Sindram v. Superior Court, District of Columbia

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In re
MICHAEL JOSEPH SINDRAM,
Debtor.
____________________________
MICHAEL JOSEPH SINDRAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
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Case No. 08-00559
(Chapter 7)
Adversary Proceeding No.
09-10036
Not for Publication in
West’s Bankruptcy Reporter
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
The debtor Sindram’s complaint in this adversary proceeding
against the Superior Court of the District of Columbia attacks an
order of April 28, 1992, entered by that court. 	It raises many
of the same issues as were addressed by motions that Sindram
previously filed in the main bankruptcy case, Case No. 08-00559.
I remain convinced that the Superior Court has not violated the
The document below is hereby signed.
Signed: December 30, 2009.
_____________________________
S. Martin Teel, Jr.
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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Bankruptcy Code by enforcing the April 28, 1992 order’s
injunction against Sindram’s proceeding pro se unless and until
he paid a $3,000.00 penalty payable to the Superior Court.
Accordingly, I will direct the clerk not to issue a summons in
this adversary proceeding and will dismiss the adversary
proceeding unless Sindram can show cause why the adversary
proceeding ought not be dismissed based on the analysis set forth
in this decision.
I
Sindram filed a motion in the main case entitled Motion to
Appoint Counsel in Core Adversary Proceeding Against Superior
Court District of Columbia for Having Violated Bankruptcy Code
(Dkt. No. 203), and supplemented it by a Supplemental Motion to
Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 210). 	In a Memorandum Decision and
Order dated August 5, 2009 (assigned Dkt. Nos. 223 and 224), I
denied that motion, as supplemented, stating:
I
The Superior Court order of April 28, 1992, long
preceding Sindram’s bankruptcy case, directed Sindram
to pay to the Clerk of the Superior Court $3,000.00 as
a fine under Rule 11 of the Superior Court’s Rules (the
analog of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). 	The order further
enjoined Sindram from filing any new cases against
anybody in the Superior Court in a pro se capacity
until he paid the fine. 	Finally, the order prohibited
Sindram, even if he paid the $3,000.00 fine, from
proceeding in forma pauperis in any of his future or
present cases “unless he has already been granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis in that case,” and
directed that unless the court granted Sindram leave to
proceed in forma pauperis with respect to the filing of
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a paper, the Clerk of the Superior Court was not to
accept the paper for filing if Sindram had not paid the
required filing fees relating to the paper.
II
Sindram contends that the obligation to pay the
$3,000.00 fine has been discharged by his discharge in
this bankruptcy case. 	He first raised that contention
in a motion filed in the Superior Court, and in the
course of the proceedings on that motion, placed
reliance on In re Corbly, 149 B.R. 125 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1992), which erroneously held that § 523(a)(7)(B)
applies to all penalties and fines, not just to tax
penalties, in support of his contention. The Superior
Court rejected that contention on June 1, 2009, in a
careful and well-reasoned decision. Sindram wants to
have a second bite at the apple by litigating the issue
in this court, and seeks the appointment of counsel to
assist him in that endeavor. 	The appointment of
counsel is within the discretion of the court. Counsel
will not be appointed when it appears that the proposed
litigation is plainly meritless. Even if the Superior
Court’s decision were not a bar against relitigation of
the issue in this court, I agree fully with the
decision of the Superior Court. 	Accordingly, I will
not appoint counsel to represent Sindram with respect
to the proposed litigation to challenge the conduct of
the Superior Court.
Sindram then filed a motion for clarification and modification
(Dkt. No. 227). 	On August 20, 2009, I issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order (Dkt. No. 232), denying that motion, and
stating:
Sindram continues to view In re Corbly, 149 B.R. 125
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1992), as correctly holding that
§ 523(a)(7)(B) applies to all penalties and fines, not
just to tax penalties, but that holding was erroneous,
has been rejected by other courts, has not been
followed by any other court, and is not binding on this
court.
Sindram asks for injunctive relief against the
Superior Court, contending that because he is indigent,
the Superior Court ought to allow him to litigate
without payment of fees and ought not require him to
pay the $3,000 fine or hire counsel before he is
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entitled to file any new action in the Superior Court.
But injunctive relief must be sought in an adversary
proceeding, and, in any event, nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code bars the Superior Court’s enforcement
of its order of April 28, 1992. 	A bankruptcy court is
not empowered to relieve a debtor from all hardships
arising from being indigent.
II
The complaint in this adversary proceeding attempts to
challenge the Superior Court’s enforcement of its April 28, 1992
order imposing a $3,000.00 penalty against Sindram and enjoining
him from proceeding pro se unless and until he paid that penalty.
He points first to Michael Sindram v. Jamison Condominium
Association, Civil Action No. 2008 CA 006673B in the Superior
Court. 	He was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in that
proceeding, but the Superior Court nevertheless later dismissed
the action based on his failure to pay the $3,000.00 penalty
imposed by the April 28, 1992 order of the Superior Court (which
as noted above, enjoined Sindram from filing any new cases
against anybody in the Superior Court in a pro se capacity until
he paid the fine). 	Specifically, he alleges:
3. During pendent Automatic Stay in
above-captioned Bankruptcy Proceeding subsequent
"order" by respondent newly appointed associate judge
Anita Josey Herring made demand for payment of Three
Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) and further dismissed 2008
CA 006673B Michael Sindram v. Jamison Condominium
Association. 	Draconian "payment order" for $3,000.00
was imposed in 1992 in an unrelated civil action by
respondent without advance notice, due process, or
fundamental fairness given Disabled
Veteran/Debtor/Movant to address or collaterally
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challenge this substantial overreaching 1992 draconian
"payment order" for $3,000.00 of respondent. 	Disabled
Veteran/Debtor/Movant was not permitted to appeal
either draconian 1992 "payment order" for $3,000.00 or
instant dismissal of 2008 CA 006673B to hold void of
legal force or effect law of this case granting "Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis." 	Under colour of law
afore-referenced draconian 1992 "payment order" for
$3,000.00 should now be dissolved given lapse of
seventeen (17) years by operation of law.
These allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
First, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code barred the Superior
Court’s refusing to permit Sindram to proceed pro se unless, as
directed by the April 28, 1992 order, he paid the $3,000.00
penalty.
Second, the challenges to the April 28, 1992 order:
• 	as void for lack of due process,
• 	as “draconian,”
• 	as unenforceable in Civil Action No. 2008 CA 006673B
once permission to proceed in forma pauperis had
already been granted in Civil Action No. 2008 CA
006673B, and
• 	as subject to “be dissolved given lapse of seventeen
(17) years by operation of law”
are challenges that Sindram could have raised in the District of
Columbia court system, and that do not go to the issue of whether
the automatic stay was violated or the $3,000.00 debt is
dischargeable.
Third, the refusal to permit Sindram to appeal the dismissal
of Civil Action No. 2008 CA 006673B is not a basis for relief
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under the Bankruptcy Code. 	It may be inferred that the refusal
was because Sindram failed to pay the applicable appeal fee, and
because the Superior Court deemed it inappropriate to permit
Sindram to appeal in forma pauperis. 	That refusal is reviewable
within the District of Columbia court system, and not an issue of
bankruptcy law. 	Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code barred the
Superior Court’s refusing to permit Sindram to appeal in forma
pauperis. 	As noted above, “[a] bankruptcy court is not empowered
to relieve a debtor from all hardships arising from being
indigent.”
III
Sindram points to two other civil actions in the Superior
Court in which his claims were dismissed based on the April 28,
1992 order, and raises similar contentions as he did with respect
to the Superior Court’s handling of Civil Action no. 2008 CA
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1 	In Lawrence Q. Ashley v. Michael Sindram, identified by
Sindram as No. 08 CA 7825 in the Superior Court, the court
enforced the April 28, 1992 order and “dismissed [Sindram’s]
‘Third Party Complaint’ and nullified ‘Writ of Attachment on a
Judgment’ for $1,500.00 given [Sindram] for destruction of
[Sindram’s] property caused by Lawrence Q. Ashley. Sindram
alleges that he was not permitted to appeal the April 28, 1992
order of the the dismissal order, and contends that an earlier
order permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis, as a matter of
law of the case, barred the dismissal.
In Maryann Czarnecki v. Michael Sindram, Civil Action No.
2008 CA 005328B in the Superior Court, the court enforced the
April 28, 1992 order and “dismissed [Sindram’s] ‘Counterclaim’
and ‘Jury Demand.’” Sindram appears to contend that an earlier
order permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis, as law of the
case, barred the dismissal.
7
006673B. 1 	For the same reasons as discussed above with respect
to Civil Action No. 2008 CA 006673B, the complaint’s allegations
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with
respect to these acts.
IV
Sindram requests a determination that the $3,000.00 penalty
was dischargeable. 	For reasons discussed in this court’s prior
Memorandum Decisions in the main case (quoted in part I, above),
and in the Superior Court’s decision of June 1, 2009 (copy
attached), the $3,000.00 penalty is clearly nondischargeable. 	I
need not decide whether this court would be barred by the
Superior Court’s prior ruling of nondischargeability from ruling
differently as I completely agree with the Superior Court’s
analysis of the issue.
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8	O:\TEEL\Judge Temp Docs\Sindram (Michael Joseph) v Superior Court - Memorandum Decision re Dismissal.wpd
V
In accordance with the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that the clerk shall not issue a summons in this
adversary proceeding, and that the court will dismiss this
adversary proceeding unless the plaintiff, Michael Joseph
Sindram, files a memorandum by January 15, 2010, showing cause
why this adversary proceeding ought not be dismissed based on the
analysis set forth in this decision.
[Signed and dated above.]
Copies to:
Debtor; Chapter 7 trustee; Office of the United States Trustee;
Hon. Ronna L. Beck
Superior Court for the District of Columbia
500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Hon. Stephanie Duncan-Peters
Superior Court for the District of Columbia
500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Hon. Anita Josey Herring
Superior Court for the District of Columbia
500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
Hon. Neal E. Kravitz
Superior Court for the District of Columbia
500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Division
MICHAEL SINDRAM, 	*
*
Plaintiff, 	*
*
v. 	* 	2003 CA 95511
* 	Judge Duncan-Peters
MARGO THORNE, et al., 	*
*
Defendants. 	*
AMENDED ORDER FINDING PLAINTIFF’S DEBT TO BE
NONDISCHARGEABLE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH DISCHARGE OF DEBTOR
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Compliance
with Discharge of Debtor. 	In that Motion, Plaintiff seeks the discharge of a
$3,000 sanction owed by him to the District of Columbia Superior Court.
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 1992, the Honorable John H. Suda2 dismissed a separate
case brought by Plaintiff in an Order that stated in relevant part:
[it is] FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Sindram
pay a sanction of $3,000.00 to the Clerk of the Court;
and it is
FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Mr. 	Sindram 	is
hereby enjoined from filing any new cases against
anybody in the District of Columbia Superior Court in
a pro se capacity until he pays the Rule 11 fine just
imposed, 	and 	this 	Court 	has 	been 	provided 	with
satisfactory proof by the Clerk of the Court of this
payment, and this Court issues a further order stating
that this condition has been satisfied. 	The Clerk of
the Court and all of his subordinates are ordered to
reject any new cases which Mr. Sindram seeks to file
1 See page 3, infra, for a history of this case, which the undersigned judge has inherited in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Civil Division.
2 Judge Suda is now retired.
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in a pro se capacity until this Court has issued a
subsequent order stating that the sanction has been
paid in full; and it is
FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Mr. 	Sindram 	is
hereby prohibited from proceeding in form pauperis
[sic] in any of his future cases, and he is prohibited
from 	proceeding 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	in 	any 	of 	his
present cases unless he has already been granted
leave 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma 	pauperis 	in 	that 	case.
Further, 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court, 	and 	all 	of 	his
subordinates, are ordered to reject for filing by Mr.
Sindram pleadings and motions in which he has not
already 	been 	granted 	leave 	to 	proceed 	in 	forma
pauperis, 	unless 	they 	are 	accompanied 	by 	the
appropriate filing fees. 	The orders in this paragraph
will continue even after Mr. Sindram has paid the
$3,000.00 sanction to the Clerk of the Court. 	The
Clerk of the Court is to notify all of the appropriate
subordinate clerks of this order.
Sindram v. King, No. 91-26258 at 28, 29 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sm. Cl. April 28, 1992)
(the “April 1992 Order”).
Plaintiff has not paid -- nor does he claim to have paid -- the $3,000
sanction. 	Since the April 1992 Order, however, Plaintiff has filed numerous pro
se complaints and motions. Where the Clerk of the Court has not rejected these
filings, the Court has denied Plaintiff’s motions or dismissed Plaintiff’s cases.
See, e.g., Borger Mgmt. v. Sindram, case no. 01-6276B (D.C. Super. Ct. March
17, 2004). 	In those cases where judges of the Superior Court inadvertently
granted Plaintiff’s pro se motions to proceed in forma pauperis, they later vacated
those orders. 	See, e.g., Sindram v. Columbia Union College, No. 01-8381B
(D.C. Super. Ct. 	Nov. 29, 2001); see also Sindram v. Scott, No. 06-6937B (D.C.
Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2006); Sindram v. Jamison Condominium Assoc., No. 08-
6673B (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009). 	The Court has made it clear that Plaintiff
2
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must pay the $3,000 sanction in compliance with the April 1992 Order before
proceeding pro se in any cases filed after April 28, 1992. See Borger Mgmt. No.
01-6276B, at 3.
In this case, on December 1, 2003, Plaintiff filed a complaint for a
temporary restraining order and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 	That
same day, the Court (the Honorable Bruce D. Beaudin, presiding) granted the
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 	On December 11, 2003, the Court (the
Honorable Steffen W. Graae,3 presiding) sua sponte vacated the order allowing
Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the case. On December 30,
2003, Plaintiff filed a motion for clarification of Judge Graae’s order. 	Judge
Graae, in an order dated February 10, 2004, explained that Plaintiff had not
complied with the April 1992 Order. 	See Order docketed February 10, 2004.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2004, which was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals on August 25, 2004. On February 13, 2009, Plaintiff filed a
Motion for Compliance with Discharge of Debtor seeking a discharge of the
$3,000 sanction.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the $3,000 sanction is discharged because he was
granted a discharge of his debts by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia. 	(Pl.’s Mot. 1, 3.) 	Plaintiff has attached proof that on
January 	23, 	2009, 	the 	United 	States 	Bankruptcy 	Court 	for 	the 	District 	of
Columbia (the Honorable S. Martin Teel, Jr., presiding) granted him “a discharge
under section 727 of title 11 of the United States Code . . .” (Pl.’s Mot. 3.)
3 At that time, Judge Graae (who is now deceased) was the Presiding Judge of the Civil Division.
3
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Plaintiff further argues that the “[l]aw of the case” is an order by the Honorable
Bruce N. Mencher in Sindram v. Jamison Condominium Assoc., No. 08-6673B
(D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2008) in which Judge Mencher stayed Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis “pending resolution of U.S. Bankruptcy No.
08-00559 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the [District of Columbia]. . .” 	(Pl.’s
Mot. 2.)
Section 523 (a)(7) of Title 11 of the United States Code provides:
A discharge under section 727 [of title 11 of the
United 	States 	Code]. 	. 	.does 	not 	discharge 	an
individual from any debt . . . to the extent such debt is
for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit 	of 	a 	governmental 	unit, 	and 	is 	not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss. . .
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) (2009). 	Whether Plaintiff is discharged from the $3,000
sanction, therefore, depends on whether the sanction is a “fine, penalty, or
forfeiture” that is “payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit” and “is
not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” 	See id. 	Before the Court can
determine whether Plaintiff’s $3,000 sanction is discharged, however, the Court
must first establish that it has jurisdiction.
I. 	Jurisdiction
Section 1334 (b) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that unless
an exception applies, “the district courts shall have original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) (2009). State courts, therefore, have
concurrent jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 of the United
States Code unless an exception applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a)-(b).
4
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“The 	general 	rule 	is 	that 	state 	and 	federal 	courts 	have 	concurrent
jurisdiction over nondischargeability actions.” 	Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v.
Franklin (In re Franklin), 179 B.R. 913, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995). 	While 11
U.S.C. § 523 (c)(1) may preclude concurrent jurisdiction with regard to 11 U.S.C.
§ 523 (a)(2), (4), or (6),4 state courts clearly have jurisdiction to determine
whether a debt is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C § 523 (a)(7). 	Accordingly, the
Court has jurisdiction to determine whether Plaintiff’s debt is nondischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b); In re Moncur, supra,
328 B.R. at 189.
II. 	Dischargeability Under Section 523 (a)(7).
For 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) to render a debt nondischargeable, that debt
must be a “penalty, fine, or forfeiture” that is “payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit” and it must not be “compensation for actual pecuniary loss.”
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7); see Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 (1986).
A. 	Fine, Penalty, or Forfeiture
Section 523 of Title 11 of the United States Code “creates a broad
exception for all penal sanctions, whether they be denominated fines, penalties,
4 Some courts have held that 11 U.S.C. § 523 (c)(1) denies state courts concurrent jurisdiction to
determine the dischargeability of debt under certain subsections of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a). See id.
at 920. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (c)(1) provides that, with regard to debts described in 11 U.S.C. § 523
(a)(2), (4) or (6), “the court determines [whether] such debt [is] excepted from discharge. . .” 11
U.S.C.S § 523 (c)(1) (2009). Legislative history suggests that “the court” in 11 U.S.C. § 523 (c)(1)
means bankruptcy court exclusively. See Moncur v. Agricredit Acceptance Co. (In re Moncur),
328 B.R. 183, 189 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 2005). Some courts have thus held that “bankruptcy courts
possess exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate some dischargeability issues (i.e., those raised by
subsections (a)(2), (4), and (6) [of 11 U.S.C. § 523]), and concurrent jurisdiction with
nonbankruptcy courts to decide other nondischargeability matters. . .” In re Borbridge, 81 B.R.
332, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); See also In re Franklin, 179 B.R. 913, 920-21 (holding that
“despite vague draftsmanship,” 11 U.S.C. § 523 (c)(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction over
determinations of dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2), (4) and (6) but leaves concurrent
jurisdiction with state court under all other paragraphs of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)).
5
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or forfeitures” including “traditional fines.” 	Kelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 51. 	Black’s
Law Dictionary defines a sanction as a “[p]enalty or coercive measure that results
from failure to comply with a rule, law or order.” 	Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed.
(2004). The Superior Court sanctioned Plaintiff pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11
for his “repeated violations” of that Rule. 	King, supra, No. 91-26258 at 25. 	The
April 1992 Order requires Plaintiff to pay $3,000 and refers to it as a “Rule 11
fine.” Id. at 28. Plainly, the monetary sanction against Plaintiff is a “fine, penalty,
or forfeiture” within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
B. 	Payable to and for the Benefit of a Governmental Unit
The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]t seems likely that the limitation of
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) to fines assessed ‘for the benefit of a governmental unit’
was intended to prevent application of that subsection to wholly private penalties
such as punitive damages.” Kelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 51, n. 13. Here, the $3,000
sanction is owed to a governmental unit for Plaintiff’s abuse of Court procedure.
The Court, established by Congress in 1970,5 is a governmental unit within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (27) (2009).6 The
Court’s Order requires Plaintiff to “pay a sanction of $3,000.00 to the Clerk of the
Court.” King, supra, No. 91-26258 at 28. Accordingly, the $3,000 sanction is “to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit.”7
5 District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, P.L. 91-358.
6 11 U.S.C. 101 (27) states in full: “The term ‘governmental unit’ means United States; State;
Commonwealth; 	District; 	Territory; 	municipality; 	foreign 	state; 	department, 	agency, 	or
instrumentality of the United States (but not a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a
case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign
state; or other foreign or domestic government.” 	The Court, established by Congress, is an
instrumentality of the United States.
7 Monies received by the Court are deposited in the Treasury of the United States or in the Crime
Victims Fund. See D.C. Code § 1-204.50 (2001). Regardless of whether any part of the $3,000
6
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C. 	Compensation for Actual Pecuniary Loss
Finally, the debt must not be “compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” 11
U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). In Kelly v. Robinson, the Supreme Court held that whether a
fine subject to 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) was penal or compensatory depended on
the state’s goals in imposing the fine and the circumstances under which it was
imposed. 	479 U.S. at 52. 	Where a fine arises out of “the State's interests in
rehabilitation 	and 	punishment,” 	such 	a 	fine 	is 	penal 	and, 	therefore,
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	Id. 	Accordingly, whether the
$3,000 sanction against Plaintiff is compensation for actual pecuniary loss within
the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) depends on the Court’s goals in imposing
the sanction and the circumstances under which it was imposed. Id.; See also In
re Gedeon 31 B.R. 942 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (“The circumstances must be
looked at to determine the true nature [of the fine].”) (citations omitted).
The 	Court 	looks 	to 	the 	April 	1992 	Order 	which 	describes 	at 	length
Plaintiff’s conduct and the Court’s reasons for sanctioning Plaintiff. 	See King,
supra, case no. 91-26258. 	The Court sanctioned Plaintiff under Rule 11 for
conducting 	frivolous 	litigation 	and 	for 	bringing 	litigation 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
harassment. 	Id. at 2, 20. 	Rule 11 (b) provides that, upon presentation to the
Court, a party certifies that its pleading, motion, or other filing:
sanction – should Plaintiff ever pay it – would be deposited into the Crime Victims Fund, there is
no question that the fine is “payable to” the Clerk of the Court. Since the Clerk of the Court would
receive the payment in his/her official capacity as a representative of the Court, the fine is
payable to a governmental unit. Furthermore, even if the entire fine was paid and deposited in
the Crime Victims Fund, fines assessed from the State’s interest in rehabilitation and punishment
and/or from a court’s interest in upholding the dignity of the court are “for the benefit of” a
governmental unit. See Kelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 53; see also pages 12-17, infra.
7
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(1) 	is 	not 	being 	presented 	for 	any 	improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) 	the 	claims, 	defenses, 	and 	other 	legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or
by 	a 	nonfrivolous 	argument 	for 	the 	extension,
modification, 	or 	reversal 	of 	existing 	law 	or 	the
establishment of new law;
(3) 	the allegations and other factual contentions
have 	evidentiary 	support 	or, 	if 	specifically 	so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable 	opportunity 	for 	further 	investigation 	or
discovery; and
(4) 	the 	denials 	of 	factual 	contentions 	are
warranted 	on 	the 	evidence 	or, 	if 	specifically 	so
identified, 	are 	reasonably 	based 	on 	a 	lack 	of
information or belief.
Rule 11 (b). 	Rule 11 (c) provides that if the Court determines that Rule 11 (b)
has been violated, the Court may impose sanctions on the violating party that
“shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Rule 11 (c), (c)(2). Thus, in its
April 1992 Order, the Court was obligated under Rule 11 to sanction Plaintiff with
the limited goal of deterring him from committing future violations.
The Court makes clear that the sanctions are to deter Plaintiff from filing
frivolous and harassing litigation. 	The April 1992 Order states that the Court
sanctioned Plaintiff for “harass[ing] and victimiz[ing]” many individuals “by forcing
them to continually appear in court and defend themselves against meritless
claims.” King, supra, case no. 91-26258 at 21. 	The “vast majority, if not all” of
Plaintiff’s cases were frivolous. 	Id. at 20. 	Plaintiff was “fabricat[ing] claims he
cannot possible substantiate,” “giving untruthful earnings figures in his affidavits,”
and “disrupting the entire courthouse.” Id. at 21, 22-23, 27. 	As a result of
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Plaintiff’s conduct, there were “severe consequences” for both civil and criminal
divisions of the Court. Id. at 21.
The April 1992 Order shows careful consideration in choosing the $3,000
sanction to deter Plaintiff’s abuse of the judicial system and harassment of the
public. 	“In fashioning a sanction, the Court seeks to prevent Mr. Sindram from
any further unwarranted harassment of individuals in the population at large, and
abuse of the procedures and personnel of the District of Columbia Superior
Court.” 	Id. at 26. 	The Court further stated that fashioning the sanctions for
Plaintiff was “a difficult task in light of the fact that Mr. Sindram has been
sanctioned before in this court with no apparent effect . . .” 	Id. 	Indeed, at the
time of the April 1992 Order, Plaintiff had also exhausted the patience of the
Supreme Court of the United States, which had directed its Clerk to reject all
petitions for an extraordinary writ filed by Plaintiff without the docketing fee. 	See
In re Michael Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991).8 Here, the Court’s $3,000
sanction was a choice made by balancing “Mr. Sindram’s right to access to the
court against the serious damage he has already done and no doubt would
continue to do if his actions are permitted to continue without restriction.” 	King,
No. 91-26258 at 26.
Nowhere in the April 1992 Order does the Court state that the $3,000
sanction is compensatory. 	To the contrary, the Court’s goal was a sanction that
8 The Court closely followed the Supreme Court in its reasoning for sanctioning Plaintiff and in its
choice of sanction. The Supreme Court held that because Plaintiff’s filings were “frivolous and
abusive,” it was “appropriate to deny in forma pauperis status to petitioner in this and all future
petitions for extraordinary relief.” 	In re Michael Sindram, 498 U.S. at 179, 180. 	Although the
Supreme Court did not impose a monetary fine on Plaintiff, its requirement that Plaintiff pay a
docketing fee in all future cases served as a basis for this Court’s denial of in forma pauperis
status to Plaintiff in all future cases. See id.; King, No. 91-26258 at 27.
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“would be most effective [at deterring Plaintiff’s abusive conduct] and at the same
time just.” Id. at 25; see Kelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 52. According to the April 1992
Order, therefore, the Court’s goals in imposing the $3,000 sanction and the
circumstances under which it was imposed make it clear that the sanction arose
out of the Court’s interests in rehabilitation and punishment. The $3,000 sanction
is thus penal, and not compensatory, and is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §
523 (a)(7). See id.
D. 	Dischargeability of Court-Imposed Fines in Other Jurisdictions
The April 1992 Order clearly identifies the Court’s goals in imposing the
$3,000 sanction and the circumstances under which the sanction was imposed.
The 	Court, 	however, 	looks 	to 	how 	other 	jurisdictions 	have 	determined 	the
character of a fine imposed for a party’s failure to obey court orders and
procedures.
1. 	Sanctions Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
Sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 that are payable to and for the benefit
of a governmental unit are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	See
In re Wood, 167 B.R. 83, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994), aff’d 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir.
1995). 	The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated that “[b]ecause the
Superior Court rule is virtually identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. . . we may consider
federal cases interpreting the federal rule as ‘persuasive authority in interpreting
[the local rule].’”9 Stansel v. American Sec. Bank, 547 A.2d 990, 996 n.8 (D.C.
1988) (quoting Vale Prop., Inc. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 471 A.2d 11, 13 n.3
9 Today, Rule 11 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 are identical except for stylistic differences. See Rule
11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Accordingly, we look to federal cases interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 as
persuasive authority.
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(D.C. 1981)). 	As noted, Plaintiff was sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11. 	King, No.
91-26258 at 27.
The debtor in Wood had been sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for
filing frivolous lawsuits. Wood, 167 B.R. 83, 83-84. Because the sanctions were
payable 	to 	a 	private 	attorney 	as 	compensation 	for 	the 	attorney’s 	fees 	in
defending those frivolous lawsuits, however, the federal bankruptcy court held
the debt to be dischargeable. 	Id. at 88-89. 	Still, the federal bankruptcy court
stated that the “central purpose [of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11] is to deter frivolous
lawsuits” and that “one of the purposes for which the sanction was awarded was
to uphold the dignity of the legal process in federal court as well as the court
itself.” 	Id. 	It was only because the sanctions failed the test of being “payable to
and for the benefit of a governmental unit” that 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) did not
apply. 	Id. at 88-89. 	Thus, under Wood, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions that are
payable to a governmental unit and do not reimburse a private individual’s
attorney’s fees would be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
Applying Wood to this case, it is clear that the $3,000 sanction against
Plaintiff is to deter frivolous lawsuits and to uphold the dignity of the Court. 	See
King, No. 91-26258 at 21-27. 	Accordingly, because the sanction is payable to a
governmental unit, the $3,000 sanction would be nondischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
2. 	Sanctions to Deter Conduct
State and bankruptcy courts have varying approaches in determining
dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	At least one court has found
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sanctions 	imposed 	pursuant 	to 	its 	rules 	of 	civil 	procedure 	to 	be 	per 	se
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	See In re McIntyre, 96 B.R. 70,
71 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989) (“Can a Rule 9011 sanction [which corresponds to a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanction] be discharged [because 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) does
not apply]? This Court must answer that question with a resounding ‘NO’! To
allow the offending party to discharge a Rule 9011 sanction would totally defeat,
destroy, and emasculate its purpose.”).
Other 	courts 	have 	held 	that 	court-imposed 	sanctions 	are
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) where they were imposed with
the intent to deter future misconduct. See In re Taite, No. LA 85-09892-LF, 1987
Bankr. LEXIS 2447 at *10 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 3, 1987); NLRB v. Fogerty (In
re Fogerty), 204 B.R. 956, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996). 	In Taite, the debtors
sought discharge of three debts: (1) $10,000 in sanctions for filing a frivolous
appeal imposed by the California Court of Appeals under its rules of civil
procedure; (2) $750,000 in civil penalties by judgment of a California trial court;
and (3) $256,654 in restitution payments by judgment of a California trial court.
In re Taite, supra, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2447 at *11. 	The sanctions and penalties
were paid to governmental units. 	Id. The federal bankruptcy court determined
that the $10,000 in sanctions were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523
(a)(7) because they were awarded to “discourage the Debtors and others from
similar conduct in the future.” 	Id. at *30. 	The federal bankruptcy court further
held that the civil penalties were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7)
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because the “civil penalties imposed against the defendant are intended to be
punitive.” Id. at *13.10
In NLRB v. Fogerty, a federal bankruptcy court determined that a $50,000
fine for contempt of court, which was levied for non-compliance with court orders,
was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	204 B.R. at 962. 	The
Seventh Circuit had fined the debtor $50,000 for contempt of court and ordered
the debtor to pay attorney’s fees to the other party. 	Id. 	Both fees and fine were
owed to a governmental unit. 	Id. 	The bankruptcy court held that the attorney’s
fees 	were 	compensatory 	and, 	therefore, 	dischargeable. 	Id. 	Because 	the
Seventh Circuit imposed the $50,000 fine “to assure against further refusals to
comply with the Court's Judgment and this Contempt Adjudication,” however, it
was “penal in nature” and therefore nondischargeable under U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
Id.
Here, the $3,000 sanction was to “prevent [Plaintiff] from any further
unwarranted harassment of individuals in the population at large, and abuse of
the procedures and personnel of [the Court].” 	King, No. 91-26258 at 26. 	The
Court’s $3,000 sanction was also to assure against future refusals to comply with
the Court’s judgments and orders, as Plaintiff had done in previous cases. King,
No. 91-26258 at 25. 	Applying the approach taken by the Taite and Fogerty
courts, the $3,000 sanction against Plaintiff would be nondischargeable under
U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) because it was imposed to deter future misconduct. 	See In
10 The federal bankruptcy court in that case declined, however, to find the $256,654 in restitution
payments nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) because the restitution is “primarily
intended to compensate victims for their losses.” Taite, supra, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2447 at *25
(emphasis in the original).
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re Taite, supra, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2447 at *30; In re Fogerty, supra, 204 B.R. at
962.
3. 	Sanctions to Uphold the Dignity of the Court
Some jurisdictions have held sanctions to be nondischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) where such sanctions are imposed to “uphold the dignity of
the court.” See In re Marini, 28 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). 	These
sanctions are nondischargeable regardless of the payee. Id.
The debtor in Marini was fined $2,000 in state court for violating a
temporary restraining order. Id. at 263. The state court had ordered a stipulation
in which the parties would settle their claims for a payment by the debtor-violator
of a sum of money, including the $2,000 fine, to the victim. 	Id. 	Although the
$2,000 fine was payable to the victim, the federal bankruptcy court held that the
sanction was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) because it “can
only be labeled as a measure to punish the defendant for disobeying the court
ordered injunction” and was “imposed to uphold the dignity of the court.” 	Id. at
265.11 Thus, under Marini, a fine is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss
where it is imposed to uphold the dignity of the court. Id. at 265-266.12
Other 	courts 	have 	followed 	Marini’s 	approach 	in 	determining 	the
dischargeability of a court fine. See In re Gedeon, 31 B.R. 942 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1983); In re Winn, 92 B.R. 938 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). In Gedeon, a state court
11 The bankruptcy court, in determining that the $2,000 fine was nondischargeable, pointed to
evidence that distinguished the fine from the money used to settle the claims, i.e., the $2,000 was
labeled as a fine in the settlement agreement and was called a fine by the court. See In re Manini,
28. B.R. at 263.
12 In determining whether the fine is to uphold the dignity of the court, the court in Manini looked
at the “totality of the record.” Id. at 265.
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had imposed a civil fine of $500 per day on the debtor for every day the debtor
failed to comply with the court’s order to turn over custody of his children to his
ex-wife. 	In re Gedeon, supra, 31 B.R. at 946. The state court then imposed a
second fine of $75,000 on the debtor for failure to make additional payments that
included attorney’s fees. 	Id. 	Both fines were payable to the ex-wife. 	Id. 	Citing
to 	Marini, 	the 	federal 	bankruptcy 	court 	found 	the 	$500 	daily 	fine
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	Id. 	The court reasoned that
because the fine was meant to coerce a defendant to obey a court order, “[which]
would seem to be imposed to uphold the dignity of the court, even though the
fine is payable to a plaintiff.” Id.
Like the debtor in Gedeon, the debtor in Winn was fined $500 per day for
failing to obey a state court order to turn over equipment and make payments to
another party. In re Winn, supra, 92 B.R. at 939. Following Gedeon, the federal
bankruptcy court in Winn stated that because the fine was imposed “as a penalty
to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court,” the fine was nondischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. 523 (a)(7). Id. at 939-40.
The Court is aware of only one court which followed the Marini court’s
approach yet discharged a debt imposed to uphold the dignity of the court. 	See
In re Corbly, 61 B.R. 851 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986), rev’d on reconsideration, In re
Corbly 149 B.R. 125, 127-28 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992). 	The Corbly court originally
held that a $3,000 court-imposed fine was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
523 (a)(7) because it “was imposed to uphold the dignity of the state court.” In re
Corbly, supra, 61 B.R. at 857. 	Six years later, the Corbly court reversed itself to
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find the debt dischargeable, but only because the debt was more than three
years old. In re Corbly 149 B.R. at 127-28.
The Corbly court’s reasoning for reversal, however, is premised on an
interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) that is without support or supporters.
Section 523 (a)(7) provides, in whole, that a debt is nondischargeable:
to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other
than a tax penalty--
(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in
paragraph (1) of this subsection; or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event
that occurred before three years before the date of the
filing of the petition;
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	The debtor in Corbly, in a motion for reconsideration,
argued that subsection (B) of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) should be interpreted to
mean that all debts imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred
three years before a debtor’s petition for discharge are dischargeable. 	In re
Corbly, supra, 149 B.R. at 126. 	Reversing its order from six years previous, the
Corbly court agreed with the debtor and interpreted subsection (B) to apply to all
debts rather than only to tax penalties. 	Id. at 127. 	Because the $3,000 sanction
had 	been 	imposed 	more 	than 	three 	years 	before 	the 	debtor’s 	petition 	for
discharge, the Corbly court discharged the $3,000 debt. Id.
No 	court, 	however, 	has 	followed 	the 	Corbly 	court’s 	reasoning 	on
reconsideration. 	See In re Jimmo, 204 B.R. 655, 658 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997)
(“Corbly apparently stands alone, as all other courts which have published rulings
on this issue have found that § 523 (a)(7)(B) applies only to tax fines, penalties
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and forfeitures.”). 	Other courts, meanwhile, have cited approvingly to the Corbly
court’s reasoning in its original decision finding the $3,000 nondischargeable or
have disagreed with or ignored the reasoning in the court’s reversal. 	See, e.g.,
id.; see also In re Wood, supra, 167 B.R. at 88; In re Bundick 303 B.R. 90, 112
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003); In re Kraft, 197 B.R. 660, 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996).
The Court is persuaded by the Corbly court’s reasoning in its original
decision. 	The plain meaning of the statute clearly provides that subsection (B)’s
three-year limit applies only to tax penalties. 	See United States v. Ron Pair
Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (holding that courts must look to the plain
meaning of the bankruptcy statute). 	Accordingly, in applying the Marini court’s
approach to this case, the Court does not consider when the $3,000 sanction
was imposed against Plaintiff.
In this case, the Court’s $3,000 sanction against Plaintiff was imposed so
that “[Plaintiff’s] abuse and harassment of the public through the filing of civil
lawsuits will be restricted.” 	King, No. 91-26258 at 2. 	The April 1992 Order
described a case prosecuted by Plaintiff that “exemplifie[d] how parties can be
worn down by multiple motions and court appearances in a small claims system
that is abused by a chronic litigant.” 	Id. at 13. 	Moreover, previous attempts to
sanction Plaintiff and limit Plaintiff’s frivolous filings had had little effect. Id. at 25.
It is clear, then, that the Court imposed the $3,000 sanction to uphold the dignity
of the courts. 	Accordingly, under the Marini approach, the Court’s $3,000
sanction against Plaintiff would be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523 (a)(7).
See In re Marini, supra, 28. B.R. at 265.
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4. 	Sanctions for Attorney Misconduct
Finally, 	courts 	have 	held 	that 	sanctions 	for 	attorney 	misconduct 	are
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) because their purpose is to deter
future bad behavior and because the governmental unit payee does not depend
on the monetary sanctions. 	See In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488 (Bankr. D. Id.
1993); see also In re Richmond, 351 B.R. 6 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006).
In Williams, the Idaho Supreme Court sanctioned an attorney debtor and
ordered him to pay $10,516.17 to the Idaho State Bar for the costs of conducting
disciplinary proceedings against him. 	The federal bankruptcy court held that the
award was not compensatory because “the bar does not depend upon such
reimbursement awards in disciplinary actions for its financial vitality.” 	Williams,
supra, 158 B.R. at 491. 	Accordingly, under Williams, 	the purpose of the
sanctions and the financial independence of the governmental unit determines
whether the sanction is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
The court in Richmond followed the logic of the Williams court. 	In
Richmond, an attorney debtor owed sanctions equal to the costs of investigating
his professional wrongdoing to the New Hampshire Supreme Court Professional
Conduct Committee (the “Committee”). 	Richmond, 351 B.R. at 8. 	Although the
costs were measured by the expenses incurred by the Committee, the court held
that the costs were “not an actual pecuniary loss to the state” because the
Committee was carrying out its governmental function when it investigated the
attorney debtor. 	Id. at 13. 	Furthermore, the bankruptcy court explained that,
rather than being compensatory:
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the 	imposition 	of 	costs 	is 	intended 	to 	further 	the
primary purposes of the disciplinary system: to deter
future misconduct and to convey to the public the
message that the practice of law in New Hampshire is
closely scrutinized so as to maintain public confidence
in the bar and preserve the integrity of the legal
profession.
Id. at 14. 	Noting that “strong public policy reasons” exist for not discharging the
debt, the federal bankruptcy court found the debt to be nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). Id.
Plaintiff is not and has never been an attorney, nor has the District of
Columbia Bar ever investigated Plaintiff’s conduct. 	The Williams and Richmond
decisions, however, reinforce the principle that a court’s purpose in imposing a
fine is highly determinative of its character.13 Fines for misconduct in the judicial
process are imposed “to deter future misconduct” and to restore the integrity of
the judicial system. 	Id. 	Accordingly, such fines are not compensatory, and,
therefore, are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
III. 	“Law of the Case”
Plaintiff argues that the “[l]aw of the case” is the Honorable Bruce S.
Mencher’s September 23, 2008 Order in Sindram v. Jamison Condominium
Assoc., supra, staying Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order pending
resolution of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy. 	(Pl.’s Mot. 2.) 	This argument has no merit.
Not only is Jamison Condominium Assoc. a separate case but the Court (the
Honorable 	Anita 	Josey-Herring 	presiding) 	dismissed 	Jamison 	Condominium
13 Williams and Richmond also look to the financial independence of the governmental unit. The
Court does not depend on monetary sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 for its financial
viability. See pages 6-7, note 7, infra, for an explanation of where fines payable to the Clerk of
the Court are deposited.
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Assoc. for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s April 1992 Order. 	See
Sindram v. Jamison Condominium Assoc., supra, No. 08-6673B.
CONCLUSION
The $3,000 sanction is a fine and is payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	See Kelly,
supra, 479 U.S. at 51. 	The Superior Court imposed a $3,000 sanction against
Plaintiff under Rule 11 for Plaintiff’s abuse of court procedure and personnel and
harassment of the public. King, No. 91-26258 at 26. As required by Rule 11, the
Superior Court imposed the $3,000 sanction with the limited goal of deterring
Plaintiff from future frivolous litigation and harassment of the public. 	While
federal, bankruptcy, and state courts do not follow a single approach to the
dischargeability of court-imposed fines, all courts converge in finding that fines
imposed for violations of court orders and procedures are not compensation for
pecuniary loss within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). 	See, e.g., Wood,
supra, 167 B.R. 83, 87; see also Taite, supra, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2447 at *13,
Marini, supra, 28 B.R. at 265. 	Therefore, the $3,000 sanction imposed by the
Superior Court in its April 1992 Order is a debt that is nondischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7).
Accordingly, it is on this 1st day of June, 2009, hereby
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ORDERED that Plaintiff’s $3,000 sanction is held nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7). It is
FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that, 	because 	Plaintiff’s 	$3,000 	debt 	is
nondischargeable, Plaintiff’s Motion for Compliance with Discharge of Debtor is
DENIED.
Stephanie Duncan-Peters
Associate Judge
(Signed in Chambers)
Copies mailed to:
Michael Sindram
6645 Georgia Ave., N.W. #306
Washington, D.C. 20012
Margo Thorne
6817 Georgia Ave NW #203
Washington, D.C. 20012
Vincent Thorne
6817 Georgia Ave NW #203
Washington, D.C. 20012
Copies e-served on:
Duane B. Delaney
Clerk of the Court
Derrick Monroe,
Branch Chief, Civil Actions Branch
Natalie Byrd
Court Clerk, Judge-in-Chambers
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