Balderas Rivas v. Baltazar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00442-SKC
LEOBARDO BALDERAS RIVAS,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner Leobardo Balderas Rivas entered the United States without
inspection in 2000 and has resided here continuously since then. Dkt. 1, ¶¶1, 39.1
He is the father of three children, one of whom is currently enrolled in college and
relies on Mr. Balderas Rivas for support. He owns his own home, has operated his
own painting business since 2010, and has had no contact with the criminal legal
system apart from traffic violations not involving alcohol. Id. at ¶14.
On November 25, 2025, while Mr. Balderas Rivas was stopped at a gas
station on his way to work, immigration officers approached him and took him into
1 Although it is of no consequence to the analysis, neither party has indicated where
Plaintiff is originally from. But it is undisputed that he entered the U.S. without
inspection.
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custody. Id. On December 26, 2025, Petitioner moved for a bond hearing, which
was held on January 13, 2026. The immigration judge found that Mr. Balderas
Rivas is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and ordered that he be
released upon payment of a $5,000 bond. Id. at ¶15. Petitioner was not permitted
to post bond, however, because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
invoked an automatic stay regulation so it could appeal the IJ’s conclusions. Id. at
¶16. That regulation reads, in relevant part:
Automatic stay in certain cases. In any case in which DHS has
determined that an alien should not be released or has set a bond of
$10,000 or more, any order of the immigration judge authorizing release
(on bond or otherwise) shall be stayed upon DHS’s filing of a notice of
intent to appeal the custody redetermination (Form EOIR-43) with the
immigration court within one business day of the order, and, except as
otherwise provided in 8 CFR 1003.6(c), shall remain in abeyance
pending decision of the appeal by the Board. The decision whether or
not to file Form EOIR-43 is subject to the discretion of the Secretary.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2).2 Mr. Balderas Rivas remains in custody to this day pursuant
to this regulation.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 5, 2026,
2 The automatic stay lapses after 90 days, absent a Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) decision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(4), but the government can extend the detention
by seeking a discretionary stay from the BIA, which automatically extends the stay
for an additional 30 days while the BIA decides the request for discretionary stay. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(5). If the BIA authorizes a noncitizens release, denies a motion for
discretionary stay, or fails to act on such a motion before the automatic stay period
expires, the noncitizen’s release shall be automatically stayed for five business days.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(d). During that period, DHS can choose to refer the bond decision
to the Attorney General, which extends the automatic stay for another 15 business
days. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(d). The Attorney General can then extend the stay for the
pendency of the custody proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(d).
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seeking an order from this Court directing Respondents to affect his immediate
release upon the payment of his $5,000 bond. Dkt. 1. He contends Respondents use
of the automatic stay regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) is unconstitutional and
violates his procedural and substantive due process rights. Id. at ¶18. And he
contends Respondents’ attempt to detain him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is
unlawful. Id. at ¶20.
This Court ordered Respondents3 to respond to the Petition within three days
of service. Dkt. 10. Specifically, the Court asked Respondents to address Magistrate
Judge Susan B. Prose’s analysis in Merchan-Pacheo v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-03860-SBP,
2026 WL 88526, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2026) and show cause why it should not adopt
her analysis in this case. In Merchan-Pacheco, Judge Prose was confronted with facts
like those here, where an immigration judge found that the petitioner merited release
upon posting a $25,000 bond. Although the petitioner’s family paid the bond, DHS
then invoked the automatic stay provision in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) so it could appeal
the immigration judge’s findings to the BIA. Judge Prose conducted a thorough
analysis pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), and concluded
that the automatic stay provision violated the petitioner’s procedural due process
rights.
3 “Respondents” refers to Juan Baltazar, the Warden of the Denver Contract
Detention Facility; Robert Gaudian, the Director of the Denver ICE Field Office;
Kristi Noem, the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security;
Todd Lyons, the Acting Director of ICE; and Pamela Bondi, the United States
Attorney General.
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On February 9, 2026, in commendable candor to the court, Respondents
acknowledged that the facts in this case are not materially different from those in
Merchan-Pacheco but argue that the case was wrongly decided. Dkt. 13, pp.4-7.
Respondents incorporate by reference the arguments they made in Merchan-Pacheco
and contend the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis is not applicable in cases like this and
even if it is, the factors do not support Mr. Balderas Rivas’ due process claims. While
thoughtfully articulated, the Court respectfully disagrees with Respondents and
adopts in full Judge Prose’s reasoning in Merchan-Pacheco and that of the growing
number of district courts to address this issue.4 See Martinez v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-
01007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379, at *4, n.1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025) (collecting cases).5
JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 2241 of Title
28, which authorizes it to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon
the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “[T]he
4 In her Order, Judge Prose addressed Respondents’ contention that Mathews v.
Eldridge does not apply in these cases. She engaged in a detailed analysis of each of
Respondents’ arguments and those cases upon which they relied and concluded
Mathews is applicable. The Court agrees and adopts this analysis. Merchan-Pacheco,
2026 WL 88526, at **4-8.
5 To be sure, the notion that this regulation likely violates the procedural due process
rights of detainees is not new. Courts have been reaching this conclusion for over 20
years. Martinez, 2025 WL 2598379, at *4, n.1.
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traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Id.
Noncitizens may properly challenge the lawfulness of their detention through habeas
proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001).
The Court has considered the Petition, the Response, the various attachments,
and the governing law. Because Petitioner’s challenge is fundamentally legal in
nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
ANALYSIS
To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights,
courts apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, (1976).
Pursuant to Mathews, courts weigh the following three factors: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424
U.S. at 335.
At the outset, there is no question but that Mr. Balderas Rivas has a significant
interest at stake. Freedom from physical detention “is the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (directing courts, when
assessing the first Mathews factor, to consider only the petitioner’s interests at stake
in ongoing detention without consideration of the respondents’ justifications for the
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detention). Despite not being accused of any crime, Petitioner is being held in a
detention 	facility 	that 	“strongly 	resemble[s] 	penal 	confinement,” 	Arostegui-
Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926, 940 (D. Colo. 2025), is away from his
family, and is unable to maintain his employment. Thus, the first Matthews factor
supports Mr. Balderas Rivas’ claim of a due process violation.
Turning to the second factor, Respondents begin by noting that this factor has
also been referred to as the “concern for accuracy.” Dkt. 13, p.9 (citing City of Los
Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 718 (2003)). Then they argue that the automatic stay
enhances accuracy because the IJ’s custody determination is promptly reviewed
before the noncitizen is released. Id. But this frames the concern for accuracy solely
in the government’s favor, and “the traditional due process concern with accuracy . .
. is meant to protect the individual interest.” Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480,
1487 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958)
(“Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal
defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first
instance. . . .”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (“[P]rocedural due
process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as
applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”). In matters such as this,
the concern for accuracy is that individuals will erroneously be deprived of their
liberty—the paramount interest at stake—as opposed to a concern with the accuracy
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of an IJ’s determination that an individual is not a danger or a flight risk.6
And the Court does conclude that Respondents’ use of the automatic stay
creates a large risk that Mr. Balderas Rivas will erroneously be deprived of his liberty
interests. To be sure, “the only individuals subject to the automatic stay are those
who, by definition, prevailed at their bond hearing.” Martinez, 2025 WL 2598379, at
*3. It creates “a patently unfair situation by taking the stay decision out of the hands
of the judges altogether and giving it to the prosecutor who has by definition failed to
persuade a judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified.” Ashley v. Ridge,
288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (D.N.J. 2003) (cleaned up).
Further, the automatic stay does not require DHS to consider or demonstrate
any individualized facts or show a likelihood of success on the merits. “A stay of an
order directing the release of a detained individual is an ‘especially’ extraordinary
step, because ‘in our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without
trial is the carefully limited exception.’” Gunaydin v. Trump, No. 25-CV-01151
(JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154, at *9 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
Finally, with respect to the third factor, Respondents contend they have a
6 To be sure, Respondents apparently have not appealed the IJ’s conclusions in that
regard and instead have appealed the IJ’s determination that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies
to Petitioner in the first place. But this Court has already rejected Respondents’
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226 in Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-
3688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL 3718159, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025). To the extent
necessary, the Court incorporates its Hernandez analysis here.
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strong governmental interest in preventing flight risks due to the difficulties of
removing noncitizens who are not detained. Dkt. 13, p.7. But this interest rings
hollow given that, as noted above, this automatic stay is being applied only to those
individuals “who an Immigration Judge has determined [do] not pose a public safety
threat or a risk of flight sufficient to warrant continued confinement.” Merchan-
Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at *16 (emphasis added). Respondents’ stated interest is
inconsequential when weighed against Mr. Balderas Rivas’ liberty interest. Maza v.
Hyde, --- F. Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 2951922, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 20, 2025).
* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, the Court finds that the automatic stay
regulation, 8 C.F.R § 1003.19(i)(2), violates Mr. Balderas Rivas’ procedural due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.7
IT IS ORDERED once Mr. Balderas Rivas posts his $5,000 bond, Respondents
shall immediately release Petitioner from custody. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
Respondents may not impose an ankle monitor or any other condition not specifically
imposed in writing by the immigration judge. See Batz Barreno v. Baltasar, No. 25-
cv-03017-GPG-TPO, 2026 WL 120253, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2026) (concluding use
7 To the extent Petitioner’s Counsel seeks an award of attorney’s fees, they must file
a separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Local Rules of Practice for this District.
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of a GPS ankle monitor constitutes custody for the purposes of habeas corpus and due
process).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents shall file a status report within TEN
DAYS of the date of this Court’s order to certify compliance.
DATED: 	February 17, 2026.
BY THE COURT
_____________________________
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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