Michael Joseph Sindram

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In re
MICHAEL JOSEPH SINDRAM,
Debtor.
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Case No. 08-00559
(Chapter 7)
Not for Publication in
West’s Bankruptcy Reporter
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE MOTION TO
APPOINT COUNSEL TO ADDRESS ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
AUTOMATIC STAY BY SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The debtor Sindram has filed a Motion for Appointment of
Counsel in Core Adversary Proceeding against Superior Court [of
the] District Of Columbia for Having Violated Bankruptcy Code
(Dkt. No. 203), and as requested by this court, has supplemented
the Motion, in a Supplemental Motion (Dkt. No. 210), that more
fully describes the conduct of the Superior Court that is at
issue. 	Sindram seeks to have counsel appointed to assist him in
pursuing an adversary proceeding against the Superior Court with
respect to its continued enforcement of an order entered on April
28, 1992. 	His motion also seeks alternative relief.
I
The Superior Court order of April 28, 1992, long preceding
The document below is hereby signed.
Signed: August 05, 2009.
_____________________________
S. Martin Teel, Jr.
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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Sindram’s bankruptcy case, directed Sindram to pay to the Clerk
of the Superior Court $3,000.00 as a fine under Rule 11 of the
Superior Court’s Rules (the analog of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). 	The
order further enjoined Sindram from filing any new cases against
anybody in the Superior Court in a pro se capacity until he paid
the fine. 	Finally, the order prohibited Sindram, even if he paid
the $3,000.00 fine, from proceeding in forma pauperis in any of
his future or present cases “unless he has already been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis in that case,” and directed
that unless the court granted Sindram leave to proceed in forma
pauperis with respect to the filing of a paper, the Clerk of the
Superior Court was not to accept the paper for filing if Sindram
had not paid the required filing fees relating to the paper.
II
Sindram contends that the obligation to pay the $3,000.00
fine has been discharged by his discharge in this bankruptcy
case. 	He first raised that contention in a motion filed in the
Superior Court, and in the course of the proceedings on that
motion, placed reliance on In re Corbly, 149 B.R. 125 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1992), which erroneously held that § 523(a)(7)(B) applies
to all penalties and fines, not just to tax penalties, in support
of his contention. 	The Superior Court rejected that contention
on June 1, 2009, in a careful and well-reasoned decision.
Sindram wants to have a second bite at the apple by litigating
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the issue in this court, and seeks the appointment of counsel to
assist him in that endeavor.
The appointment of counsel is within the discretion of the
court. 	Counsel will not be appointed when it appears that the
proposed litigation is plainly meritless. 	Even if the Superior
Court’s decision were not a bar against relitigation of the issue
in this court, I agree fully with the decision of the Superior
Court. 	Accordingly, I will not appoint counsel to represent
Sindram with respect to the proposed litigation to challenge the
conduct of the Superior Court.
III
Sindram complains that he has not been allowed by the Clerk
of the Superior Court to pursue an appeal of the June 1, 2009,
decision of the Superior Court in forma pauperis. 	Nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code barred the Superior Court from directing its
clerk’s office to refuse to let Sindram file papers without
paying required fees (unless a judge of the Superior Court
granted Sindram leave beforehand to proceed in forma pauperis).
It is doubtful that Sindram is being deprived of a “license,
permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant” within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 525(a), as that list is limited to
obtaining the right to engage in some endeavor, see Ayes v. U.S.
Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 104, (4th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 486, 169 L. Ed. 2d 338 (2007); In Re Goldrich,
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771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985) (credit guarantee under a statute
providing for issuance of such guarantees was not a “license,
permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant”), and even if
pursuing litigation is such an endeavor, the Superior Court is
not barring Sindram from pursuing matters in that court as he has
the same permission to file an appeal in any case there as anyone
else upon paying the related fees. 	In any event, § 525(a) does
not apply because the Superior Court has not barred its clerk’s
office from allowing Sindram to file papers in forma pauperis
(without a judge having authorized such in forma pauperis filing)
on the ground, as required for § 525(a) to apply, that he “has
been a debtor under [the Bankruptcy Code] . . ., has been
insolvent before the commencement of the [bankruptcy case], or
during the [bankruptcy] case . . ., or has not paid a debt that
is dischargeable in the case . . . .” 	The Superior Court’s
refusal to let Sindram pursue his appeal in forma pauperis is not
a basis for relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
IV
Finally, Sindram notes that he wants to contest in the
Superior Court the allegedly inflated and bogus assessments
asserted against him by the Jamison Condominium Association in a
letter of June 8, 2009, and that his indigency and the Superior
Court’s bar against his proceeding in forma pauperis is
preventing him from attacking those assessments in the Superior
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Court. 	He requests that this Court hold in abeyance Jamison
Condominium Association’s efforts to enforce the assessments
pending resolution of a proceeding he has brought against the
Association regarding alleged violations of the automatic stay
based on certain other alleged conduct. 	Even if the Association
were found to have violated the automatic stay, the Bankruptcy
Code does not provide a remedy of this court’s enjoining the
Association from engaging in ongoing collection activity that is
not alleged to violate the automatic stay or the discharge
injunction.
Of course, success by Sindram in showing that there was a
violation of the automatic stay might give rise to a monetary
award against the Association, and a defense of setoff against
its claim, but that is not a matter that can be addressed as
within the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. 	This is
because the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to
matters arising under the Bankruptcy Code, arising in a
bankruptcy case, or related to a bankruptcy case. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b). 	None of those categories of jurisdiction exist here
with respect to assertion of the defense of setoff as a basis for
injunctive relief:
• 	The Bankruptcy Code creates no right to bar collection
not prohibited by the automatic stay or discharge
injunction, and any injunction based on the right of
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1 	If a court were to reach the merits of the request for
injunctive relief based on an assertion of the defense of setoff,
the court would likely treat the defense of setoff as premature
at this juncture because Sindram has not yet obtained a judgment
against the Association for its alleged misconduct of violating
the automatic stay, and thus would deny the request for
injunctive relief.
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setoff does not arise under the Bankruptcy Code.
Although Sindram would have a right to assert any
recovery against the Association as a defense by way of
setoff against the amounts the Association is owed,
this is not the court in which Sindram should assert
any setoff defense. 1
• 	The claim for injunctive relief arises with respect to
conduct unrelated to the case, and cannot be treated as
“arising in” the bankruptcy case. “Arising in” matters
are limited to those claims that could not have any
existence outside of bankruptcy. 	Although the request
for injunctive relief depends on establishing a
violation of the automatic stay, Sindram is free
outside of the bankruptcy case to rely on any claim he
recovers for violation of the automatic stay as a
setoff defense against the Association’s claims.
• 	The Association’s pursuit of its allegedly inflated and
bogus claims would have no impact on the administration
of the estate (as the bankruptcy trustee has fully
administered the bankruptcy estate), and the
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Association’s collection activity thus is not related
to the case.
In any event, Sindram has not requested injunctive relief by way
of a proceeding against the Association (his motion was against
the Superior Court) and has not sought injunctive relief by way
of an adversary proceeding complaint as required by Rule 7001 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
V
In accordance with the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that the Motion and the Supplemental Motion (Dkt.
Nos. 203 and 210) are DENIED.
[Signed and dated above.]
Copies to:
Debtor; Chapter 7 trustee; Office of the United States Trustee;
Hon. Stephanie Duncan-Peters
Superior Court for the District of Columbia
500 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
George R. Pitts
Katherine Thomas
Dickstein Shapiro, LLP
1825 Eye Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
Craig A. Parker, Esq.
110 N. Washington St.
Ste. 500
Rockville, MD 20850
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