A.T. v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-00925-NYW
A.T.,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
GEORGE VALDEZ, in his official capacity,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity, and
TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity,1
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(the “Petition”). [Doc. 1]. The Petition is fully briefed. [Doc. 15; Doc. 17]. For the reasons
stated in this Order, the Petition is GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner A.T. (“Petitioner”)2 is a Honduran woman who has been present in the
United States since 2019. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 17]. She has been detained by the Department
of Homeland Security since March 14, 2024, and she has not been given an individualized
bond hearing. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 2, 33]. 	On December 19, 2024, she was granted a bona fide
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted in as a
Respondent as the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security and Todd Blanche
is substituted in as the Acting United States Attorney General.
2 The Court granted A.T. leave to proceed in this case under her initials. See [Doc. 16].
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determination and a stay of removal while the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) adjudicates her application for a visa. 	[Id. at ¶ 24]. 	Her claim for
asylum was denied by an immigration judge, and an appeal of that denial is pending. [Id.
at ¶¶ 25–26].3
Relevant here, in 2022, A.T. was arrested on charges of child neglect after her
partner was arrested for sexually abusing A.T.’s daughter. [Id. at ¶ 19]. A.T. alleges that
“[a]fter six months in jail, [she] signed a plea deal, believing this would allow her to reunite
with her children.” 	[Id. at ¶ 20]. A.T. was sentenced to four years of parole. 	[Id.]. 	The
day that A.T. was released from jail, she was detained by ICE. [Id.].
Petitioner alleges that “Respondents incarcerate [her] pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226
but have never made a threshold determination as to whether her detention falls under §
1226(a), discretionary detention, or § 1226(c), mandatory detention.” 	[Id. at ¶ 54]. 	She
asserts that no matter the statute authorizing her detention, “they all lead to the same
result: [her] detention is unlawful.” [Id. at ¶ 59].
A.T. raises three claims in her Petition. 	First, she asserts a claim under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing that her detention violates the APA
because it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful. 	[Id. at
¶¶ 60, 154–59]. Her second claim alleges a violation of her Fifth Amendment procedural
due process rights, arguing that her detention has been unreasonably prolonged and is
3 A declaration from ICE deportation officer Eric Danko states that the immigration judge
“ordered Petitioner removed to Honduras” in this same order. 	[Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 40].
Petitioner’s Petition does not make any mention of an order of removal. See [Doc. 1]. No
Party has provided the Court with a copy of the immigration judge’s order. 	The Court
notes that because the immigration judge’s order of removal has been appealed, see
[Doc. 15-2 at ¶ 42], the removal order “is not administratively final,” [id. at ¶ 47].
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therefore unconstitutional. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 6, 160–63]. 	And her third claim asserts that her
detention violates her Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights because it is
punitive in nature, is not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, and because it is
excessive and indefinite in nature. [Id. at ¶¶ 61, 164–67]. As for relief, Petitioner requests,
among other things, that this Court order Respondents to immediately release her or,
alternatively, provide her a bond hearing. [Id. at 48].
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
In her Petition, A.T. contends that she is detained pursuant to one of two statutory
provisions: 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 	See [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 45–46]. 	She
argues that Respondents “have never made a threshold determination as to whether her
detention falls under” §§ 1226(a) or (c), but argues that no matter what statutory provision
provides the basis for her detention, her detention is nevertheless unlawful. [Id. at ¶¶ 54,
59]. 	In their Response, Respondents argue that Petitioner is actually “mandatorily
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), . . . which does not afford her a bond hearing.”
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[Doc. 15 at 2]. 	They also state that they “recognize that this Court is likely to hold that
Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),” so they “do[] not address
Petitioner’s arguments for release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” 	[Id. at 2–3]. 	Indeed,
Respondents do not respond to or engage with Petitioner’s substantive arguments about
the constitutionality of her prolonged detention. See generally [id.].
The Court first addresses the applicable statutory framework before turning to the
Parties’ arguments.
I. 	Statutory Framework for Detention
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1226 “sets forth
‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already present in the United States.’” Quispe-
Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept.
30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). 	Section 1226(a) permits, but does not
require, the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2) (the Attorney General “may continue
to detain” or “may release” the noncitizen (emphasis added)). 	Section 1226(a) thus
establishes a discretionary framework for the detention of noncitizens pending removal
proceedings.
Section 1226(c), on the other hand, contemplates mandatory detention for certain
individuals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The statute creates a “special rule” for individuals
who have committed certain dangerous crimes and those who have connections to
terrorism,” mandating that such individuals “must be detained without a bond hearing until
the question of their removal is resolved.” 	Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 396 (2019).
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“The Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to detain individuals pursuant to
§ 1226(c) without a bond hearing during removal proceedings.” Martinez v. Ceja, 760 F.
Supp. 3d 1188, 1192–93 (D. Colo. 2024) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531
(2003)).
Section 1225(b) “supplement[s] § 1226’s detention scheme.” 	Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)). 	Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to
[noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States,” i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), “certain applicants for admission who are deemed
inadmissible are subject to expedited removal, unless they express a fear of persecution
or an intent to apply for asylum.” Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 802 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304
(D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-2152 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2025); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“If an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who is
arriving in the United States or described in clause (iii) is inadmissible . . ., the officer shall
order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless
the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution.”).
Section 1225(b)(2) provides, in relevant part, that “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien
shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis
added).
Under § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is
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An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters).
Absent an exception for urgent humanitarian reasons not implicated in this case,
“detention under § 1225(b)(2) is considered mandatory,” and “[i]ndividuals detained under
§ 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
In sum, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain
[individuals] seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). 	It also
authorizes the Government to detain certain [individuals] already in the country pending
the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at
289 (emphasis added).
II. 	Petitioner’s Detention
Based on Respondents’ decision to “not address Petitioner’s arguments for
release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),” [Doc. 15 at 3], and the fact that they do not argue that
Petitioner is detained under § 1226(c), see generally [id.], Respondents have waived any
argument that A.T. is detained under § 1226(c), see Ramos v. Dedos, No. 1:26-cv-00264-
KWR-JHR, 2026 WL 555338, at *2 (D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2026) (by not arguing that the
petitioner was detained pursuant to a specific statutory provision, the government waived
any argument that he was detained under that provision). 	Therefore, the Court cannot
and does not conclude that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(c).
That leaves § 1226(a) or § 1225(b). 	Respondents contend that Petitioner is
“subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b),” [Doc. 15 at 3 (emphasis
omitted)], without any argument explaining whether they purport to detain Petitioner under
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§ 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) or any analysis of the different requirements of those
sections, see [id.]. Respondents have thus arguably waived their arguments under either
subsection. Ramos, 2026 WL 555338, at *2.
Nevertheless, the Court will address, and reject, Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b). 	Notably, Respondents acknowledge that “this
Court 	has 	consistently 	rejected 	Respondents’ 	interpretation 	of 	the 	relevant 	legal
provisions” and concede that “the facts of this case are not materially distinguishable from
[the Court’s prior rulings] for purposes of the Court’s decision on the legal issue of whether
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).” [Doc. 15 at 4].
Indeed, 	this 	Court 	has 	already 	rejected 	Respondents’ 	interpretation 	of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	See Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL
2977650, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (“[F]ederal courts have overwhelmingly rejected
Respondents’ ‘broad interpretation of section 1225(b)(2).’” (collecting cases)).4 	In Loa
Caballero, this Court reviewed a similar habeas petition filed by a noncitizen who had
resided in the United States for nearly 20 years before he was detained by ICE. See id.
at *1. 	Like Petitioner here, the Government detained the petitioner in Loa Caballero
4 In addition to this Court’s ruling in Loa Caballero, a majority of other judges in this District
have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens similarly situated to
Petitioner, who have been present in the country for some time and are not actively
“seeking admission.” 	See, e.g., Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02720-RMR,
2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2024) (Rodriguez, J.), appeal docketed, No. 25-
1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025); Moya Pineda v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02955-GPG, 2025
WL 3516291 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2025) (Gallagher, J.); Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No.
25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sweeney, J.); Arredondo
v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03040-RBJ, 2025 WL 4083607 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025); Florez
Marin v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03697-PAB, 2025 WL 3677019 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2025)
(Brimmer, J.); Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL
3718159 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025) (Crews, J.); Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp.
3d ----, 2026 WL 100587 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026) (Martínez, J.).
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without a bond hearing and asserted that § 1225 mandated his detention. See id. 	The
Court disagreed, emphasizing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) only provides for mandatory detention
of noncitizens “seeking admission” to the country. 	Id. at *6. 	“The plain meaning of the
phrase ‘seeking admission’ requires that the applicant must be presently and actively
seeking lawful entry into the United States.” 	Id. 	Thus, noncitizens who are merely
“present”—and have been for “years upon years” without obtaining legal status—are not
“seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. (quoting Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797
F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2025)). 	Interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate
detention for all 	“applicants 	for admission” would 	render the “seeking admission”
language superfluous. Id. at *7. The Court concluded that both the plain text of § 1225
and applicable canons of statutory interpretation demonstrated that the petitioner in Loa
Caballero was detained under § 1226, not § 1225. See id. at *5–8. The Court has since
reaffirmed its ruling in Loa Caballero in several other similar habeas cases. 	See, e.g.,
Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03439-NYW, 2026 WL 35227, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan.
6, 2026); Bautista v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00272-NYW, 2026 WL 532427, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb.
26, 2026).
Insofar as Respondents’ argument could be construed as an assertion that
Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(1), Respondents do not explain how Petitioner
could reasonably be considered a person “arriving in the United States” under the plain
language of the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); see also [Doc. 15]. The Court’s
above analysis applies in a similar manner to any assertion that Petitioner is detained
under § 1225(b)(1). See Qasemi v. Francis, No. 25-cv-10029-LJL, 2025 WL 3654098, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (petitioner was not “arriving in the United States” under
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§ 1225(b)(1) because he had “already arrived, was paroled, entered, and ha[d] . . . been
present in the United States for over a year”).
Accordingly, consistent with the Court’s prior rulings and the weight of authority in
this District, the Court concludes that neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) authorizes
Petitioner’s detention. 	The “default rule” of discretionary detention under § 1226(a)
therefore applies. See, e.g., Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5, *7. And because
Respondents have not provided Petitioner the required bond hearing, Petitioner’s
continued detention without a bond hearing violates her due process rights. 	See, e.g.,
Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 100587, at *6–7 (D. Colo. Jan. 14,
2026); Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784–85.
III. 	Appropriate Remedy
Petitioner’s primary requested relief is a Court order directing Respondents to
immediately release her. [Doc. 1 at 47]. She argues that “there is no evidence that [she]
is either a danger or a flight risk” because “DHS has granted [her] a [bona fide
determination] for her T visa—meaning the agency has already reviewed [her] entire
history, including her sole criminal contact, and determined she is not a public danger.”
[Id. at ¶ 105]. She also asserts that there is no evidence that she is a flight risk because
“[h]er pending T visa with [a bona fide determination] gives her a strong incentive to follow
through with her immigration proceedings to obtain legal status and remain in the country
where two of her children, one of whom is a U.S. citizen, reside.” [Id.].
In their Response, Respondents assert that “[i]f the Court holds that Petitioner is
detained under 1226(a), the appropriate relief is a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” 	[Doc. 15 at 5 (emphasis omitted)]. 	They assert that “[m]ultiple decisions in the
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District of Colorado have recognized this principle,” but they do not explain why a bond
hearing is the appropriate remedy in this particular case or why immediate release is
unwarranted. [Id.].
Petitioner staunchly disputes that a bond hearing will provide sufficient relief. She
argues, among other things, that (1) a bond hearing is “the most common remedy for
procedural due process claims,” but is “not the typical remedy for the substantive due
process or APA claims [she] raises,” [Doc. 17 at 6 (emphasis omitted)]; (2) the Court
should not stop its analysis at the procedural due process claim but should instead
adjudicate all of her claims, [id. at 6–7]; and (3) she is neither a flight risk nor a danger to
the community, so release is appropriate, [id. at 8–9]. Alternatively, A.T. argues that if the
Court orders a bond hearing, it should hold the hearing itself, [id. at 9–10], and should
also order that Respondents bear the burden of justifying A.T.’s detention, [id. at 10–11].5
For the following reasons, the Court agrees with Petitioner that, based on the
unique circumstances of this case, a bond hearing would not adequately remedy the
constitutional violations arising out of Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond
hearing. Immediate release is therefore appropriate.
First, Petitioner has been detained without a bond hearing for over two years.
[Doc. 1 at ¶ 2]. This means that, based on Respondents’ disclaimer of detention under
5 Petitioner also argues that because Respondents have not “produce[d] the requisite
warrant by the Attorney General justifying [her] detention,” they have “provided no
evidence at § 1226(a) affords detention authority,” so her detention is not justified under
any statute. [Doc. 17 at 7–8]. But Petitioner did not argue in her Petition that her original
detention lacked the warrant required under § 1226(a), see [Doc. 1], so Respondents had
no occasion to produce a warrant in their response. Moreover, Petitioner does not explain
why the warrant contained in her exhibits, see [Doc. 1-2 at 7], does not meet the
requirements of § 1226(a).
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§ 1226(c) and this Court’s determination that Petitioner is detained under § 1226(a),
Petitioner has been unconstitutionally detained for over two years. 	See Garcia Abanil,
2026 WL 100587, at *7 (“[C]ontinued detention without an individualized bond hearing
necessarily violates [a person detained under § 1226(a)’s] Fifth Amendment right to due
process.”); Martinez Torres v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-01062-CYC, 2026 WL 860425, at *1 (D.
Colo. Mar. 30, 2026) (same); Arenas v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00024-SBP, 2026 WL 317562,
at *8 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026) (same). Respondents could have brought Petitioner before
an immigration judge for a bond hearing at any point over the last two years, but they did
not do so. The Court is not inclined to prolong Petitioner’s unconstitutional detention to
permit Respondents to do what they could have done all along.
Petitioner’s 	prolonged 	detention 	without 	a 	bond 	hearing 	raises 	serious
constitutional concerns, as “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects,” and a detention scheme that “permit[s] indefinite detention” of
a person “raise[s] a serious constitutional problem.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Although
“as a general matter, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides the government with discretion to detain
noncitizens in removal proceedings, noncitizens still ‘have a substantive due process right
to be free of arbitrary confinement pending deportation proceedings.’” 	Alfaro Herrera v.
Baltazar, No. 25-cv-04014-CNS, 2026 WL 91470, at *7 (D. Colo. Jan. 13, 2026) (quoting
Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991)). By detaining Petitioner for over
two years without a bond hearing—and without any affirmative finding that Petitioner is a
flight risk or a danger to the community—Respondents have arbitrarily detained her,
which amounts to a violation of her substantive due process rights, too. 	See id.
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Respondents do not explain how a bond hearing would remedy this violation. See [Doc.
15].
Second, this case is materially different from the typical §§ 1225 and 1226 cases
filed over the last several months. Petitioner asserts that the bona fide determination on
her T-visa application “afforded her deferred action and a stay of removal.” 	[Doc. 1 at
¶ 2]; see also [id. at ¶¶ 24, 56, 106; Doc. 1-2 at 10 (“[A]ny final order of removal,
deportation, or exclusion is automatically stayed because your application has been
determined to be bona fide.”)]. 	Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner has been
granted deferred action status or a stay of removal. 	See [Doc. 15].6 	“When deferred
action status is approved, that means ‘no action will thereafter be taken to proceed against
an apparently deportable alien, even on grounds normally regarded as aggravated.’”
Marcos L. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00676-MJD-SGE, 2026 WL 327953, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb.
3, 2026) (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 484
(1999)), recommendation adopted sub nom. Marcos L. v. Easterwood, 2026 WL 331418
(D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2026). And “an ever-growing number of district courts across the country
have concluded[] that an unrevoked grant of deferred action prevents removal.” Nevarez
6 The bona fide determination letter states that “[s]ince USCIS has deemed your
application boda fide, USCIS may consider you for deferred action. . . . To be considered
for deferred action and employment authorization as a matter of discretion, you must
submit 	a 	Form 	I-765, 	Application 	for 	Employment 	Authorization, 	under 	8 	CFR,
2741.12(c)(40) [sic] in accordance with form instructions.” 	[Doc. 1-2 at 10]. 	But
Respondents do not challenge Petitioner’s assertions that she has been granted deferred
action status, so any such argument has been waived. See Juan M. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-
00266-ECT-JFD, 2026 WL 129059, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026) (“Respondents did not
respond to Juan’s arguments about deferred action, . . . meaning Respondents waived
any challenge to these arguments.”).
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Jurado v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3687264, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025)
(collecting cases).
Petitioner asserts that “[t]he current average adjudication times for a T visa with a
Bona Fide Determination is 2.25 years,” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 92]; see also Case Processing
Times, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-
times/ (last accessed April 9, 2026) (stating that “80% of cases are completed within 29
months”), and Respondents do not dispute this assertion, see [Doc. 15]. 	Because
Petitioner’s detention appears to be indefinite, and it is likely she will remain in deferred
action status for at least another two years, she “is being held in indefinite detention not
authorized by law, and [s]he is consequently entitled to immediate release.” 	Chavez
Rascon v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00161-RJS, 2026 WL 800684, at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2026)
(“Because Chavez still possesses deferred action status, his detention appears to be
indefinite and therefore requires release.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.7
Third, Petitioner asserts that immediate release “is appropriate when the petitioner
has been subject to some prior screening with no findings of flight risk or danger.” [Doc.
7 In other statutory contexts, courts have concluded that a person’s detention, if extended
too long, can violate the detainee’s due process rights simply due to its length. See, e.g.,
Martinez, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 1193 (“Several federal appellate courts have concluded that,
at some point, prolonged detention under § 1226(c) without a bond hearing violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (recognizing
that a six-month detention period after an order of removal is issued is presumptively
reasonable, but explaining that that presumption may be rebutted if there is “good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future” and the government does not rebut that showing). Although these cases deal with
a different statute than the one authorizing Petitioner’s detention here, they provide
important guidance on the constitutional concerns arising out of Petitioner’s prolonged
detention. 	See Rascon, 2026 WL 800684, at *4 (recognizing that although Zadvydas
concerned detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, not § 1226, “the similar discretionary
language of the statutes makes the constitutional concerns applicable” in a § 1226 case).
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17 at 8–9]; see also [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 105–06 (Petitioner asserting that, through the bona fide
determination, DHS “determined that [she] is not a public danger”)]; id. at ¶ 117 (“USCIS
. . . found that [Petitioner] did not present public safety concerns and granted her the
[bona fide determination].”)]. The Court does not entirely agree with Petitioner’s reading
of the record. 	The bona fide determination letter states that the results of A.T.’s initial
background check “are complete, have been reviewed, and do not present national
security concerns.” 	[Doc. 1-2 at 10]. 	A finding that A.T.’s application did not present
national security concerns is not necessarily equivalent to a finding that A.T. does not
present a danger to her immediate community. But still, courts have relied on this finding
in determining that immediate release is appropriate. See Marcos L., 2026 WL 327953,
at *3. 	And Respondents’ argument against immediate release is nothing more than a
perfunctory assertion that a bond hearing is the “appropriate” remedy, without any actual
explanation as to how a bond hearing provides an adequate remedy for the violation of
Petitioner’s constitutional rights in this action that is an outlier to the heartland of these
immigration habeas appeals. [Doc. 15 at 5]. Respondents do not argue that immediate
release is inappropriate due to the risk of flight or dangerousness presented by Petitioner
or identify any evidence specific to this Petitioner that needs to be weighed by the
immigration judge in the first instance, see [id.]. If such a risk or evidence were known to
Respondents, the Court expects that Respondents would have mentioned it in their brief.
“[I]n the context of deferred action recipients, district courts have found both
immediate release and a bond hearing to be appropriate remedies.” Santiago v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-00361, 2025 WL 2792588, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025). 	“Habeas is at its
core a remedy for unlawful executive detention,” and “[t]he typical remedy for such
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detention is, of course, release.” 	Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). 	Having
found that Petitioner’s detention violates her substantive and procedural due process
rights, and based on the considerations discussed above, the Court concludes that
prolonging Petitioner’s unconstitutional detention by ordering a bond hearing would not
remedy the violation of her constitutional rights. 	Accordingly, the Court will order
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner.8 	Due to the exceptional and unique
circumstances of this case and this Petitioner, Respondents are DIRECTED to transport
A.T. back to her place of residence within seven days from the entry of this Order, at their
own expense, and immediately upon effectuating A.T.’s transfer, Respondents shall
release her from custody. See Diallo v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-3548-SKC, 2026 WL 237296,
at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2026) (ordering the petitioner’s immediate release but ordering
that the petitioner “shall remain in Respondents’ temporary custody for the sole purpose
of Respondents effectuating his return to Newark, New Jersey”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED in
part;
(2) 	Due to the exceptional and unique circumstances of this case and this
Petitioner, Respondents are DIRECTED to transport A.T. back to her place
8 Petitioner also requests that the Court “enjoin Respondents from imposing additional
indefinite conditions of release, such as a GPS monitor or check-ins with ICE” and to
“enjoin and restrain Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless they bear the burden
of proof and demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond
hearing before an impartial adjudicator that [s]he is a flight risk or a danger to the
community.” 	[Doc. 1 at 47]. 	These requests are not supported by citations to legal
authority or developed argument, so the Court declines to order this additional relief.
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of residence within seven days from the entry of this Order, at their own
expense, and immediately upon effectuating A.T.’s transfer, Respondents
shall RELEASE her from custody. Respondents shall return any and all of
Petitioner’s belongings in their care, custody, or control;
(3) 	The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to place [Doc. 1-2] under Level 1
Restriction, given that it contains references to A.T.’s full name; and
(4) 	On or before April 23, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
informing the Court of the status of A.T.’s release and whether any
additional proceedings in this matter are required.
DATED: April 9, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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