RAHMAN v. BOULDIN et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAHSIN RAHMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEGAN BOULDIN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-01836 (TNM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tahsin Rahman is a Bangladeshi citizen who wishes to live in the United States with her
husband. Rahman’s husband, himself a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition for her to join him, and
she interviewed at the U.S. embassy in Bangladesh. After multiple inquiries, Rahman learned
that her application has been denied but remains in administrative processing. Disheartened by
the delay, Rahman sues to compel the Government to more quickly adjudicate her application.
The Government moves to dismiss the case. The Court will grant the Government’s motion.
I.
Tahsin Rahman is a Bangladeshi citizen who lives in Bangladesh with her U.S. citizen
daughter. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 8, 11. In early May 2022, Rahman’s now-husband—a U.S.
citizen living in the United States—filed an I-130 visa petition on her behalf. Id. ¶¶ 2, 17.
Although Rahman and her husband did not marry until 2023, they hoped to live together in the
United States, especially after welcoming their daughter in 2024. Id. ¶¶ 7–8, 19. To that end,
Rahman interviewed in September 2024 at the U.S. embassy in Bangladesh. Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
Later that year, Rahman’s husband reached out to the embassy about her case, and
embassy staff informed him that Rahman’s application had been adjudicated and denied. Id.
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¶ 23; Pl.’s Ex. E, ECF No. 1-5, at 8–9. Unsatisfied with this response, Rahman’s husband
inquired twice more over the following months, and embassy staff told him that Rahman’s case
needed additional processing. Compl. ¶¶ 24–26; Pl.’s Ex. E at 2–7. Currently, the State
Department website shows Rahman’s visa status as “Refused”—and specifies that if her “case
was refused for administrative processing, [her] case will remain refused while undergoing such
processing.” Compl. ¶ 22; Pl.’s Ex. D, ECF No. 1-4, at 2. Rahman and her husband remain
separated during her application’s processing, putting financial and emotional strain on their
family. Compl. ¶¶ 6–10. Rahman cannot work in Bangladesh and relies solely on income from
her husband, who cannot afford to visit her. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
Exactly nine months after her interview, Rahman sued the Deputy Chief of Mission at the
U.S. embassy in Bangladesh and the Secretary of State,1 asserting that the Government has
unreasonably delayed its duty to adjudicate her visa application. Id. ¶¶ 27–38. Rahman asks this
Court to order the Government to “process [her] visa application within fifteen (15) calendar
days . . . or as soon as reasonably possible.” Id. ¶ 39. The Government moves to dismiss, and its
motion is now ripe.
II.
The Government’s dismissal request invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2
To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
1 The Court will dismiss Rahman’s claims against the Secretary of State because consular
officers—not the Secretary—have exclusive authority to adjudicate visa applications.
Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft, 734 F. Supp. 3d 87, 97–98 (D.D.C. 2024); Baan Rao Thai Rest. v.
Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021); 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Because the Secretary
cannot provide Rahman the relief she seeks, she lacks Article III standing to sue him. Accord
Liew v. Sanders, 737 F. Supp. 3d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2024).
2 The Government also moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, at 7. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Rahman’s claims
against the Secretary. Supra n.1; see Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). The complaint must “allow[] the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court must accept all “well-pleaded
factual allegations,” but it need not credit “legal conclusions.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v.
Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
III.
Rahman’s lawsuit resembles others that the Court has previously dismissed. Like those
cases, Rahman’s claims falter for two independent reasons: first, because the Government has
performed its nondiscretionary duty by denying her visa; and second, because consular
nonreviewability bars her suit. The Court discusses each reason in turn.
A.
Rahman wants the Court to compel the Government to more quickly adjudicate her visa
application. She invokes the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 33. The parties agree that Rahman’s pleading
burden is essentially the same for both causes of action, so the Court addresses them together.
See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, at 11; Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, at 17; In re Core
Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The crux of both claims is that Rahman
must plausibly allege that the Government “failed to take a discrete agency action that it is
required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis in
2012) (“Standing under Article III is jurisdictional.”). The Court also lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Rahman’s claim under the Mandamus Act because she cannot meet its
requirements. See infra Part III.A; Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir.
2016). But the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Rahman’s
APA claim. More, the Supreme Court has made clear that consular nonreviewability is non-
jurisdictional. Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (2024).
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original); see also In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[I]ssuance
of the writ [of mandamus] is an extraordinary remedy, reserved only for the most transparent
violations of a clear duty to act.”).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that “[a]ll immigrant visa
applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b).
When adjudicating the application, “the consular officer must issue the visa, refuse the visa
under INA 212(a) or 221(g) or other applicable law or . . . discontinue granting the visa.” 22
C.F.R. § 42.81(a); see also id. § 41.121(a). In other words, the consular officer has a “discrete,
nondiscretionary [duty] to adjudicate visa applications.” Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft, 734 F. Supp.
3d 87, 99 (D.D.C. 2024).
The Government has fulfilled its nondiscretionary duty here. As Rahman concedes, a
consular officer adjudicated and refused her visa application under INA § 221(g). Compl. ¶¶ 22–
23; Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 15. That is all the INA and its regulations require. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1202(b); 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.81(a), 41.121(a); Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 99.
Rahman contends that the Government must do more. She asserts that “Defendants
retain a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate [her] visa application through conclusion and within
a reasonable time.” Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 15. The Government has not discharged that
duty, Rahman maintains, because its “preliminary” visa denial merely “plac[ed] her application
into administrative processing status.” Id.
Rahman’s position finds no footing. “By arguing that [the Government] must complete
administrative processing and issue a ‘final’ refusal, [Rahman] ask[s] the Court to impose a duty
that has no basis in the INA or its implementing regulations.” See Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp.
3d at 102. While the regulations provide various avenues for the consular officer to review or
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reconsider visa applications, nothing requires the Government “to issue a final, unreviewable
decision” or even “complete administrative processing once it has properly refused a visa.” See
id. at 100–101 (cleaned up). As the D.C. Circuit held in Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178, 2024
WL 3517852 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (per curiam), the Government has no duty to “make yet
another ‘final decision’ on [Rahman’s] already-refused visa application.” See id. at *6; accord,
e.g., Liew v. Sanders, 737 F. Supp. 3d 30, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2024).
One note on Karimova. The Court considers that case to be persuasive authority only.
The Government, meanwhile, asserts that the D.C. Circuit’s unpublished decision is binding on
this Court. See Mot. to Dismiss at 12 n.2, 15. That is mistaken for the reasons the Court
explained at some length in Akter v. Rubio, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 1950884, at *4–5
(D.D.C. 2025). After all, D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2) makes clear that “a panel’s decision to issue
an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition.”
Still, while non-binding, Karimova persuasively explains that a visa applicant has no legal right
to anything more than the “official refusal decision she already received.” 2024 WL 3517852,
at *4.
* 	* 	*
The Government has satisfied its duty by adjudicating Rahman’s visa application.
Rahman’s case fails for this reason alone.
B.
Rahman’s suit also founders on consular nonreviewability. The Supreme Court has long
recognized that “admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign
attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial
control.” Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S. 899, 907 (2024). Courts “ha[ve] no role to play
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unless expressly authorized by law.” Id. at 908 (cleaned up). And because the INA “does not
authorize judicial review of a consular officer’s denial of a visa,” “the federal courts cannot
review those decisions.” Id. (footnote omitted).3
Rahman’s claim falls headfirst into consular nonreviewability. As Rahman admits, a
consular officer has already denied her visa application. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23. There thus “has been
a final decision on the merits of [Rahman’s] application,” and consular nonreviewability
prevents the Court from “inquir[ing] into the basis or validity of that decision.” See
Sedaghatdoust v. Blinken, 735 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2024). In an attempt to evade consular
nonreviewability, Rahman insists that her application remains in “administrative processing,”
which supposedly makes the earlier refusal nonfinal. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 24. But that
will not do. After all, compelling the Government to speed up its administrative processing
would be “no different from ordering [it] to reopen a dispositive adjudication.” Yaghoubnezhad,
734 F. Supp. 3d at 104. That is why the “bar on judicial review applies both to ‘the substance of
a consular officer’s visa determination’ as well as the decision to place a visa application into
post-refusal ‘administrative processing’ for ‘discretionary re-adjudication of’ the application.”
Sedaghatdoust, 735 F. Supp. 3d at 7 (quoting Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 103). That bar
blocks Rahman’s suit.
Because Rahman’s case already fails on two independent grounds, the Court declines to
address whether there was undue delay under the factors outlined in Telecommunications
Research & Action Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But the prospects for that
3 There is one slim carveout to consular nonreviewability: “when the denial of a visa allegedly
burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 703 (2018);
Baan Rao, 985 F.3d at 1024–25. Even if Rahman had argued for it, this exception would not
have helped her because Muñoz ruled that “a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest
in [his] noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.” 602 U.S. at 909.
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claim would also be gloomy. See, e.g., Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 104–05 (holding that
a 22-month delay was not unreasonable and collecting cases upholding similar or even longer
delays); Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (finding that 29-month
delay was not unreasonable).
IV.
The Government has validly refused Rahman’s application for entry into this country. At
this point, “[t]he Judicial Branch has no role to play.” Muñoz, 602 U.S. at 908. The Court will
therefore dismiss Rahman’s case. A separate Order will issue today.
Dated: November 21, 2025 	TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.
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