A. v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-00755-NYW
M.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
GEORGE VALDEZ, in his official capacity,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity,1
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity, and
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)
filed by Petitioner M.A. [Doc. 1].2 Respondents filed a Response to the Petition on March
5, 2026, [Doc. 14], and Petitioner filed a Reply on March 11, 2026, [Doc. 15]. 	For the
reasons herein, the Petition is respectfully GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Iran who has been in ICE detention since June 10, 2024.
[Doc. 1 at ¶ 2]. 	On February 26, 2025, an immigration judge granted withholding of
removal upon concluding that Petitioner is likely to face religious persecution if he returns
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), George Valdez is automatically substituted in as a
Respondent in place of Robert Hagan as the Acting Field Office Director of the Denver
Field Office and Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted in as the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security.
2 The Court granted M.A. leave to proceed under his initials in this case. See [Doc. 13].
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to Iran. [Id. at ¶¶ 3, 32 & n.3, 36]. The government did not appeal the immigration judge’s
decision. 	[Id. at ¶ 3]. 	In the year since Petitioner was granted withholding of removal,
Respondents have not identified a third country that will accept him. [Id. at ¶ 6]. Indeed,
Respondents concede that they “do not have information to present to the Court
concerning their efforts to remove Petitioner to a third country that post-date July 2025.”
[Doc. 14 at 5].3
Petitioner brings the following claims: 	(1) a claim asserting that his prolonged
detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); (2) a claim asserting that his prolonged detention
violates his procedural due process rights; (3) a claim asserting that his prolonged
detention violates his substantive due process rights; and (4) a claim asserting that his
due process rights to raise a fear-based claim as to removal to a third country have been
or are being violated. [Doc. 1 at 27–31].
LEGAL STANDARD
A court may issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “The
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 	“Challenges to immigration
3 Respondents have submitted a declaration from an ICE deportation officer stating that
on July 2, 2025, “ICE submitted a Form I-241 to the consulate offices for Niger, Saudi
Arabia, and Costa Rica.” 	[Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 20]. 	Niger declined to accept Petitioner and
neither Saudi Arabia nor Costa Rica responded to the request. [Id. at ¶ 21].
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detention are properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687–88).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Detention of Noncitizens
Generally, when a noncitizen is ordered removed from the United States, the
removal 	“shall” 	occur 	within 	the 	next 	90 	days—the 	“removal 	period.” 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1); Morales-Fernandez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 418 F.3d 1116, 1123
(10th 	Cir. 	2005). 	Detention 	is 	mandatory 	during 	the 	removal 	period, 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A), but once the removal period expires, the noncitizen “may” be detained,
id. § 1231(a)(6) (emphasis added). 	The Supreme Court has recognized that this
permissive language “suggests discretion,” but “does not necessarily suggest unlimited
discretion.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. 	Indeed, “read in light of the Constitution’s
demands,” section 1231(a)(6) “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period
reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Id. at
689. In Zadvydas, the Court explained that
[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids
the Government to “depriv[e]” any “person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due
process of law.” 	Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that Clause protects.
Id. at 690 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 	Finding “nothing in the
history of these statutes that clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize
indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,” the Zadvydas Court held that “once removal is
no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.”
Id. at 699.
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The 	Court 	did 	recognize, 	however, 	a 	presumptively 	reasonable 	six-month
detention period. Id. at 701. “After this 6-month period,” if the noncitizen demonstrates
“good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” 	Id. 	The Supreme Court explained that a six-month presumptive period does
not mean that every noncitizen detained for six months must be released; rather, a
noncitizen may remain in detention “until it has been determined that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Id. 	But “if the government
fails to demonstrate a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the noncitizen must be released.” Ahrach v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03195-PAB, 2025
WL 3227529, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
II. 	Petitioner’s Detention
Respondents do not dispute that the length of Petitioner’s detention since the
removal order exceeds the presumptively reasonable six-month period recognized in
Zadyvas. 	See [Doc. 14 at 4–5 (“Petitioner’s order of removal became administratively
final on February 26, 2025. . . . Thus, the ninety-day removal period concluded on May
27, 2025. 	To date, Petitioner has been detained for approximately one year since his
removal order became final.”)]. Therefore, Petitioner bears the burden of providing “good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. This standard does not require M.A. to
“show the absence of any prospect of removal—no matter how unlikely or unforeseeable.”
Id. at 702. 	“Rather, []he simply must show that removal is not significantly likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Ahrach, 2025 WL 3227529, at *3.
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M.A. argues that there is good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the future because (1) he has been granted withholding of removal
to Iran, his only place of citizenship; (2) in the 12 months since the immigration judge’s
order, Respondents have not identified any country that will accept Petitioner; and
(3) Respondents have provided no concrete updates on their progress in identifying a
third country for removal. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 6]. Respondents do not contest these assertions
or argue that Petitioner has not met his initial burden under Zadvydas. 	See [Doc. 14].
The Court finds that M.A. has met his burden by showing “the existence of either
institutional barriers to repatriation or obstacles particular to his removal.” 	Dusabe v.
Jones, No. 24-cv-00464-SLP, 2024 WL 5465749, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2024),
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 486679 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2025). Because M.A.
has been granted withholding of removal to Iran, and because Respondents have not
identified any other country that would accept him (or indicated that they have made any
efforts to locate such a country since July 2025), M.A. has shown “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; see also Castellano v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-
cv-00080-PAB, 2026 WL 472732, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2026) (finding that petitioner
met his burden where respondents had not identified any country that would accept him
and had made little progress in securing deportation); Trejo v. Warden of ERO El Paso
E. Montana, 807 F. Supp. 3d 697, 705–06 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (petitioner met his burden
by showing he could not be removed to El Salvador, “the only country of which he is a
citizen,” and the government identified no alternative country for removal).
The burden now shifts to Respondents to present sufficient evidence to show that
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removal is likely. 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 	Having presented no such evidence,
Respondents have not met their burden. 	At best, Respondents assert that “ICE is
pursuing Petitioner’s removal to alternative countries pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b).”
[Doc. 14-1 at ¶ 13]. This vague statement provides no meaningful information to the Court
and does not demonstrate that removal is likely, especially in light of Respondents’
concession that that have taken no identifiable steps to locate a third country in over eight
months. 	See [Doc. 14 at 5]; see also Balouch v. Bondi, No. 9:25-cv-00216-MJT, 2025
WL 2871914, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2025) (ruling that “conclusory statements via written
declarations that [the government was] taking steps to remove Petitioner to Iran” were
insufficient to meet government’s burden). 	Respondents do not, for example, “identify
which countries they might contact” to effectuate removal, nor do they list “concrete steps
they will take to effectuate [M.A.’s] timely removal.” Ahrach, 2025 WL 3227529, at *5.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Respondents have not met their burden to
justify Petitioner’s continued detention. 	See Momennia v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-01067-J,
2025 WL 3011896, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2025) (“[M]ere intent to find a third country
is 	too 	speculative 	to 	permit 	indefinite 	detention 	or 	to 	overcome 	[the 	petitioner’s]
showing.”), recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3006045 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2025);
Ahrach, 2025 WL 3227529, at *5 (concluding that the respondents did not meet their
burden because they did not “provide[] concrete evidence that removal is likely in the
foreseeable future” and did not “commit[] to continue pursuing such removal”).
While the government “has the right to enforce” Petitioner’s order of removal, it
“may not detain [him] for an indefinite and undetermined period of time while it tries to
effect that removal when the circumstances are such that his removal is not reasonably
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likely in the foreseeable future.” Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex.
2025). For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents’ continued
detention of Petitioner violates the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 	See Pena-Gil v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-03268-PAB-NRN, 2025 WL 3268333, at *4 (D.
Colo. Nov. 24, 2025). 	The Court ORDERS that Petitioner be released from custody
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) immediately. See Ahrach, 2025 WL 3227529, at *5
(granting release in similar circumstances); Pena-Gil, 2025 WL 3268333, at *5 (same).
III. 	Petitioner’s Other Requests for Relief
In addition to immediate release from detention, Petitioner asks the Court to
(1) declare that Respondents’ continued detention of Petitioner violates the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Due Process Clause;
(2) enjoin Respondents “from imposing additional indefinite conditions of release, such
as a Global Positioning System (‘GPS’) monitor in violation of M.A.’s rights under the Due
Process 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment 	to 	the 	U.S. 	Constitution”; 	(3) 	“[r]equire
Respondents to provide adequate process prior to removing M.A. to any third country or
a country to which removal has been deferred”; (4) “[e]njoin and restrain Respondents
from re-detaining M.A. unless, bearing the burden of proof, they demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing, that M.A. is a flight risk or
danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified”; and (5) award
costs and fees. [Doc. 1 at 32–33].
With respect to Petitioner’s request for declaratory relief related to Respondents’
detention-related actions, this request is moot in light of the Court’s order to release
Petitioner. Pena-Gil, 2025 WL 3268333, at *5. To the extent Petitioner seeks attorney’s
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fees, this District’s Local Rules require that those requests be made by separate motion.
See D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3. And the Court will award costs as appropriate after the filing
of the joint status report discussed below.
That leaves Petitioner’s requests for a Court order enjoining Respondents from
imposing additional indefinite conditions of release, enjoining Respondents from re-
detaining M.A. unless they show that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community, and
requiring Respondents to provide adequate process to M.A. prior to any removal to a third
country. 	[Doc. 1 at 32]. 	The Court recognizes that courts throughout the country have
concluded that ICE’s policy of removing individuals to third countries without meaningful
notice and an opportunity to be heard is unlawful, and a number of courts have granted
the type of relief sought by Petitioner here. See, e.g., Emara v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-00116-
KKE, 2026 WL 266067, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2026); Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-
cv-02020-EPG-HC, 2026 WL 350829, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026); Al Zoubani v. Noem,
No. 26-cv-00378-BJC-KSC, 2026 WL 524053, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026). The Court
acknowledges Petitioner’s concern that he will be removed to a (currently unidentified)
third country without an opportunity to raise a fear-based claim against removal.
However, a “petition for writ of habeas corpus is only available to challenge the fact or
duration of confinement,” Basri v. Barr, 469 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1066 (D. Colo. 2020), so
this requested relief “is outside the relief available on a petition for writ of habeas corpus,”
Fadwa v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-03660-PAB, 2025 WL 3525026, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2025).
As for M.A.’s request that the Court enjoin Respondents from imposing additional
conditions of release, the Court observes that other courts in this District have addressed
this issue when ICE imposes conditions of release, such as GPS monitoring, that were
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not ordered by an immigration judge. See, e.g., Batz Barreno v. Baltasar, --- F. Supp. 3d
----, 2026 WL 120253, at *1–3 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2026). But there is no present indication
that Respondents intend to impose such additional conditions in this case. Therefore, the
Court respectfully finds that M.A. has not “clearly established” that the requested
injunctive relief is necessary at this time. De La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB,
2026 WL 439217, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026) (citing Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268,
270 (10th Cir. 1964) (“Injunction is a drastic remedy to be exercised with caution, and
should be granted only in cases where the necessity therefore is clearly established.”)).
For these reasons, the Petition is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part;4
(2) 	Respondents SHALL RELEASE M.A. no later than 48 hours after the
issuance of this Order; and
(3) 	On or before March 31, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
informing the Court of the status of M.A.’s release and whether any additional
proceedings in this matter are required.
DATED: March 24, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
4 Because the Court has granted Petitioner the habeas relief he seeks and has explained
why his other requested relief cannot be granted, the Court need not address Petitioner’s
other claims. See Pena-Gil, 2025 WL 3268333, at *4.
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