Alpine PCS, Inc.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In re
ALPINE PCS, INC,
Debtor.
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)
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Case No. 08-00543
(Chapter 11)
Not for Publication in
West’s Bankruptcy Reporter
MEMORANDUM DECISION SUPPLEMENTING ORAL DECISION RE
DEBTOR’S EMERGENCY MOTIONS TO ENFORCE THE AUTOMATIC STAY
This decision addresses the emergency motions of the debtor,
Alpine PCS, Inc. (“Alpine”), for enforcement against the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) of the automatic stay. 	The
first motion (Docket Entry (“DE”) No. 10) sought relief on an
interim basis, and the second (DE No. 11) sought relief on a
final basis.
I held a hearing on the motions on August 20, 2008, and
issued an oral decision setting forth my grounds for denying the
interim motion on August 21, 2008, and I adopt that oral decision
as a basis for denying the second motion as well. 	The oral
decision did not expressly address the parties’ supplemental
filings of August 20 and 21, 2008, and this Memorandum Decision
addresses the arguments those filings raised, and supplements the
The Memorandum Decision below is hereby signed.
Dated: October 10, 2008.
_____________________________
S. Martin Teel, Jr.
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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oral decision.
I
On August 12, 2008 (the “Petition Date”) Alpine filed its
petition commencing this bankruptcy case. 	In an auction that
closed in 1996, Alpine had purchased two licenses issued by the
FCC (the “Licenses”) to use certain radio spectrum to provide
wireless telecommunications services, agreeing to pay for the
purchases in installments. 	Taking the position that the Licenses
had automatically terminated before the Petition Date for non-
payment of installments, the FCC has conducted an auction to sell
the same radio spectrum. 	Alpine’s motions seek a declaration
that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) bars the auction.
As explained below, the Licenses were automatically canceled
prior to the Petition Date, and thus they are not part of
Alpine’s bankruptcy estate, and the auctioning of the radio
spectrum does not constitute an act to collect the debt owed by
Alpine to the FCC. 	Consequently, § 362(a) does not bar the FCC
from auctioning the rights to use the radio spectrum previously
covered by the Licenses.
II
After it acquired the Licenses, Alpine began to have
difficulty in making required installment payments, and on July
31, 2002, it filed a Request for Waiver with the FCC (“Waiver
Request”), seeking to extend the time for it to resume making
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installment payments and to waive provisions for automatic
cancellation of the Licenses that would otherwise arise on August
1, 2002, based on non-payment. 	On January 29, 2007, the FCC
denied Alpine’s Waiver Request. 	In re Alpine PCS, Inc., 22 FCC
Rcd. 1492 (Jan. 29, 2007) (the “Automatic Cancellation Order”) ¶
1. 	On February 28, 2007, Alpine filed a Petition for
Reconsideration and a motion for stay of the Automatic
Cancellation Order, and those matters are still pending before
the FCC.
Without awaiting a disposition of the Petition for
Reconsideration, and taking the position that Alpine’s Licenses
had automatically canceled on August 1, 2002, the FCC proceeded
on April 4, 2008, to announce a public auction of various
licenses, including licenses for the spectrum that had been
covered by Alpine’s Licenses. 	On April 18, 2008, Alpine filed a
request to stay the auction. 	On July 7, 2008, the FCC issued an
order denying the stay request. 	The auction began on August 13,
2008, the day after Alpine commenced this bankruptcy case.
The Licenses expressly “conditioned [the Licenses’ existence]
upon the full and timely payment of all monies due pursuant to
Sections 1.2110 and 24.711 of the [FCC’s] Rules and the terms of
the Commission’s installment plan as set forth in the Note and
Security Agreement executed by the Licensee.”
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III
Alpine’s Licenses automatically canceled on August 1, 2002,
for the reasons that follow. 	The Licenses plainly stated that
“[f]ailure to comply with this condition will result in automatic
cancellation of this authorization.” 	Likewise, this condition to
the Licenses’ existence was reiterated in the Security Agreements
provided by Alpine to the FCC. 	Security Agreement ¶ 8(a) (in the
event of default, “the License shall be automatically canceled
pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110”). 	See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)
(2001) (licenses automatically cancel if not paid prior to
expiration of grace period).
Under the terms of the Licenses, Alpine’s notes to the FCC
and the FCC’s rules, installment payments on Alpine’s two notes
were due on January 31, 2002. 	Alpine failed to make these
payments by that date. 	Automatic Cancellation Order ¶ 8. From
that date, under applicable FCC regulations, Alpine was
automatically given two quarterly grace periods to make these
installment payments. 	47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2110(g)(4)(i) and (ii).
The grace periods applicable to Alpine thus expired two calendar
quarters later, at the end of July 2002. 	Alpine did not make the
overdue installment payment by then. 	Alpine was thus in default
on its obligations to the FCC as of August 1, 2002, and the
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1 	Alpine has not challenged the FCC’s representation that,
consistent with the plain language of the regulations, the FCC
has long interpreted its regulations to mean that FCC licenses
automatically cancel for non-payment. 	See In the Matter of
Requests for Extension of the Commission's Initial Non-
Delinquency Period For C and F Block Installment Payments, WT
Docket No. 97-82, Order, FCC 98-290, 13 FCC Rcd. 22071, 14
Communications Reg. (P & F) 172, 1998 WL 754808 (October 29,
1998) (finding that licensees failing to make payment deadlines
were subject to automatic cancellation of the licenses); In the
Matter of Request for Extension of the Commission's Initial Non-
Delinquency Period for C and F Block Installment Payments, WT
Docket No. 97-82, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 99-62, 14 FCC
Rcd. 6080, 1999 WL 181805 (April 2, 1999) (affirming FCC's
determination that licenses will automatically cancel if payment
deadline missed).
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Licenses automatically canceled, 1 unless the Waiver Request
suspended those obligations. 	It did not.
The relevant default provisions from each of the Notes
provide as follows:
A default under this Note (“Event of Default”) shall
occur upon any or all of the following: a. non-payment
by Maker of any Principal or Interest on the due date
as specified hereinabove if the Maker remains
delinquent for more than 90 days and (1) Maker has not
submitted a request, in writing, for a grace period or
extension of payments, if any such grace period or
extension of payments is provided for in the
then-applicable orders and regulations of the
Commission; or (2) Maker has submitted a request, in
writing, for a grace period or extension of payments,
if any such grace period or extension of payments is
provided for in the then-applicable orders and
regulations of the Commission, and following the
expiration of the grant of such grace period or
extension or upon denial of such a request for a grace
period or extension, Maker has not resumed payments of
Interest and Principal in accordance with the terms of
this Note . . . .
Alpine contends that its Waiver Request, consistent with the
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express terms of the Notes, constituted a timely written request
for an “extension of payments” of its debt obligations to the
FCC, and thus there was no Event of Default under the Notes and
cannot be one pending final adjudication of Alpine’s Waiver
Request (as to which a Petition for Reconsideration is still
pending).
However, the quoted language from the Notes made clear that
a request for a grace period or an extension of payments would be
effective to prevent an Event of Default arising from a failure
timely to make payments only “if any such grace period or
extension of payments is provided for in the then-applicable
orders and regulations of the Commission.” 	The applicable
regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(g)(4)(iv), made clear that once
the two automatic grace periods (which ended as to Alpine on July
31, 2002) were past, and Alpine failed to bring its payments
current, “[it] shall be in default, its license shall
automatically cancel, and it will be subject to debt collection
procedures.” 	No mention is made in the regulations for any
extension of time for making payments beyond the two automatic
grace periods. 	In denying a stay of the auction, the FCC
explained:
Alpine’s argument fails . . . because it ignores the
immediately following language which makes clear that
with respect to “grace periods” the Notes are worded
conditionally -- “if any such grace period or extension
of payments is provided for in the then-applicable
orders and regulations of the Commission.” 	In 1997,
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the Commission eliminated individual grace period
requests, replacing them with automatic grace periods,
within which licensees could make installment payments
after the deadline for two quarters with a late fee.
If a licensee failed to pay within those two quarters,
as Alpine did, it would be in default and its licenses
would automatically cancel. 	Thus, when Alpine failed
to make payment by July 31, 2002, of its payment due on
January 31, 2002, plus applicable late fees, it
defaulted and the licenses cancelled automatically,
consistent with the provisions in the Note and the
Commission’s rules. 	Thus, Alpine’s claim that it has
not defaulted is without merit.
Alpine has failed to point to any FCC order or regulation that
provided for the granting of an additional grace period or
extension of payments. 	Although the FCC retained the authority
in appropriate circumstances to grant a waiver of its rules,
including the automatic cancellation rule, that authority is not
the same as an order or regulation providing for grace periods or
extensions of the time for payments. 	Accordingly, there was an
Event of Default that led to automatic cancellation of Alpine’s
Licenses as of August 1, 2002.
IV
Alpine contends that the auction constitutes an interference
with the Licenses that it would have in place were the FCC to
grant the Petition for Reconsideration and waive the automatic
cancellation rule. 	Alpine is confusing two different property
rights: first, its Licenses, which at this moment stand
automatically canceled, and, second, its rights pursuant to the
Petition for Reconsideration.
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Alpine’s right to pursue the pending Petition for
Reconsideration of the denial of its Waiver Request constitutes a
form of property that is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C.
§ 541. 	But the FCC has not interfered with Alpine’s Petition for
Reconsideration: it is permitting Alpine to litigate the Petition
for Reconsideration in the due course of the administrative
process. 	Although subject to Alpine’s pending Petition for
Reconsideration, the FCC’s order denying waiver of its automatic
cancellation rules is effective. 	See 47 C.F.R. § 1.102(b)(3);
see also Committee to Save WEAM v. FCC, 808 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). 	That is presumably why Alpine sought a stay (which
has been denied) of the order denying its Waiver Request.
Because the debtor’s rights pursuant to its Petition for
Reconsideration did not include a stay of the automatic
cancellation of the Licenses, the FCC’s conducting of the auction
of the Licenses does not constitute an interference with the
Petition for Reconsideration.
If Alpine were to succeed on its Petition for
Reconsideration and obtain a waiver of the automatic cancellation
rule, then its Licenses (if not sold by then) would no longer
stand canceled, and Alpine would be entitled to the protections
of 11 U.S.C. § 525 with respect to cancellation of the Licenses.
See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003). 	At
this juncture, however, there are no Licenses in place
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constituting property of the estate.
V
Because the Licenses were automatically canceled on August
1, 2002, they do not constitute property of the bankruptcy
estate. 	In re Personal Communications Network, Inc., 249 B.R.
233, 237 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000). 	See also Fed. Aviation Admin.
v. Gull Air, Inc. (In re Gull Air, Inc.), 890 F.2d 1255, 1262
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding that “when a debtor’s proprietary
interest [in that case, its interest in an FAA-issued license]
expires by operation of an express condition, the Bankruptcy Code
does not preserve that interest and prevent termination.”);
California v. Farmers Mkts., Inc. (In re Farmers Mkts., Inc.),
792 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir. 1986) (“the estate takes the
license subject to the restrictions imposed on the
debtor by [the license's governmental] transferor”).
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code, including section 525,
requires a different outcome for entities not yet in bankruptcy.
By its terms, section 525 applies to “a person that is or has
been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or
debtor has been associated . . . .” 	It does not purport to
restrict governmental action for entities that may in the future
become a debtor under the Code. 	The Supreme Court’s decision in
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FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293 (2003), does
not hold or even suggest otherwise. 	There, NextWave petitioned
for bankruptcy before the deadline by which its installment
payments needed to be made. 	See 537 U.S. at 297.
Moreover, Alpine’s pending Petition for Reconsideration
cannot itself be viewed as a license that is protected by § 525.
It is only a request that may lead to setting aside of the
cancellation of the licenses, and, as noted already, the FCC is
not interfering with the due processing of that request. 	If the
request becomes mooted by a completion of an auction sale of
licenses for the same spectrum, that will not amount to
interference with a license already in place as contemplated by §
525. 	Alpine’s reliance on NextWave is thus misplaced.
VI
The first aspect of the automatic stay addressed by Alpine’s
motions is that dealing with acts against property of the estate.
In pertinent part, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) bars “any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”
Similarly, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) bars any act to enforce a lien
against property of the estate. 	Because Alpine’s Licenses were
canceled prepetition, §§ 362(a)(3) and 362(a)(4) do not apply to
the ongoing auction. 	A debtor’s property rights do not expand
upon the commencement of a case. 	See Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734
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F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984) (“whatever rights a debtor has in
property at the commencement of the case continue in bankruptcy--
no more, no less.”). 	This principle applies to expired licenses.
In re Personal Communications Network, Inc., 249 B.R. at 237
(expired FCC license); In re Yachthaven Restaurant, Inc., 103
B.R. 68, 74-76 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Edwin M. Lipscomb
Farms, Inc., 90 B.R. 422, 424 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
Moreover, the new licenses that the FCC may issue after
conclusion of the auction are distinct from the canceled Licenses
previously held by Alpine. 	“[O]nce [FCC] licenses are
cancelled for nonpayment, the licenses cease to exist along with
any interest in the spectrum for which the license was issued.”
Thacker v. FCC (In re Magnacom Wireless, LLC), 503 F.3d 984, 990
(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2076 (Apr. 21, 2008).
Alpine argues that the FCC’s cancellation of a license and
issuance of a new license to use the same portion of spectrum is
an effective foreclosure upon and sale of the same license, which
remains property of the estate. 	But Magnacom rejects this
argument, explaining, “[a] lawful extinction of a property right
. . . does not give the trustee in bankruptcy rights to other
property created by that creditor.” 	503 F.3d at 992. 	The rights
granted via a license to use any spectrum exclude any property
right in the underlying spectrum.
It is through a debtor’s realizing the value of the license
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that the creditors of a licensee of broadcast spectrum may have a
source of payment of their claims, not through enforcing their
claims against the spectrum. 	Although the FCC obtained a
security interest in Alpine’s Licenses, that security interest
itself became a nullity once the Licenses automatically canceled.
The security interest served to secure the claim held by the FCC
only so long as the Licenses remained in place, and the ongoing
auction of broadcast spectrum as to which Alpine no longer has a
license is not an enforcement of a security interest against the
Licenses.
Where a debtor’s interest in property terminates
prepetition, that property is not part of the 	bankruptcy estate,
and the automatic stay does not apply to postpetition disposition
of such property. 	See In re Pettit, 217 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th
Cir. 2000); In re Alcom America Corp., 154 B.R. 97, 103, 100-11
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1993) (provisionally holding that a creditor’s
sale of ethanol did not violate stay because title to ethanol had
passed before debtor’s petition was filed), vacated in part on
other grounds, 156 B.R. 873, 876, 882, 884 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1993)
(adhering to provisional holding that ethanol sale did not
violate § 362(a)(3)), aff'd sub nom. ALCOM America Corp. v. Arab
Banking Corp., 48 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 	Alpine has thus not
established a violation of the automatic stay with respect to
property of the estate.
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VII
The remaining aspect of the automatic stay addressed by
Alpine’s motions is that dealing with collecting a claim against
the debtor. 	Section 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code stays “any
act to collect, assess, or recover a [prepetition] claim against
the debtor. . . .” 	The Code defines “claim” in relevant part as
“right to payment. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 	It further
provides as a rule of construction that “claim against the
debtor” includes “claim against property of the debtor.” 	11
U.S.C. § 102(2). 	The FCC’s postpetition actions cannot fairly be
said to be acts to collect a claim against Alpine or against
property of Alpine.
A.
First, with respect to the issue of whether this is an act
to collect a claim against property of Alpine, the answer is
obvious. 	As demonstrated above, Alpine no longer had any
property interest in the Licenses: the Licenses had automatically
canceled in 2002, and with them any right to utilize the spectrum
that was the subject of the Licenses. 	The proceeds realized from
the new auction of the spectrum that were the subject of Alpine’s
Licenses will not be an auction of property of Alpine, but
instead of property held by the FCC on behalf of the public.
Accordingly, the FCC auction was not an act to collect a claim
against property of Alpine.
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An auction of nondebtor property to collect an independent
claim against the nondebtor and that will not result in
destruction of any interest of the debtor in property is neither
an act to collect a claim from debtor property in violation of §
362(a)(6) nor an act to exercise control over property of the
estate in violation of § 362(a)(3). 	See In re Alcom America
Corp., 154 B.R. at 115-16. 	Here, the FCC’s auction is not an
auction of property owned by anyone (other than by the FCC on
behalf of the public). 	Instead, it is an act of the FCC in its
regulatory role to put the broadcast spectrum that was covered by
the already canceled Licenses to the use that it has determined
will best serve the interest of the public. 	This is thus an even
stronger case for concluding that there is no act to collect a
claim against property of Alpine.
B.
Second, with respect to whether the FCC is acting to collect
a claim against Alpine, the answer is similarly in the FCC’s
favor. 	This is not a case of a creditor selling a debtor’s
collateral at auction with the debtor entitled to a credit for
the amount received at auction, and liable only for the resulting
deficiency in payment of its own bid amount. 	Alpine concedes
that the FCC's "Deficiency Payment" rule, 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.2104(g)(2)(i), does not apply to installment payment defaults
of licensees, and applies only to "defaulting bidders" who have
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not yet been issued licenses. 	Alpine nevertheless contends that
the ongoing auction process is an act of debt collection.
Alpine points to In the Matter of Amendment of Part 1 of the
Commission’s Rules—Competitive Bidding Procedures, Third Order on
Reconsideration of the Third Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 2551
(February 11, 2004) ("Third Order"), in which the FCC
stated:
MetroPCS further claims that a 1996 letter (the
“Letter”) co-authored by the then-general counsel of
the Commission states that the Commission would never
collect from a debtor twice. 	Again, MetroPCS
disregards context. 	The Letter describes the
Commission rules as providing “that, upon default, the
Commission will cancel the license and initiate debt
collection procedures.” 	The Letter does go on to
postulate that equity principles established in the
Debt Collection Act and in Federal Claims Collection
Standards should allow the federal government to
consider, in the course of debt collection proceedings,
forgiving an outstanding debt so long as the government
has been made whole, penalties and costs included, in a
subsequent auction. 	Rather than support MetroPCS's
claim, the Letter makes clear that any forgiveness of a
debt arising from an installment payment default would
occur only in the course of federal debt collection
proceedings and not pursuant to the Commission's
competitive bidding rules.
Id. at ¶ 19, citing Letter from William E. Kennard, General
Counsel, et al., 11 FCC Rcd 21,572 (1996) ("Kennard Letter").
Alpine also points to the following statement in the Third Order,
in which the FCC compared licenses canceled for non-monetary
defaults to licenses canceled for installment payment defaults:
TTPS argues that the consequence of an installment
payment default is unlike that of any other default in
Western jurisprudence. 	Yet, as we have just shown, the
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consequence of any other post-licensing default on a
license won at a Commission auction is, under our
rules, comparable. 	We note, however, that while
Commission rules provide for parity, an installment
payment defaulter may ultimately enjoy relief that
would not be available to other post-licensing
defaulters. 	As discussed above, equity principles
established in the Debt Collection Act and in Federal
Claims Collection Standards should provide the federal
government with the opportunity, during debt collection
proceedings, to forgive an outstanding debt so long as
the government has been made whole (including penalties
and costs) in a subsequent auction.
Third Order at ¶ 32 (footnotes omitted). 	Finally, Alpine quotes
from the Kennard Letter. 	The full passage containing the
language quoted by Alpine is worth setting forth here, as it puts
the matter in context:
Under the Debt Collection Act, as amended, 31 U.S.C.
Chapter 37, and Federal Claims Collection Standards, 4
C.F.R. Parts 101-105, it is our understanding that,
where there is collateral in goods or other tangible
property, the proceeds from the liquidation of
collateral would be applied to debts (and other costs)
due. See 4 C.F.R. § 102.10. In the case of FCC licenses
that are cancelled and reauctioned, however, there is
no liquidation of the collateral by the FCC and no
proceeds from the resale of the defaulted license
because the license is canceled and, in effect,
disappears. 	The Commission would be simply auctioning
another initial license to use the same spectrum to
another entity, not transferring the original license.
Nevertheless, although there would be no liquidation of
the collateral for purposes of the Debt Collection Act
and Federal Claims Collection Standards, the equity
principles established therein should allow the federal
government to forgive any outstanding debt so long as
it has been made whole (penalties and costs included)
in a subsequent auction. 	Thus, the Commission would
not be collecting from the debtor twice, but rather
reclaiming the license and ensuring that any remainder
due to the federal government on the Note is either
collected or recovered in a reauction (if authorized).
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. . . [W]ith regard to the issue of the rights of
the debtor, or other creditors, to the excess proceeds
(if any) from a reauction following a default, Section
309(j)(8) of the Communications Act provides that all
proceeds from the use of competitive bidding shall be
deposited in the Treasury of the United States or used
to cover certain of the Commission's costs. See 47
U.S.C. § 309(j)(8). 	Therefore, while the proceeds from
the liquidation of the collateral through a
FCC-conducted reauction would generally be applied to
debts due, the Commission is constrained by the terms
of the Communications Act with regard to the
distribution of excess reauction proceeds to the debtor
or other creditors.
Kennard Letter, 11 FCC Rcd at 21576-77. 	[Emphasis added.]
Alpine contends that the foregoing passages demonstrate that the
FCC has an affirmative duty to mitigate, and that Alpine is
entitled to offset rights that will be governed by the outcome of
the re-auction of the spectrum that was covered by Alpine’s
Licenses.
Although Alpine owes the FCC a considerable debt, and is
subject to debt collection procedures (see 47 C.F.R. §
1.2110(g)(4)(iv)), the FCC’s conducting of an auction to re-
license the spectrum that was formerly licensed to Alpine cannot
be viewed as a debt collection act. 	The proceeds realized from
the new auction of the spectrum will not be an auction of
property of the debtor, but instead of property held by the FCC
on behalf of the public, with the FCC being the regulatory
authority vested with the discretion as to how the spectrum can
best be put to a use in the interest of the public. 	The FCC is
thus acting in the ongoing auction wearing its regulatory hat,
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not that of a creditor collecting a debt from pledged collateral.
Any effect the auction may have on Alpine (via the FCC’s applying
equity principles, in the exercise of its discretion, as
established in the Debt Collection Act and in Federal Claims
Collection Standards, to treat the proceeds as an offset against
Alpine’s debt) would arise only after the re-auction, and would
be only incidental to the outcome of the regulatory process, and
not as a result of an act designed to collect the FCC’s claim
against Alpine. 	As the Third Order states, “any forgiveness of a
debt arising from an installment payment default would occur only
in the course of federal debt collection proceedings and not
pursuant to the Commission's competitive bidding rules.” 	Third
Order at ¶ 19. 	The FCC’s discretion to forgive a licensee’s debt
after the re-auction of its canceled license does not amount to a
right in the licensee to an offset, and, more fundamentally, does
not demonstrate an act to collect the FCC’s claim, as the FCC is
not proceeding against Alpine or against property of Alpine in
re-auctioning the spectrum that was formerly licensed to Alpine.
Collecting a claim from nondebtor property pledged to secure
a debtor’s debt does not constitute an act to collect a claim
against the debtor. 	See In re Alcom America Corp., 154 B.R. at
115, citing Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc. v. U.S.
Interstate Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office
Prods., Inc.), 125 B.R. 259, 263 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991)
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(collecting debtor’s debt from property its shareholder pledged
to secure payment of the debt was not an act to collect a claim
against the debtor). 	See also In re Chugach Forest Prods., Inc.,
23 F.3d 241, 246 (9th Cir. 1994). 	Because the payment at re-
auction will not come from Alpine or Alpine’s property, the
conduct of the auction is not an act to collect or recover the
FCC’s claim against Alpine in violation of § 362(a)(6). 	Whatever
impact the re-auction has on the debt Alpine owes will be only
incidental, and not the result of an act to collect the FCC’s
claim against Alpine. 	Section 362(a)(6) does not bar the FCC’s
re-auctioning of the spectrum that was formerly licensed to
Alpine.
VIII
In accordance with the foregoing, orders follow denying
Alpine’s two motions.
[Signed and dated above.]
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20	O:\TEEL\Judge Temp Docs\Alpine -Decsn Supplementing Oral Decision v3.wpd
Copies to:
Debtor
Lawrence A. Katz, Esq.
[Debtor’s counsel]
Frederick M. Joyce, Esq.
[Debtor’s co-counsel]
Office of United States Trustee
Glenn D. Gillett, Esq.
Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 875
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044-0875
Case 08-00543 Doc 67 Filed 10/10/08 Entered 10/10/08 13:25:41 Desc Main
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