Doe v. Czerepusko

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES BRANDON CZEREPUSKO,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym With
Incorporated Authority, ECF No. 2, and Motion for Immediate (Ex Parte) Temporary
Restraining Order, ECF No. 9. After examining the motion and relevant legal authority,
the Court concludes responsive briefing would not materially assist the Court’s resolution
of the motions. As explained below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed
under a pseudonym and GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order.
Additionally, the parties are to appear for a hearing before the Court on Tuesday, March
31, 2026 at 1:00 p.m.
I. 	ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym
Plaintiff’s first motion seeks permission for Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym
in this matter pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6851(3)(B) because the case arises from
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 14

2
Defendant’s alleged disclosure online of Plaintiff’s private, intimate photographs and
sexually explicit activity without Plaintiff’s consent. ECF No. 2 at 2.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings contain parties’
names. See Fed. R. Civ. P 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties.”);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (“Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.”). “However, parties may be pseudonymized under certain circumstances.”
D.B.U. v. Trump, No. 1:25-CV-01163-CNS, 2025 WL 1101149, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 14,
2025) (citing Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff’s
request is made pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6851(3)(B), which concerns “[c]ivil action[s]
relating to [the] disclosure of intimate images,” and which provides courts with authority
to “grant injunctive relief maintaining the confidentiality of a plaintiff using a pseudonym.”
Additionally, Plaintiff invokes C.R.S. § 13-21-1405, see ECF No. 2 at 2, which “specifically
provides [that] a plaintiff bringing a claim thereunder may proceed under a pseudonym.”
Doe v. Willis, No. 23-cv-2171-REB-SBP, 2023 WL 6907100, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 22,
2023); see also C.R.S. § 13-21-1405(1)(a)–(b) (“A plaintiff may proceed using a
pseudonym in place of the true name of the plaintiff” and “[t]he court may exclude or
redact from all pleadings and documents filed in the action other identifying characteristics
of the plaintiff.”)). Given that Plaintiff brings claims under 15 U.S.C. § 6851; C.R.S. § 13-
21-1401, et. Seq.; and Fla. Stat. § 784.049 arising from Defendant’s alleged unauthorized
disclosure on the internet of Plaintiff’s sexually explicit photographs and videos, Plaintiff
has 	clearly 	established the type of action 	covered by the 	pseudonym 	provisions
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 14

3
contemplated by the Colorado and federal statutes to which Plaintiff cites. See C.R.S. §
13-21-1405(1); 15 U.S.C. § 6851(3)(B).1
The invocation of these statutes notwithstanding, Plaintiff has also demonstrated
the presence of at least two of the three “exceptional” circumstances that the Tenth Circuit
has determined justify permitting a party to proceed under a pseudonym: (1) “cases
involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature,” (2) cases involving a “real
danger of physical harm,” or (3) “where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a
result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity.” Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1246 (quoting
Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)).
First, this case clearly involves a matter of a highly sensitive and personal nature
as contemplated by Femedeer, given that it arises from Defendant’s alleged unauthorized
disclosure of Plaintiff’s intimate images on the internet. See, e.g., Willis, 2023 WL
6907100, at *1–2 (permitting plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym in a case involving
“matters of the most intimate and sensitive nature” where plaintiff’s claims arise from
defendants’ non-consensual disclosure of plaintiff’s intimate images). The following facts,
taken from Plaintiff’s complaint, demonstrate the highly sensitive and personal nature of
this action. See generally ECF No. 1. When Plaintiff and Defendant were previously
engaged in an intimate relationship, Defendant pressured Plaintiff to take intimate images
of herself engaged in sexual acts, and Defendant would harass and demean Plaintiff if
1 As one Court has observed, although the Colorado statute provides that a Plaintiff may proceed under a
pseudonym, the anonymity provision in the federal statute 15 U.S.C. § 6851(b)(3)(B), contains “language
[that] is somewhat less clear as to a plaintiff's right to anonymity throughout the [entirety] of the action.”
Willis, 2023 WL 6907100, at *2. Regardless, as explained above, the Court finds that it is proper for the
Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 14

4
she did not comply. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Some images were taken without Plaintiff’s consent.
Id. ¶ 12. The parties’ relationship subsequently ended, and Defendant reacted poorly to
the breakup, including by engaging “in harassing behaviors which included calling
Plaintiff’s workplace, hacking her phone, and tracking her location.” Id. ¶¶ 13–15. Years
later, after announcing her engagement over social media, Plaintiff began receiving
messages online from unknown individuals “containing sexually explicit statements
indicating that they had seen intimate images of her online.” Id. ¶¶ 16–18. After
investigating how these unknown individuals came to possess these images, Plaintiff
learned that her “extremely intimate and private sexual photographs and at least one
video” were “posted on at least 28 different websites,” including on a website dedicated
to revenge porn. Id. ¶¶ 20–23. Plaintiff asserts that all of the explicit images she found
online were from her time in a relationship with Defendant and that Defendant was the
only person she ever gave permission to view or possess those images. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. It
is indisputable that such matters, by their very nature, are highly sensitive and personal
and would alone justify Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a pseudonym.
Second, a failure to protect Plaintiff’s anonymity would result in her incurring the
very injury she is attempting to litigate against. As Plaintiff explains it, because this “entire
case is about Defendant disclosing the private, intimate, nude photographs and sexually
explicit activity of Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s permission, and doing so with the specific
intent to embarrass and cause damage to Plaintiff and her reputation through those
disclosures,” requiring Plaintiff to disclosure her identity would result in her suffering
additional harm in order to prosecute this action. ECF No. 2 at 2–3. The Court agrees that
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 14

5
in light of the facts, “revealing plaintiff's identity plainly will incur, and thus compound, the
very harm [s]he already allegedly has suffered as a result of [defendant’s] alleged
disclosures” of her intimate images. Willis, 2023 WL 6907100, at *2 (citing Doe v.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 46 F.4th 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2022)). Additionally,
Plaintiff’s representation that “Defendant will instantly know who Plaintiff is because,
based upon information and belief, he has only done this to one person on or about
October of 2025,” id. at 3, lessens any claims of prejudice that may result from her use of
a pseudonym. See Doe v. Reese, No. 8:26CV14, 2026 WL 94123, at *1 (D. Neb. Jan. 13,
2026) (“[D]efendants’ knowledge of the plaintiffs’ identities ‘lessens their claims to be
prejudiced by the use of pseudonyms.’”) (quoting Cody v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:17-CV-
2707-AGF, 2022 WL 1202354 *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2022)).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a pseudonym
in this action, ECF No. 2, including in the filing of any affidavits, unless otherwise directed
by the Court. In light of this Order, all parties are hereby prohibited from (1) disclosing
Plaintiff’s identity in any documents and pleadings filed with the Court, and (2) identifying
Plaintiff to any and all individuals not involved in this case.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
Having dispensed with Plaintiff’s first motion, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s motion
for an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO). ECF No. 9. In the motion, Plaintiff asks
that this Court enter issue a TRO “barring Defendant James Brandon Czerepusko from
[(1)] disclosing Plaintiff’s identity[;]” (2) “sharing any additional nude or sexually explicit
photographs or videos of Plaintiff[;]” (3) “harassing, molesting, intimidating, or retaliating
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 14

6
against Plaintiff[;]” and (4) “post[ing] any further intimate images of Plaintiff or encourage
others to contact her.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff argues that a TRO is necessary because, without
it, “Defendant poses a risk to Plaintiff by further exposing her to electronic forms of
harassment and retaliation and has shown a willingness to do so through his past
actions.” Id. at 2. The Court agrees.
“Granting a temporary restraining order is extraordinary relief.” Gess v. USMS, No.
20-v-01790-PAB-STV, 2020 WL 8838280, at *20 (D. Colo. Dec. 10, 2020), report and
recommendation adopted in part sub nom. Gess v. USMS & 10th Cir. Dist. Ct., No. 20-
cv-01790-PAB-STV, 	2021 	WL 	423436 	(D. 	Colo. 	Feb. 	5, 	2021) 	(citing 	Soskin 	v.
Reinertson, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057 (D. Colo. 2003)). “A party seeking a TRO must
show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips
in the movant's favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest.” Browne v. City
of Grand Junction, Colorado, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1165 (D. Colo. 2014) (citing RoDa
Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009)). In addition, for a court to
issue a TRO ex parte, the moving party must satisfy two additional requirements. First,
the movant must set forth “specific facts in an affidavit . . . clearly show[ing] that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party
can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Second, “the movant’s attorney
[must] certif[y] in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not
be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B).
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 14

7
Despite this high bar, “[t]he Court finds that this is the rare case that merits a TRO.”
Raina v. EBIX, Inc., No. 1:25-cv-05033-LMM, 2025 WL 3567278, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8,
2025) (granting plaintiff’s motion for a TRO because plaintiff “is likely to succeed on the
merits of the claim he asserts under 15 U.S.C. § 6851 for non-consensual disclosure of
intimate images; absent ex parte emergency relief, there is an imminent risk that
Defendant . . . will publish sexually explicit depictions of Plaintiff and his wife without their
consent, a harm for which there would be no adequate legal remedy; and the threatened
injury far outweighs the interest of Defendant and the public”). As explained below,
Plaintiff has demonstrated each of the factors necessary to obtain an ex parte TRO.
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on, at least, her claim under
Colorado law. Under C.R.S. § 13-21-1403(2), Colorado provides a civil right of action for
a depicted individual who is identifiable and who has suffered harm from a
person’s intentional disclosure or threatened disclosure of an intimate
image that was private without the depicted individual’s consent has a
cause of action against the person if the person knew or acted with reckless
disregard for whether: (a) The depicted individual did not consent to the
disclosure; (b) The intimate image was private; and (c) The depicted
individual was identifiable.
C.R.S. § 1403(2)(a)–(c). Thus, to establish that she is likely to succeed on the
merits of her claim, Plaintiff must satisfy four elements: (1) Defendant intentionally
disclosed (or threatened to disclose); (2) a private and intimate image of Plaintiff; (3) in
which Plaintiff is identifiable; (4) without Plaintiff’s consent; and (5) Defendant’s intentional
disclosure harmed Plaintiff. C.R.S. § 1403(1)-(2).
The affidavit submitted in connection with Plaintiff’s TRO motion establishes the
first three elements to the Court’s satisfaction. Specifically, the affidavit represents that
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 14

8
Defendant is “in possession of Plaintiff’s intimate images” that he has been “posting . . .
across numerous websites;” ECF No. 9-1 (Cohn Aff.) ¶¶ 4, 5, and that Defendant has
been “post[ing] Plaintiff’s personal information, including her name and social media
accounts, attached to these images on various websites,” id. ¶ 6. Additionally, Plaintiff’s
motion makes clear that these intimate images were posted “without her consent.” ECF
No. 9 at 2; see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 38 (alleging that “Plaintiff did not consent to the
disclosures of her private intimate images by Defendant”). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that
she has “suffered harm from Defendant[’s] intentional disclosure of her private intimate
images, including embarrassment and emotional distress.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 37. In light of
these representations, the Court finds that there is a high likelihood that Plaintiff will be
able to succeed on her claim against Defendant under Colorado law § 1403(1)-(2).
Accordingly, the first factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
Second, it is clear that absent the entry of a TRO, Plaintiff is likely to suffer
irreparable harm. “To constitute irreparable harm, an injury must be certain, great, actual
and not theoretical.” Schrier v. University of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253, 1267 (10th Cir.
2005) (citation omitted). Even “serious or substantial harm is not irreparable harm.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[B]ecause a showing of probable
irreparable harm is the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction, the moving party must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the
other requirements for the issuance of an injunction will be considered.” Dominion Video
Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The party seeking injunctive relief must show that
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 8 of 14

9
the injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for
equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1267 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that irreparable harm is likely in the
absence of a TRO and that “Defendant poses a risk to Plaintiff by further exposing her to
electronic forms of harassment and retaliation and has shown a willingness to do so
through his past actions,” ECF No. 9 at 2, given that Plaintiff has already found online
intimate images of her that are only in Defendant’s possession. The allegations in
Plaintiff’s complaint further underscore the likelihood that Defendant will engage in
additional retaliatory acts against Plaintiff absent a TRO, as he has done so in the past in
other circumstances. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 14 (stating that “Defendant reacted poorly
to the [parties’] breakup and engaged in harassing behaviors which included calling
Plaintiff’s workplace, hacking her phone, and tracking her location”).
Defendant’s existing unauthorized dissemination of Plaintiff’s intimate photos has
already resulted in harm to Plaintiff, “including embarrassment and emotional distress,”
as well as Plaintiff “being harassed by strangers and the likely permanent availability of
her intimate images online.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 37, 41. That there is a high likelihood that
Defendant may do so again is “a harm for which there would be no adequate legal
remedy.” Raina, 2025 WL 3567278, at *1. Indeed, “[c]ourts around the country ‘have
considered the threat of further dissemination of sexually explicit images to constitute
irreparable harm because of the images’ uniquely sensitive nature.’” Doe v. Alame, No.
3:25-CV-0329-B, 2025 WL 713120, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2025) (collecting cases).
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 9 of 14

10
This conclusion is intuitive. Information, once on the internet, is incredibly difficult to
contain or erase. No monetary reward can adequately compensate the injury Plaintiff
would suffer in the event Defendant were to continue disseminating Plaintiff’s intimate
images without her consent.
The irreparable harm Plaintiff articulates speaks both to the ordinary preliminary
injunction factors, as well as the requirement for an ex parte TRO under Rule 65(b)(1)(A)
which demands that a movant set forth “specific facts in an affidavit . . . clearly show[ing]
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition.” As discussed above, the sworn affidavit
submitted in connection with Plaintiff’s motion makes clear that, absent a TRO, Plaintiff is
highly likely to suffer another irreparable injury if Defendant continues disseminating
intimate images of her online without her consent. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Gilroy, No. 3:24-
CV-1772 (VAB), 2024 WL 4723332, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2024) (granting Plaintiff’s
request for an ex parte TRO where plaintiff, whose intimate images were already
published online without his consent, was “suffering and is likely to continue suffering”
absent injunctive relief because such harm “would not be addressed by legal remedies”).
Accordingly, this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
Third, the Court finds that the balance of equities among the parties weighs in
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant. As another court has observed: “‘The impact of
revenge porn can include public shame and humiliation, an inability to find new romantic
partners, mental health effects such as depression and anxiety, job loss or problems
securing new employment, and offline harassment and stalking.’ Plaintiff continues to
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 10 of 14

11
suffer these consequences each day, while Defendant faces no discernable burden from
an order prohibiting publication of sexually explicit videos of Plaintiff.” Diaz v. Hernandez,
No. 24-81151-CIV, 2024 WL 5341743, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2024) (citation omitted).
The same here is true for Plaintiff here. At this stage, all Plaintiff seeks is an order
enjoining Defendant “from further disclosing the sexually explicit image[s] of [her that
Defendant] possesses. [A TRO] would ask nothing more of [Defendant] than that [he]
comply with the law. Further dissemination of the image[s] would serve no lawful purpose,
and [Defendant] will not be harmed for refraining from doing so.” Doe v. Serpa, No. 3:25-
CV-0057-X, 2025 WL 332555, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2025). Thus, the balance of the
equities weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
Fourth, the Court is satisfied that no adverse harm to the public will result from the
entry of a TRO in this matter. Indeed, the public has a “strong interest in preventing the
nonconsensual dissemination of another’s intimate visual images.” Diaz, WL 5341743, at
*3. This is clear not only from Colorado’s passage of C.R.S. § 1403, but also the fact that
both Florida and the United States Congress have also passed similar laws. See, e.g., id.
(discussing the passage of 15 U.S.C. § 6851(b)(3)) (citing Doe v. Constant, No. 24-554,
2024 WL 3512136, at *4 (W.D. La. July 23, 2024)). And as another court has observed,
“[t]he rise in legislative action recognizes the potential for far-reaching and long-lasting
effects on victims’ relationships, mental health, employment, and physical and emotional
safety, not to mention the effects of shame or humiliation that can be difficult to escape
or limit” when their intimate images are shared online without their consent. K.I. v. Tyagi,
No. CV 1:23-2383-JRR, 2024 WL 4732703, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2024), report and
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 11 of 14

12
recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-02383-JRR, 2024 WL 5399243 (D. Md. Nov. 25,
2024) (citing Constant, 2024 WL 3512136, at *4). The Court agrees with the risks
identified by other courts. Considering this, “rather than harm the public interest, [a TRO]
upholds protections the federal and state governments expressly provide by law and
protects both [Plaintiff’s] privacy and dignity.” Serpa, 2025 WL 332555, at *4. Accordingly,
this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.
Finally, in order for Plaintiff to receive an ex parte TRO, her attorney must certify
“in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). In this case, Defendant has not yet been served in this action,
let alone received a copy of the TRO motion, despite Magistrate Judge Neureiter’s
February 26, 2026 order “that Plaintiff shall promptly serve Defendants.” ECF No. 6.
However, the affidavit submitted by Plaintiff’s attorney explains that Defendant has not
yet been given notice because “[i]f Defendant is given notice of the present case without
a restraining order also attached, I believe there is an extreme risk that he may destroy
evidence, lash out at Plaintiff in a manner that would further harm her reputation, disclose
her identity to the public, or take actions that would be injurious to her mental health.”
ECF No. 9-1 ¶ 8. Given this, and in light of Plaintiff’s representation that Defendant has
already engaged in the same statutorily prohibited conduct that Plaintiff now seeks to
enjoin, the Court finds good cause to excuse the notice requirement in Rule 65(b)(1)(B).
Taken together, the Court finds that the TRO factors lean in Plaintiff’s favor and
that Plaintiff has met the requirements necessary for the Court to grant an ex parte TRO.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for an ex parte TRO, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED.
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 12 of 14

13
II. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Motion To
Proceed Under a Pseudonym With Incorporated Authority, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.
Plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym, including in the filing of any affidavits, unless
otherwise directed by the Court. Additionally, all parties are hereby PROHIBITED from
(1) disclosing Plaintiff’s identity in any documents and pleadings filed with the Court, and
(2) identifying Plaintiff to any and all individuals not involved in this case.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion for Immediate (Ex Parte) Temporary Restraining
Order, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED, and the Court orders the following:
1. 	Defendant James Brandon Czerepusko shall not disclose to anyone Plaintiff’s identity
in connection with this lawsuit or with any of the intimate images or videos of Plaintiff
he may have already disseminated;
2. 	Defendant shall not share any additional nude or sexually explicit photographs or
videos of Plaintiff with anyone;
3. 	Defendant shall not engage in any behavior intended to harass, molest, intimidate, or
retaliate against Plaintiff; and
4. 	In connection with any existing images or videos posted online, Defendant shall not
share Plaintiff’s personal information online or encourage others to contact her.
Additionally, counsel for Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve the Complaint and this
Order on Defendant immediately, but no later than Tuesday, March 24, 2026, and file
proof of service on the docket. To the extent Plaintiff’s counsel is aware of any counsel
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 13 of 14

14
for Defendant, the Complaint and this Order are to be provided to any such counsel.
Failure to meet this deadline may result in a change to the scheduled hearing.
Finally, the Court ORDERS Defendant and Plaintiff to appear for a hearing before
the Court on Tuesday, March 31, 2026 at 1:00 p.m.
DATED this 20th day of March 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
Case No. 1:26-cv-00792-CNS-NRN Document 10 filed 03/20/26 USDC Colorado
pg 14 of 14