Navarro v. Bondi et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 25-cv-04210-NYW
JUAN IZQUIERDO NAVARRO,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity;
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity;
ERNESTO SANTACRUZ, in his official capacity; and
JOHNNY CHOATE, in his official capacity;
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(“Petition”). 	[Doc. 1]. 	Respondents have responded, [Doc. 10], and Petitioner has not
sought leave to file a reply. 	For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is respectfully
GRANTED in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Juan Izquierdo Navarro (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Izquierdo Navarro”) is a
citizen of El Salvador who has lived in the United States since 2013. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 18].
He was taken into custody by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) on November 19, 2025 and is being detained at the ICE Detention Facility in
Aurora, Colorado. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 1, 23]. 	The Government purports to detain Mr. Izquierdo
Navarro for the purpose of executing his final order of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(l)(2)(iii). See [Doc. 10 at 4–5, 11; Doc. 10-1 at ¶ 16].
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Mr. Izquierdo Navarro is subject to an order of removal. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 24]. 	But in
2017, an immigration judge granted Mr. Izquierdo Navarro deferral of removal under
Article III of the Convention Against Torture. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 1, 20, 24]. 	Following the
immigration judge’s order, Mr. Izquierdo Navarro was detained for approximately 90 days
and then released on an order of supervision. 	[Id. at ¶ 21; Doc. 10 at 7–8]. 	From then
until he was detained on November 19, 2025, Mr. Izquierdo Navarro complied with the
conditions of his order of supervision. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 21–23].
Mr. Izquierdo Navarro challenges his detention on two primary bases: 	(1) the
revocation of his release was effected without compliance with applicable regulations;
and (2) it is not reasonably foreseeable that he will be removed to El Salvador or any
other country. [Id. at ¶ 27]. Because of these issues, Mr. Izquierdo Navarro argues that
his detention violates his rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and the INA’s implementing regulations. [Id.; id.
at ¶¶ 41–45]. Mr. Izquierdo Navarro seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents
to immediately release him from custody. [Id. at 17].
Respondents responded to the Petition on January 16, 2026, [Doc. 10], and
Petitioner did not file a Reply. 	No Party has requested an evidentiary hearing or oral
argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No.
25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (declining to hold
a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was “fundamentally legal in nature”).
Thus, this matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
It appears from the Petition that Mr. Izquierdo Navarro does not even know
pursuant to which regulation his release was revoked and he was re-detained. See [Doc.
1 at ¶ 34 (making arguments for “if he were re-detained pursuant to the exercise of
discretion detailed in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)”; id. at ¶ 37 (making additional arguments
“[s]hould Mr. Izquierdo Navarro’s re-detention be subject to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)”
(emphasis added))]. 	While Respondents clarify that these actions were taken pursuant
to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii), see [Doc. 10 at 4–5, 11], Mr. Izquierdo Navarro’s lack of
knowledge reflects a constitutional flaw with the revocation and re-detention here.
As Mr. Izquierdo Navarro observes, revocation of release under § 241.4(l)(2) must
be 	made 	either 	by 	the 	Executive 	Associate 	Commissioner 	or, 	under 	certain
circumstances, a district director. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 34]; 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2). 	Additionally,
this regulation demands that “[u]pon revocation, the alien . . . be notified of the reasons
for revocation of his or her release or parole” and “be afforded an initial informal interview
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promptly after his or her return to Service custody” so that he or she can “respond to the
reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); see Banega v.
Warden of Soft Side S. Facility, No. 25-cv-01152-JES-DNF, 2026 WL 234042, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 29, 2026) (“Courts routinely ‘interpret[] section 241.4(l) as requiring an informal
interview upon the revocation of release regardless of the reason for the revocation’—
meaning that the notice and interview requirements stated in § 241.4(l)(1) also apply to
revocation under § 241.4(l)(2).” (collecting cases)); Funes v. Francis, --- F. Supp. 3d ----,
2025 WL 3263896, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases regarding the same);
Guerra v. Bondi, 2026 WL 114258, at *5–6 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 15, 2026) (finding that notice
and interview requirements apply to revocations conducted pursuant to § 241.4(l)(2)).
The Court agrees with Mr. Izquierdo Navarro that “the revocation of his release”
was effectuated absent compliance with the above regulations. See [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 27, 34,
36–37, 41]. 	First, as Mr. Izquierdo Navarro points out, “there is no indication” that the
decision to revoke his release was “made by the Executive Associate Commissioner or
by a district director as required by the regulations.” [Id. at ¶ 34]. Respondents sidestep
this argument by stating that “Petitioner does not provide any factual support” for it. See
[Doc. 10 at 11]. 	However, Respondents do not provide any information to counter Mr.
Izquierdo Navarro’s assertion and show that the revocation decision was made by a
properly authorized official. 	See, e.g., [Doc. 10-1 at ¶¶ 16–17 (Declaration of ICE
Detention Officer Gary Zolock submitted by Respondents stating only that “ICE” revoked
Mr. Izquierdo Navarro’s release, and “ICE” notified him that he would be removed to
Mexico)]; see also Nazarian v. Noem, 5:25-cv-02694-KK-ADSx, 2025 WL 3236209, at *5
n.4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding that because “Respondents do not specify who made
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the decision to revoke Petitioner’s release[,] . . . to the extent Petitioner’s revocation was
a discretionary act pursuant to Section 241.4, Respondents do not establish the decision
was issued by a properly authorized official”). Nor do Respondents explain how Petitioner
could provide “factual support” when he alleges that he never received any information
about why he was re-detained. 	See [Doc. 1 at ¶ 32]. 	Even the exhibits attached by
Respondents purporting to be the “Notice[s] of Removal” which were served on Mr.
Izquierdo Navarro do not state anything about revocation at all—including but not limited
who made the decision to revoke Petitioner’s release. See [Doc. 10-1 at 9, 11].
Second, Respondents did not provide Petitioner with the requisite notice and
informal interview. The “Notice[s] of Removal” which Mr. Izquierdo Navarro received are
plainly insufficient to provide “noti[ce] of the reasons for revocation of . . . release,” 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1), considering that they consist of one sentence stating, “This letter is
to inform you that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) intends to remove
you to Mexico.” See [Doc. 10-1 at 9, 11; id. at ¶¶ 16–17]. Respondents do not argue that
Mr. Izquierdo Navarro received any other kind of notice. See generally [Doc. 10; Doc. 10-
1]. 	And they do not contest Petitioner’s allegation that Respondents have not even
responded to his counsel’s emails requesting the reasons for Mr. Izquierdo Navarro’s re-
detention. See [Doc. 1 at ¶ 32]. There is also no evidence in the record that Mr. Izquierdo
Navarro has been “afford[ed] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation” or
received “an initial informal interview promptly after his . . . return to Service custody.” 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); [Doc. 1 at ¶ 37].1
1 The only interview that Respondents mention in their Response is the credible fear
interview that United States Citizenship and Immigration Services conducted two weeks
after re-detaining Mr. Izquierdo Navarro to determine whether he could be removed to
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Respondents’ main argument in response to ICE’s lack of compliance with its own
regulations is that any “deviation” from the required process “would [not] amount to a due
process violation” and even if it did, Mr. Izquierdo Navarro would be entitled only to
“additional process, not immediate release.” See [Doc. 10 at 11–12]. But courts across
the country routinely hold that (1) ICE violating its own regulations in detaining an
individual is a due process violation,2 and (2) this violation makes the detention unlawful
and the proper remedy is release. 	See, e.g., Sanchez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-02287-CNS,
2025 WL 3484756, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2025) (ordering release of noncitizen when ICE
failed to follow its own regulations (collecting cases)); Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d
144, 152–53 (D. Mass. 2025) (“ICE, like any agency, has the duty to follow its own federal
regulations. . . . 	As here, where an immigration regulation is promulgated to protect a
fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal state and ICE fails to adhere
to it, the challenged action is invalid.” (cleaned up) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 690 (2001))); Guerra, 2026 WL 114258, at *8 (“Habeas corpus relief is warranted”
where 	“Respondents’ failure 	to 	comply 	with 	§ 	241.4(l)(3) 	resulted 	in 	redetention,
Mexico, see [Doc. 10 at 5; Doc. 10-1 at ¶ 18], and it is not relevant here. Respondents
do not argue, let alone demonstrate, that Mr. Izquierdo Navarro was informed of the
reasons for the revocation of his release and given the opportunity to respond at this
interview.
2 Respondents argue that there is no due process violation here because (1) “Petitioner
has been provided notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and (2) Petitioner has not
shown prejudice from any violation. 	[Doc. 10 at 11–12]. As to the first point, the Court
already found that Petitioner has not been provided with the requisite notice and
opportunity to be heard. At most, Petitioner has been heard on his claim of credible fear
of prosecution or torture upon removal to Mexico—not, as relevant, on the reasons for
the revocation of his release. 	As to the second point, “failure to receive mandatory
process is clearly prejudicial,” Sanchez v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-02287-CNS, 2025 WL
3484756, at *2 n.* (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2025), particularly when accompanied by physical
restraint.
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accompanied by a lack of notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond.”); Funes, 2025
WL 3263896, at *25 (finding that the court must order the petitioner’s release in
“align[ment] with numerous cases releasing habeas petitioners held in custody following
procedural due process violations” (collecting cases)); Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-
022914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9–10 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (“The failure to
provide Petitioner with an informal interview promptly after his detention or to otherwise
provide a meaningful opportunity to contest the reasons for revocation violates both ICE’s
own regulations and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. This compels Petitioner’s
release. Courts around the country have concluded likewise.” (collecting cases)).
Accordingly, the Court respectfully GRANTS Mr. Izquierdo Navarro’s habeas
petition in part and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release him. Given this Order,
the Court need not reach Mr. Izquierdo Navarro’s second argument regarding the
foreseeability that he will be removed to El Salvador or any other country. See Sanchez,
2025 WL 3484756, at *1; Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED in part;
(2) 	Respondents are DIRECTED to immediately release Petitioner subject to the
terms of his Order of Supervision; and
(3) 	Respondents SHALL SUBMIT a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746
within three days of this Order affirming Petitioner’s release from custody.
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DATED: February 18, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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