Cammaran-Farfan v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 26-cv-00955-NRN
YOFRAN RAFAEL CAMMARAN-FARFAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden, Denver Contract Detention Facility;
ROBERT HAGAN, Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director, United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 in his official capacity as Secretary of U.S. Department of
Homeland Security;
PAMELA JO BONDI, United States Attorney General, in their official capacities,
Respondents.
ORDER
N. REID NEUREITER
United States Magistrate Judge
This case is before the Court on Yofran Rafael Cammaran-Farfan’s (“Petitioner”)
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner is a
detainee at the Denver Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado. ECF No. 1 at ¶
8. He contends that the Respondents are improperly subjecting him to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Instead, he says, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his
detention. Because this is a fundamentally legal debate, there is no need for a hearing
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as
Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has automatically been substituted
as a party to this action.
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on the Petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS
IN PART the Petition.
BACKGROUND
This case is one of numerous cases in this District and across the country
seeking habeas relief for immigrants detained within the United States and denied bond
hearings under a new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. E.g., Olivas v. Baltazar,
No. 26-cv-00777-NRN, 2026 WL 672897 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2026), Vasquez Gomez v.
Bondi, No. 26-cv-00489-NRN, 2026 WL 482677 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2026); Diaz Marquez
v. Baltasar, No. 26-cv-00293-CYC, 2026 WL 370864 (D. Colo. Feb. 10, 2026); Abarca
v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-04086-CYC, 2026 WL 309198 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026);
Hernandez-Redondo v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-03993-2 PAB, 2026 WL 290989 (D. Colo. Feb.
4, 2026); Jimenez Facio v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03592-CYC, 2025 WL 3559128 (D.
Colo. Dec. 12, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL
2652880 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Batz Barreno v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-03017-GPG-
TPO, 2025 WL 3190936 (D. Colo. Nov. 14, 2025); Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-
03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025). Petitioner asks that he be
immediately released from unlawful detention. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7.
Petitioner is a Venezuelan national who entered the United States without
inspection on or about September 20, 2023, and was released on his own
recognizance. Id. ¶ 17. He and his wife had a pending affirmative asylum application
with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Id. However, on January 18,
2026, while he was driving to work, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
arrested him without a warrant and placed him into removal proceedings through the
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issuance of a Notice to Appear (“NTA”). Id. He has been detained, separated from his
wife and three minor children, without a bond hearing since that time. Id.
Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 6. He asks to be
released immediately because he claims that “there is ample evidence and reporting
that immigration judges are regularly flouting habeas rulings by denying bond based on
‘flight risk’ rather than expressly denying . . . .” Id. ¶ 30.
Respondents maintain that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b). Respondents’ statutory interpretation has been rejected by this Court as well
as several other judges in this District. See Vasquez Gomez, 2026 WL 482677, at *2;
Jimenez Facio, 2025 WL 3559128, at *2 (recognizing that “every decision in this District
addressing the issue” has determined that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to persons,
like Petitioner, who have already been residing in the United States for years). Indeed,
Respondents concede
that until the Tenth Circuit rules on this issue, this Court’s prior ruling on this
issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here if the Court
adheres to that decision, as the facts of this case are not materially
distinguishable from that case for purposes of the Court’s decision on the
legal issue of whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
ECF No. 9 at 3.
ANALYSIS
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who
demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes “[c]hallenges to immigration detention.”
Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). The individual in custody
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bears the burden of proving that their detention is unlawful. Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275, 286 (1941). To meet that burden, Petitioner argues, in part, that 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) applies to him; “that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at
the outset of detention,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)); see 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing for discretionary
detention); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 (providing framework for requesting a bond
determination); and that he has received no such hearing.
As this Court and others in this District have repeatedly found in similar cases,
Petitioner has met his burden showing that his continued detention without a bond
hearing is unlawful. See Diaz Marquez, 2026 WL 370864, at *1 (“The Court remains
firmly convinced that it and the other judges in the District who have addressed this
issue have correctly decided those cases.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner
has a statutory right to a bond hearing that has not been provided, in violation of
Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights, see Jimenez Facio, 2025
WL 3559128, at *3 (“Resolution of the due-process question may be unnecessary[,] . . .
[b]ut to the extent it is, ‘the Court agrees with other courts that have, against
substantially similar factual backgrounds, concluded that detention without a bond
hearing amounts to a due process violation.’”) (quoting Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025)); and the INA, see
Abanil v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-4029-WJM-STV, 2026 WL 100587, at *6 (D. Colo. Jan. 14,
2026) (“The Court joins its colleagues in this District and those courts across the country
that have concluded Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A) is contrary to the
INA’s plain text. As a consequence, the Court also concludes that Garcia Abanil’s
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detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates the INA, and that he is instead properly
considered to be detained under § 1226(a).”).2
Moreover, the Court rejects Respondents’ reliance on the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). As this Court has
repeatedly held, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is not binding authority in this District, and,
as to persuasiveness, the Court respectfully finds in Judge Douglas’s dissent a more
rigorous and compelling legal analysis of the relevant statutory provisions. See also
Singh v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 352870, at *3–6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026)
(explaining in detail why Buenrostro-Mendez does not compel a contrary outcome).
Petitioner asks for immediate release because “requesting a bon[d] hearing
would be fruitless, as there are indications of blanket denials of bond hearings before
immigration judges in Colorado.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 30. That has not been the experience of
this judicial officer. Until a record of such blanket denials is more fully developed and
substantiated, the Court concludes that an immigration judge is better suited to consider
whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the community. See Abanil, 2026 WL
100587, at *7. At the bond hearing, Respondents bear the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified due to
dangerousness or flight risk. See id. at *8 (“[T]the weight of authority in this District is
clear: it is the Government’s burden to ‘justify[ ] a noncitizen’s continued detention at a
2 The Court need not address Petitioner’s other arguments or claims for relief.
See Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-0276-WJM-TPO, 2026 WL 304362, at *1 n.1 (D.
Colo. Feb. 5, 2026) (“Because the Court concludes that section 1226(a) controls here, it
need not base its Order on whether Alvarez Hernandez's other arguments are
availing.”); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is
unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
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bond hearing.’”) (quoting Arauz v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03260-CNS, 2025 WL 3041840,
at *4 n.3 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025)); Espinoza Ruiz v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03642-CNS,
2025 WL 3294762, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2025) (ordering that the Government would
carry the burden for bond hearing under § 1226(a)); Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-
cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *9 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (“During such [bond]
hearing, the Respondents bear the burden of justifying detention.”).
Lastly, Petitioner requests attorney fees and costs. ECF No. 1 at 17. But
D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3(a) requires that “a motion for attorney fees . . . be supported by
affidavit,” and no such affidavit supported the request. Further, “a motion involving a
contested issue of law shall . . . be supported by a recitation of legal authority in the
motion.” D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d). As a result, the Court denies this portion of the
Petition without prejudice. If the Petitioner chooses to file a motion for attorney fees, it
must comply with all applicable rules and provide legal authority for the request. See
L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1187 (D. Colo. 2024).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition, ECF No. 1, is
GRANTED IN PART as follows.
It is further ORDERED that
1) Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) within seven days of this Order. If Respondents to not do not provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein,
Petitioner must be immediately released from detention;
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2) Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that
he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); and
3) Respondents shall file a status report within three days of Petitioner’s bond
hearing, stating whether he has been granted bond, and, if his request for bond
was denied, the reasons for that denial.
Dated: March 18, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
N. Reid Neureiter
United States Magistrate Judge
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