TERREROS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JUAN TERREROS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
Case No. 22-cv-3803 (JMC)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Juan Terreros filed this suit against the United States to seek the return of money
seized from him by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Terreros alleges that the funds
were seized illegally and that the DEA proceeded to administratively forfeit his money without
providing him proper notice. The Government has moved to dismiss on subject-matter jurisdiction
grounds, arguing that the DEA’s subsequent rescinding of the forfeiture proceeding and reopening
of the period to file a claim rendered Terreros’s suit moot. Alternatively, the Government moves
to transfer venue. Because the Court agrees with the Government that the DEA’s rescinding of the
forfeiture and reopening of the claims period rendered the case moot, and this Court otherwise
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Terreros’s claims, the Court will GRANT the Government’s
motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Government’s motion in the alternative to transfer the case to
the Eastern District of New York is DENIED as moot.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Juan Terreros is a resident of New York. ECF 1 ¶ 4. On November 13, 2020, DEA agents
seized $29,000 from him at the San Francisco International Airport. Id. ¶ 6. The DEA mailed
Terreros a notice informing him of the seizure and the initiation of an administrative forfeiture
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proceeding on January 12, 2021. Id. ¶ 7; ECF 8-1 at 8–9. The notice stated that Terreros had two
paths for contesting the forfeiture. ECF 8-1 at 8–9. First, Terreros could file a petition “for
remission or mitigation,” which would be reviewed and adjudicated by an official at the
Department of Justice. Id. at 8. Second, he could have filed a claim to contest the forfeiture, which
would have “stop[ped] the administrative forfeiture proceeding” and permitted him to contest the
forfeiture in U.S. District Court. Id. at 9. The deadline to file a claim, as stated in the letter, was
February 16, 2021. Id. The DEA also posted a notice on the Forfeiture.gov website, which stated
that any potential claimant had until March 26, 2021, to either make a claim or file a petition for
remission. Id. at 12–13. Terreros did not receive the mailed notice of seizure until February 27,
2021, after the deadline for filing a claim had passed as stated in the mailed notice (but not the
deadline as stated on Forfeiture.gov). ECF 1 ¶ 8. Rather than file a claim, he filed a petition for
remission on March 10, 2021. Id.; ECF 8-1 at 19. No claims were filed by any other persons, and
on January 19, 2022—while Terreros’s petition for remission was still pending—the DEA
administratively forfeited the funds. ECF 8-1 at 6. Then, on October 6, 2022, the DEA denied
Terreros’s pending petition for remission. Id. at 7; ECF 1 ¶ 10.
Terreros then filed this suit in December 2022, seeking return of the funds under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). ECF 1 ¶ 2. He alleged that he did not receive sufficient notice
of the forfeiture to file a claim, that his property could not be forfeited under any statute, and that
this Court could provide him the equitable relief of return of the funds. Id. ¶¶ 3, 11–13. Following
Terreros’s filing of the lawsuit, the DEA rescinded the initial declaration of forfeiture on February
16, 2023, and simultaneously reopened the administrative forfeiture proceeding, which meant that
the period to file a claim was again open from February 16, 2023, to March 23, 2023. See ECF 8-
1 at 66–68. The notice was sent to Plaintiff’s counsel by certified mail and email. Id. at 69–72. The
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Government then moved to dismiss on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds, arguing that the case
was moot because Terreros had received all of the relief that this Court could provide—a setting
aside of the procedurally defective forfeiture action for failure to receive proper notice and a new
opportunity to file a claim. ECF 8 at 10–11. Terreros opposes the motion. ECF 9.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Government moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1). Article III of the U.S. Constitution prescribes that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction,” and it is generally “presumed that a cause lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). If a court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction to entertain a claim, it must dismiss that claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “[O]nce
jurisdiction is in question, the party claiming subject matter jurisdiction . . . has the burden to
demonstrate that it exists.” Bronner ex rel. Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 602
(D.C. Cir. 2020). Under Article III, federal courts also “lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases
because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies.” Larsen v. U.S.
Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are
no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 3. “Even
where litigation poses a live controversy when filed, the mootness doctrine requires a federal court
to refrain from deciding it if events have so transpired that the decision will neither presently affect
the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in the future.”
Columbian Rope Co. v. West, 142 F.3d 1313, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are
required to “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Am. Freedom
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L. Ctr. v. Obama, 821 F.3d 44, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016). However, a court “may consider materials
outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Id.
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Terreros’s challenge to the
administrative forfeiture proceedings.
To begin, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Terreros’s request for equitable review of the
seizure of his money. Terreros frames his claim as one brought under Rule 41(g) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. ECF 1 ¶ 2; see id. ¶ 13. That Rule allows a “person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property” to move for its return.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). No criminal charges were filed against Terreros, ECF 1 ¶ 11, and “[a]
motion for return of property under Criminal Rule 41(g) that is filed by ‘a party against whom no
criminal charges have been brought’ is” therefore “construed as ‘a petition that the district court
invoke its civil equitable jurisdiction.’” Richman v. United States, 350 F.R.D. 401, 418 (D.D.C.
2025) (quoting Parrott v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-2930, 2023 WL 2162859, at *10
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2023)), amended, No. 25-cv-0170, 2025 WL 3718712 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2025).
But Terreros’s invocation of 41(g) does not suffice to establish jurisdiction in this case,
because the “law is well settled, . . . ‘that once the Government initiates an administrative
forfeiture proceeding and the property is not the subject of an ongoing criminal proceeding, the
District Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of return of property.’” Ford-Bey v. United
States, No. 19-cv-2039, 2020 WL 32991, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2020) (quoting United States v.
Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1990)), aff’d, No. 21-5053, 2021 WL 2525374 (D.C. Cir.
June 2, 2021). Instead, “once the Government initiates an administrative forfeiture proceeding,”
the Plaintiff’s remedy is “to challenge forfeiture in the administrative proceeding.” Price, 914 F.2d
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at 1511; United States v. Barnhardt, 555 F. Supp. 2d 184, 186 (D.D.C. 2008). That is the case
here. The property at issue was the subject of a completed administrative forfeiture proceeding at
the time Terreros filed this case. See ECF 1 ¶ 7; ECF 8-1 at 6. And even though the DEA rescinded
the initial forfeiture proceeding on February 16, 2023, after this lawsuit was filed, it simultaneously
issued a new notice of seizure and initiation of administrative forfeiture proceedings. ECF 8-1 at
66–68. Had Terreros wanted to seek judicial review of the merits of the forfeiture action, he would
have needed to file a claim as part of the administrative forfeiture process, which would have
triggered the Government’s obligation to either return the property or file a civil forfeiture action.
See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 8.10(e); Wada v. U.S. Secret Serv., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1,
12 (D.D.C. 2007). Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Terreros’s challenge to the merits of
the forfeiture proceeding. See Price, 914 F.2d at 1511; Wada, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (“The
Court . . . lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff's challenge to the forfeiture once the administrative
proceeding was initiated.”).
Of course, Terreros also claims that he was unable to avail himself of this remedy because
he did not receive notice in order to file a timely claim in the forfeiture action. ECF 1 ¶¶ 3, 8.
Although district courts are limited in addressing the merits of a forfeiture when a party has not
filed a claim, Terreros was not entirely out of luck. “Upon completion of an administrative
forfeiture, a party may seek to set it aside and reopen forfeiture proceedings.” Ford-Bey, 2020 WL
32991, at *8. The mechanism for doing so, a motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(e), allows
a party to sue in federal court to “set aside a declaration of forfeiture.” However, this remedy
provides for only limited review by the district court. “Section 983(e) limits the bases for setting
aside an administrative forfeiture to defects in the notice provided to a person with an interest in
the property.” Ford-Bey, 2020 WL 32991, at *8; see 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1). And even if a court
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finds that notice was defective, the relief is also limited: The court must set aside the forfeiture,
but “without prejudice to the right of the Government to commence a subsequent forfeiture
proceeding as to the interest of the moving party.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(2)(A). Terreros’s pleadings
are somewhat amorphous on the scope of relief sought, but because his complaint invokes his lack
of proper notice to the initial forfeiture and cites § 983(e), the Court construes his complaint as
also asking the Court to set aside the declaration of forfeiture under this provision in addition to
his Rule 41(g) claim. ECF 1 ¶ 3.
But even if Terreros has brought a request to set aside the forfeiture under § 983(e), the
Court still lacks jurisdiction over this claim because it was mooted out by the reopening of the
forfeiture proceedings. After Terreros filed this suit, the DEA rescinded the initial forfeiture and
reopened the administrative forfeiture proceedings for an additional 35-day period. See ECF 8-1
at 66–68. The DEA also provided notice of the reopened forfeiture by mailing the documents via
certified mail and emailing the notice to Terreros’s counsel. See ECF 8-1 at 69–72. In doing so,
the DEA provided Terreros the relief able to be provided in a § 983(e) action. A case is moot, as
here, where “the court can provide no effective remedy because a party has already obtained all
the relief that it has sought.” Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
Terreros’s arguments for why this case remains a live controversy after the DEA reopened
the forfeiture proceedings miss the mark. First, he complains about the defects in notice for the
initial forfeiture, but has not objected to the sufficiency of the renewed notice sent by the
Government for the reopened administrative forfeiture proceeding, which is now the only relevant
proceeding for the Court’s analysis. ECF 9 at 3. Second, he raises objections to the Government’s
decision on his remission petition. Id. at 4–7. But given that the DEA rescinded the initial
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forfeiture, the Court does not find the petition relevant. And even if that petition were relevant to
the reopened forfeiture proceeding, the Court would not have jurisdiction to review the decision
on his remission petition or issue the relief he requests. See Patterson v. Haaland, No. 21-cv-
02391, 2022 WL 4534685, at *5 (D.D.C. Sep. 28, 2022) (finding that the Court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over challenge to forfeiture where only action taken by Plaintiff was to file a
petition for remission, rather than to file a claim in the administrative forfeiture proceedings under
18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)), dismissed, No. 22-5297, 2023 WL 2604280 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 21, 2023); see
also Tourus Recs., Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 259 F.3d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[C]ases appear
to treat the decision to mitigate or remit as an agency action committed to agency discretion by
law, a category of administrative decisions to which the judicial review provisions of the APA are
inapplicable.”); 28 C.F.R. § 9.7(a)(1) (regulations governing remission and mitigation which state
that “[w]hether the property or a monetary equivalent will be remitted to an owner shall be
determined at the discretion of the ruling official”).
Finally, Terreros argues that the case remained live following the reopening of the
forfeiture because he still sought to challenge the merits of the forfeiture and seek the return of the
$29,000. ECF 9 at 7–8. For the reasons discussed above, the Court lacks jurisdiction over that
claim. Terreros objects that requiring him to proceed through the administrative forfeiture process
would be onerous or ineffective. He notes that the process of “fil[ing] a claim with [the] DEA on
the reopened administrative proceedings” would likely lead to a referral to the U.S. Attorney in
San Francisco to file a civil forfeiture action, but claims that “[s]uch a referral could be ignored.”
Id. at 2. He also complains that were such an action filed, his attorney would have to “file a motion
pro hac vice to participate in the proceeding which would require the affiliation of local counsel
to which [the] undersigned counsel has no access.” Id. at 2–3. None of these objections overcome
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the fact that the administrative forfeiture process in significant part “preempt[s] the district court’s
jurisdiction to review disputes over seized property.” United States v. Barnhardt, No. 04-cv-0132,
2006 WL 2474224, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2006); see Price, 914 F.2d at 1511.
The Court therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims in this case and must
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.
* 	* 	*
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF 8, is GRANTED, and the
case is DISMISSED. As a result, Defendant’s request in the alternative to transfer to the Eastern
District of New York, ECF 8, is DENIED as moot. A separate order accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge
Date: March 31, 2026
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