Chennah v. Baltazar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00112-CNS
KARIM CHENNAH,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of the Aurora Contract Detention Facility owned and
operated by GEO Group, Inc.,
ROBERT HAGAN, Acting Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement,
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
TODD LYONS, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Respondents.
ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF
No. 1, and Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 2. After ordering
Respondents to respond in a show cause order, ECF No. 5, Respondents filed their
response to Petitioner’s petition and emergency motion, ECF No. 14, arguing both should
be denied.
Respondents’ arguments are unpersuasive. Explained further below, the Court
GRANTS Petitioner’s habeas petition, ECF No. 1, and DENIES AS MOOT his emergency
motion, ECF No. 2. The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner
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from custody. In doing so, the Court presumes familiarity with this case’s factual and
procedural background, and the legal standards governing the Court’s analysis of
Petitioner’s habeas petition. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court provides a summary of undisputed facts. Petitioner is a gay man from
Morocco. See ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 6. He entered the United States on or about
October 17, 2024. See ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 6. After being taken into custody
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Petitioner filed an application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
See ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 6.
After a merits hearing on June 25, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Petitioner
removed to Morocco and granted Petitioner withholding of that removal to Morocco. See
ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 6. Petitioner has been detained since June 2025. See
ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 6. On or about January 8, 2026, Petitioner was provided
with a notice of removal to Cameroon. See ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 12.
Petitioner filed the instant petition on January 10, 2026. ECF No. 1. After
transferring Petitioner to Texas from this judicial district, Respondents returned Petitioner
to this judicial district on January 22, 2026. See ECF No. 16.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s habeas challenge is reducible to a core issue: whether there is a
substantial likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See, e.g., ECF
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No. 1 at 25. There isn’t, and Respondents have failed to meet their burden of showing
otherwise. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
As Respondents acknowledge, Petitioner has been detained for over “209 days,”
ECF No. 14 at 10, and therefore exceeds the “presumptively reasonable” six-month
period of detention. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 21–23; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; Sanchez
v. Noem, No. 5:25–CV–00104, 2025 WL 3760317, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“In
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court recognized a 6-month period of presumptively reasonable
detention.” (citation modified)). Therefore, Petitioner must provide “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; Kazemzadeh v. United States, Case No. 2:25–cv–01941–
JAD–NJK, 2026 WL 93122, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2026) (“[A]fter six months, the
noncitizen must provide good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future to show that his prolonged detention
exceeds the government’s statutory authority and that he should be released from ICE
custody.” (citation modified)).
Petitioner has made this showing. As Petitioner observes, he has no travel
documents to any other country, including Cameroon, see, e.g., ECF No. 1 at 21, and
evidence attendant to his removal to a third country other than Morocco indicates
Respondents’ removal efforts are at best “haphazard,” id. at 12. See also id. (“[Petitioner]
was provided with a notice of removal to Cameroon on January 8, 2026, only after ICE
was notified that this petition would be filed. He has no documents to travel to Cameroon.
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He has affirmatively asserted a fear of removal to Cameroon based on widespread
persecution of gay people there.” (citation modified)).
This is sufficient to meet his burden under Zadvydas, given there is “no indication
as to when or if he will be lawfully removed to a third country,” Sanchez, 2025 WL
3760317, 	at 	*10, 	and 	ICE 	“has 	been 	unable 	to 	remove 	him” 	since 	June 	2025,
Kazemzadeh, 2026 WL 93122, at *3. See also Jimenez Chacon v. Lyons, --- F. Supp. 3d
----, No. 2:25–cv–977–DHU–KBM, 2025 WL 3496702, at *7 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025) (“The
remote prospect of removal—to a hypothetical third country that may eventually choose
to accept him—does not make Petitioner’s removal reasonably foreseeable. (citation
modified)). Indeed, as discussed further below, Respondents have “yet to even identify a
third country to deport [Petitioner] to,” and the “burden thus shifts” to Respondents to
“respond with evidence sufficient to rebut” Petitioner’s initial showing. Azzo v. Noem,
Case No. 3:25–cv–03122–RBM–BJW, 2025 WL 3535208, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025)
(citation modified).
Respondents argue Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim fails because “ICE is continuing
to take steps to effectuate [his] removal by determining whether to pursue renewed
proceedings in the immigration court or whether to designate another country for
removal.” ECF No. 14 at 10. Central to this argument was Respondents’ prior intent to
remove Petitioner to Cameroon. Id. at 1 (“[H]e has a final order of removal and was
actively in the process of being removed from the United States to a third country—
Cameroon—when he filed his Petition.” (emphasis added)). But, based on Respondents’
own briefing and evidentiary submissions, that’s not happening any longer. See id.
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(“While Petitioner cannot be imminently removed to that third country . . . .” (citation
modified). In the words of Mark Kinsey, a Deportation Officer in ICE’s Enforcement and
Removal Operations Denver Field Office:
On January 11, 2026, Petitioner was transferred from the Denver
CDF to the Port Isabel Service Processing Center for staging for
removal to Cameroon. Petitioner arrived at the facility in Port Isabel
on January 13, 2026.
Petitioner 	claimed 	fear 	of 	removal 	to 	Cameroon. 	ICE 	referred
Petitioner to USCIS for screening for eligibility for protection under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
Between 	January 	13, 	2026, 	and 	January 	15, 	2026, 	USCIS
conducted a third country screening interview with Petitioner. At the
conclusion of 	the 	screening, 	USCIS 	determined 	that 	Petitioner
established it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted if
removed to Cameroon.
ICE ERO has been made aware of the Court’s Order prohibiting
Petitioner’s removal from the District of Colorado or from the United
States without further order of the Court. ICE ERO is in the process
of arranging Petitioner’s return to the District of Colorado and expects
him to return to the Denver CDF by January 22, 2026. ICE will
determine whether 	to move 	to 	reopen 	proceedings before 	the
immigration court for proceedings solely related to eligibility for
withholding of removal or CAT protection, or designate another
country for removal.
ECF No. 14-1 at 5–6 (emphases added).
“Will determine.” Id. “Whether to move to reopen.” Id. “Or designate another”—
unnamed, unidentified—“country for removal.” Id. “While Petitioner cannot be imminently
removed . . . .” ECF No. 14 at 1. These are not representations or arguments that
demonstrate a good reason to believe removal is reasonably foreseeable. Cf. Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. Numerous courts have persuasively rejected such equivocated,
conclusory justifications for continued detention, and based on the current record the
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Court joins them in rejecting Respondents’ infirm justification for Petitioner’s continued
detention here. See, e.g., Kazemzadeh, 2026 WL 93122, at *4 (“[A] document informed
[the petitioner] that he was to remain in custody and that ICE ‘expects to effectuate [his]
removal from the United States in the foreseeable future.’ But that conclusory statement,
unsupported by concrete facts demonstrating why ICE expects removal to occur, is
insufficient to carry the government’s burden. The government has provided no details to
show what it has done to obtain travel documents . . . [a]nd though the government may
not need to provide an exact removal date to meet its burden, it has failed to provide any
estimate about when it may obtain [the petitioner’s] documents.” (citation modified));
Jimenez Chacon, 2025 WL 3496702, at *8 (“Respondents have provided no indication
that a third country is likely to accept Petitioner in the reasonably foreseeable future.”);
Olea Sanchez v. Bondi, Case No. C25–2573–KKE, 2026 WL 160882, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 21, 2026) (“Though Officer Dumo makes generalized assertions that ICE is actively
pursuing removal to both Cuba and Mexico, he provides no particularized evidence that
supports a significant likelihood of removal to either country in the reasonably foreseeable
future.”); Azzo, 2025 WL 3535208, at *4 (“Respondents have not even identified a third
country to which they plan to remove Petitioner, much less submitted a travel document
or provided an estimate for how long it would take this unidentified third country to
respond.”).
At bottom, Respondents’ own evidentiary submission belies their argument that
Petitioner’s removal is “significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” ECF No.
14 at 9.
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Separately, Respondents argue that the “certified D.V.D. class action pending in
the District of Massachusetts” limits Petitioner’s relief, because “Petitioner is a member
of the D.V.D. class” and therefore “cannot challenge the adequacy of the process for third-
country removal in this case.” ECF No. 14 at 12. But this misunderstands the relief that
Petitioner seeks. While Petitioner discusses, as he must, the process he has received
throughout his immigration proceedings, the relief he seeks is clear: “Where the
government cannot demonstrate the significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, it must release [him].” ECF No. 1 at 22 (citation modified); see also id.
at 25 (“[Petitioner] respectfully requests that this Court order Respondents to immediately
release him from detention.”).
In other words, Petitioner doesn’t seek more or different process—he seeks
release from his improperly prolonged detention. Respondents acknowledge as much.
See ECF No. 14 at 14 (“Petitioner’s direct request in this matter is for release rather than
additional process to assert a fear-based claim.” (citation modified)). Courts have
construed such requests as outside D.V.D.’s ambit, and given the relief that Petitioner
seeks the Court does so as well. See, e.g., Banoub v. Crawford, Civil Action No.
3:25cv917, 2025 WL 3723458, at *7 n.13 (E.D. Va. Dec. 23, 2025) (“D.V.D. is inapposite.
The relief Mr. Banoub seeks—release from detention pending removal—is not relief
sought on behalf of the class in D.V.D. The Court will not dismiss or stay the Amended
Petition as a result of D.V.D.” (citation modified)); Zavvar v. Scott, Civil Act No. 25–2104–
TDC, 2025 WL 2592543, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 8, 2025) (“Moreover, where Zavvar primarily
seeks relief from detention pending any removal, he seeks relief that is not sought on
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behalf of the class in D.V.D.”). Therefore, the Court need not consider Respondents’
remaining 	D.V.D. 	arguments, 	including 	their 	unsupported 	argument 	that 	releasing
Petitioner—the outcome that faithful application of Zadvydas’s framework to the factual
record demands—somehow “contravenes” the Supreme Court’s stay determination in the
D.V.D. class action. ECF No. 14 at 14; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, Respondents have not met their burden of
rebutting Petitioner’s showing of good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701; Azzo, 2025 WL 3535208, at *3. And because Petitioner is entitled to immediate
release 	on 	this 	basis, 	see, 	e.g., 	id., 	the 	Court 	need 	not 	analyze 	his 	remaining
constitutional claims. See ECF No. 1 at 25–28; Cruz v. Bondi, C.A. No. 25–cv–262–JJM–
PAS, 2025 WL 3295485, at *5 (D.R.I. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining distinction between
“Zadvydas claims” and constitutional claims).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release
Petitioner from custody.
Respondents are ORDERED to notify Petitioner’s counsel of the exact time and
location of his release no less than three hours prior to releasing him. Respondents are
FURTHER ORDERED to file within twenty-four hours of this order a status update
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confirming 	Petitioner’s 	release 	from 	custody. 	Petitioner’s 	Emergency 	Motion 	for
Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 2, is DENIED AS MOOT.
DATED this 23rd day of January 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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