion to
dismiss (Doc. 20), Scott’s opposition (Docs. 25 & 26), and the relevant law, the
undersigned finds the motion should be GRANTED. This Court lacks jurisdiction
over this matter because Scott’s claims against Batchelor are barred by sovereign
immunity and also because this case falls under the domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction.
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I. 	BACKGROUND1
On November 6, 2023, DCF case worker Batchelor arrived at Scott’s
residence to perform a child welfare investigation. 	In front of Scott and his two
minor children, Batchelor stated, “Perhaps the other (4) DCF investigators failed to
communicate the prior investigations because of the injunction that was in place at
the time.” Scott told Batchelor there was no injunction between him and his minor
children at that time. Scott “believes he stated that not communicating investigations
of child neglect violated DCF policy and [Scott’s] civil rights.” 	To support
Batchelor, the “supporting deputy” stated Scott had a history of domestic violence,
“which is inaccurate.”
Batchelor returned to Scott’s residence on November 8. 	She told Scott he
needed to leave his residence for twenty-four hours because she was implementing
a safety plan.2 Scott requested a physical copy of the safety plan from Batchelor and
from Okaloosa County Sheriff Deputy Jerry Miller. 	No one provided a physical
copy of the safety plan. Scott gathered 24 hours’ worth of medication and clothing
and departed the residence.
1 The undersigned derived the following relevant factual allegations from Scott’s complaint (Doc.
1).
2 Under Florida law, a “safety plan” is defined as “a plan created to control present or impending
danger using the least intrusive means appropriate to protect a child when a parent, caregiver, or
legal custodian is unavailable, unwilling, or unable to do so.” Fla. Stat. § 39.01(78).
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On the morning of November 9, a different DCF “Investigator” called Scott
and informed him that (1) Batchelor had modified the original safety plan to extend
Scott’s time away from his residence for ten calendar days; (2) Scott could not return
to his residence without a law enforcement escort; and (3) Batchelor had completed
the investigative phase, and “any statements [Scott] made” would be irrelevant to
the investigation’s outcome.
Scott contacted Batchelor on November 9. Batchelor told Scott he could not
return to his residence without law enforcement. Batchelor was aware Scott did not
have enough medication with him to keep from returning to the residence.
Scott contacted the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Office and spoke with Deputy
Blake. Over the course of two telephone conversations, Blake stated Scott could not
request civil standby without a physical copy of the safety plan and that Batchelor
either knew or should have known that Scott needed a copy of the safety plan as it
is “standard practice of [DCF.]”
Scott returned to his residence, where his spouse stated, “Bea told me to call
her if you came back and if I didn’t they might take the kids.” Batchelor contacted
911 dispatch and requested a response to Scott’s residence due to “a safety plan
breaking down.” When she called 911, Batchelor knew or should have known that
the safety plan was not enforceable because of her failure to provide Scott with a
copy of the safety plan, despite numerous requests.
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On November 11, Crystal Martin told Scott that Batchelor had emailed Martin
a digital copy of the safety plan on November 9. Martin forwarded the email to Scott
for “evidentiary purposes.” Scott emailed a copy of a police report from his spouse’s
“2015 DV Battery arrest and conviction.”3
On November 27, Batchelor returned to Scott’s residence with the Okaloosa
County Sherrif’s Office. During this visit, Batchelor made several statements on the
deputies’ body-worn camera, including: (1) “I got you here for safety, this guy is a
real asshole”; (2) “I think you’re barking up the wrong tree, to be honest I think
working with us is better than fighting us”; (3) “I mean we followed the playbook,
so umm you can pursue whatever your investigation entails but I can tell you that in
the long run you’re probably better off just not, but you’re welcome to”; and (4) “We
can give you our report at the end of the investigation, um but I don’t think that, I
don’t necessarily think that it’s gonna have the info that you want. Um and I mean
we are the State, we have a team of lawyers, so I don’t know what you’re thinking
is gonna happen, but it’s gonna be, it’s gonna be a lot for you to pursue what you’re
thinking of pursuing.”
Between November 20, 2022, and October 31, 2023, Scott’s spouse told Scott
that Batchelor “had provided Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Office the Inaccurate
Background check that was taken from [Scott’s] residence without a warrant.”
3 The complaint does not state to whom Scott emailed the police report.
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When Scott received Batchelor’s investigative summary for his DCF case,
Scott discovered inaccuracies, including one contradicting DCF records. The other
inaccuracies included statements Batchelor made, which “negated [Scott’s] status as
a domestic violence survivor.” Batchelor also failed to document Scott’s statements
to the investigator. 	When Scott attempted to file a criminal complaint, Okaloosa
County’s Sergeant Robert Robinson stated Florida DCF investigators are immune
from criminal prosecution. Captain Todd Watkins “supported” Sergeant Robinson,
stating “the DCF investigator had not violated any criminal statutes.”
Scott telephoned Geanetta Salter, a DCF supervisor of investigation, who
stated that Batchelor resigned from DCF for personal reasons, not because of her
interactions with Scott or his family. Scott believes Salter also stated that Batchelor
followed the playbook. 	An associate of Scott’s also told him that Batchelor was
“super friendly and helpful” while working on a case for her.
Scott has emailed and stated verbally in meetings and during incidental
interactions, via telephone and formal complaints to the DCF Office of Civil Rights,
that Batchelor’s actions were criminal and violated Scott’s civil rights and that he is
entitled to relief. However, no relief has been provided.
Scott states that because of Batchelor’s actions, he suffered “irreparable
emotional and psychological harm.” He brings several claims under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 	He alleges Batchelor: (1) conspired to violate his rights
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under 	the 	Fourth 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments4; 	(2) 	violated 	his 	Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights when she refused to provide a copy of the safety
plan; (3) violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when she denied
Scott access to his minor children; and (4) violated his Fourth Amendment rights
when she called 911 for assistance in implementing a safety plan and when she
removed “a legal document” from Scott’s residence. Scott requests a total of $17.5
million in compensatory damages and punitive damages “in the amount the court
feels is appropriate.”
II. 	DISCUSSION
Batchelor has filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including failure
to state a claim, Younger abstention, sovereign immunity, and the domestic relations
exception.5 As discussed below, the undersigned finds that this Court lacks
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity and the domestic relations exception.
4 As part of this count, Scott also alleges Batchelor violated criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242. 	To the extent Scott is asking the Court to initiate a criminal prosecution, this
Court is not a prosecutorial body and cannot refer a case for prosecution. See U.S. ex rel. Stolls v.
Martin, 2006 WL 1883439, at *3 (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2006) (noting the “authority to investigate and
initiate criminal complaints rests exclusively with federal prosecutors”).
5 Defendant’s motion to dismiss also includes a section arguing the Court should decline
supplemental jurisdiction over Scott’s state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See Doc. 20 at 11. The undersigned does not read Scott’s complaint to allege any state
law claims, but even if it did, the undersigned agrees with Defendant. See Raney v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (encouraging “district courts to dismiss any remaining
state claims when … the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”) (citation omitted).
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Because those findings are dipositive, the Court need not address Batchelor’s other
arguments.
A. 	Sovereign Immunity
As an initial matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because the
claims against Batchelor are barred by sovereign immunity. 	Scott sues Batchelor
solely in her official capacity for monetary damages.6 Throughout the suit Scott
alleges that all conduct taken by Batchelor was in her “official capacity.” 	A suit
against a defendant in her official capacity is effectively a suit against her employer,
which, here, is the State of Florida. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits
against state officials in their official capacity … should be treated as suits against
the State.”). 	However, Scott cannot recover damages from the State of Florida
because Florida is immune from suits for damages under § 1983. See Jackson v. Ga.
Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Under the Eleventh
Amendment, state officials sued for damages in their official capacity are immune
from suit in federal court.”). The complaint asks for no other type of relief besides
damages.7
6 In his response, Scott argues “state employees sued in their individual capacities” are not
protected. 	Doc. 26 at 7. 	Scott, however, has sued Batchelor only in her official capacity.
Regardless, even if he were allowed to amend the complaint to sue Batchelor in her individual
capacity, dismissal would nonetheless be appropriate because of the domestic relations exception,
infra Section II.B.
7 Scott’s response indicates he “seeks money damages and declaratory relief,” but the complaint
seeks only damages. 	Compare Doc. 26 at 4 with Doc. 1. 	Even if he sought declaratory relief,
Scott is not entitled to a declaratory judgment to adjudicate the legality of past conduct. See
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Therefore, Defendant Batchelor is immune from suit in her official capacity,
and the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Washington
v. Bauer, 149 F. App’x 867, 871 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o the extent the plaintiffs
made claims against the DCFS individual defendants and Governor Bush, in their
official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment of the Federal Constitution bars such §
1983 claims.”); Sigler v. Bradshaw, 2015 WL 1044175, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10,
2015) 	(“As 	a 	state 	agency, 	[the 	Florida] 	DCF 	receives 	the 	same 	Eleventh
Amendment protection from suit in federal court as the state itself.”).
B. 	Domestic Relations Exception
Even if sovereign immunity did not apply to Batchelor, this Court also lacks
jurisdiction over this case because it involves child custody matters that fall under
the domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. 	Notably, this Court
recently invoked the domestic relations exception to jurisdiction and dismissed a
case Scott filed against an employee of the Families First Network, alleging
similar—and some of the same—facts as the instant case, including facts involving
Batchelor. 	See Scott v. Shaw, Case No. 3:25cv974-TKW-HTC, at Doc. 16 (N.D.
Fla. Dec. 8, 2025) (adopting magistrate judge’s report and recommendation).
Hitchcock v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 6:18-cv-1986-Orl-28EJK, 2020 WL 364600, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 22, 2020); Regency of Palm Beach, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 08-81442-CIV, 2009 WL
2729954, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2009) (“The point of a declaratory judgment is to permit ‘actual
controversies to be settled before they ripen into violations of law,’ not to adjudicate past conduct.”
(quoting Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC v. TLU Ltd., 07-61259-Civ, 2008 WL 828122 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 27, 2008)).
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“The 	federal 	judiciary 	has 	traditionally 	abstained 	from 	deciding 	cases
concerning domestic relations.” 	Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir.
1988) (“federal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child
custody, 	visitation[] 	rights, 	establishment 	of 	paternity, 	child 	support, 	and
enforcement 	of 	separation 	or 	divorce 	decrees 	still 	subject 	to 	state 	court
modification”). The doctrine imposes two limits on federal courts’ power: (1) courts
may not issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees; and (2) even when
subject matter jurisdiction might be proper, courts should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction when “sufficient grounds” exist. Alliant Tax Credit 31, Inc. v. Murphy,
924 F.3d 1134, 1146 (11th Cir. 2019).
Scott argues in his response that the domestic relations exception does not
apply because this is a § 1983 claim “incidentally” touching on family matters. Doc.
26 at 4. The undersigned disagrees. All of Scott’s allegations relate to Batchelor’s
investigation in the DCF case and how she implemented and handled the child safety
plan. As Scott explains in his opposition8 to the motion, he seeks redress because
Batchelor “fabricated or materially altered investigative summaries” later used
against him in the State dependency proceedings and manipulated a DCF safety plan
8 Scott’s opposition also includes a “supplemental statement of facts.” 	Doc. 26 at 2. 	Scott,
however, cannot amend his complaint through an opposing brief. 	See Lightfoot v. Henry Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 771 F.3d 764, 779 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A plaintiff may not amend her complaint through
argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”).
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to deprive him of access to his minor children. Doc. 26 at 1. He contends Batchelor
“repeatedly modified a ‘safety plan’ with no written notice, hearing, or appeal
mechanism … stripping [him] of custody and visitation rights.” 	Doc. 26 at 5.
Undoubtedly, the claims Scott raises against Batchelor would require the Court to
become enmeshed in disputes regarding Scott’s children—a matter best addressed
by the State.
Moreover, as Batchelor argues in her motion to dismiss, Scott and his
estranged spouse have an extensive litigation history in state court, involving
contested proceedings regarding their marriage and their children, including several
petitions for protection from domestic violence, petitions for child support and
custody, and an ongoing petition for dissolution of marriage.9 Thus, to resolve the
allegations Scott raises in this case, including the allegation that there was no
injunction in place and that he, rather than his spouse, was a victim of domestic
abuse, the Court would necessarily have to “delve into the parties’ domestic affairs.”
See Doc. 20 at 5 (quoting Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988)).
9 See Scott v. Shaw, Case No. 3:25cv974-TKW-HTC, at Doc. 14 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2025) (detailing
the Scotts’ state court proceedings). At least one of the Scotts’ cases is ongoing. See Scott v. Scott,
Okaloosa County Case No. 2024 DR 20 C (dissolution with children, filed Jan. 2024, ongoing);
Scott v. Scott, Okaloosa County Case No. 2022 DR 3559 CV (Mrs. Scott’s petition for protection
against Scott, filed Nov. 2022); Scott v. Scott, Okaloosa County Case No. 2023 DR 2427 (Mrs.
Scott’s petition to establish child support, filed June 2023); Scott v. Scott, Okaloosa County Case
No. 2024 1657 CV (Scott’s petition for protection against his wife, filed June 2024); Scott v. Scott,
Okaloosa County Case No. 2024 DR 2028 (Mrs. Scott’s petition for protection against Scott, filed
July 2024). It also appears the state may have commenced a dependency proceeding at some point
in 2025, which may also be ongoing. See Okaloosa County Case No. 2025 DP 78.
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This Court, however, should not decide issues relating to matters involving the
Scotts’ marital affairs or the parent-child relationship. 	See Stone v. Wall, 135 F.3d
1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that in applying the domestic relations
exception, the “main point [is] whether the litigation would mandate an inquiry into
the marital or parent-child relationship”) (citation omitted).
In sum, this case is not, as Scott argues, “outside the contours” of the domestic
relations exception. Doc. 26 at 4. Undermining his own argument, Scott repeatedly
lists “denial of … custodial access to his three minor children” in his claims. This
Court is, however, powerless to issue child custody decrees. See Powell v. R.R. Ret.
Bd., 2023 WL 3731418 (M.D. Ala. May 15, 2023) (noting the domestic relations
exception “flatly prohibits a federal court from issuing … child custody decrees”)
(internal citation omitted). Thus, “sufficient grounds” exist that warrant the Court’s
abstention from exercising jurisdiction. 	See Alliant Tax Credit, 924 F.3d at 1146.
And federal courts have abstained from exercising jurisdiction in similar situations.
See e.g., Keys v. Presbyterian Child. Home Servs., 2025 WL 2299482, at *1-2 (E.D.
Mo. Aug. 8, 2025) (applying domestic relations exception and dismissing complaint
where plaintiff sought damages against defendant for failing to allow plaintiff to see
his two sons in accordance with a visitation agreement); see also Dixit v. Singh, 758
F. App’x 766, 768 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s application of domestic
relations exception where plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress resulting
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from divorce and child custody proceedings because a “federal court must abstain
from 	hearing 	claims 	that 	mandate 	inquiry 	into 	the 	marital 	or 	parent-child
relationship”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).10
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should dismiss Scott’s claims against
Batchelor for lack of jurisdiction because she enjoys sovereign immunity or,
alternatively, it should abstain from hearing Scott’s claims under the domestic
relations exception to jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendant Bea Batchelor’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) be GRANTED,
and this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	The clerk close the file.
10 See also, Ray v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 2023 WL 8254434, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 29, 2023) (stating the court lacks “jurisdiction over cases involving divorce and child custody
under the domestic-relations exception to federal-court jurisdiction” and “[s]tate courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over those matters”); Deaton v. Stephens, 2023 WL 6131452, at *9 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 19, 2023) (finding the domestic relations exception provided a reason for the court to
refrain from adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims because the court “would inevitably be compelled
to conduct an inquiry into various aspects of ongoing custody issues”); Guevara v. Padin, 2016
WL 7188783, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2016) (“Many courts ‘willingly apply the domestic relations
exception to federal questions and constitutional issues involving intra-family disputes’ and
‘decline jurisdiction over federal questions which would deeply involve them in adjudicating
domestic affairs.’”) (citation omitted); see also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (“The
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws
of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.”).
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Case No. 3:25cv973-MCR-HTC
At Pensacola, Florida this 12th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all
other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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