BROWN v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
MONICA BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 23-cv-03030 (APM)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
Defendant District of Columbia moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Monica Brown’s
sole remaining claim for retaliation under the American with Disabilities Act. See Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. [hereinafter Def.’s Mot.], ECF No. 25.1 As explained below, the motion is granted.
II.
The relevant facts are largely not in dispute. Plaintiff started working as a contract
supervisor for the D.C. Children and Family Services Agency in the fall of 2019. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 1;
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 28 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n], at 3 (not contesting Def.’s Stmt.
¶¶ 1–12). Her immediate supervisor was Tara Sigamoni. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 2. Starting in November
2021, Plaintiff received a disability accommodation permitting her to telework at least three full
days per week and, on the remaining days, to work four hours in the office and four hours remotely.
Reply in Supp. of Def’s Mot., ECF No. 29 [hereinafter Def.’s Reply], Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt.
1 At ECF No. 25, Defendant has docketed in a single, integrated document its motion, memorandum of law in support,
and statement of undisputed material facts. When citing a page in the memorandum, the court uses “Def.’s Mem.”
and the relevant page number. When citing to the statement of facts, the court uses “Def.’s Stmt.” and the relevant
paragraph number.
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of Material Facts for Which There is No Genuine Dispute, ECF No. 29-1 [hereinafter Pl.’s Stmt.],
¶¶ 6, 10. Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint on July 1, 2022, alleging sex and disability
discrimination by Ms. Sigamoni. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 8. In October 2022, her
accommodation was modified so that, on her two in-office days, she was required to use leave for
any hours she did not spend physically in the office. Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 13. Then, in December 2022,
Plaintiff renewed her request to telework three days per week and, on the other two days, split time
between in-office and remote work. Id. ¶ 15. Human Resources Manager Keyana McNeil denied
the request. Id. ¶ 16; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 13.
III.
The crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that Sigamoni retaliated against her for her July 2022 EEOC
complaint by urging McNeil to deny her accommodation request in December 2022. Pl.’s Opp’n
at 9.2 But to prevail at this stage, Plaintiff must produce some evidence establishing a genuine
dispute of fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), that Sigamoni knew about her protected activity. See Ho v.
Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (observing that the decisionmaker’s knowledge of the
plaintiff’s protected activity is “a requirement for any retaliation claim”); Talavera v. Shah, 638
F.3d 303, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This is where her claim fails. Sigamoni testified that she was not
aware that Plaintiff had filed an EEO complaint in July 2022. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 6, Dep. of Tara
Sigamoni, ECF No. 25-6 [hereinafter Sigamoni Dep.], 79:17–80:5. Plaintiff did not contradict
Sigamoni. She recalled telling her subordinates about the filing but could not say whether she had
informed Sigamoni. Def.’s Reply, Ex. 7, Dep. of Monica Brown II, ECF No. 29-2, at 25:3–26:1.
2 Plaintiff’s opposition also asserts that the October 2022 modification was an adverse action. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9.
Defendant argues that this position is at odds with Plaintiff’s discovery responses, which identified only the December
2022 denial as the adverse action, and therefore the court should not consider it. See Def.’s Reply at 3. The court
does not need to address this dispute. As will be discussed, because Plaintiff failed to produce evidence of Sigamoni’s
knowledge of her EEO activity, whether she asserts one or two adverse actions is immaterial.
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That is the totality of evidence about Sigamoni’s awareness of Plaintiff’s protected activity. A
plaintiff “need only offer circumstantial evidence that could reasonably support an inference” of a
decisionmaker’s knowledge to defeat summary judgment. See Talavera, 638 F.3d at 313 (quoting
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff has not overcome even that low
bar.
Plaintiff counters that she still gets to a jury because “Ms. Sigamoni’s testimony is simply
not credible.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10. As support, she points to three pieces of evidence. First, she
claims that Sigamoni falsely testified that she had no decision-making authority regarding
Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation request, when in fact, according to the Human Resources
Manager, Kenya McNeil, if Sigamoni not expressed concerns about continued telework, the
accommodation likely would have been granted. Pl.’s Opp’n at 10 (citing Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 1,
ECF No. 28-1 [hereinafter McNeil Dep. I], at 10).3 Sigamoni also expressed doubt that Plaintiff’s
need for accommodation was “genuine.” McNeil Dep. I at 4. Second, Plaintiff points to an
interrogatory response by Defendant stating that human resources “did not solicit or receive a
recommendation from Plaintiff’s supervisor, Tara Sigamoni, that Plaintiff’s reasonable
accommodation request be denied.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11 (citing Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 11, ECF No. 28-1
[hereinafter Ex. 111], at 109). McNeil’s testimony arguably conflicts with that contention. See id.
Finally, Plaintiff points out that Sigamoni approved of her teleworking arrangement before her
EEO complaint but did not support it afterwards. Id. at 9–10.
When, as here, “challenges to witness’ credibility are all that a plaintiff relies on, and he
has shown no independent facts—no proof—to support his claims, summary judgment in favor of
the defendant is proper.” Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). Or, put another
3 Because Plaintiff included all of her exhibits in a single docket entry, the court uses CM/ECF pagination when
referencing her exhibits.
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way, “[t]he general rule is that specific facts must be produced in order to put credibility in issue
so as to preclude summary judgment. Unsupported allegations that credibility is in issue will not
suffice.” Wright & Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2726 (4th ed). “On the other hand, . . . if the
credibility of the movant’s witness is challenged by the opposing party and specific bases for
possible impeachment are shown, summary judgment should be denied and the case allowed to
proceed to trial.” Id.
Plaintiff’s proffered facts do not put Sigamoni’s credibility “in issue.” First, there is
nothing inconsistent about Sigamoni saying she lacked decisionmaking authority and McNeil’s
testimony that Sigamoni’s input influenced the denial. Indeed, McNeil confirmed that the ultimate
decision over the request belonged with human resources and that Sigamoni’s views were but one
input in the decisionmaking process. Def.’s Reply, Ex. 10, Dep. of Keyana McNeil, ECF No. 29-
5, at 16:6–19:22. Second, the interrogatory response does not challenge Sigamoni’s credibility for
two reasons. For one, she did not sign it; McNeil did. Ex. 11 at 110. For another, when read in
context, the interrogatory did not represent that Sigamoni made no recommendation about
Plaintiff’s request, only that Defendant had no written evidence of her views. See id. at 109
(interrogatory asking Defendant to “[p]rovide any correspondence or documentation,” and McNeil
attesting that human resources “does not have any record of correspondence [or] documentation
of any such recommendation from Tara Sigamoni to HR ADA Specialist Annie Johnson[4] or HR
Manager Kenyana McNeil”). Finally, Sigamoni’s change in position on Plaintiff’s telework after
the EEO complaint was filed does not establish that she knew about the complaint. Just as
temporal proximity alone cannot establish causation at summary judgment, see Iyoha v. Architect
4 Annie Johnson was the human resources specialist responsible for modifying the telework accommodation in
October 2022. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. 4, ECF No. 28-1, at 20.
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of the Capitol, 927 F.3d 561, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2019), it likewise cannot, without more, undermine a
witness’s credibility.
IV.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to present evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to
conclude that, in December 2022, Sigamoni was aware of Plaintiff’s June 2022 protected
EEO activity. Defendant’s motion therefore is granted, and the court will enter judgment in its
favor. See Talavera, 638 F.3d at 313–44. A separate, final order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
Dated: May 15, 2026 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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