Hernandez Murillo v. Ceja et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-04163-TPO
RANDI RONALDO HERNANDEZ MURILLO,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTASAR, Warden,
Denver Contract Detention Facility (Aurora);
ROBERT HAGAN, Denver Field Office Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
KRISTI NOEM, Acting Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, and
TODD LYONS, Acting Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
in their official capacities,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________________
Timothy P. O’Hara, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before this Court upon the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF 1]
filed by Petitioner. The Parties have consented to this Court’s jurisdiction, ECF 7, and Chief U.S.
District Judge Philip A. Brimmer referred the matter to this Court “for all purposes pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).” ECF 14. This Court issued an Order to Show Cause [ECF 8] to which
Respondents responded [ECF 15]. Petitioner did not file a Reply. The Petition is fully briefed and
ripe for review. Because the Court determines that the Petitioner’s challenge is fundamentally legal
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in nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Having reviewed the Petition
and its briefing and having reviewed the relevant case law, the Court grants the Petition as to
Claim One and Claim Three.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who last entered the United States in February of 2019.
ECF 1 ¶ 33. He asserts that he is married and has one United States citizen child that is less than
one year old. Id. He “works to support his wife and child,” and “has lived a responsible and law-
abiding life in the U.S. for the last six years.” Id. He has no criminal history beyond traffic tickets.
Id.
On November 4. 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers identified
and arrested Petitioner at his home. ECF 1 ¶ 34. Soon thereafter, Respondents commenced removal
proceedings, id. ¶ 35, and transferred him to the ICE Processing Center in Aurora, Colorado, where
he remains detained, id. ¶ 1.
JURISDICTION AND LEGAL STANDARD
This Court has jurisdiction under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to
hear this case relating to the immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-
88 (2001). Courts are authorized to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It
is undisputed that Petitioner has been in immigration custody in the District of Colorado since
November 4, 2025. ECF 1 ¶ 34. “The individual in custody bears the burden of proving that their
detention is unlawful.” Batz Barreno v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-03017-GPG-TPO, 2026 WL 120253,
at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2026) (citing Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941)).
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ANALYSIS
I. 	Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or § 1226
Counts One and Three of the Petition claim that Respondents failed to comply with the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and are unlawfully subjecting him to the mandatory
detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF 1 ¶¶ 38-39, 46. Petitioner argues that because
he has been present and living in the United States for years, his detention is proper under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a),1 and thus he is entitled to a bond hearing. Id. ¶¶ 38, 46.
As acknowledged by the government, ECF 15 at 1, this Court has already addressed this
issue in a case with similar facts. See Colindres Carmona v. Ceja, No. 25-cv-04061-TPO, ECF
No. 22. There, this Court held that the petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and not
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus entitled to a bond determination hearing. Id. at 9. The
government still disagrees with that ruling, but rather than rehashing its argument as part of this
case, it submits an “abbreviated response” and reserves its right to appeal this Court’s decision.
ECF 15 at 2. The government concedes that based on this Court’s prior ruling in Colindres
Carmona, it “may lead the Court to reach the same result here, as the facts of the case are not
materially distinguishable from that case . . .” Id. at 3. The government is correct, and this Court
finds, as it did in Colindres Carmona, that Petitioner is being detained subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
and is thus entitled to a bond determination hearing.
1 Petitioner also argues that he is a part of the Bond Eligible Class established in Maldonado
Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
25, 2025) (order certifying Bond Eligible Class), as amended by Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz,
No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).
As noted recently in Bah v. Noem, Petitioner’s potential membership in the Maldonado Bautista
class does not affect this Court’s ability to adjudicate the present petition. No. 26-cv-00039-CNS,
2026 WL 205642, at *1 n.1 (D. Colo. Jan, 27, 2026).
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The detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal is governed by two sections
of the INA: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025
WL 2977650, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rogriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
(2018)). “Section 1225 mandates detention pending removal proceedings, providing that, ‘if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.’” Portrillo Martinez v. Baltazar,
No. 26-cv-00106-PAB, 2026 WL 194163, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2026) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A)). If none of the statutory exceptions apply, § 1225 “mandates detention without the
opportunity for a bond hearing.” Id. (citing Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025
WL 2996643, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025)).
By contrast, § 1226(a) does not mandate detention. It states that a noncitizen, “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General,” may be arrested pending a decision on whether to remove
the individual, and once arrested, the Attorney General may continue to detain or release the
individual. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).2 Section 1226 “sets forth ‘the default rule’ for detaining
noncitizens ‘already present in the United States.’” Quispe-Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-
MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at
303). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at
the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306.
2 The Court notes that Petitioner alleges he was never presented with a warrant prior to his arrest.
ECF 1 ¶ 34. Section § 1226(a) authorizes detention “only ‘[o]n a warrant issued’ by the Attorney
General leading to the alien’s arrest.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 302. However, Petitioner does not
challenge DHS’s adherence to federal regulations which only authorize detention of non-citizens
following warrantless arrests in certain circumstances, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, nor does he confirm
that the arrest, in fact, was warrantless. As a result, the Court affords little weight to Plaintiff’s
characterization of his arrest as warrantless. ECF 1 ¶¶ 1, 43; see Fernando C.C. v. Bondi, No. 26-
cv-1235 (LMP/JFD), 2026 WL 446408, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2026) (discussing statutory
framework for warrantless arrests under the INA).
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The crux of the issue is under which section Petitioner’s detention should be considered.
This Court finds U.S. District Judge Nina Y. Wang’s statutory analysis in Loa Caballero to be
persuasive. 2025 WL 2977650, at *5-7. The plain language of the applicable statutes would
suggest that the phrase “‘seeking admission’ requires that the applicant must be presently and
actively seeking lawful entry into the United States.” Id. at *6. Noncitizens who have been living
in the country for years are not “‘seeking admission’ under § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. (citing Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6). This is Petitioner’s situation. He has demonstrated an
established presence in the United States by living in this country for the last six years.
The principal thread of Respondents’ argument is that all noncitizens that entered the
country without permission should be deemed “applicants for admission,” regardless of how long
these noncitizens have been present in the country. ECF 15 at 2. Respondents claim that Jennings
supports their conclusion. Id. (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). This Court disagrees with the
Respondents’ interpretation of Jennings. After all, the Jennings Court distinguished the two
statutes and noted “[i]n sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain
aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2)” and that “[i]t also
authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under [] § 1226(a).” Portillo Martinez v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00106-PAB,
2026 WL 194163, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2026) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis in
Portillo Martinez not in Jennings).
Numerous courts have disagreed with Respondents’ position, finding, like in Loa
Caballero, that “[n]oncitizens who are just ‘present’ in the country . . ., who have been here for
years upon years and never proceeded to obtain any form of citizenship[,] . . . are not ‘seeking’
admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at *5 (quoting Lopez-Campos
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v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-CV-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich, Aug. 29, 2025)). Even the
title of § 1225, “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving
aliens; referral for hearing,” suggests a different application of § 1225, one not applicable to an
individual living in the United States for as long as Petitioner. In fact, “federal district courts have
overwhelmingly 	rejected 	Respondents’ 	‘broad 	interpretation 	of 	section 	1225(b)(2).’” 	Loa
Caballero, 2025 WL 2977650, at *5 (collecting cases).
The Respondents point out that a limited number of courts have supported Respondents’
position. See ECF 15 at 2 (citing Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026); Montoya v. Holt, No. 25-cv-01231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025)).
However, as U.S. District Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney explains in Singh v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-
00336-CNS, at 7-13 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026), Buenrostro-Mendez is neither controlling nor
persuasive. Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit have yet weighed in on this
issue, this Court finds more persuasive the great weight of authority in this Circuit and throughout
the country that have interpreted §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a) and have concluded that they do not
support the mandatory detention of noncitizens in Petitioner’s circumstances.
As a result, this Court orders that Petitioner receive a bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C.
§ 	1226(a). 	Respondents 	concede 	this 	as 	the 	appropriate 	remedy 	based 	on 	this 	Court’s
determination. ECF 15 at 4.
II. 	Petitioner’s Remaining Claims for Relief
Because this Court is granting the habeas petition and ordering a bond determination
hearing pursuant to § 1226(a), this Court declines to address the remaining Counts. This Court
intends to review the Parties’ forthcoming Status Report, discussed below, regarding the outcome
of the bond determination hearing and may entertain reinstating these alternative grounds for relief
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if necessary. Finally, because the Court has considered Counts One and Three on the merits and
has afforded the requested relief, the Court declines to consider whether Maldonado Bautista can
provide grounds for relief. See Lopez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-04089-NYW, 2026 WL 206220, at *5
(D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2026) (declining to consider Maldonado Bautista-related claim); Hernandez-
Redondo v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-03993-PAB, 2026 WL 290989, at *4 n.2 (D. Colo. Feb. 4, 2026)
(same).
CONCLUSION
This Court agrees with Petitioner that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs his detention. Petitioner
therefore is entitled to a release determination/bond hearing consistent with § 1226(a)(2).
The Respondents shall conduct the appropriate bond hearing within seven days of the date
of this Order. See Portillo Martinez, 2026 WL 194163 at *2 (ordering respondents to provide a
bond hearing within seven days of the court’s order granting the habeas petition); Loa Caballero,
2025 WL 2977650, at * 1 (same); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL
2652880, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025) (same). The Court declines to order Petitioner’s release
at this time because release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is discretionary, and because the immigration
judge is in a better position to decide between detention or release in the immigration context,
Portillo Martinez, 2026 WL 194163, at *5 (finding that an immigration judge is better suited to
determine the issue of detention). The government will bear the burden of justifying Petitioner’s
continued detention by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or flight risk. Hernandez
v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00276-WJM-TPO, 2026 WL 304362, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2026).
For the above reasons, it is therefore ORDERED that:
1) 	Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF 1] is GRANTED as to Counts
One and Three;
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2) 	Respondents shall conduct the appropriate release determination/bond hearing under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of this Court’s order, i.e., by March 16, 2026; and
3) 	On or before March 20, 2026, the Parties shall file a Joint Status Report informing the
Court of whether the bond hearing was held and whether bond was granted or denied.
At that time, the Court will review the report and determine whether further
proceedings in this Court are necessary.
SO ORDERED.
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 9th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
Timothy P. O’Hara
United States Magistrate Judge
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