LASSITER v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MASHIACH C. LASSITER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00322 (UNA)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 	)
COURTS, et al., 	)
)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is currently before the Court on consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint
(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF
No. 2. Upon review, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons explained
below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Alabama, sues the “District of Columbia Courts,” the “Clerk of
Court,” and two John Doe Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officers. See Compl. at 1.
He does not provide names or addresses for the latter three Defendants, in contravention of D.C.
Local Rule 5.1(c)(1); see Armstrong v. Bureau of Prisons, 976 F. Supp. 17, 23 (D.D.C. 1997)
(“there is no provision in the federal statutes or federal rules of civil procedure for the use of
fictitious defendants.”), aff’d, No. 97-5208, 1998 WL 65543 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 1998) (per curiam),
and both the Superior Court for the District of Columbia and the D.C. Court of Appeals are non
sui juris, see Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court, 786 F.Supp.2d 338, 344–45 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing
cases); Featherston v. Dist. of Columbia Sup. Court, No. 07-1933, 2009 WL 10713464, at *2
(D.D.C. May 5, 2009) (citing cases). Therefore, as pleaded, none of the named Defendants can be
sued.
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The allegations themselves fare no better. 	Plaintiff contends that Defendants denied him
meaningful access to the courts, violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and his
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Compl. at 1. 	He broadly alleges that
he “attempted to file time-sensitive objections to prevent the deprivation of his vehicle. The filings
were 	rejected 	for 	non-substantive 	technical 	reasons[,]” 	that 	he 	was 	“denied 	assistance,
accommodation, or a meaningful opportunity to cure defects. As a result, no hearing occurred and
Plaintiff’s vehicle was taken. These events constitute a denial of meaningful access to the courts
and caused concrete injury.” See id. He further alleges he “timely attempted to file post-judgment
objections 	and 	motions, 	which 	were 	rejected 	on 	technical 	grounds 	without 	reasonable
accommodation or opportunity to cure.” Id. No timeline or dates are provided for these alleged
events, nor any details or context regarding the seizure of his vehicle, or with respect to any related
proceedings or attempted proceedings, administrative, judicial, or otherwise. 	Plaintiff demands
damages and an injunction. See id. at 2.
Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Jarrell v. Tisch,
656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987), and here, the Complaint and its addendums fail to comply
with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a pleading to contain “(1)
a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted
so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
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The instant Complaint does not provide the Defendants or the Court with adequate notice
of a claim. 	Relevant here, “the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff[] if such
inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,
16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nor must the court accept “a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not sufficient to state a claim.
Id. Plaintiff’s allegations fall squarely into this category.
For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for
Appointment of ADA Coordinator, ECF No. 3, and Motion for Hearing, ECF No. 5, are denied as
moot. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: 	April 27, 2026 	___________/s/____________
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
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