Lara Mejia v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-00385-NYW-TPO
JOSE LARA MEJIA,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
GEORGE VALDEZ, in his official capacity,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity,
TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
SIRCE OWEN, in her official capacity, and
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,1
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Judgment (the
“Motion” or “Motion to Enforce”). [Doc. 19]. The Motion is fully briefed. [Doc. 23; Doc. 25].
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is respectfully GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Jose Lara Mejia (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Lara Mejia”) is a citizen of Mexico
who has been present in the United States since 1999. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 24]. 	He was
detained by ICE officers in January 2026. [Id. at ¶¶ 12–13]. That month, he filed a petition
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Markwayne Mullin and Todd Blanche are automatically
substituted in as Respondents as current officeholders.
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for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his detention. See [id.]. This Court
granted the Petition on March 17, 2026.2 [Doc. 17]. The Court ordered Respondents to
provide Mr. Lara Mejia a bond hearing no later than March 24, 2026, and further ordered
that “[a]t the bond hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified.” [Id. at 9].
A hearing was held on March 19, 2026. [Doc. 19-2 at 3]. The immigration judge’s
written order states as follows:
[Id. at 2].
Mr. Lara Mejia filed the Motion to Enforce on April 7, 2026, arguing that the
immigration judge (or “IJ”) failed to comply with this Court’s order, “culminating in a
conclusory decision utterly devoid of individualized analysis.” [Doc. 19 at 2]. He argues
2 The Petition was filed on January 30, 2026 and was assigned to the Honorable Daniel
D. Domenico. [Doc. 1; Doc. 2]. On March 16, 2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion
for Expedited Decision on Petition for Habeas Corpus and Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, which asked for a ruling on his Petition in
advance of a March 19, 2026 immigration court hearing. [Doc. 13]. On March 17, Chief
Judge Domenico recused from the case, [Doc. 15], and the case was then reassigned to
the undersigned, [Doc. 16]. The Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order that
same day due to the then-pending emergency motion. [Doc 17].
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that the bond hearing failed to comply with due process requirements, and his “continued
detention is unlawful.” [Id.]. He asks that this Court enter an order directing his immediate
release or ordering a new bond hearing, before a different immigration judge, “with explicit
instructions ensuring compliance with the Court’s Order.” [Id.].
ANALYSIS
“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,
with power to impose . . . submission to their lawful mandates.” 	Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227
(1821)). Respondents acknowledge that the Court “has inherent authority to ensure that
its orders are carried out.” [Doc. 23 at 5].
Although the INA provides that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of [§ 1226] shall not be subject to review” and “[n]o court may
set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention or release of any alien,” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), this statute “only bars review of the
Attorney General’s ‘discretionary judgment,’” Mendez v. Dedos, No. 1:26-cv-00394-KG-
JHR, 2026 WL 973077, at *2 (D.N.M. Apr. 10, 2026) (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 516–17 (2003)). “Whether [a petitioner] received the due process to which he was
entitled ‘is not a matter of discretion’ and is subject to judicial review.” Velasco Lopez v.
Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688
(2001)); see also Castillo v. Field Off. Dir., No. 25-cv-25296, 2025 WL 4689387, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2025) (“Courts have repeatedly concluded that § 1226(e) does not
preclude challenges to the procedures used in custody determinations under § 1226.”
(collecting cases)).
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Thus, while the Court cannot “serv[e] as an appellate court over an IJ’s bond
decision,” the Court may “assess[] whether the IJ applied the legal standard prescribed
by this Court and otherwise followed the Court’s directives.” 	Quiroz Zacarias v. Mullin,
No. 26-cv-00574-WJM, 2026 WL 1092162, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2026). To the extent
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Motion “asks the Court to substantively review the
merits of the bond hearing and argues that the standard and evidence should have led
the immigration judge to a different conclusion,” [Doc. 23 at 8], the Court disagrees that
this is proper framing of Petitioner’s Motion. In this Order, the Court does not weigh the
evidence before the immigration judge or act as an appellate court conducting a review
of the IJ’s ultimate determination. Instead, the Court will “review the nature and structure
of the [IJ’s decision] for the minimal indicia of due process.” Lopez v. Paulk, --- F. Supp.
3d ----, 2026 WL 961948, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2026).
Mr. Lara Mejia argues that the immigration judge failed to comply with this Court’s
order imposing a clear and convincing evidentiary burden on Respondents to justify
Petitioner’s detention. He asserts that “it is doubtful that the IJ even attempted to apply
this standard” in her ruling because “the IJ never mentions the clear and convincing
evidence standard,” the “IJ did not identify what evidence satisfied the Government’s
burden, how that evidence meets the stringent clear and convincing evidence standard,
or what factors support the conclusion that Mr. Lara Mejia poses an unacceptable flight
risk or danger.” [Doc. 19 at 9, 12]. The Court respectfully agrees.
“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due
Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to instruct the factfinder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
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conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423
(1979) (quotation omitted). “To prove a fact by clear and convincing evidence is a heavy
burden that equates to showing the fact is ‘highly probable.’” United States v. Dear, 104
F.4th 145, 147 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Florida v. Georgia, 592 U.S. 433, 438–39 (2021)).
There is no indication in the IJ’s oral ruling at the close of the bond hearing, [Doc. 19-1],
or her subsequent written order, [Doc. 19-2], that the IJ applied this applicable standard
of proof—or even placed any burden on the Government at all.
The Court begins with the bond hearing itself, which the Court has listened to in its
entirety. At the outset, the Government argued for approximately 90 seconds that, based
on criminal charges filed in 2000, 2002, and 2003, Mr. Lara Mejia poses a danger to the
community. See [Doc. 19-1 at 1:48–3:16]. The Government did not make any argument
about risk of flight or even mention this component in passing. 	[Id.]. 	After hearing
argument from Mr. Lara Mejia’s attorney, [id. at 3:20–7:32], asking questions to Mr. Lara
Mejia, [id. at 7:35–20:40], and hearing additional argument from Mr. Lara Mejia, [id. at
22:38–24:04], the IJ issued the following oral ruling:
The court will issue its order now based on all the evidence and the legal
argument of counsel. Madam interpreter I’ll pause periodically so you can
interpret; it’s not a long order. 	The court has considered all evidence and
argument of counsel. 	The court would note as an initial matter that the
Department of Homeland Security contests jurisdiction, or contests the
Court’s authority or bond jurisdiction in this case, despite the issuance of
the federal habeas order. Although respectfully the Department maintains
that the federal district court has improperly shifted the burden to the
Department of Homeland Security, however, [sic] the Court has moved
forward and will make alternative findings. 	And just for the record I’m
referring 	to 	civil 	case 	number 	26-cv-0038-NYW-TPO 	[sic], 	District 	of
Colorado. After considering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant
factors, the court respects the federal district court’s order but denies bond.
That is, the court has allowed the Respondent to present all of his evidence
and the court considers it in the best possible light. If the Department bears
the burden, the court finds that the Department has met its burden to
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establish that the Respondent is both a danger and a flight risk. 	If an
appellate review body determines that the Respondent bears the burden,
as is usual in these types of cases, the court finds that the Respondent has
not met his burden to establish that he is neither a danger nor a significant
flight risk such that release from custody is warranted. 	Accordingly, the
court denies the Respondent’s request for a change in custody status. To
be clear, the court provided the Respondent with an individualized bond
hearing as ordered by the federal district court.
[Id. at 24:07–28:57 (Spanish translations omitted)].
This cursory oral ruling “deprives the Court of a meaningful opportunity to review
whether the IJ actually applied the standard it prescribed in its Order: 	the clear and
convincing standard to be satisfied by the Government.” 	Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL
1092162, at *4. This ruling contains no case-specific analysis. It does not reference the
clear 	and 	convincing 	evidence 	standard, 	let 	alone 	identify 	the 	evidence 	that 	the
immigration judge believed satisfied the Government’s burden. 	In fact, the IJ did not
reference the Government’s presentation of evidence at all, stating instead that she had
“allowed” Mr. Lara Mejia to present evidence and viewed that evidence “in the best
possible light.” These deficiencies “indicate an absence of the individualization required
by due process.” 	Lopez, 2026 WL 961948, at *5 (finding that IJ failed to provide
constitutionally adequate bond hearing where her decision “comprised two sentences,”
she did not discuss the petitioner’s personal circumstances, and she “announced her
decision immediately at the end of the hearing”); cf. Arrendondo v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-
03040-RBJ, ECF No. 26 at 8–9 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2025) (granting motion to enforce
where the IJ considered evidence “without regard for what party proffer[ed] the evidence
or the order in which it [was] considered,” which “risk[ed] subtly reassigning the burden to
the noncitizen”). 	“[T]he strength or paucity of [the habeas petitioner’s] evidence cannot
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substitute for the government’s obligation to establish danger or flight risk by clear and
convincing evidence in the first instance.” Arrendondo, ECF No. 26 at 9.
The IJ’s written order fares no better. 	Like the oral ruling, the written order does
not mention the clear and convincing evidence standard. 	[Doc. 19-2 at 2]. 	It does not
contain any analysis or expressly mention any evidence that the IJ considered in her bond
determination. [Id.]. In other words, “the IJ supplied no reasoning, oral or otherwise, in
support of her bond decision.” 	Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *4; see also
Arrendondo, ECF No. 26 at 15 (in ruling that the IJ did not adhere to burden allocation
ordered by the court, noting that the IJ’s decision “never clearly identifie[d] what
affirmative proof submitted by DHS satisfied th[e] burden in the first instance”).
“Due process is not satisfied by rubberstamp denials of bond.” 	Garcia v. Hyde,
817 F. Supp. 3d 112, 131 (D.R.I. 2025) (quoting Chi Thon Ngo v. Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv., 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)); cf. Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908,
916 (10th Cir. 1977) (while due process does not require a “full opinion or even formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law,” a decision made in “conclusory terms” is
insufficient; “the decision maker should state the reasons for the determination and the
evidentiary basis relied on”); Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir.
2005) (“In the administrative context, an alien: 	(1) is entitled to factfinding based on a
record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her, (2) must be
allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an
individualized determination of his or her interests.” (cleaned up)). And a noncitizen can
demonstrate that a bond hearing was constitutionally inadequate by showing that the
immigration judge “simply did not apply the correct standard to the facts.” Garcia, 817 F.
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Supp. 3d at 126 	(quotation omitted). 	For the reasons explained above, the nature and
structure of the bond hearing and the IJ’s order demonstrate that the IJ failed to comply
with this Court’s order directing that the Government bear the burden of justifying
Petitioner’s detention by clear and convincing evidence. 	This violated Mr. Lara Mejia’s
due process rights. Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *5; Lopez, 2026 WL 961948,
at *5, *10.
Respondents’ arguments opposing the Motion are not persuasive. They contend
that the immigration judge complied with the Court’s order because she “acknowledged
this Court’s order,” stating at the bond hearing that the hearing had been conducted “as
ordered by the federal court,” and because she stated in her written order that she had
“provided [Mr. Lara Mejia] with an individualized bond hearing as ordered by the federal
court.” 	[Doc. 23 at 5–7 (quotations omitted)]. 	However, “[m]erely stating the proper
standard does not discharge the obligation to correctly apply the standard.” Akinsanya v.
Garland, 125 F.4th 287, 297 (1st Cir. 2025). The IJ’s assertions that she complied with
this Court’s order do not overcome the plain deficiencies on the face of her order.
Arrendondo, ECF No. 26 at 8 (granting motion to enforce even though the IJ’s decision
stated that DHS bore the burden by clear and convincing evidence).
Respondents next argue that if the Court cannot determine whether the IJ
complied with its Order, “the Court should ask the immigration judge to clarify its order, so
that the Court can determine what burden of proof the immigration judge applied.” [Doc.
23 at 12]. The Court declines this suggestion. This Court’s ruling was unambiguous with
respect to the applicable standard of review and burden of proof required at the bond
hearing—it left no doubt that the Government would be required to justify Petitioner’s
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continued detention by clear and convincing evidence, and the Court declines to suggest
that due process violations can be remedied after the fact by permitting an IJ a second
opportunity to do what was required in the first instance. Any post-hoc explanations would
not satisfy this Court that Mr. Lara Mejia was afforded the amount of process he was due
at the hearing. 	Cf. Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *4 (declining to credit IJ’s
belated explanation of the application of the burden of proof).
Respondents also contend that Mr. Lara Mejia can appeal the IJ’s decision and
“should exhaust those administrative remedies.” 	[Doc. 23 at 15]. 	“In the immigration
context, ‘exhaustion of remedies is statutorily required only for appeals of final orders of
removal.’” 	Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *3 (quoting Quintana Casillas v.
Sessions, No. 17-cv-01039-DME-CBS, 2017 WL 3088346, at *9 (D. Colo. Jul. 20, 2017)).
Where a petitioner “challenges the procedures employed by the IJ at his bond hearing,
. . . exhaustion is merely prudential, not mandatory,” and “whether to require exhaustion
is committed to sound judicial discretion.” 	Id. 	Respondents’ short argument does not
demonstrate that exhaustion is required here, and “the Court will not require [Petitioner]
to sit in an ICE detention facility for months on end while []he awaits a BIA decision.”
Alvarado Lopez v. Dillman, No. 1:25-cv-02456-LMB-LRV, 2026 WL 688958, at *6 (E.D.
Va. Mar. 11, 2026); Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *3 (same).
Finally, Respondents argue that, by requesting immediate release, Petitioner is “in
essence asking the Court to overrule the decision of the immigration judge that he should
remain in custody.” [Doc. 23 at 13 (cleaned up)]. And “because release is not required
under § 1226(a),” they assert that “release is not appropriate habeas relief.” [Id. at 14].
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In fashioning an appropriate remedy in similar cases, some courts have ordered a
second bond hearing employing the constitutionally required standards. 	See, e.g.,
Arrendondo, ECF No. 26 at 15; Bayani v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-00266-JES-VET, 2026 WL
1270059, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2026); Castillo, 2025 WL 4689387, at *7; Lopez, 2026
WL 961948, at *10. Others have ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. See, e.g.,
Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *5; Garcia Diaz v. Mattos, No. 2:26-cv-00926-
RFB-BNW, 2026 WL 1270816, at *7 (D. Nev. May 9, 2026); Perez Sierra v. Margolin, No.
25-cv-18829, 2026 WL 800158, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026); Garcia Ortiz v. Henkey, No.
1:26-cv-00043-BLW, 2026 WL 948275, at *4 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2026); Mendez, 2026 WL
973077, at *2.
Upon review of this record and considering all the circumstances of this case, the
Court finds that an order of immediate release is warranted. In its prior Order, the Court
signaled that if Petitioner did not receive a compliant bond hearing, immediate release
would be appropriate. See [Doc. 17 at 9 (“If Respondents . . . do not provide Petitioner
with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, he must be immediately
released 	from 	detention.” 	(emphasis 	omitted))]. 	Mr. 	Lara 	Mejia 	has 	now 	been
unconstitutionally detained for nearly four months. And even after this Court ruled that
Petitioner’s constitutional rights had been violated, his due process rights were violated
again at the deficient bond hearing. 	The Court sees no reason to order another bond
hearing—and risk a third constitutional violation—and prolong the detention that this
Court has already determined is unlawful. See Quiroz Zacarias, 2026 WL 1092162, at *5
(ordering immediate release and recognizing that “[r]equiring [the petitioner] to undergo
yet another” bond hearing “would only add further insult to the constitutional injury to
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which Petitioner has already been subjected”); Mendez, 2026 WL 973077, at *2 (granting
immediate release where the bond hearing did not comply with the court’s order). In these
circumstances, the Court finds that immediate release is appropriate and warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Judgment [Doc. 19] is GRANTED;
(2) 	Respondents SHALL RELEASE Mr. Lara Mejia within 48 hours of the
issuance of this Order;
(3) 	On or before May 22, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
confirming Mr. Lara Mejia’s release and informing the Court whether further
proceedings are required in this case.
DATED: May 15, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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