ALTER v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOE ALTER.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-2573-RCL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Joe Alter filed this pro se suit against the United States of America, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, objecting to the
existence of the doctrine of standing developed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), as it applies to structural constitutional claims. 	The challenge comes after Plaintiff, a
frequent pro se litigant, has had several suits dismissed on standing grounds in this Court and in
others. 	See, e.g., Alter v. U.S. Dep’t of Gov’t Efficiency, No. 1:25-cv-1162, 2025 WL 1279354
(D.D.C. May 3, 2025), aff’d, No. 25-5172, 2025 WL 2463705 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 2025). Plaintiff
now seeks a series of judicial declarations stating that structural constitutional claims should not
be dismissed on standing grounds before they are adjudicated on the merits, as well as a specific
declaration that dismissal of Plaintiff’s previous suits “demonstrate[s] a systemic misuse of
standing doctrine.” Compl. at 15–17. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that this
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish Article III
standing.1 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
1 Defendants state in their Motion to Dismiss that they are moving pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), but their filing plainly seeks dismissal for lack of standing. Mot. to Dismiss at 1. However, it is clearly
established that a challenge to the standing of a party, when raised as a motion to dismiss, proceeds pursuant to Rule
Case 1:25-cv-02573-RCL Document 21 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 3

2
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A challenge to the standing of a party, when raised as a motion to dismiss, proceeds
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “As the party
invoking federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing.” 	Strunk v.
Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011) (first citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 104 (1998), and then citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To establish Article III standing,
a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a concrete injury in fact that is (2) traceable to the complained-of
conduct, and (3) redressable by the relief sought. 	See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 	“[T]he
requirement that courts liberally interpret pro se pleadings does not dispense with the constitutional
requirement of standing.” Strunk, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged facts to establish standing;
rather, they contend that he presses an “undifferentiated, generalized grievance” about the very
existence of the standing doctrine. Mot. to Dismiss at 3 (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437,
442 (2007)). The Court agrees.
To establish the first element of Article III standing, “injury in fact,” a plaintiff must show
“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation omitted). Here,
Plaintiff has not shown an invasion of a legally protected interest that is particular to him. Though
he points to several of his own previous lawsuits that were dismissed for lack of standing, his
complaint is that the doctrine of standing is unconstitutional because it prevents all citizens from
12(b)(1). Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). That’s because standing is a jurisdictional matter
and “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion imposes on the court an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope
of its jurisdictional authority.” Johnson v. District of Columbia, 71 F. Supp. 3d 155, 158 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation
omitted). For this reason, the Court construes Defendants’ motion as one raised under Rule 12(b)(1).
Case 1:25-cv-02573-RCL Document 21 Filed 03/30/26 Page 2 of 3

bringing structural constitutional claims. See Compl.at 2-3. The Supreme Court has previously
foreclosed this argument: a "litigant 'raising only a generally available grievance about
govemment---claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws .. . does not state an Article III case or controversy.'" Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74). Because Plaintiff fails to
present a personalized injury in his Complaint or in his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (where
he instead relies on the argument that "[t]he Constitution does not condition judicial review of
alleged constitutional violations on a showing of personal tragedy," Opp'n at 14), the Court finds
that Plaintiff has not established Article III standing.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the case is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	'f .. Jo · -Z..C,,	- -	------- Royce C. Lamberth
United States District Judge
3
Case 1:25-cv-02573-RCL Document 21 Filed 03/30/26 Page 3 of 3