SMITHER v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DONALD Q. SMITHER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02959 (UNA)
)
)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and an
Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Upon review, the Court
grants Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, dismisses this matter
without prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, who apparently attempts to bring this matter as a
whistleblower, sues the U.S. Department of Justice, “and named officials, in their official
capacities,” although he does not, in fact, name any officials, in contravention of D.C. Local Civil
Rule 5.1(c)(1). 	See Compl. at 1. 	The Complaint is vague and sparse. 	Plaintiff quite broadly
alleges that his “claims have been ignored and mishandled by DOJ, despite multiple emails,
referrals from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and evidence submitted to DOJ and OIG
offices. As of August 2025, DOJ has not provided a single substantive response.” Id. He contends
that Defendants’ “failure to respond to communications, deliberate delay, and obstruction of
redress mechanisms related to a pending federal civil rights and housing discrimination matter,”
constitute “violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Retaliation).” See id. He
Case 1:25-cv-02959-UNA Document 5 Filed 11/20/25 Page 1 of 3

demands “immediate injunctive relief, recognition of protected whistleblower status, and oversight
by an independent party to ensure compliance with federal law.” Id.
First, Plaintiff cannot bring this case as a whistleblower. As background, whistleblowers
are generally authorized to bring qui tam actions under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3732, “an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to
the federal government.” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634,
640 (6th Cir. 2003). More specifically, the FCA authorizes a private individual, as a relator, “to
bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name, and to recover a portion of the proceeds of the
action, subject to the requirements of the statute.” 	U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d
1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); 31 U.S.C. § 3730. However, it “well-settled that
a qui tam action may not be brought by a pro se plaintiff.” Walsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA,
75 F. Supp. 3d 256, 263 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases); see Idrogo v. Castro, 672 F. App'x 27,
27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The district court correctly held that pro se plaintiffs, such as appellant, may
not file a qui tam action pursuant to the False Claims Act.”). Put differently, because the United
States is “the real party in interest,” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1
(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015), a “pro se plaintiff may not file a qui tam action[,]” Jones v. Jindal, 409 Fed.
App’x. 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
This prohibition is rooted in the requirement that a plaintiff proceeding in federal court
“may [only] plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654;
Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member of
the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel
for others”) (citation and footnote omitted). In other words, Plaintiff has neither a constitutional
Case 1:25-cv-02959-UNA Document 5 Filed 11/20/25 Page 2 of 3

nor a statutory right to pursue the claims of the United States, or anyone apart from himself,
without counsel.
Second, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). 	Federal Rule 8(a) requires a
complaint to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction
[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d
661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that respondents receive fair notice of
the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and
determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. 	Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498
(D.D.C. 1977). 	Here, Plaintiff’s ambiguous allegations fall short of providing notice of any claim
or establishing this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Third, this Court does not have jurisdiction to compel the government to prosecute a
criminal case, see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Shoshone–Bannock Tribes
v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Cox v. Sec’y of Lab., 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C.
1990) (citing cases), or to compel a federal investigation by the DOJ, or any other federal law
enforcement agency, see Otero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141-42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982).
For all of these reasons, the Court dismisses the Complaint, and this matter, without
prejudice. 	Plaintiff’s other pending Motions, ECF Nos. 3, 4, are denied as moot. An Order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.
TREVOR N. McFADDEN
Date: November 20, 2025 	United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-02959-UNA Document 5 Filed 11/20/25 Page 3 of 3