RUTLEDGE v. DIXON et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
TROY D. RUTLEDGE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No.: 1:25cv228/MCR/ZCB
WILLIAM E. FLETCHER, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this prisoner
civil rights action. After screening Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) under 28
U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915(e)(2)(B), 	1915A(a)-(b), 	the 	Court 	identified 	several
deficiencies and ordered Plaintiff to correct those deficiencies by filing an
amended complaint. 	(Doc. 14). 	Plaintiff has now filed an amended
complaint. (Doc. 17).
The Court must screen the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(a)-(b) to determine if it is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a plausible claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief from
immune defendants. 	Upon review, several of Plaintiff’s claims fail to
state a plausible claim for relief or seek monetary relief from an immune
Defendant. 	Accordingly, those claims should be dismissed and the case
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recommitted to the undersigned for further proceedings on the remaining
claims.
I. Plaintiff’s Allegations1
The amended complaint lists nine Defendants from the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC): (1) William Fletcher; (2) Lieutenant
Tanner; (3) Sergeant C.M. Collins; (4) Officer B. Jones; (5) Sergeant
Singh; (6) Sergeant Keaton; (7) Captain Bond; (8) Cross City C.I. Medical
Department; and (9) Warden J. Kennedy. 	Plaintiff sues the employees
in their individual capacities and the Medical Department in its official
capacity. (Doc. 17 at 2-7).
On December 3, 2024, Cross City Correctional Institution was
locked down and searched after an officer was stabbed. While searching
Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant Fletcher found Plaintiff’s civil complaint and
allegedly said, “we got one that likes to write our ass up. 	He’s got some
shit ready for our ass right now.” Defendant Fletcher asked about knives
found in the cell, but neither Plaintiff nor his cellmate responded.
Defendant Fletcher wrote disciplinary reports about the knives and sent
Plaintiff and his cellmate to confinement. (Id. at 9).
1 Plaintiff’s allegations are assumed true at this stage. DeVillier v. Texas,
601 U.S. 285, 288 n.1 (2024).
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On the way to confinement, an officer told other officers—including
Defendant Keaton—that Plaintiff was a writ writer and snitch. Plaintiff
and his cellmate were put in a shower cell for six hours before Plaintiff
was taken to a different shower cell for another six hours. 	Plaintiff was
put in a confinement cell between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on December
4, 2024, and did not receive toiletries or a bed roll until 4:00 p.m. (Id. at
9-10).
For forty-three 	days, 	Plaintiff allegedly 	stayed in 	confinement
without proper clothing or bedding for cold weather. 	Plaintiff raised
these 	issues 	with 	Defendant 	Tanner, 	but 	Plaintiff’s 	concerns 	were
“denied or ignored.” 	Plaintiff sent grievances to Defendant Kennedy
“concerning these acts of retaliation but none of them were returned.”
Plaintiff claims Defendant Keaton stamped grievances Plaintiff filed
against Defendants Fletcher and Tanner. On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff
wrote grievances because it took Defendant Tanner three weeks to give
Plaintiff a security pen. 	Defendants Collins, Jones, and Singh had
previously denied Plaintiff a pen. The woman responsible for picking up
the grievances allegedly “refused” to take Plaintiff’s grievances against
Defendants Fletcher and Tanner. (Id. at 10-12).
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On January 15, 2025, Defendant Keaton processed a letter Plaintiff
wrote to a state clerk of court about his treatment at the prison. 	On
January 16, 2025, Plaintiff intended to mail his re-drafted civil complaint
that had been destroyed by Defendant Fletcher. 	Plaintiff addressed
copies of the complaint to the clerk of court and State Attorney’s Office.
But Plaintiff claims Defendant Keaton never mailed his letters or civil
complaint. 	Defendant Keaton also allegedly destroyed Plaintiff’s legal
mail in retaliation and told other officers about Plaintiff’s grievances
against them after seeing the grievances. (Id. at 12-13).
Plaintiff alleges that violence was rampant at the prison from
December 1, 2023, to February 2, 2025, when at least twelve inmates
were stabbed. Prison officials allegedly used “gang members as hitmen”
against inmates who wrote grievances against them. 	On January 17,
2025, Plaintiff’s cellmate—a gang member—allegedly carried out an
unprovoked attack on Plaintiff with a shank. Plaintiff alleges the shank
had to pass by Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, and Bond to get to the
cellmate. 	Defendants Collins, Jones, and Singh watched the altercation
between Plaintiff and his cellmate at the cell window before spraying
Plaintiff with chemicals. The cellmate flushed the shank down the toilet
after the altercation ended. (Id. at 13-14).
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Plaintiff 	suffered 	stab 	wounds 	and 	other 	injuries 	from 	the
altercation. After cuffing up, Plaintiff waited fifteen minutes for the cell
door to open when Defendant Bond arrived. 	Plaintiff’s cellmate was
taken to the medical unit first despite Plaintiff allegedly having more
serious injuries. Plaintiff waited ten more minutes before being taken to
medical. Defendant Bond could see Plaintiff’s wounds but made Plaintiff
wait for the cellmate to see medical first. Plaintiff states Defendant Bond
was told about the attack and should have ordered the cell door to be
opened sooner. On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff wrote a witness statement
about the altercation and gave it to Defendant Singh. 	Defendant Bond
allegedly tore up the witness statement saying Plaintiff was mad about
getting beat up. Plaintiff received disciplinary reports for the altercation,
while the cellmate got a disciplinary report and a recommendation for
the administrative management unit (AMU). (Id. at 14-15).
Plaintiff alleges his cellmate was already approved for AMU status
and should not have been in the same cell as Plaintiff. 	Plaintiff filed
grievances on this issue with Defendant Kennedy who did not respond.
Plaintiff 	claims 	the 	lack 	of 	response 	led 	to 	“the 	other 	defendants
becoming bolder in their acts of retaliation and deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s safety, protection and medical care.” (Id. at 16).
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After the altercation on January 17, 2025, Plaintiff “was treated for
his injuries but all of the wounds were left open.” 	Plaintiff alleges the
Medical Department never re-examined Plaintiff’s injuries. 	Plaintiff
filed 	medical 	grievances, 	but 	they 	were 	rejected 	by 	the 	Medical
Department. 	Defendants 	Collins 	and 	Singh 	also 	refused 	care 	for
Plaintiff, telling Plaintiff that the Medical Department said it was not
coming. 	After a week, Plaintiff submitted a sick call due to his injuries
becoming infected. A nurse determined Plaintiff’s wounds were infected
and gave Plaintiff antibiotics. 	Plaintiff claims he endured pain and
suffering due to the Medical Department’s lack of treatment. (Id. at 17-
18).
Plaintiff asserts First Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment
failure to protect, and Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to
medical needs claims. 	(Doc. 17 at 11-18). 	For relief, Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 18).
II. Statutory Screening Standard
To 	survive 	dismissal 	at 	screening, 	“a 	complaint 	must 	contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(cleaned up). 	The plausibility standard is met only where the facts
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alleged enable “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	Plausibility means
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 	Id. (cleaned up).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s 	official 	capacity 	claims 	against 	the 	Medical
Department are barred by sovereign immunity.
Absent 	waiver 	or 	express 	congressional 	abrogation 	(neither 	of
which is present here), the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a § 1983
plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against employees of a State
sued in their official capacities. 	Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 65, 71 (1989).
By suing the Medical Department in its official capacity, Plaintiff
has effectively sued the State of Florida. 	Therefore, the official capacity
damages claims brought by Plaintiff against the Medical Department are
barred by sovereign immunity. See Leonard v. Dep’t of Corr. Fla., 232 F.
App’x 892, 894 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The Department of Corrections is not
amenable 	to 	suit 	because 	it 	has 	immunity 	under 	the 	Eleventh
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Amendment.”); 	see 	also 	Taylor 	v. 	Fla. 	Dep’t 	of 	Correction 	Med.
Departments, No. 5:12cv110, 2012 WL 2155277, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 9,
2012) (discussing that medical departments of Florida prisons “are not
‘persons’ for the purposes of § 1983” and even if the FDOC was a “person”
under § 1983, a damages suit “was barred by the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity”), adopted, 2012 WL 2160231 (N.D. Fla. June 13,
2012).
B. Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	Eighth 	Amendment
deliberate indifference claims.
In Count 3, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Collins, Singh, Bond, and
the Medical Department failed to provide adequate medical care after the
altercation with his cellmate. 	(Doc. 17 at 17-18). 	The Court construes
these claims as Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims.
The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments.” 	U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 	The Supreme Court has held
that it is “cruel and unusual punishment” for prison officials to act with
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” 	Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 	That means prison officials must
provide prisoners with “minimally adequate medical care[.]” 	Bayse v.
Ward, 147 F.4th 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2025).
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The Eighth Amendment does not require a prisoner’s medical care
to be “perfect, the best obtainable, or even very good.” 	Id. 	Deliberate
indifference is a high standard, and prisoners are not “constitutionally
entitled to their preferred treatment plan[.]” 	Id. at 1311-12. 	Indeed, a
“denial of medical care constitutes deliberate indifference only when it is
so 	grossly 	incompetent, 	inadequate, 	or 	excessive 	as 	to 	shock 	the
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” 	Id. at 1312
(cleaned up).
“To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must
satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry, and must establish a
necessary causal link between the challenged conduct and their injuries.”
Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
The objective inquiry requires plaintiffs to show an “objectively serious
medical need.” 	Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266
(11th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
The subjective inquiry “turns on whether the prison official acted
with an attitude of deliberate indifference to the serious medical need.”
Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1283 (cleaned up). 	Prison officials are deliberately
indifferent if they “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm,
(2) disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to
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subjective recklessness.” Id. The “third prong will be satisfied only if the
plaintiff shows that the defendant actually knew that his conduct—his
own acts or omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious
harm.” 	Id. (cleaned up). 	But “[e]ven when a defendant has subjective
knowledge of a serious risk, a defendant who responds reasonably to such
a risk cannot be found liable . . . .” 	Id. at 1284 (cleaned up).
Plaintiff alleges that after his wounds were initially treated, the
Medical Department left the wounds open and refused to re-examine
them. 	Plaintiff alleges Defendants Collins and Singh refused to act on
Plaintiff’s medical grievances and that his wounds became infected after
not receiving treatment for a week. Plaintiff states he should have been
put on 	wound care 	and his wounds 	re-examined. 	Plaintiff alleges
Defendants Bond, Collins and Singh were deliberately indifferent by not
putting Plaintiff on wound care. (Doc. 17 at 17-18).
The Court assumes arguendo that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an
objectively serious medical need—the “stab wounds, cuts, bites, and
swelling to his face, head, back, and shoulders.” 	(Doc. 17 at 17). 	See
Burgess v. Palm Beach Cnty., 2023 WL 7410056, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9,
2023). 	As to the subjective element of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff
first claims Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, and Bond were deliberately
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indifferent when they took his cellmate to the medical unit first instead
of Plaintiff (who had to wait an additional ten minutes). (Doc. 17 at 14).2
The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff’s cellmate being taken to the medical unit first while
Plaintiff had to wait ten minutes does not show subjective recklessness
because 	choosing 	to 	separate 	the 	two 	inmates—who 	were 	fighting
moments before—was a reasonable course of action.3 	“Defendants did
not ignore [Plaintiff’s] need for medical attention but selected a course of
treatment”—separating the fighting inmates before taking Plaintiff to
the medical unit. 	Stalley v. Cumbie, 586 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1239 (M.D.
Fla. 2022), aff’d, 124 F.4th 1273 (11th Cir. 2024). 	Plaintiff’s treatment
being briefly delayed for the two inmates to be separated does not amount
to criminal recklessness because it was a “classic example of a matter for
medical judgment[.]” 	Id. 	at 	1240 (noting that 	“erratic behavior of
inmates” made it “safer to assess [the prisoner-plaintiff] in the treatment
2 Given they concern events before and during the altercation, the Court
considers Defendants’ alleged delay in stopping the altercation as part of
Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims. (Doc. 17 at 14).
3 See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.
2010) (“[C]ourts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint
‘obvious alternative explanations,’ which suggest lawful conduct rather
than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.”).
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room” 	and 	while 	that 	decision 	might 	have 	been 	“wrong 	or 	even
negligent[,]” it “was not so inadequate as to constitute an unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain” (cleaned up)). The ten-minute delay is not
so unreasonable that it amounts to subjective recklessness.4
Ultimately, the decision to take Plaintiff’s cellmate to the medical
unit first (while making Plaintiff wait ten minutes) was not reckless.
Plaintiff does not allege his injuries were life-threatening. The delay was
relatively brief. 	And no allegations suggest the delay was for improper
reasons. 	See Irizarry v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 21-10591-A, 2021
WL 3231163, at *2 (11th Cir. July 22, 2021) (affirming dismissal of
deliberate indifference claim based on delay in treating a broken bone
because the “district court correctly concluded that the 20-to-30-minute
delay in calling emergency medical services does not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference”).5
4 Although Plaintiff describes his injuries as “serious[,]” Plaintiff does not
allege that his injuries were life-threatening, nor does he allege that his
treatment was delayed for hours. 	(Doc. 17 at 15). 	See, e.g., Gartman v.
Cheatham, No. 2:18cv534, 2021 WL 96467, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2021)
(noting that “an unexplained delay of hours in treating a serious injury
states a prima facie case of deliberate indifference” and is “particularly
true in the context of emergency needs” like “broken bones, bleeding cuts,
and . . . heart attacks” (cleaned up)).
5 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bond “showed deliberate indifference” by
not recovering the cellmate’s shank. 	(Doc. 17 at 15). 	But Plaintiff’s
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The 	Court 	next 	addresses 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	that 	the 	Medical
Department and Defendants Bond, Collins, and Singh were deliberately
indifferent for leaving his wounds open, denying additional treatment,
and not putting him on wound care. (Doc. 17 at 17-18). Plaintiff’s claims
against the Medical Department are subject to dismissal on immunity
grounds 	as 	already 	discussed 	above. 	But 	even 	if 	Plaintiff 	had
individually 	sued 	the 	employees 	of 	the 	Medical 	Department, 	his
deliberate indifference claim appears insufficient.
Plaintiff 	admits 	his 	wounds 	were 	initially 	treated 	after 	the
altercation with his cellmate. 	(Doc. 17 at 17). 	This is not a case where
Plaintiff received no treatment at all. 	Rather, Plaintiff takes issue with
the 	treatment 	decision 	that 	was 	made—leaving 	his 	wounds 	open.
Because 	“Defendants 	did 	not 	ignore 	[Plaintiff’s] 	need 	for 	medical
attention but selected a different course of treatment, the proper inquiry
injuries were already complete at that point and not recovering the shank
did not exacerbate or affect Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, there is no “causal
link” between not recovering the shank and Plaintiff’s injuries. 	Stalley,
124 F.4th at 1283. 	And to the extent Plaintiff asserts the shank was
needed for the cellmate to be punished, Plaintiff has no cognizable
interest in such punishment. 	See Williams v. Wetzel, 827 F. App’x 158,
160, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding no constitutional claim based on
prison officials failing “to charge Bader with more serious offenses,
because Williams lacked a cognizable interest in Bader’s punishment”).
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is 	whether 	their 	response 	was 	so 	inadequate 	that 	it 	nevertheless
constituted deliberate indifference.” 	Stalley, 586 F. Supp. 3d at 1239.
The Court does not believe Plaintiff’s treatment was “so inadequate.” Id.
Deciding to leave Plaintiff’s wounds open is essentially a question
of whether Defendants “should have employed additional diagnostic
techniques or forms of treatment[.]” 	Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545
(11th Cir. 1995). 	But this question “is a classic example of a matter for
medical 	judgment 	and 	therefore 	[is] 	not 	an 	appropriate 	basis 	for
grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (cleaned up). This
is true even if the decision to leave the wounds open “was wrong” or
“negligent.” 	Stalley, 586 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.
“At most, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that [medical employees]
acted negligently” which is insufficient to show that the care Plaintiff
received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to
shock 	the 	conscious 	or to 	be 	intolerable 	to 	fundamental 	fairness.”6
6 See also Leonard v. Dep’t of Corr. Fla., 232 F. App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir.
2007) (“Plaintiff merely alleges that he was denied the Brogan boots,
which he asserts are necessary to treat his arthritis, and that the denial
of this medical treatment caused him further injury. But a difference of
opinion between an inmate and prison medical staff does not—by itself—
give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 	And negligence in
medical judgment is similarly insufficient to state a claim.”).
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Washington v. Shell, No. 3:22cv3800, 2023 WL 5939400, at *5 (N.D. Fla.
Aug. 9, 2023) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim where prisoner
alleged a nurse cleaned his stab wounds but “should have done more to
stunt the chance for further infection” (cleaned up)), adopted, 2023 WL
5942275 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2023); see also Harris v. Prison Health
Servs., 706 F. App’x 945, 952 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Dr. Nields provided
Harris with some treatment—an examination in the emergency room
and giving him Tylenol—while Harris wanted other treatment, such as
x-rays, 	immediately. 	This 	alone 	does 	not 	establish 	deliberate
indifference.”).
Lastly, the Court disagrees that Defendants Bond, Collins, and
Singh were deliberately indifferent by not putting Plaintiff on wound care
after he filed medical grievances. 	(Doc. 17 at 17-18). 	Generally, “a lay
correctional 	officer 	cannot 	be 	liable 	for 	medical 	staff’s 	diagnostic
decisions 	or 	be 	expected 	to 	second 	guess 	those 	decisions 	in 	most
circumstances.” 	Foster v. Maloney, 785 F. App’x 810, 816 (11th Cir.
2019). 	Plaintiff alleges Defendants Bond, Collins, and Singh 	were
deliberately indifferent by not putting Plaintiff on wound care after the
altercation or the medical grievances. 	But Plaintiff’s allegations imply
that these Defendants were told by medical personnel that Plaintiff did
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not need additional treatment. (Doc. 17 at 17) (“Plaintiff was also refused
by Defendants . . . Collins and . . . Singh[.] 	Telling Plaintiff that
Defendant Medical Department said they are not coming.”). 	It appears
from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants Bond, Collins, and Singh
were relying on the medical staff’s judgment that Plaintiff required no
further treatment of his wounds at the relevant time.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	deliberate
indifference claims against Defendants Bond, Collins, and Singh. 	See
Williams v. Gams, 2018 WL 4189666, at *6 (M.D. Ala. July 24, 2018)
(“The law does not impose upon correctional officials a duty to directly
supervise health care personnel, to set treatment policy for the medical
staff, or to intervene in treatment decisions where they have no actual
knowledge that intervention is necessary to prevent a constitutional
wrong.”), adopted, 2018 WL 4186400 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2018).7 Because
there is no underlying constitutional violation, any related supervisory
liability claims necessarily fail as well. 	See Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1288.
7 Plaintiff also has no plausible claims for his sick calls or grievances
being denied or ignored. 	See Aiken v. Perry, No. 5:14cv97, 2016 WL
3676629, at *4 n.5 (S.D. Ga. July 6, 2016) (“To the extent Plaintiff
contends Defendant delayed in responding to his grievances pertaining
to medical treatment, that contention does not set forth a constitutional
violation.”).
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C. Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	First 	Amendment
retaliation claims against Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh,
and Tanner.
In Count 1, Plaintiff asserts First Amendment retaliation claims
against Defendants Keaton, Fletcher, Tanner, Collins, Jones, and Singh.
Plaintiff 	alleges 	these 	Defendants 	retaliated 	against 	him 	for 	filing
grievances and drafting civil complaints. (Doc. 17 at 11-13). But Plaintiff
fails to plausibly allege these claims against several Defendants.
“The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliating
against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech.” 	O’Bryant v.
Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). To prevail, “a plaintiff must
satisfy three elements: first, that his speech or act was constitutionally
protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely
affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection
between 	the 	retaliatory 	actions 	and 	the 	adverse 	effect 	on 	speech.”
Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
The Court assumes that Plaintiff’s grievances, letters, and civil
complaint 	were 	protected 	speech. 	See 	Hollins 	v. 	Keller, 	2013 	WL
12132072, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 12155733
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2013). The Court also assumes that destroying these
materials or putting Plaintiff in confinement can constitute adverse
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actions. 	See Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1192-93 (11th Cir.
2023). 	But 	Plaintiff 	fails 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	the 	required 	causal
connection as to Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, and Tanner.
“To establish a causal connection between the retaliatory actions
and the adverse effect on speech, [Plaintiff] must show that [Defendants]
were subjectively motivated to discipline [him] because he complained of
some of the conditions of his confinement.” 	Nabors, 76 F.4th at 1334.
(cleaned up). 	To do so, Plaintiff “must show that his constitutionally-
protected speech was a motivating factor” in Defendants’ “decisions to
carry out the adverse actions.” 	Radford, 64 F.4th at 1193 (cleaned up).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, and Tanner
“participated in retaliation acts that brought Plaintiff to confinement.”
(Doc. 17 at 11). 	Plaintiff also claims Defendants Collins, Jones, and
Singh did not provide him with a security pen in confinement. 	(Id.).
Plaintiff alleges he was “labeled a snitch and writ writer” and denied
proper 	clothes, 	bedding, 	and 	security 	pens. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff 	wrote
grievances against Defendant Tanner on January 2, 2025. 	(Id. at 12).
And Defendants Tanner, Collins, Jones, and Singh allegedly “violat[ed]
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by committing retaliation against
him.” (Id. at 13). These allegations, however, are insufficient.
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Plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory assertions that Defendants
Collins, 	Jones, 	Singh, 	and 	Tanner 	“participated 	in 	retaliation” 	or
“committ[ed] retaliation” without providing specific factual allegations
plausibly alleging such retaliation. 	See Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 375
F. App’x 905, 911 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Smith’s complaint makes only
conclusory allegations of a retaliatory motive; it does not allege facts
sufficient to raise that conclusion above a speculative level.”).
The only specific allegations in the amended complaint are: 	(1)
Plaintiff wrote grievances on January 2, 2025, complaining about the four
Defendants not 	providing a 	security 	pen; 	and (2) Plaintiff wrote 	a
grievance about Defendant Tanner “and the length of time he dealt with
retaliation.” 	(Doc. 17 at 11). 	Plaintiff, however, fails to plausibly allege
that Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, or Tanner had any knowledge of
these grievances, much less that they retaliated against Plaintiff because
of them. Without such subjective knowledge or motivation, Plaintiff has
not plausibly alleged causation.8 	See Perry v. Ahbol, No. 5:25cv13, 2025
8 Plaintiff alleges that “one of the officers” escorting him to confinement
told “another group of officers that Plaintiff is a writ writer and . . .
snitches on officers . . . .” (Doc. 17 at 9-10). Plaintiff also describes “other
officers” including Defendant Keaton pointing out Plaintiff as a grievance
writer. 	(Id. at 10). 	And Plaintiff claims Defendant Keaton “notified
officers that Plaintiff wrote grievances against them . . . .” 	(Id. at 13).
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WL 2214556, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2025) (“The mere fact that
Defendants’ AMU recommendation was made four days after Perry filed
the grievance to Lykins and Schuler does not, by itself, support a
reasonable inference of causation. 	Perry does not allege that the AMU-
Defendants subjectively knew of Perry’s protected activity or how they
knew.”), 	adopted, 	2025 	WL 	2210757 	(N.D. 	Fla. 	Aug. 	4, 	2025).
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	First 	Amendment 	retaliation 	claims 	against
Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, and Tanner should be dismissed.9
But Plaintiff does not allege Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, or Tanner
were among these groups of officers.
9 Plaintiff complained to Defendant Tanner while in confinement and
filed a grievance against him. (Doc. 17 at 10, 12). But Plaintiff pleads no
facts suggesting Defendant Tanner was aware of this grievance. And the
Court is unconvinced that the verbal complaints to Defendant Tanner—
made after Plaintiff was already in confinement—plausibly show a causal
connection. 	See Lopez v. United States, 656 F. App’x 957, 965 (11th Cir.
2016) (“[W]e can find no plausible 	causal relationship between the
excessive delays in processing his withdrawal requests and the protected
speech. 	The processing problems began in January 2009, when prison
officials began investigating inmate funds for illicit sources. 	Lopez
complained, and the processing delays continued, but Lopez did not
allege that the processing problems got any worse as a result of his
complaints. In fact, he alleged that some of his withdrawal requests were
processed after he complained. 	Under the circumstances, the fact that
Lopez’s September 2009 withdrawal requests were delayed after he
engaged in protected speech, just as his earlier requests had been delayed
before he engaged in protected speech, does not show a plausible causal
connection between the alleged retaliation and the protected speech.”).
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	The 	Eighth Amendment 	deliberate 	indifference claims in
Count 3 of the amended complaint (Doc. 17) be DISMISSED under 28
U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), 	1915A(b)(1)-(2) 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a
plausible claim for relief and for seeking monetary relief against an
immune Defendant.
2. 	As to Defendants Collins, Jones, Singh, and Tanner, the First
Amendment retaliation claims in Count 1 of the amended complaint (Doc.
17) be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a plausible claim for relief.
3. 	This matter be recommitted to the undersigned for further
proceedings on the claims against Defendants Fletcher and Keaton in
Count I (retaliation), and the claims against Defendants Collins, Jones,
Singh, Bond, and Kennedy in Count II (failure to protect) of the amended
complaint (Doc. 17).
At Pensacola, Florida, this 1st day of June 2026.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge
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Notice To The Parties
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must
be 	filed 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may 	appear 	on 	the
electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s 	internal 	use 	only 	and 	does 	not
control. 	An objecting party must serve a copy of the objections on all
other parties. 	A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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