HOGAN v. DIXON

Page 1 of 16
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
TIYARI R. HOGAN,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
RICKY DIXON,
Respondent.
__________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Tiyari Raheem Hogan, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state
court conviction in Walton County, Florida, and raising six grounds for relief. Doc.
1. 	Upon careful consideration of the petition and the Secretary’s response (Doc.
10),1 the undersigned recommends that the petition be 	DENIED 	without an
evidentiary hearing because Hogan failed to exhaust his state remedies, and his
claims are procedurally defaulted.
I. 	Background
On November 2, 2021, the State filed an Amended Information in the First
Judicial Circuit in Walton County, Florida, Case No. 2021-CF-000458, charging
Hogan with Count One: Introduction of Contraband into a County Detention Facility
(Methamphetamine) and Count Two: Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Doc. 10-1
1 The Court gave Hogan the opportunity to file a Reply (Doc. 13), but Hogan did not do so.
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 1 of 16

Page 2 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
at 46–48. These charges arose when Hogan was arrested on a burglary charge and
contraband was discovered during a body search upon his admission to the Walton
County Jail. Doc. 10 at 2. Officers Christopher Lewis and Matthew Roden of the
DeFuniak Springs Police Department conducted the arrest, with Officer Roden
wearing an active body camera during the incident. Doc. 10-1.
During the body search at the Walton County Jail, Sergeant Stephen Pate
discovered a straw and a small black plastic bag containing a white residue2 in
Hogan’s sock. 	Id. at 14–16. 	The straw and bag were subsequently collected and
tested by the arresting officers and confirmed positive for methamphetamine. 	Id.
The burglary charge was subsequently dropped. Doc. 10-2 at 14:18–24.3
On November 4, 2021, Hogan demanded a speedy trial—even though his
public defender had not taken witness depositions—and elected to represent himself.
Id. at 11–12, 21:16–24. After jury selection on November 9, 2021, Hogan changed
course and elected to have a public defender represent him at trial. 	Doc. 10-3 at
15:10–18:4. A jury found Hogan guilty on both counts. Id. at 159:13–24.
At trial, Hogan testified and admitted he had put a bag, from which he had
just snorted methamphetamine, into his sock. Doc. 10-3 at 112:5–10. He testified
2 The white residue found inside the straw and bag collected by jail staff after processing Hogan
tested positive for methamphetamine and is referred to throughout the record by Hogan as a “trace
amount.” See Doc. 1 at 15, 17; Doc. 10 at 15.
3 When citing transcripts, the citation will include the page number of the PDF before the colon
and the lines on that page following the colon.
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 2 of 16

Page 3 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
he believed he had consumed all the methamphetamine and had no intention of
bringing contraband into the jail. Id. at 112:20–113:1. The jury was instructed that
lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative
defense to possession of a controlled substance. 	Id. at 142:2–10. On February 22,
2022, the trial court sentenced Hogan to five years’ imprisonment on Count One and
time served on Count Two. Doc. 10-4 at 10:1–4.
Hogan appealed the judgment and conviction to the First District Court of
Appeal (“First DCA”). 	See Case No. 1D22-0815. 	On August 17, 2022, his
appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders4 brief, outlining possible arguments but
providing no supporting analysis and requesting permission for Hogan to file a pro
se brief. Doc. 10-5. Subsequently, Hogan filed a pro se initial brief, challenging the
legality of his arrest and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and arguing his arrest
lacked probable cause and the evidence was the fruit of a poisonous tree. Doc. 10-
6 at 8–9, 31. On April 19, 2023, the First DCA affirmed and remanded the case to
the trial court only for entry of a corrected written judgment reflecting that Hogan
was adjudicated guilty on Count Two, possession of paraphernalia. 	See Hogan v.
State, 359 So. 3d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Doc. 10-7. Hogan did not seek certiorari
review in the United States Supreme Court, and his conviction became final for
4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (appointed counsel may withdraw from a case if the
appeal is “wholly frivolous” and without merit but must file a brief “referring to anything in the
record that might arguably support the appeal”).
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 3 of 16

Page 4 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 18, 2023. 	See, e.g., Nix v. Sec’y for Dep’t
Corrs., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that a conviction becomes
final when the 90-day period to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court expired
following the state appellate court’s affirmation of the trial court judgment).
Hogan filed several unsuccessful post-conviction motions and petitions, the
denials of which he did not appeal. 	On July 14, 2023,5 Hogan filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus relief in the state court, claiming his arrest was unlawful
because the arresting officers did not obtain a sworn or handwritten affidavit from a
material witness, and that his due process rights were violated. Doc. 10-8.6 On July
19, 2023, the trial court denied the petition, finding Hogan’s claims were frivolous,
not cognizable in a habeas petition, and should have been raised on direct appeal.
See Doc. 10-9. 	Hogan did not appeal. 	See Docs. 10-10, 10-25 (state trial and
appellate court dockets).
On September 5, 2023, Hogan filed a motion for postconviction relief,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. 	Doc. 10-11. The trial court struck the
motion on September 7, 2023, for being facially insufficient and gave Hogan sixty
5 When possible, consistent with the prisoner mailbox rule, all filing dates refer to the date Hogan
submitted the document to prison mail officials. Daniels v. United States, 809 F.3d 588, 589 (11th
Cir. 2015).
6 Included with Exhibit H of the Secretary’s Response are two copies of the same petition – one
that Hogam appears to have submitted July 10, and the other on July 14.
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 4 of 16

Page 5 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
days to file a single amended motion. Doc. 10-12. On November 13, 20237, Hogan
filed an Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief, two days after the 60-day
deadline. 	Doc. 10-13. 	On November 22, 2023, the trial court denied the motion
with prejudice as untimely (Doc. 10-14), and Hogan did not appeal. Docs. 10-10,
10-25.
On March 31, 2024, Hogan filed a successive motion for postconviction relief
alleging one ineffective assistance of counsel claim and three newly discovered
evidence claims. Doc. 10-15. The trial court denied the motion with prejudice on
April 17, 2024, finding the claims were untimely, procedurally barred, refuted by
the record, or ineligible for relief under the newly discovered evidence exception.
Doc. 10-16. Hogan did not appeal. Docs. 10-10, 10-25.
On April 22, 2024, Hogan filed another successive motion for postconviction
relief, alleging Brady8 and Giglio9 violations. Docs. 10-17; 10-18 at 4 n.4–5. The
trial court denied the motion with prejudice as untimely on May 2, 2024, finding that
no exceptions applied. Doc. 10-18 at 5–6. Hogan did not appeal. Docs. 10-10, 10-
25.
7 Under the “mailbox rule,” Hogan’s motion was deemed filed on November 13, 2023, the date he
delivered it to prison officials for mailing. See Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th
Cir. 1999).
8 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 5 of 16

Page 6 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
On May 7, 2024, Hogan filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing
the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to sustain findings of guilt. Doc.
10-19. 	The trial court denied the motion on May 21, 2024, finding he was not
entitled to relief because his claims were not cognizable under Rule 3.800 and should
have been raised on direct appeal. Doc. 10-20. Hogan did not appeal. Docs. 10-10,
10-25.
After filing the instant federal habeas petition, Hogan filed a second petition
for writ of habeas corpus in state court on June 9, 2024, raising three grounds for
relief. Doc. 10-21. The trial court denied the petition on June 19, 2024, finding that
Hogan had abused the writ and warning him about potential sanctions for future
frivolous findings. 	Doc. 10-22 at 5 (“The instant petition is untimely and/or
successive, frivolous, and an abuse of process.”). Hogan did not appeal. Docs. 10-
10, 10-25.
On September 5, 2024, Hogan filed a petition in the First DCA alleging
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Doc. 10-23, Case No. in Case No. 1D24-
2266. 	Hogan argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
supplemental brief raising alleged fundamental error in the jury instructions used at
trial. Id. The First DCA denied the petition on the merits per curiam and without a
written opinion on November 13, 2025.
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 6 of 16

Page 7 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
II. 	Discussion
On May 12, 2024, while several of his state proceedings were still pending,
Hogan filed the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising six grounds for relief
based on Brady violations, ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), trial court
error, or “newly discovered facts.” 	Doc. 1. 	The Secretary has filed a response
arguing that each claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.10 For the reasons
discussed below, the undersigned agrees with the Secretary.
A. 	Legal Standard
Before seeking federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a petitioner must
exhaust all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). For example, a claim that is properly brought
on a post-conviction motion is not exhausted unless a petitioner also exhausts his
appellate rights as to that motion. 	See Baker v. Dep’t of Corr., 634 F. App’x 689,
692 (11th Cir. 2015).
Additionally, to properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly
present” his federal claims to the state courts in a manner that alerts them to the
federal nature of the claims. 	Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); see also
10 Because the Secretary does not contest that Hogan’s petition is timely (Doc. 10 at 6), the Court
does not further address it in this Report and Recommendation. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
198, 209–10 (2006) (holding that district courts are permitted, but not required, to consider sua
sponte the timeliness of a federal habeas petition, and that “a district court is not required to
doublecheck the State’s math.”).
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 7 of 16

Page 8 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n order to exhaust state
remedies, a petitioner must fairly present every issue raised in his federal petition to
the state’s highest court [and] the state court petition must make the state courts
aware that the claims asserted do, in fact, raise federal constitutional issues.”). Mere
similarity of claims alone does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See Duncan
v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995). 	This ensures that state courts have the first
opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of federal constitutional rights.
See id. at 365–366.
A claim that has not been fairly presented to the state courts and can no longer
be raised is procedurally defaulted. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302–03 (11th
Cir. 1999). Federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred unless
the petitioner can demonstrate: 1) cause for the default and actual prejudice from the
alleged constitutional violation; or 2) that “failure to consider the claims [would]
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 750 (1991); see also Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001).
To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner “must demonstrate
that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the
claim properly in state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999).
A subjective belief that state courts would not provide petitioner his desired relief
does not excuse the exhaustion requirement for his claim. See Sundar v. I.N.S., 328
F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[P]erceived futility is no exception to the
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 8 of 16

Page 9 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
exhaustion requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254[.]”).
B. 	All Grounds Are Unexhausted and Procedurally Defaulted
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that each of the six
grounds for relief Hogan raises is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because
he did not exhaust his state remedies and is procedurally barred from returning to
state court and raising these claims now. Additionally, the undersigned finds Hogan
has not shown the exceptions to procedural default for cause and prejudice or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice applies.
1. 	Ground One – Brady violation
In Ground One, Hogan alleges the State violated Brady by failing to use
Officer Roden’s body camera footage at trial. He argues that the footage would have
shown that the officers never asked whether he had any illegal items on his person
before his arrest, thereby impeaching their trial testimony and undermining the
State’s evidence that he knew about the contraband. Doc. 1 at 18–21.
This claim is unexhausted. 	Although Hogan raised this Brady claim in his
third Rule 3.850 motion filed on April 22, 2024 (Doc. 10-17 at 10), the trial court
denied the motion as untimely on May 2, 2024 (Doc. 10-18) and Hogan did not
appeal the denial to the First DCA. 	See Doc. 10-10. 	Hogan states in the petition
that he is “working on [an] appeal now” (Doc. 1 at 10); however, that is irrelevant,
as his time to appeal has passed and there is no pending appeal. Because Hogan did
not complete “one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 9 of 16

Page 10 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process,” the claim
is unexhausted. 	Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845).
Moreover, this claim is now procedurally defaulted. Any attempt by Hogan
to return to state court would be barred because any successive Rule 3.850 motion
would be denied as both untimely and successive. See Doc. 10-18 at 4–6. The trial
court has already determined that no exception under Rule 3.850(b) applies. 	Id.
Florida’s rule prohibiting successive postconviction motions serves as a state
procedural bar that is independent of federal law and strictly enforced. 	See Harris
v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 11cv471, 2012 WL 5876649, at *7 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2012)
(citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f) and collecting Florida appellate court and Northern
District cases supporting the prohibition on successive Rule 3.850 motions); see also
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30.
Because Hogan’s claims would be barred under this rule, it cannot be
reviewed on the merits in federal court unless he shows cause for the default and
actual prejudice, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result. See id.;
Jennings v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1230, 1247–48 (11th Cir. 2007). Hogan’s self-
serving statement that “[he] feel[s] like the appeal court and state court will not grant
[him] any relief” (Doc. 1 at 14) and his prediction that the motions pending in state
court “will be [denied] with prejudice like the rest [he has] filed” do not establish
cause for failing to properly exhaust his claims. See Sundar v. I.N.S., 328 F.3d 1320,
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 10 of 16

Page 11 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
1325 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[P]erceived futility is no exception to the exhaustion
requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254[.]”). Accordingly, Ground One should
be denied.
2. 	Ground Two – IAC for Failing to Object to Insufficient Evidence
In Ground Two, Hogan alleges the trial attorney was ineffective for failing to
object to insufficient evidence, i.e., failing to argue that only trace amounts of residue
cannot support a felony conviction for introduction of contraband.11 Ground Two is
unexhausted.
Hogan claims he raised this ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a Rule
3.800(a) motion, which is limited to challenging illegal sentences, not convictions.
State v. Williams, 854 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). 	When the trial court
denied the claim as not cognizable on May 21, 2024 (Doc. 10-20), Hogan failed to
timely appeal, leaving the claim unexhausted. 	This claim is now procedurally
defaulted because the proper vehicle, a Rule 3.850 motion, is time-barred under
Florida’s two-year limitation period. 	See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). 	Ground Two
should be denied.
11 Even if exhausted, this claim is without merit because Florida law establishes that residual
amounts of controlled substances are sufficient for a felony conviction. See Gilchrist v. State, 784
So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Thus, counsel could not have been ineffective for railing to
raise an unmeritorious claim. 	United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000)
(attorney cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise claims that are “reasonably considered
to be without merit.”).
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 11 of 16

Page 12 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
3. 	Ground Three – IAC for Failing to Challenge Filing of Information
Without Testimony of Material Witness
In Ground Three, Hogan alleges his attorneys failed to file a motion or appeal
brief showing that the State filed an Information without sworn testimony from a
material witness, and that the State instead relied on “secondhand information” from
the arresting officers.12 Doc. 1 at 13, 24.
Hogan raised a related claim in his first and second state habeas petitions but
framed it as trial court error rather than ineffective assistance of counsel.13 The trial
court denied both petitions on July 19, 2023, finding that the trial court error claims
could not be raised in a habeas petition and were procedurally barred. 	Doc. 10-9.
Hogan did not appeal this decision. In the instant federal petition, Hogan suggests
he did not file an appeal because he “feel[s] like the appeal court and the state court
will not grant [him] any relief.” (Doc. 1 at 14). This subjective belief does not excuse
the exhaustion requirement for his claim. See Sundar, 328 F.3d at 1325.
Ground Three is, thus, unexhausted. Also, the claim is procedurally defaulted
12 Even if exhausted, this claim lacks merit because challenges to an Information based on the
absence of sworn testimony are not cognizable unless they allege a fundamental defect. 	See
Johnson v. State, 321 So. 3d 853, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“[A] challenge to an information on
the ground that it was not supported by probable cause or sworn testimony from a material witness
does not raise a fundamental defect[.]”); see, e.g., Edwards v. State, 128 So. 3d 134, 135 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013) (“Because Appellant’s postconviction claim alleged no fundamental defect in the
information filed against him…the court correctly dismissed Appellant’s motion.”).
13 Hogan thus failed to fairly present the IAC claim to the state courts at all, since a substantive
trial court error claim is not the same claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
counsel's failure to raise the substantive claim. 	See Lefroy v. Sec'y for Fla. Dep't of Corr., 421
F.3d 1237, 1260 n.24 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that a substantive claim is “separate and distinct”
from an ineffective assistance claim based on the substantive claim).
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 12 of 16

Page 13 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
because a Rule 3.850 motion would be deemed untimely and successive. 	See Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). Ground Three should be denied.
4. 	Grounds Four & Five – Trial Court Error/“Newly Discovered Fact”
In Grounds Four and Five (which are duplicative), Hogan alleges as “newly
discovered fact” that the trial court committed fundamental error by not instructing
the jury that the State must prove Hogan knew the illicit nature of the trace amount
of methamphetamine. 	Hogan argues that this omission violated his due process
rights. Doc. 1 at 15–17, 25.
Hogan raised this claim in the state courts for the first time after he filed the
instant federal petition; he first raised it in his June 9, 2024, second state petition for
habeas relief. Doc. 10-21 at 5 (see Ground 2). The state court denied the petition
on June 19, 2024, finding the claim should have been raised on direct appeal, was
without merit, or was not cognizable in habeas and was procedurally barred as a
result. Doc. 10-22. Hogan did not appeal this denial.
This claim is unexhausted because Hogan failed to file a timely appeal with
the First DCA. It is also procedurally defaulted because a claim of fundamental error
by the trial court error must be brought on direct appeal and the time for Hogan to
bring such an appeal has long since expired.14 See Jaimes v. State, 51 So. 3d 445,
14 Similarly, even assuming Hogan could show that this claim was in fact based on newly
discovered evidence (as opposed to well-settled law on jury instructions), such a collateral attack
on a judgment must be brought in a Rule 3.850 motion, and Hogan cannot return to state court to
file such a motion because it would be both successive and untimely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b).
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 13 of 16

Page 14 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
448 (Fla. 2010). Accordingly, Grounds Four and Five should be denied.
5. 	Ground Six – IAC for Failing to Object to Jury Instructions
In Ground Six, Hogan alleges trial attorney was ineffective for failing to
object to the jury instructions that omitted knowledge of the illicit nature of the
substance as an element of the offense. Doc. 1 at 17. Hogan raised this claim in his
third state habeas petition, which was denied on June 19, 2024, as procedurally
barred. Doc. 10-22. He failed to exhaust the claim by not appealing that denial, and
any attempt to raise it now in a proper Rule 3.850 motion would be time-barred.
Therefore, Ground Six should be denied.
III. 	Conclusion
A. 	Evidentiary Hearing
The undersigned finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. In
deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, this Court must consider “whether
such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,
which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” 	Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). 	Additionally, this Court must consider the
deferential standards prescribed by § 2254. See id. Because the lack of exhaustion
and procedural default findings do not rely on the resolution of any factual disputes,
the undersigned finds that the claims in this case can be resolved without an
evidentiary hearing. See id.
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 14 of 16

Page 15 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
B. 	Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Court provides, “The district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” If a certificate is
issued, “the court must state the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice
of appeal must still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b). 	After review of the record, the Court finds no
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000) (citation modified) (explaining how
to satisfy this showing). 	Therefore, it is also recommended that the district court
deny a certificate of appealability in its final order.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that:
1. 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED without
an evidentiary hearing;
2. 	A certificate of appealability be DENIED; and
3. 	The clerk be directed to CLOSE the file.
IN CHAMBERS at Pensacola, Florida, this 31 st day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 15 of 16

Page 16 of 16
Case No. 3:24cv229-MCR-HTC
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2024); 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case 3:24-cv-00229-MCR-HTC Document 14 Filed 12/31/25 Page 16 of 16