ESTATE OF MAJD KAMALMAZ et al v. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ESTATE OF MAJD KAMALMAZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 24 - 2136 (SLS)
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
UNDER SEAL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Majd Kamalmaz, a Syrian American, was abducted, held, tortured, and killed by the Syrian
Arab Republic during the rule of former Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. By all accounts,
Mr. Kamalmaz was a remarkable man. He was a psychotherapist who dedicated his life to treating
patients with severe psychological trauma. His work included treating victims of Hurricane
Katrina in the United States, victims of the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, and victims of the Yugoslav
Wars in Kosovo. In 2013, Mr. Kamalmaz started a clinic in Lebanon to treat traumatized Syrian
refugees who crossed the border. It employed dozens of people and provided care to thousands.
But Mr. Kamalmaz wanted to do more. Leaving his family behind in the United States, he went to
Syria in 2017 to evaluate establishing a clinic there to help even more people.
But in February 2017, the former Syrian regime abducted Mr. Kamalmaz in a suburb of
Damascus and held him for several years in facilities known for torture and arbitrary killings. His
abduction was one of many recorded disappearances of Syrian medical professionals, as these
professionals were targets in Syria’s then ongoing civil war. For years, his family waited for his
return, experiencing their own form of torture. But that day never came. In June 2024, the
State Department confirmed that Mr. Kamalmaz had died while in captivity.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 1 of 18

2
The Plaintiffs, the Estate of Mr. Kamalmaz and members of Mr. Kamalmaz’s family—his
wife Hassnaa Kamalmaz, daughter Ula Kamalmaz, son Khalid Kamalmaz, daughter Maryam
Kamalmaz, son Ibrahim Kamalmaz, and sister Samar Hamwi—bring this action against the Syrian
Arab Republic under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, for
compensatory and punitive damages. The loss they have experienced is unimaginable.
Mr. Kamalmaz was a father, a husband, and a brother. Nothing will ever heal the pain his family
has felt or fill the void he left behind. But the Court will grant the relief within its authority. For
the reasons below, the Court grants the Plaintiffs default judgment under § 1608(e) of the FSIA
and awards damages to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $134.29 million.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Mr. Kamalmaz emigrated from Syria to the United States in 1968 with his family,
including his sister, Samar Hamwi. See Ex. 3 ¶ 3.1 He became a U.S. citizen in 1982, more than
forty years ago. See Ex. 2 ¶ 4. He married his wife Hassnaa Kamalmaz that same year, and they
have four children together—Ula, Khalid, Maryam, and Ibrahim Kamalmaz. Id.
In 2013, shortly after a conflict began in Syria, Mr. Kamalmaz founded and became
the director of a clinic in Lebanon across the border from Syria to treat traumatized refugees.
See Ex. 2 ¶ 12. The clinic employed dozens of employees and treated thousands of Syrian
refugees. Id. Mr. Kamalmaz lived on site for extended periods, while his family remained in
the United States. Id. Given the tremendous suffering in his homeland, Mr. Kamalmaz did
what he had done time and again in his life—he sought to help others by opening another
clinic in Syria to treat victims of the conflict. See id. ¶ 13.; Ex. 7.
1 Exhibit numbers reference the exhibits attached to the Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 17.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 2 of 18

3
On February 14, 2017, Mr. Kamalmaz traveled to Syria to help accomplish this goal. Ex.
2 ¶ 15. Upon arriving in Syria, Mr. Kamalmaz went to his family’s house in Damascus. Id. ¶ 15.
The next day, on February 15, 2017, Mr. Kamalmaz was abducted “at a Syrian Government
checkpoint in Mezzeh, a suburb of Damascus” after leaving his Damacus house. See Ex. 7. The
FBI confirmed Mr. Kamalmaz’s abduction. Id.
At the time, civilians were being “arbitrarily arrested and detained by the Syrian security
and armed forces or by militia acting on behalf of the Government during mass arrests, house
searches, at checkpoints and in hospitals.” Ex. 14 ¶ 17 (report of the U.N. Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic). The United Nations reported
that in Syria, “widespread enforced disappearance was deliberately perpetrated by government
security forces throughout [the 2010s] on a massive scale, to spread fear, stifle dissent and as
punishment.” Ex. 15, at 6. In May 2017, the Czech Ambassador to Syria confirmed that
Mr. Kamalmaz was in Syrian custody. Ex. 8 ¶ 12.2 And in 2020, the FBI also confirmed that
Mr. Kamalmaz was held in captivity following his abduction. See Ex. 24.
Following his abduction, Mr. Kamalmaz was held at the Mezzeh Military Airport. Ex. 8
¶ 10. He was then held at the Sednaya prison. Id. ¶ 19. Both the Mezzeh and Sednaya prisons are
known for particularly harsh treatment of detainees. See infra B.4. And the Syrian government’s
2 “[A]ssuming without deciding that the Federal Rules of Evidence apply” to a motion for default
judgment, the Plaintiffs’ declarations relying on third-party statements “could arguably come
within the residual hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 807,” Etters v. Shanahan, No.
09-CT-3187-D, 2013 WL 787344, at *2 n.5 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2013), report and recommendation
adopted, 2013 WL 792834 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2013), because they are “more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable
efforts,” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2). The Court is thus permitted to consider them in this procedural
posture. See Etters, 2013 WL 787344, at *2 n.5.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 3 of 18

4
widespread use of torture and killings of detainees are well-documented. The United Nations has,
for instance, reported the following:
Nearly all former detainees held in Government facilities and interviewed . . . were
held incommunicado for prolonged periods of time, without access to their family,
friends and lawyers. During their detention, they described being subjected to
varied acts of torture and ill-treatment, usually to force them to “confess”, as
punishment or as intimidation. These included suspension by one or two limbs for
prolonged periods (shabeh) or being folded into car tyres (dulab). Severe beatings
all over the body including the genitals, often with green hosepipes, sticks, cables
or other tools, usually accompanied both shabeh and dulab and also took place
independently. Other mentioned methods included electric shocks, burning of body
parts and sexual violence. In addition, most detainees described being held in
inhumane conditions which amount to ill-treatment, and may in some cases amount
to torture: severely overcrowded cells, lack of food, drinking water and sanitary
facilities, widespread illness and diseases, and denial of medical care.
Ex. 17 ¶ 4. As the U.N. described it, “the practice of torture was almost becoming public
policy [in Syria].” Ex. 28, at 7. And the State Department has recognized “numerous reports
[that] the government and its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings,” especially of
“journalists, medical personnel, antigovernment protesters, their families, and associates.”
Ex. 19, at 3 (emphasis added).
Throughout his captivity, Mr. Kamalmaz’s family received repeated assurances that
Mr. Kamalmaz was alive. See Ex. 2 ¶ 27; Ex. 8 ¶¶ 18–22; Ex. 9 ¶¶ 19–20; Ex. 24 (FBI confirmed
that Mr. Kamalmaz was alive in March 2020); Ex. 9 ¶ 21 (Syrian Government’s civil registry listed
Mr. Kamalmaz as alive). But in May 2024, U.S. national security officials notified the
Kamalmaz family of classified information indicating that Mr. Kamalmaz had been killed. Ex. 8
¶ 23. And on June 11, 2024, the State Department publicly announced that Mr. Kamalmaz “died
while being held in Syria.” Ex. 1.
B. Procedural Background
The Plaintiffs initiated this FSIA action on July 22, 2024. Compl., ECF No. 1. Despite
proper service, Syria has not responded to the Complaint or otherwise appeared in this action. On
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 4 of 18

5
June 26, 2025, the Clerk of the Court entered default against Syria. Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF
No. 15. The Plaintiffs now move for default judgment. Mot., ECF No. 17.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for “default judgments, which safeguard
plaintiffs when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive
party.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). But an entry of default
judgment is not automatic, and it is not a decision that courts make lightly. See Jackson v. Beech,
636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that “[d]efault judgments are not favored by modern
courts, perhaps because it seems inherently unfair to use the court’s power to enter and enforce
judgments as a penalty for delays in filing”).
Where a plaintiff seeks default judgment in a case implicating the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, the plaintiff must “establish[ ] . . . [its] right to relief by evidence satisfactory to
the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This “imposes a duty on [the] court[ ] to not simply accept a
complaint’s unsupported allegations as true, and obligates courts to inquire further before entering
judgment[.]” Firebird Glob. Master Fund II Ltd. v. Republic of Nauru, 915 F. Supp. 2d 124, 126
(D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court retains its affirmative obligation” to
ensure it has subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defaulting sovereign
nation. Compagnie Sahélienne d’Entreprise v. Republic of Guinea, No. 20-cv-1536, 2021 WL
2417105, at *2 (D.D.C. June 14, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, on default judgment, the court may “accept as true the plaintiff’s
uncontroverted evidence.” Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C.
2000). An evidentiary hearing is not required; proof may be established by affidavit. See Bluth v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2016); Roth v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 78 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Courts may rely on uncontroverted factual
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 5 of 18

6
allegations that are supported by affidavits.”); Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d
204, 212 (D.D.C. 2012). In addition, the court may “take judicial notice of related proceedings
and records in cases before the same court.” Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp.
2d 39, 43 (D.D.C. 2008).
DISCUSSION
The Court is satisfied that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, that it has
personal jurisdiction over the Parties, and that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated an entitlement to
relief. The Court therefore finds that default judgment is proper and awards damages to the
Plaintiffs in the amount of $134.29 million.
A. Rule 55 Requirements
At the threshold, a plaintiff seeking default judgment must: (1) request that the Clerk of the
Court enter default based on the defendant’s failure to respond and (2) file a motion for default
judgment. See Omni Bridgeway Ltd. v. Ministry of Infrastructure & Energy of the Republic of Alb.,
No. 23-1938, 2025 WL 506570, at *3; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The Plaintiffs have completed
both steps, see Aff. for Default, ECF No. 14; Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 15; Mot., ECF
No. 17, so this requirement is satisfied.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Starting with subject matter jurisdiction, the FSIA is “the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in a United States court.” Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278
F. Supp. 3d 145, 157 (D.D.C. 2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), district courts have jurisdiction
over (1) “any nonjury civil action” (2) “against a foreign state” (3) for “any claim for relief in
personam,” but only if (4) the state “is not entitled to immunity.” Id. at 157 n.6 (emphasis added).
Here, the first three requirements are easily met. Mr. Kamalmaz “ha[s] not sought a jury
trial”; “Syria is a foreign state”; and “the suit is brought against Syria in its capacity as a legal
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 6 of 18

7
person, not against property.” Mueller v. Syrian Arab Republic, 656 F. Supp. 3d 58, 76 (D.D.C.
2023). The fourth requires further discussion.
Typically, foreign states are “immune from the jurisdiction” of United States courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1604. But the FSIA provides a terrorism exception when the lawsuit seeks “money
damages” for “personal injury or death.” Id. § 1605A(a)(1). More precisely, the personal injury
or death must have been “caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act.” Id. The act (or
provision of support) must also have been “engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” Id.
A “[p]laintiff must prove four elements to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under the
terrorism exception: (1) the foreign state was designated a state sponsor of terrorism when the act
of terrorism occurred and when th[e] action was filed; (2) the claimant or victim was a national of
the United States at the time of the act; (3) the claimant afforded the foreign state a reasonable
chance to arbitrate the claim; and (4) the damages sought are for personal injury or death caused
by the act of terrorism.” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 804 F. Supp. 3d 229, 240 (D.D.C. 2025);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. The Plaintiffs have met their burden on all four elements.
1. State Sponsor of Terrorism
First, the State Department designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism on December 29,
1979. See Revision of Foreign Policy Controls on Exports to Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen, 45 Fed. Reg. 33955, 33956 (May 21, 1980). Although the State
Department is currently reviewing this designation, Providing for the Revocation of Syria
Sanctions, Exec. Order No. 14,312, 90 Fed. Reg. 29395, 29398 (June 30, 2025), Syria remains so
designated, 31 C.F.R. § 596.201.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 7 of 18

8
2. United States National
Next, Mr. Kamalmaz was a United States citizen when he was tortured and killed by Syria.
See Ex. 2 ¶ 4. The other Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States as well. See Id. ¶ 5; Ex. 26 ¶ 3;
Ex. 27 ¶ 3; Ex. 8 ¶ 3; Ex. 9 ¶ 3; Ex. 3 ¶ 3. And United States citizens are nationals for purposes of
the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(5); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).
3. Offer to Arbitrate
The Plaintiffs have also provided Syria “a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in
accordance with the accepted international rules of arbitration.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii).
“[T]he FSIA ‘does not require any particular form of offer to arbitrate, simply the extension of a
reasonable opportunity.”’ Warmbier v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 356 F. Supp. 3d
30, 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Simpson v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 326 F.3d
230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). And the Plaintiffs included an offer of arbitration when it effectuated
service on Syria. Notice of Offer to Arbitrate, July 22, 2024, ECF No. 2.
4. Terrorism Exception
“The fourth element of subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA terrorism exception is
that the plaintiff seeks damages for personal injury or death caused by the foreign state’s
commission of at least one terrorist act enumerated in the statute, including ‘torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such
an act.’” Foley, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 240 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). Here, Mr. Kamalmaz’s
estate seeks money damages for personal injury and death resulting from his torture and
extrajudicial killing at the hands of the Syrian Arab Republic. And Mr. Kamalmaz’s family
members “satisfy the personal injury requirement of § 1605A(a)(1)” because “the [FSIA] is
understood to encompass claims by family members of those injured or killed for the distress
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 8 of 18

9
caused by their relative’s injuries.” Est. of Fouty v. Syrian Arab Republic, 743 F. Supp. 3d 118,
146 (D.D.C. 2024) (cleaned up).
a. Torture
The Plaintiffs have established that Mr. Kamalmaz was tortured. “Torture” under the FSIA
has the same meaning as that term in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(h)(7):
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical
control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only
from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual
for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind.
TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 3(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73 (Mar. 12, 1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
note. And “mental pain or suffering” means “prolonged mental harm caused by” one of the
following: “the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering,”
the use or threatened use of “mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality,” “the threat of imminent death,” or the threat that another
person “will imminently be subjected” to any of the above. Id. § 3(b)(2).
“[T]he Court may infer that a victim was tortured from ‘compelling, admissible evidence’
that the regime at issue routinely tortures its prisoners.” Levinson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 443
F. Supp. 3d 158, 173 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Han Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
774 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). “This is especially true in cases of forced disappearance,
like this one, where direct evidence of subsequent torture and execution will, by definition, almost
always be unavailable, even though indirect evidence may be overwhelming.” Han Kim, 774 F.3d
at 1048.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 9 of 18

10
Here, Mr. Kamalmaz was held for seven years in multiple Syrian regime prisons that were
known for torture, including Mezzeh. There is ample evidence that individuals detained by the
Syrian regime were routinely tortured. In 2017, the year Mr. Kamalmaz was abducted, the State
Department reported that:
Activists, the [U.N. Commission of Inquiry], and local NGOs reported thousands
of credible cases of government authorities engaging in frequent torture to punish
perceived opponents, including during interrogations. Observers reported most
cases of torture or mistreatment occurred in detention centers operated by each of
the government’s security service branches. Human Rights Watch . . . and the [U.N.
Commission of Inquiry] reported regular use of detention and torture . . . at
checkpoints and facilities run by the air force, Political Security Division, General
Security Directorate, and Military Intelligence Directorate. They identified specific
detention facilities where torture occurred, including the Mezzeh airport detention
facility, Military Security Branches 215, 227, 235, 248, and 291, Adra and Sednaya
prisons, the Harasta Air Force Intelligence Branch, Harasta Military Hospital,
Mezzeh Military Hospital 601, and Tishreen Military Hospital.
Ex. 19, at 5. The United Nations has found the same. See, e.g., Ex. 14 at 2 (reporting on the
“massive and systematised violence” against detainees in Syria by government forces, particularly
Military Intelligence forces); Ex. 28 at 7 (detailing widespread torture, noting “the practice of
torture was almost becoming public policy [in Syria]”). And courts in this District have concluded
that Syria engaged in torture in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Dawes v. Syrian Arab Republic,
No. 21-cv-2730, 2023 WL 8529288, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2023) (finding Syria engaged in torture
by confining U.S. citizen to “tiny, vermin-infested cell without heat or a toilet,” “regularly
den[ying] him medical care, food, water, and the ability to maintain basic hygiene,” and
“subject[ing] him to systematic beatings and interrogation sessions,” among other depravities).
b. Extrajudicial Killing
The Plaintiffs have also shown that Mr. Kamalmaz’s death was an extrajudicial killing.
The state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA defines “extrajudicial killing” through
reference to the TVPA. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7). Under the TVPA, an “extrajudicial killing” is:
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 10 of 18

11
[A] deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not
include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under
the authority of a foreign nation.
TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73 (Mar. 12, 1992), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
This definition “contains three elements: (1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and (3) is not
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” Owens v.
Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “A ‘deliberated’ killing is simply one
undertaken with careful consideration, not on a sudden impulse.” Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174
F. Supp. 3d 242, 263 (D.D.C. 2016).
Here, the indirect evidence of Mr. Kamalmaz’s killing is compelling. See Maupin v. Syrian
Arab Republic, No. 17-cv-1213, 2019 WL 11322512, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2019) (relying on
indirect evidence to find extrajudicial killings). It is well established that the former Syrian regime
regularly engaged in extrajudicial killings. In 2017, the State Department reported “[t]here were
numerous reports the government and its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.” Ex. 19,
at 3. Disappearances where the victim was abducted and never seen alive again were particularly
common. The State Department documented that:
The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) reported the number of forced
disappearances remained high. [. . .] In August 2016 the SNHR attributed 96
percent of the estimated 75,000 forced disappearances to the government. The
government reportedly targeted critics, specifically journalists, medical personnel
[like Mr. Kamalmaz], antigovernment protesters, their families, and associates.
Id. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry similarly concluded that the Syrian regime regularly and
capriciously murdered the people it detained:
Former detainees detailed how cellmates were killed as they were beaten to death
during interrogations and in their cells, or died as a result of severe injuries
sustained due to torture or ill treatment. Others perished as a consequence of
inhuman living conditions inflicted on the prison population, including severe over-
crowding, lack of food, and unclean drinking water. Prisoners were given
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 11 of 18

12
inadequate or no medical care, and died in large numbers from preventable
conditions such as diarrhoea or other contagious infections spread in the unhygienic
and overcrowded cells.
Ex. 14, at 5. The U.N. also noted that “[t]he highest numbers of fatality cases occurred in places
of detention controlled by the Military Security, . . . as well as the Air Force Intelligence
(Investigations) Branch in Mezzeh military airport.” Id. at 7. At Mezzeh, “[d]etainees were
brought back to their cells by the guards with open wounds, swollen limbs, haemorrhaging and
left without medical care. When they died, the bodies would be removed from the overcrowded
cells by prison staff within a few hours.” Id. at 10. “A high number of deaths were also
documented in Sednaya military prison.” Id. at 8.
* * *
The evidence that torture and death were commonplace among those in Syrian captivity is
overwhelming and well-documented. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Kamalmaz was
tortured and killed by the Syrian regime while he was held in captivity. See Han Kim, 774 F.3d
at 1048 (permitting use of “indirect evidence” of widespread torture or execution in enforced
disappearance cases).3 The actions of Syria and its government agents who abducted, tortured, and
3 The D.C. Circuit has analogized the use of indirect evidence in such cases to the common-law
doctrine of “of res ipsa loquitur, or, literally, ‘the thing speaks for itself.’” Han Kim, 774 F.3d
at 1048. As the Circuit explained:
Under that doctrine, the courts have, without direct proof, inferred negligence from
the very nature of events—say, from the fact that a surgery patient awoke from
anesthesia to discover that a sponge had been left in her gut. That sort of inference
is justified in part on the ground that “the court does not know, and cannot find out,
what actually happened in the individual case, often because the facts are known
only to the defendant. This approach allows the court to encourage the defendant
to disclose relevant evidence, and, if the defendant is unable to do so, to reach the
common-sense conclusion.
Id. (cleaned up).
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 12 of 18

13
ultimately killed Mr. Kamalmaz were thus a “substantial factor” in causing the Plaintiffs’ harms.
Foley, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 242 (cleaned up) (discussing standard for causation under the FSIA).
And these injuries were “reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence of Syria’s
conduct.” Id. (cleaned up) (discussing standard for proximate causation under the FSIA). The
Plaintiffs have thus demonstrated the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to support their request
for default judgment.
C. Personal Jurisdiction
Moving to personal jurisdiction, that requirement is satisfied if the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction and Syria was properly served. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). As explained above, the Court
has subject-matter jurisdiction. And the Plaintiffs properly served Syria through the State
Department.
The FSIA provides four ways to serve a foreign state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a). The first
two options are unavailable because Syria and the United States have no “special arrangement for
service,” id. § 1608(a)(1), and because Syria is not party to an “applicable international convention
on service,” id. § 1608(a)(2). Method three entails asking the Clerk of Court to “send[] a copy of
the summons and complaint and a notice of suit,” with translations of each, “to the head of the
ministry of foreign affairs” of Syria. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3). But courts have recently found such
service impracticable in cases involving the Syrian Arab Republic. See Foley, 804 F. Supp. 3d at
243. The last resort is requesting that the Clerk send two copies of those materials to the State
Department so that “service can be effected through diplomatic channels.” Saberi v. Gov’t of
Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F. Supp. 3d 67, 81 (D.D.C. 2021) (citing § 1608(a)(4)).
Here, the Plaintiffs served Syria through diplomatic channels as authorized under 28
U.S.C § 1608(a)(4). The Plaintiffs provided two copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 13 of 18

14
the suit, along with translations of each into Arabic, to the Clerk of the Court on August 27, 2024.
Aff. Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 11. The U.S. Department of State effectuated service
and confirmed that Syria was served on February 26, 2025. Return of Service, June 5, 2025, ECF
No. 13. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have adequately served Syria and established personal
jurisdiction for their suit. See Foley, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 242–43.
D. Liability
Liability, too, is easily established. The FSIA provides that a foreign government is liable
to a U.S. citizen “for personal injury or death caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act.”
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1), (c). As a result, “a plaintiff that offers proof sufficient to establish a
waiver of foreign sovereign immunity under § 1605A(a) has also established entitlement to relief
as a matter of federal law.” Levinson, 443 F. Supp. 3d at 176 (cleaned up). “Essentially, liability
under § 1605A(c) will exist whenever the jurisdictional requirements of § 1605A(a)(1) are met.”
Hekmati, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 163. Having established subject matter jurisdiction over Syria under
§ 1605A, the Plaintiffs have also established liability.
E. Damages
All that is left is damages. Based on the current record, the Court finds that compensatory
and punitive damages are warranted.
1. Compensatory Damages
Mr. Kamalmaz is entitled to be compensated for the “pain and suffering” that occurred
during and after captivity. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4); see also Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908
F. Supp. 2d 216, 232 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 554 F. App’x 16 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (awarding damages
for pain and suffering during captivity and for “lingering physical and psychological effects” post-
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 14 of 18

15
captivity). “[I]n many cases of prolonged and abusive captivity, [the] plaintiffs are awarded
approximately $10,000 per day for the pain and suffering they experienced while captive.” Moradi
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 70 (D.D.C. 2015) (collecting cases). Because
Mr. Kamalmaz spent 2,632 days in captivity—from his abduction on February 15, 2017, to when
the U.S. government informed the Kamalmaz family he had been killed on May 1, 2024, See Mot.
27—the Court awards his estate $26.32 million.4
Mr. Kamalmaz’s family is also entitled to “solatium” for the loss of Mr. Kamalmaz.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4). They have experienced an unimaginable loss. There is a “presumption
that family members in direct lineal relationship suffer compensable mental anguish, and
testimony proving a close emotional relationship will usually be sufficient to sustain an award of
solatium damages.” Kaplan v. Hezbollah, 213 F. Supp. 3d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up).
These “damages [are] intended to compensate [family members] for mental anguish, bereavement
and grief that those with a close personal relationship to a decedent experience . . . as well as the
harm caused by the loss of the decedent’s society and comfort.” Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402. Here,
Mr. Kamalmaz’s family has submitted expert psychological evaluations documenting the mental
harm each of them has suffered from losing Mr. Kamalmaz. See Exs. 30–35.
Courts in this District have “adopted the framework set forth in” Estate of Heiser v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006), as “an appropriate measure of [solatium]
damages for the family members of victims who died.” Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F.
Supp. 2d 52, 85 (D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up). Under the Heiser framework, spouses of deceased
victims receive approximately $8-12 million, children receive $5 million, and siblings receive
4 The Plaintiffs ask this Court to adjust the award to account for inflation from prior cases using
the $10,000 method, but they cite to no authority endorsing such a practice. See Mot. 26–27. In
the absence of such authority, the Court declines to do so here.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 15 of 18

16
$2.5 million. Heiser, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 269. But courts have increased such awards when plaintiffs
provide “medical proof of severe pain, grief or suffering” or the “circumstances” of the case made
“the suffering particularly more acute or agonizing.” Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 403. In similar cases
where medical documentation was provided, courts have granted “a 25% enhancement over the
Heiser baseline” for torture by the Syrian regime. See, e.g., Sotloff v. Syrian Arab Republic, No.
16-cv-725, 2022 WL 22902285, at *23 (D.D.C. May 20, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, 2023 WL 2727599 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2023). Since the Plaintiffs have provided medical
documentation, the Court awards an enhancement here as well.
Thus, the Court awards Hassnaa Kamalmaz, Mr. Kamalmaz’s spouse, her requested
compensatory damages of $12.7 million, which falls within the Heiser range with a 25%
enhancement. See Mot. 29. The Court awards each of Mr. Kamalmaz’s children (Ula Kamalmaz,
Khalid Kamalmaz, Maryam Kamalmaz, and Ibrahim Kamalmaz) $6.25 million, their $5 million
Heiser baseline alongside a 25% enhancement. And the Court awards Mr. Kamalmaz’s sister,
Samar Hamwi, $3.125 million, her $2.5 million Heiser baseline alongside a 25% enhancement.5
So the total award of compensatory damages for the family of Mr. Kamalmaz is $40.825 million.
* * *
In total, the Court awards the Plaintiffs compensatory damages of $67.145 million.
5 During the pendency of this action, Ms. Hamwi passed away, and the Plaintiffs have filed a
Motion to Substitute, ECF No. 20. The Court grants this Motion and substitutes Abdel Hadi
Hamwi and Hani Mohammed Hamwi, as the personal representatives for the Estate of Samar
Hamwi, in the place of Samar Hamwi in this dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a). So the Court awards
$3.125 million in compensatory damages to the personal representatives for the Estate of Samar
Hamwi.
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 16 of 18

17
2. Punitive Damages
The FSIA also provides for the award of “punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(4).
Such damages serve to “punish outrageous behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the
future.” Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 56 (D.D.C. 2012). In deciding
whether to award punitive damages, courts look to the following four factors: “(1) the character of
the defendants’ act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused
or intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.” Selig v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F. Supp. 3d 40, 75 (D.D.C. 2021) (citation omitted).
“For cases like this one, ‘[c]ourts have repeatedly held’ that the actions of similarly placed
State defendants were ‘outrageous’ and justified ‘substantial punitive damages awards.’” Foley,
804 F. Supp. 3d, at 246 (quoting Rezaian v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 422 F. Supp. 3d 164, 183
(D.D.C. 2019)). And harms arising from “detention and torture” commonly justify an award of
punitive damages. Moradi, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 73. Courts have regularly determined that “Syria’s
vast wealth” and the “need to deter sovereign states like Syria” also supports the award of punitive
damages. Foley, 804 F. Supp. 3d at 246 (citation omitted). Although general deterrence is certainly
served by the award of punitive damages, this Court notes that “the policies and actions of the
former regime of Bashar al-Assad” such as those at issue here “have been transformed by
developments over the past . . . months, including the positive actions” by a new Syrian
government. Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions, Exec. Order No. 14,312, 90 Fed.
Reg. 29395, 2395 (June 30, 2025).
In accounting for these factors, courts have adopted various approaches to determining
punitive damages. See Est. of Fishbeck v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 18-cv-2248, 2024 WL
1508871, at *10–11 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2024) (noting the various methods used in this District
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 17 of 18

18
including: (1) multiplying the foreign state’s expenditure on terrorism by a certain factor, (2) a set
fee of $150 million, (3) multiplying the compensatory damages by a certain factor, or (4) awarding
an amount equal to compensatory damages). Here, in light of the recent regime change in Syria,
the Court will award punitive damages in an amount equal to compensatory damages. See Selig,
573 F. Supp. 3d at 76 (awarding punitive damages in the amount of compensatory damages
because using a multiplier in that case “would yield an excessive award”). Thus, the Court awards
punitive damages of $67.145 million.
* * *
Accordingly, the total award for the Plaintiffs is $134.29 million in damages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Motion for Default Judgment and awards
damages to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $134.29 million.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: February 23, 2026
Case 1:24-cv-02136-SLS Document 23 Filed 02/24/26 Page 18 of 18