Leyva Ramirez v. Baltasar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-00199-NYW
LEONARDO LEYVA RAMIREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR, in his official capacity;
ROBERT HAGAN, in his official capacity;
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity;
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity;
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity;
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(“Petition”), [Doc. 1], and Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction (“Motion for TRO”), [Doc. 14]. Respondents1 filed a consolidated
1 The Court agrees with Respondents that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and the Department of Homeland Security are not proper Respondents to this action.
[Doc. 21 at 1 n.1]. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]here is generally only one
proper respondent to a given prisoner’s habeas petition. This custodian, moreover, is ‘the
person’ with the ability to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court.” Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35 (2004); see also id. at 435 (“The writ of habeas corpus
acts upon the person who holds [the detainee] in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”
(quotation omitted)). To be sure, Padilla left open the question of which “person” may be
considered the custodian of a noncitizen in immigration detention. See id. at 435 n. 8.
But Respondents only challenge the inclusion of federal agencies as parties to this case.
With respect to this limited challenge, Padilla is clear that where, as here, a detainee
attacks his present physical confinement, the habeas action must be directed at a
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response in opposition, [Doc. 21], and Petitioner has replied, [Doc. 22]. For the reasons
set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Leonardo Leyva Ramirez (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Leyva Ramirez”) is a
noncitizen who has resided in the United States since 2022. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1–2, 40]. He
was taken into custody by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
in November 2025 and has been held without a bond hearing ever since. [Id. at ¶¶ 3–4,
43–44]. The Government purports to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See
[id. at 50; Doc. 21 at 3; Doc. 21-1 at ¶ 12]. Petitioner disputes the Government’s
interpretation of § 1225(b) and contends that he is actually detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), which would entitle him to a bond hearing. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 34–39, 45–52]. But
because § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for mandatory detention, he has no opportunity for
release on bond while the Government considers him detained under this provision. See
[Id. at ¶¶ 4, 45–52].
In the Petition, Mr. Leyva Ramirez brings four claims challenging the lawfulness of
Respondents’ decision to detain him without a bond hearing. First, he asserts that
Respondents’ erroneous application of § 1225(b) and § 1226(a) violates § 1226(a)
(“Count One”). [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 45–47]. Second, he argues that Respondents’ denial of a
bond hearing violates § 1226(a)’s implementing regulations (“Count Two”). [Id. at ¶¶ 48–
“person,” not a federal agency. See, e.g., Wallace v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 7:12–
cv–00258, 2012 WL 6600348, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2012) (“Neither the [Federal
Bureau of Prisons] nor the United States of America is a proper respondent to a habeas
corpus petition.” (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. 426)). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to terminate U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Department
of Homeland Security as Respondents in this action.
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52]. Third, he asserts that his detention based on § 1225(b) violates the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) (“Count Three”). [Id. at ¶¶ 53–56]. Fourth, he contends that that
his detention without a bond hearing violates his rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment (“Count Four”). [Id. at ¶¶ 57–60]. Mr. Leyva Ramirez seeks, among
other things, a writ of habeas corpus ordering that he either be released from custody or
granted a bond hearing within seven days. [Doc. 1 at 12].
This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.2 No Party has requested an
evidentiary hearing or oral argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
16, 2025) (declining to hold a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was
“fundamentally legal in nature”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
2 Respondents represent that Mr. Leyva Ramirez has been ordered removed by an
immigration judge, and if he does not file an appeal by February 13, 2026, that order will
become final and justify his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. [Doc. 21 at 2]. But to the
extent that Respondents implicitly suggest that the Court should simply hold a ruling on
this Petition in abeyance until they file a Status Report on February 16, 2026, see [id. at
2–3], this Court respectfully declines to do so. In his Reply, Petitioner represents he
intends to file an appeal. [Doc. 22 at 3]. But more fundamentally, as another court has
aptly observed, Respondents may not detain first and sort out the lawful authority later.
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habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s claims primarily turn on whether Respondents may detain him
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A), such that he is not entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
The Court summarizes the statutory framework before turning to the Parties’ arguments.
I. Statutory Framework
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1226 “sets forth
‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already present in the United States.’” Quispe-
Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept.
30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). This section permits, but does not require,
the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings, subject to
certain exceptions not applicable here. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–
(2) (the Attorney General “may continue to detain” or “may release” the noncitizen
(emphasis added)). Section 1226(a) thus establishes a discretionary framework for the
detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
Section 1225(b) “supplement[s] § 1226’s detention scheme.” Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)). Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to
[noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States,” i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. This section provides, in relevant part, that “in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
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that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added).3 Under § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters).
Absent an exception for urgent humanitarian reasons not implicated in this case,
“detention under § 1225(b)(2) is considered mandatory,” and “[i]ndividuals detained under
§ 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
II. Application to Petitioner’s Statutory Claim
The Court’s analysis begins and ends with Count One, the statutory claim.
Respondents argue that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies and requires Petitioner’s detention, so
he is not entitled to a bond hearing. See [Doc. 21]. This Court, following the clear weight
of persuasive authority, has already rejected Respondents’ position. See Loa Caballero
v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025)
(“[F]ederal courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ ‘broad interpretation of
3 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), “certain applicants for admission who are deemed
inadmissible are subject to expedited removal, unless they express a fear of persecution
or an intent to apply for asylum.” Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 802 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304
(D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-2152 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2025); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (directing an immigration officer to “order [a person deemed
inadmissible] removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless
[the person] indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution”).
Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), see [Doc.
11], so the Court does not substantively address detention under this subsection.
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section 1225(b)(2).’” (collecting cases)).4 In Loa Caballero, this Court reviewed a similar
habeas petition filed by a noncitizen who had resided in the United States for nearly 20
years before he was detained by ICE. See id. at *1. Like Mr. Leyva Ramirez, the
Government did not provide the petitioner in Loa Caballero with a bond hearing because
it asserted that § 1225 mandated his detention. See id. The Court disagreed,
emphasizing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) only provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens
“seeking admission” to the country. Id. at *6. “The plain meaning of the phrase ‘seeking
admission’ requires that the applicant must be presently and actively seeking lawful entry
into the United States.” Id. Thus, noncitizens who are merely “present”—and have been
for “years upon years” without obtaining legal status—are not “seeking admission” under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. (quoting Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D.
Mich. 2025)). Interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate detention for all “applicants for
admission” would render the “seeking admission” language superfluous. Id. at *7. The
Court concluded that both the plain text of § 1225 and applicable canons of statutory
interpretation demonstrated that the petitioner in Loa Caballero was detained under
4 In addition to this Court’s ruling in Loa Caballero, a majority of other judges in this District
have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens similarly situated to
Mr. Leyva Ramirez, who have been present in the country for some time and are not
actively “seeking admission.” See, e.g., Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02720-
RMR, 2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2024) (Rodriguez, J.), appeal docketed, No.
25-1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025); Moya Pineda v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02955-GPG, 2025
WL 3516291 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2025) (Gallagher, J.); Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No.
25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sweeney, J.); Florez
Marin v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03697-PAB, 2025 WL 3677019 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2025)
(Brimmer, C.J.); Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL
3718159 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025) (Crews, J.); Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-04029-
WJM-STV, 2026 WL 100587 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026) (Martinez, J.).
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§ 1226, not § 1225. See id. at *5–8. The Court has since reaffirmed its ruling in Loa
Caballero in several other similar habeas cases. See, e.g., Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar,
No. 25-cv-03439-NYW, 2026 WL 35227 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2026).
Respondents acknowledge the issue presented in this case “is not materially
different” than Loa Cabellero, see [Doc. 21 at 2], and provide no persuasive reason for
the Court to depart from the conclusion it reached in that case. Nor has the Tenth Circuit
yet addressed the issue. And although Respondents preserve their arguments to the
contrary, they concede that the Court’s ruling in Loa Caballero will lead the Court to the
same conclusion here.
Accordingly, as in Loa Caballero and Briales-Zuniga, the Court concludes that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) does not authorize Respondents’ detention of Petitioner. The “default
rule” of discretionary detention under § 1226(a) therefore applies. See, e.g., Quispe-
Ardiles, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5, *7. And because Respondents have failed to provide
Mr. Leyva Ramirez with a bond hearing or any other individualized custody determination,
his continued detention violates § 1226(a).
III. Appropriate Remedy
Petitioner asks the Court to order Respondents to either release him immediately
or “provide him with a bond hearing pursuant to [§ 1226(a)] within seven days.” [Doc. 1
at 12]. But § 1226(a) “does not require release—it provides DHS the discretion to grant
an alien release on bond.” Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *8. This Court has
previously held that a bond hearing before an immigration judge is sufficient to vindicate
the procedural protections afforded by § 1226(a). See Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650,
at *9; Briales-Zuniga, 2026 WL 35227, at *4. As in those cases, the Court finds that an
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immigration judge is better suited than this Court to conduct the hearing and consider
whether Mr. Leyva Ramirez poses a flight risk or danger to the community.
Accordingly, Respondents are ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing before an immigration judge no later than February 13, 2026. If Respondents do
not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein,
he must be immediately released from detention. On or before February 20, 2026, the
Parties shall file a joint status report concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that
was conducted or, if no hearing was held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was
released from custody; (2) whether Petitioner has appealed the immigration judge’s order
of removal, see [Doc. 21 at 2]; and (3) whether any additional proceedings in this matter
are required.
Having granted Mr. Leyva Ramirez relief as to Count One, the Court does not reach
his other claims at this time. And because Petitioner’s Motion for TRO seeks substantially
the same relief as the relief the Court grants as to Count One, see [Doc. 14 at 12], the
Motion for TRO is respectfully DENIED as moot, see Loa Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650,
at *9 (denying motion for temporary restraining order as moot after granting petitioner
“identical” relief on the merits).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) The Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED in part;
(2) Respondents shall provide Petitioner a bond hearing no later than February
13, 2026. If Respondents to not do not provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be
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immediately released from detention;
(3) On or before February 20, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no
hearing was held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was released from
custody; (2) whether Petitioner has appealed the immigration judge’s order of
removal; and (3) whether any additional proceedings in this matter are
required;
(4) Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction [Doc. 14] is DENIED as moot; and
(5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents in
this action.
DATED: February 6, 2026 BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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