Alfaro Herrera v. Baltazar et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04014-CNS
JOSUE ALDAIR ALFARO HERRERA,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Aurora Contract Detention
Facility,
ROBERT HAGAN, in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary U.S. Department of Homeland
Security,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States,
Respondents.
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Josue Aldair Alfaro Herrera’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, and Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or
Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 2. The petition and motion arise from the same set of
facts: Petitioner’s prolonged civil immigration detention following Respondents’ decision
to renew his removal proceedings, despite Petitioner’s Special Immigrant Juvenile status.
The petition and motion seek similar relief and ask the Court to “[g]rant a writ of habeas
corpus 	directing 	Respondents 	to 	immediately 	release 	[Petitioner] 	on 	his 	own
recognizance or, in the alternative, order his immediate release and afford him a
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subsequent individualized bond hearing before this Court.” ECF No. 1 at 19; see also
ECF No. 2 at 32 (requesting that “the Court issue an order. . . directing Respondents to
immediately release Josue without imposing additional indefinite conditions of release”).
As the briefing demonstrates that Petitioner’s challenge is fundamentally legal in
nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. As explained further
below, because Petitioner’s prolonged detention violates his constitutional rights, as well
as Respondents’ obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court GRANTS
the 	petition 	and 	ORDERS 	Respondents 	to 	immediately 	release 	Petitioner 	from
immigration detention.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner’s personal history and experience in the United States’ immigration
system, as well as the broader immigration framework through which Petitioner has
navigated, are relevant to the Court’s decision. Accordingly, this section provides an
overview of the relevant legal framework applicable to the Special Immigrant Juvenile
designation, as well as Petitioner’s personal background and experience navigating the
immigration system in the United States.
A. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Beginning in 1990, Congress created Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status as
part of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to protect vulnerable immigrant children.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). In doing so, Congress intended to
help “alleviate[] hardships experienced by some dependents of United States juvenile
courts by providing qualified [noncitizens] with the opportunity to apply for special
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immigrant classification and lawful permanent resident status, with [the] possibility of
becoming citizens of the United States in the future.” See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (amending various sections of the INA);
Special Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 43844 (Aug. 12, 1993); see also Osorio-
Martinez v. Att’y Gen. United States of Am., 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Congress
established SIJ status in 1990 in order to ‘protect abused, neglected or abandoned
children who, with their families, illegally entered the United States’”) (citing Yeboah v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)).
SIJ status is not easily granted. “Pursuant to § 1101(a)(27)(J), applicants must
complete a two-step process before receiving SIJ status,” Joshua M. v. Barr, 439 F. Supp.
3d 632, 657 (E.D. Va. 2020), and noncitizen youths must “satisfy[] a set of rigorous,
congressionally defined eligibility criteria,” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163. To be
eligible for SIJ status, a noncitizen youth must be (1) present in the United States;
(2) dependent on a state juvenile court or placed in the custody of the state or someone
appointed by the state; (3) unable to reunify with one or more parents due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment; and (4) a state juvenile court must determine that it is not in the
noncitizen 	youth’s 	best 	interest 	to 	return 	to 	their 	country 	of 	origin. 	8 	U.S.C. 	§
1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c). Once those requirements are met, the noncitizen
youth must then “submit an application to [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration and Services
(USCIS)], which includes the state juvenile court order, demonstrating his or her statutory
eligibility.” Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 657 (citation omitted). “After satisfying these two
steps, the Secretary of Homeland Security, generally through USCIS’s directors, must
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consent to the grant of SIJ status for each applicant.” Id. (citing Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d
at 170).
The design of the SIJ program “show[s] a congressional intent to assist a limited
group of abused children to remain safely in the country with a means to apply for [lawful
permanent residence (LPR)] status.” Garcia v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1261, 1271 (9th Cir.
2011) (abrogated on other grounds). In furtherance of this goal, Congress removed
numerous barriers for an SIJ beneficiary applying for an adjustment of status to become
a LPR. For example, under the INA, SIJ beneficiaries are “deemed . . . to have been
paroled into the United States” for the purposes of adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. §
1255(h)(1).1 Put differently, parole permits the SIJ beneficiary to lawfully remain in “the
United States for purposes of adjustment [of status],” which is “the process an individual,
like [Petitioner], can use to apply for [LPR] status when present in the United States.”
Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 660; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). This makes sense, and is
indeed crucial, for SIJ beneficiaries because SIJ status can only be maintained if the
recipient is “present in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (emphasis added).
Moreover, 	“[t]o 	apply 	for 	permanent 	residency,” 	an 	SIJ 	beneficiary 	“must 	not 	be
‘removable’ from the United States.” Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 660.
1 Although parole does not constitute a noncitizen’s “legal admission to the United States as defined by the
INA,” Bustos v. Mayorkas, No. CV 20-1348 KG/SMV, 2021 WL 3931173, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 2, 2021) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)), “[p]arole generally comprises ‘an administrative practice whereby the
government allows an arriving [noncitizen] who has come to a port-of-entry without a valid entry document
to be temporarily released from detention and to remain in the United States pending review of his
immigration status,” Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 660 (citing Ibragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125, 131 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
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Despite providing a potential pathway for lawful permanent resident status, an SIJ
beneficiary “may wait years for the opportunity to file for adjustment of status.” Id. at 661
n.19. This “delay comes from the prohibition against filing a Form I-485 application, (the
form used to apply for register permanent residence or adjustment of status), until a visa
becomes available.” Id. And because there are limits on “the number of immigrants from
a given country who may receive visas during each fiscal year, a visa is not always
immediately available to each person who has received SIJ status.” Id. (citations omitted).
As a result, for “immigrants from Honduras, like [Petitioner], are forced to apply for
adjustment of status to become a permanent resident using a staggered timeline based
on visa availability.” Id. (citing Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 160 n.3). SIJ beneficiaries are
thus assigned a priority date, which determines when they may apply for an adjustment
of status. See Casa Libre/Freedom House v. Mayorkas, 637 F. Supp. 3d 805, 810 (C.D.
Cal. 2022) (“When the demand is higher than the number of immigrant visas available for
a given year, the government allocates the availability of immigrant visas according to a
‘priority date’ USCIS provides the SIJ upon approval of a petition. . . . Noncitizens,
including SIJ petitioners, must wait for their priority dates to become ‘current’ before they
can apply for adjustment of status.”) (citation omitted).
In addition to providing a pathway for lawful permanent residence, Congress also
created certain protections for SIJ status youths by exempting them from many common
grounds of inadmissibility and creating a generous waiver of many of the non-exempted
inadmissibility grounds. See Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3df at 657–58 (“SIJ status . . . provides
significant benefits for young immigrants and certain protections against removal.”) (citing
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8 U.S.C. § 1255). Specifically, and relevant to Petitioner’s case here, Congress prohibited
consideration of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(a) (noncitizens present without admission or
parole) and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A) (documentation requirements for immigrations)
when determining an SIJ beneficiary’s admissibility to the United States for purposes of
an adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) (providing that “paragraphs (4), (5)(A),
(6)(A), (6)(C), (6)(D), (7)(A), and (9)(B) of section 1182(a) [(Inadmissible noncitizens)] of
this title shall not apply” when determining an SIJ beneficiary’s admissibility). In addition,
the 	INA 	also 	provides 	that 	certain 	grounds 	for 	removal 	“shall 	not 	apply 	to 	[SIJ
beneficiaries] based upon circumstances that exist before the date the [noncitizen] was
provided such special immigrant status.” Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 656 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, under the INA, an SIJ beneficiary cannot “be removed for having
entered the country somewhere other than at an official checkpoint.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(c)). Likewise, “the INA exempts SIJ designees from inadmissibility based on the
lack of ‘valid entry document[s],’” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)).
Just as significant as the removability protections are the “host of procedural rights
designed to sustain [the SIJ beneficiaries’] relationship to the United States and to ensure
they would not be stripped of SIJ protections without due process.” Id. at 171. Once
granted, SIJ status may be revoked only for “good and sufficient cause,” as determined
by an authorized USCIS officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.2.2 In the event of
2 USCIS regulations also permit the automatic revocation of SIJ status in certain circumstances not relevant
here. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(j).
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revocation, USCIS regulations require that SIJ status beneficiary receive notice of the
revocation and an opportunity to submit evidence in opposition. See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2. If
SIJ status is revoked, the youth is entitled to notice and the opportunity to appeal the
decision. See id. §§ 205.2(c) & (d).
B. Petitioner’s Personal History
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 4. In Honduras,
Petitioner lived with his mother who struggled and was unable to provide him with the
necessary shelter, support and supervision. ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 4–7. Petitioner’s father was
not involved in his life after childhood, and he did not receive any financial or parental
support from his father through much of his teenage years. Id. ¶ 8. After eighth grade,
Petitioner stopped attending school and began working in construction six days a week
to support his family. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. This job was dangerous and resulted in Petitioner
suffering multiple serious injuries. Id. ¶ 5. Despite informing her of his injuries, Petitioner’s
mother did not attempt to seek medical care for him. Id. Petitioner’s safety and life were
also threatened by gang members in Honduras, including on one occasion when gang
members placed a gun to Petitioner’s head after falsely accused him of theft. Id. ¶ 6.
Fearing for his safety, Petitioner, age 16 at the time, arrived in the United States in
September 2019 without his parents, claiming fear of persecution should he return to
Honduras. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 8–9. Immigration officials encountered Petitioner after his entry
into the United States and designated him an unaccompanied child (“UAC”). ECF No. 10-
1 ¶ 6. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a Notice to Appear
(NTA) initiating Petitioner’s removal proceedings and charging him with being deportable
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. ¶ 7. Petitioner was detained in juvenile housing
while in removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 8.
On December 14, 2020, Petitioner filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and
for Withholding of Removal, with USCIS as a UAC. Id. ¶ 9. On April 6, 2021, while in state
custody in Arizona, Petitioner obtained an order from the Honorable Ken Sanders in the
Juvenile Division of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of
Pima—a necessary step to Petitioner obtaining SIJ status. See ECF No. 1-2. In his order,
Judge Sanders determined that based on the neglect he suffered from his mother and
abandonment from his father, reunification between Petitioner and his parents was not
viable. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. The Court further found that returning Petitioner to his country of
origin, Honduras, was “not in [Petitioner’s] best interest because there is no one to safely
care for him in Honduras,” id. ¶ 19, and concluded that it is in “[Petitioner’s] best interest
to stay in the United States,” id. ¶ 20. The court further determined that Petitioner was a
dependent child and affirmed his placement with the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR). Id. ¶¶ 21–22. On May 10, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
subsequently moved to dismiss Petitioner’s removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(3)(C) 	based 	on 	USCIS 	having 	initial 	jurisdiction 	over 	Petitioner’s 	asylum
application as an UAC. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 11. On May 13, 2021, the Immigration Judge (IJ)
granted the motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 12.
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On June 9, 2021, Petitioner filed a Form I-360 petition seeking SIJ status, id. ¶ 13,
which USCIS approved and granted Petitioner parole on July 21, 2021, id. ¶ 15.3 Further,
on May 12, 2022, USCIS granted Petitioner “deferred action,” id. ¶ 16, as part of his SIJ
status, which temporarily defers Petitioner’s removal from the United States as part of
USCIS’s policy aimed at allowing noncitizen youth to remain in the United States and
obtain employment authorization while they await the chance to apply for permanent
residency. See Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. EP-25-CV-00432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880,
at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025) (“Form I-360's approval granted Petitioner deferred action
status, meaning that he was authorized to remain in the United States while waiting for
the visa bulletin to file for his adjustment of status to become a legal permanent
resident.”). Petitioner’s “priority date” for when he is qualified to apply for permanent
residency is June 9, 2021. ECF No. 1 ¶ 49. However, due to limited visa availability, as
of December 2025, only those with a priority date prior to September 1, 2020, can be
approved for permanent residency. Id.
On September 13, 2021, not long after Petitioner’s removal proceedings were
dismissed, Petitioner was released from ORR custody, ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 14; ECF No. 1-
4—a determination that required finding that Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community, see 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (requiring the government to
“consider danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight” prior to releasing a
UAC from custody); see also 45 C.F.R. § 410.1201. Following his release, Petitioner was
3 Although the declaration submitted by Gary Zolock, the ICE Deportation Officer assigned to Petitioner’s
case, states that Petitioner was “never . . . paroled into the United States,” ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 5, this is untrue.
As discussed in further detail below, by virtue of his receipt of SIJ status (which Respondents do not
dispute), Petitioner was paroled into the United States on July 21, 2021.
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accepted into the Unaccompanied Refugee Minor (URM) program in Massachusetts.
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 33–34. While in the URM program and awaiting his opportunity to apply for
LPR status based on his priority date, Petitioner lived in supportive independent living
housing, graduated from high school, and enrolled in community college. Id. 1 ¶ 36.
Petitioner voluntarily chose to remain in the URM program after turning 18, as he was
permitted to do. Id. ¶ 34.
After receiving employment authorization in connection with his grant of deferred
action in October 2022, Petitioner held numerous jobs, including working most recently
with the company “El Toro Fashion,” where he traveled across the country transporting
goods. Id. ¶ 38. In the spring of 2025, Petitioner learned that his girlfriend was pregnant.
ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 15. In a declaration submitted in connection with his habeas application,
Petitioner explained that he took the delivery job as a way to “save money for when my
child was born and for when I could not work as much once college started.” Id. ¶ 17.
On May 25, 2025, while driving in connection with his delivery job, Petitioner was
arrested during a traffic stop in Laramie County, Wyoming. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 39–40;
ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 17. After paying bond, Petitioner was informed that his release from
Laramie County Jail was delayed due to a hold from United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), which had “concluded that Petitioner is subject to removal”
because he “did not possess documentation authorizing his entry into or presence in the
United States.” ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 18; see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 41. The same day, ICE took
Petitioner into custody, reinitiated removal proceedings against him, and issued a new
NTA, charging Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being “present in the
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United States without being admitted or paroled.” ECF No. 10-1 ¶¶ 19–21. DHS ICE later
added additional grounds for Petitioner’s removal and charged him pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (immigrant who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or
other valid entry document). Id. ¶ 26. In July 2025, USCIS sent Petitioner notice, devoid
of any explanation or reasoning, stating that it was terminating Petitioner’s period of
deferred action and revoking his employment authorization. ECF No. 1 ¶ 44 (citing ECF
No. 1-8).
On June 9, 2025, Petitioner appeared pro se for a bond hearing before an IJ
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 23. At the hearing, the IJ placed the
burden of proof on Petitioner and denied his bond, as Petitioner put forth no evidence in
support of his request for release. Id. Per his declaration, Petitioner did not understand
that he was obligated to provide evidence and ultimately declined the IJ’s opportunity to
delay the hearing until an attorney could attend because Petitioner wanted to return home
to be there for the birth of his first child, who was born 10 days later. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 22.
On August 5, 2025, Petitioner appeared before the IJ for a master calendar
hearing. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 28. After Petitioner admitted to the allegations and charges, the
IJ sustained the removal charges and directed Honduras as Petitioner’s country of
removal, id., despite the Arizona state court’s prior conclusion (and Respondents previous
acceptance of this conclusion) that returning Petitioner “to his country of origin, Honduras,
is not in [his] best interest,” ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 19. While in detention, Petitioner has attended
additional master calendar hearings and a custody redetermination hearing, but due to
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his UAC status, only USCIS (and not the IJ) has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s pending
asylum application, which must be considered before an IJ can assess the removal
claims. See ECF No. 10-1 ¶¶ 330, 32–33, 35; ECF No. 1 ¶ 45. Although Petitioner has
moved to terminate his removal proceedings, the IJ denied both his termination motion
and motion to reconsider. ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 37; ECF No. 1 ¶ 46. The immigration court
continues to reset the case for hearings every two weeks based on DHS’s assurances
that USCIS will expedite his asylum interview. However, on December 2, 2025, USCIS
announced that it is halting the adjudication of all asylum decisions regardless of
nationality.4
Petitioner is currently detained at the ICE Denver Contract Detention Facility in
Aurora, Colorado, ECF No. 1 ¶ 41, and his removal proceedings remain pending, ECF
No. 10-1 ¶ 38. Since being in detention, Petitioner’s girlfriend gave birth to their child, who
is currently in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Child and Family Services.
ECF No. 1 ¶ 48.5 Petitioner filed this petition seeking habeas relief and requesting that
the Court enter an order either immediately releasing him or requiring that Respondents
provide Petitioner with a new bond hearing where the government bears the burden. Id.
at 60. Petitioner asks to be released so that, among other reasons, “he can meet his
newborn daughter and ensure that he does not lose his parental rights” and also resolve
the charges pending against him in Wyoming. Id. ¶ 48.
4 See Dep’t of Homeland Security, USCIS Policy Memorandum, “Hold and Review of all Pending Asylum
Applications and all USCIS Benefit Applications Filed by [Noncitizens] from High-Risk Countries,”
(December 	2, 	2025), 	https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0192-
PendingApplicationsHighRiskCountries-20251202.pdf.
5 Not long after becoming pregnant, Petitioner’s girlfriend was arrested and detained. Id.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
District courts may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates
he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The individual in custody bears the burden of proving that his
detention is unlawful. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s habeas petition seeks relief based on three grounds and argues that
by re-detaining and prolonging his detention, Respondents have violated Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. ECF Nos. 1, 2. Petitioner
also argues that Respondents’ actions violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
based on DHS’s arbitrary, capricious, and internally inconsistent actions. Id. Respondents
filed a response opposing Petitioner’s requested relief, arguing that the Court does not
have jurisdiction to grant certain of the relief that Petitioner seeks. See ECF No. 10 at 18–
22. Respondents’ opposition is not persuasive, particularly in light of its near complete
failure to address Petitioner’s arguments regarding his unique SIJ status and the
protections it affords. Where, as here, “a party files a response to a motion but does not
address all arguments which the motion raises, the party has effectively conceded the
arguments which it does not address.” Series 17-03-615 v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 785
F. Supp. 3d 904, 935 (D. Kan. 2025) (citation omitted); see also C1.G ex rel. C.G. v.
Siegfried, 38 F.4th 1270, 1282 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding that the district court correctly
dismissed plaintiff’s facial challenge as “abandoned” where plaintiff failed to include that
challenge in his response to arguments raised in defendant’s motion to dismiss).
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As explained further below, the Court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner’s 	habeas 	application. 	Additionally, 	it 	finds 	that based 	on the 	numerous
safeguards and rights Congress has granted SIJ beneficiaries, Petitioner’s prolonged re-
detention attendant to the renewed removal proceedings is irreconcilable with Petitioner’s
SIJ status and violates Petitioner’s substantive due process rights. This is particularly so
given that ORR previously released Petitioner, and Respondents do not now even
attempt to argue that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community. Moreover,
Petitioner continues to be held in immigration detention despite Respondents’ new policy
that precludes the review of Petitioner’s pending asylum application for the indefinite
future. Likewise, the process that Petitioner has been afforded thus far in his renewed
removal proceedings is constitutionally inadequate and in violation of his procedural due
process rights. Finally, the internally inconsistent positions taken by DHS and ICE on one
hand, and USCIS on the other, with respect to Petitioner’s attempted removal on grounds
from which he is statutorily exempted is arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act. In light of these violations, the Court grants Petitioner’s
habeas application and orders his immediate release, with no conditions of supervised
release, from immigration detention.
A. Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has explained that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “implements the
constitutional command that the writ of habeas corpus be made available . . . to test the
legality of a given restraint on liberty.” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963).
Respondents do not dispute that, to the extent Petitioner challenges both the “fact [and]
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duration of [his] confinement,” the Court has jurisdiction. Basri v. Barr, 469 F. Supp. 3d
1063, 1066 (D. Colo. 2020). Indeed, “[h]abeas corpus review is available under Section
2241 if an immigration detainee is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.’” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)).
Despite 	this, 	Respondents 	raise 	two 	primary 	jurisdictional 	challenges 	to
Petitioner’s claims, neither of which succeeds. First, Respondents argue that under 8
U.S.C. 	§ 	1252(g), 	the 	Court 	does 	not 	have 	jurisdiction 	to 	hear 	a 	challenge 	to
Respondents’ decision to reinitiate Petitioner’s removal proceedings, primarily because
Petitioner’s SIJ status does not exempt him from removal proceedings. See ECF No. 10
at 20–22. But this misconstrues Petitioner’s request for relief. As noted in Petitioner’s
reply brief (and confirmed by a review of Petitioner’s initial briefing), Petitioner is “not
challeng[ing] the government’s decision to initiate removal proceedings,” ECF No. 11 at
10; rather, Petitioner challenges the fact and duration of his immigration-related detention
and seeks immediate release as a remedy for his constitutional and APA challenges.
Thus, the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) that strips courts of jurisdiction to “hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any [noncitizen] arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders against any [noncitizen],” is inapplicable.
Respondents’ second jurisdictional challenge fails for largely the same reason.
Respondents contend that Petitioner’s argument that his removal would amount to a de
facto revocation of his SIJ status without due process is not ripe because Petitioner has
not yet been ordered removed and his SIJ status has not been revoked. ECF No. 10 at
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19–20. But, as noted, this is not the basis of Petitioner’s grievance. And as Petitioner
clarified, that removal would amount to a de facto revocation of his SIJ status is relevant
to and supportive of his Fifth Amendment claims, but it does not change the fact that the
thrust of Petitioner’s grievance is focused on the fact of his detention, and that he seeks
his immediate release, and not the termination of his removal proceedings, as relief. See
ECF No. 11 at 8–9. Thus, Respondents’ second challenge fails.
Having dispensed with Respondents’ jurisdictional challenges, the Court turns to
the merits of Petitioner’s claims.
B. Substantive Due Process
It is undisputed that Congress has plenary power over immigration, however, that
power is subject to constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
695 (2001) (citations omitted). With respect to the rights of a noncitizen held in civil
immigration detention, as Petitioner is here, “Supreme Court jurisprudence emphasizes
. . . the government’s need to show a compelling justification for such detention in the
absence of an adjudicated crime.” Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-00824-NYW, 2019
WL 2774211, at *8 (D. Colo. July 2, 2019). Indeed, “the Supreme Court has held that civil
detention 	violates 	due 	process 	absent 	‘certain 	special 	and 	‘narrow’ 	nonpunitive
‘circumstances,’ 	where 	a 	special 	justification 	. 	. 	. 	outweighs 	the 	‘individual’s
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690).
Petitioner 	argues 	that 	Respondents 	can 	provide 	no 	legitimate, 	let 	alone
compelling, justification to support his prolonged re-detention and that, accordingly, this
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detention violates his due process rights. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 148–151.6 Petitioner does not
have a final order of removal and notes that due to the protections granted to SIJ
beneficiaries, as well as due to the recent USCIS policy halting its review of all pending
asylum applications, Petitioner’s removal proceedings cannot proceed, and so his
detention continues with no end in sight. Id. ¶¶ 47, 49. Petitioner further argues that, as
an SIJ beneficiary, his detention serves no legitimate, non-punitive objective because it
is based purely on conduct that pre-dates his receipt of SIJ status and otherwise
undermines Congress’s intent of permitting those with SIJ status to remain in the country
to pursue lawful permanent residency. Id. ¶¶ 148-49. In response, Respondents contend
that Petitioner’s detention is authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which permits immigration
officials to detain noncitizens while their removal proceedings are pending, and that SIJ
beneficiaries have no blanket exemption from removal. See ECF No. 10 at 2, 3, 20–21.
While Respondents are correct that, as a general matter, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides the
government with discretion to detain noncitizens in removal proceedings, noncitizens still
“have a substantive due process right to be free of arbitrary confinement pending
deportation proceedings.” Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added). Moreover, Respondents’ arguments wholly ignore the unique situation
that Petitioner is in as an SIJ beneficiary and, specifically, as an SIJ beneficiary in 2026
with a pending asylum application.
6 Because it is clear that many of the arguments Petitioner raises in support of his procedural due process
claim are cross applicable to his substantive due process claim, this order addresses those arguments in
this section as appropriate.
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The 	facts 	Respondents 	chose 	to 	ignore 	in 	their 	opposition 	undermine 	the
legitimacy of Petitioner’s prolonged detention for at least four reasons. First, as an SIJ
beneficiary, Petitioner must be afforded an opportunity to apply for an adjustment of status
with USCIS before he can be ordered removed; however, he has been unable to do so
yet because due to his priority date he is not yet eligible to apply based on visa limitations.
Second, because Petitioner was designated as an UAC, USCIS (and not DHS or ICE)
has sole, exclusive jurisdiction over his asylum application, and that application—which
is now on hold indefinitely—must be resolved before an IJ can order that Petitioner be
removed. Third, there is no indication that the Arizona state court’s 2021 determination
that Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger has changed, and Respondents do not
argue otherwise or offer any justification for Petitioner’s continued confinement. Fourth,
based on the numerous safeguards provided to SIJ beneficiaries by Congress, the
grounds on which Respondents seek Petitioner’s removal are unlikely to be sustained.
For these reasons, and as discussed further below, the Court finds that Petitioner’s
prolonged detention constitutes a violation of his substantive due process rights.
i. 	As an SIJ Beneficiary, Petitioner Must be Provided an Opportunity to
Apply for an Adjustment of Status Prior to Being Ordered Removed
First, Petitioner argues that his detention, imposed in connection with his renewed
removal proceedings, is improper because as an SIJ beneficiary, he must be afforded an
opportunity to apply for an adjustment of status to obtain LPR status in the United States,
which he cannot do if ordered removed. ECF No. 1 ¶ 80. Respondents’ opposition ignores
this entirely. The Court agrees with Petitioner that the statutory protections afforded to
SIJ beneficiaries like Petitioner undermine the legitimacy of Respondents’ pursuit of
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Petitioner’s removal and, as a result, Petitioner’s detention incident to the renewed
removal proceedings.
Under the INA, a noncitizen youth, once accepted into the SIJ program, is
permitted to remain in the United Status and apply to become a LPR. See 8 U.S.C. §
1255(h) (deeming SIJ beneficiaries “paroled” in the United States for purposes of
adjustment of status). The design and protections of the SIJ program make sense in light
of the fact that (1) an application for adjustment of status cannot be filed by someone who
is not physically present in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(a); and
(2) any submitted application is deemed abandoned and terminated if the applicant leaves
the country, including, as is relevant here, if the applicant is removed via immigration
proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(B); see also Joshua, 439 F. Supp. 3d at 660.
As previously discussed, because limitations on visa availability have been
reached, Petitioner is unable to apply for that adjustment of status at this time, despite his
SIJ status. But the lack of an immediately available visa does not negate Congress’s
intent. As an SIJ beneficiary, Congress intended that Petitioner have an opportunity to
pursue lawful permanent residence in the United States. See Garcia, 659 F.3d at 1271
(the design of the SIJ program “show[s] a congressional intent to assist a limited group of
abused children to remain safely in the country with a means to apply for LPR status”)
(abrogated on other grounds) (emphasis added). Pursuing Petitioner’s removal before he
is eligible to apply for an adjustment of status “summarily strip[s]” him of his right to do
so, Osorio-Martinez. 893 F.3d at 178–79, and by extension, holding Petitioner in detention
without regard to his rights as an SIJ beneficiary serves no legitimate purpose and thus
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fails to justify this extreme restriction on his liberty. See, e.g., id. (discussing the
“incompatibility of expedited orders of removal with the statutory and constitutional rights
of SIJ designees” given that “Congress granted SIJ designees a clear set of rights,
including eligibility to apply for adjustment to LPR status, protection against having their
SIJ status revoked without statutorily prescribed process, and the due process rights that
automatically attach to statutory rights”).
ii. 	Because Petitioner Was Designated an UAC, Before Petitioner is
Ordered 	Removed, 	USCIS 	Must 	Resolve 	His 	Pending 	Asylum
Application, Which is Now On Hold Indefinitely
Petitioner also argues that his detention serves no legitimate purpose because he
cannot be ordered removed until his pending asylum application is resolved and, due to
Petitioner’s UAC status, only USCIS, and not an IJ, has initial jurisdiction to do so. ECF
No. 1 ¶ 151. Petitioner also notes that his detention is not simply prolonged, but has no
end in sight at this point, in light of the recent USCIS memorandum indefinitely halting its
review of all asylum applications.7 Id. ¶ 47. Respondents again ignore these facts. But
the Court refuses to do so.
That an IJ lacks jurisdiction to finalize an order of removal against Petitioner at this
time significantly undermines the legitimacy of Petitioner’s continued detention in pursuit
of his removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C) (providing that “[a]n asylum officer . . . shall
7 See Dep’t of Homeland Security, USCIS Policy Memorandum, “Hold and Review of all Pending Asylum
Applications and all USCIS Benefit Applications Filed by [Noncitizens] from High-Risk Countries,”
(December 	2, 	2025), 	https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0192-
PendingApplicationsHighRiskCountries-20251202.pdf.
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have initial jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by an [UAC]”).8 Moreover,
USCIS’s recent decision to halt its review of all pending asylum applications adds even
more uncertainty to the endpoint of Petitioner’s detention. The possibility that Petitioner
may be ordered removed at some undefined time in the future does not justify the extreme
restraint on his liberty now. Where, as here, Petitioner is detained despite numerous
procedural roadblocks that, as a practical matter, mean his removal is not “reasonably
foreseeable,” such “continued detention is” not “authorized” by the constitution. See
Salazar-Martinez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-CV-00961-KG-KBM, 2025 WL 3204807, at *2
(D.N.M. Nov. 17, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 699). Rather being a “carefully
limited exception,” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755, Petitioner’s continued detention “constitutes
a significant deprivation of liberty,” Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983),
without sufficient justification in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights.
iii. 	Petitioner Was Previously Determined To Be Neither a Flight Risk
Nor A Danger to The Community
Petitioner also argues that the government has no interest in detaining him
because he is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community and should thus be
eligible for release on bond. ECF No. 1 ¶ 129. Respondents do not argue otherwise but
contend that determination is to be made by an IJ. ECF No. 10 at 4, 9. The Court is not
now independently making a finding as to Petitioner’s bond eligibility; however, the Court
acknowledges that 	an 	Arizona 	state 	court 	previously 	made such 	a determination
regarding the factors relevant to such a bond release decision and finds that this fact
8 See also USCIS Memorandum, Revised Updated Procedures for Determination of Initial Jurisdiction over
Asylum Applications Filed by Unaccompanied Alien Children and Implementation of the J.O.P. Settlement
Agreement, HQRAIO 120/12a (October 30, 2025).
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further 	supports 	its 	conclusion 	that 	Respondents 	lack 	a 	legitimate 	justification 	to
Petitioner’s continued detention.
When a non-citizen is considered for release on bond under § 1226(a), Congress
identified flight risk and danger to the community as the specific factors that would justify
a non-citizen’s detention during his removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). These are
the same factors that were considered by a court prior to Petitioner’s release from ORR
custody in 2021. See ECF No. 1-4. Thus, implicit in the fact of Petitioner’s 2021 release
(which Respondents do not dispute) is a determination that he is neither a danger to the
community nor a flight risk. See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A) (directing the government to
“consider danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight” when considering
the release of an UAC from ORR custody); 45 C.F.R. §§ 410.1200, 410.1201 (describing
“the policies and procedures used to release, without unnecessary delay, [an UAC] from
ORR custody” and providing that “when ORR determines that the detention of the [UAC]
is not required either to secure the child’s timely appearance before DHS or the
immigration court, or to ensure the child’s safety or that of others, ORR shall release a
child from its custody. . .”). Respondents do not contend that those facts have changed
or otherwise argue that Petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community such
that his continued detention is justified. Instead, Respondents simply argue that the
Petitioner’s detention is authorized by statute and that he has already enjoyed the
“extensive safeguards” that protect noncitizen’s constitutional rights when they receive a
§ 1226(a) bond hearing. ECF No. 10 at 13. But as discussed further below, the bond
hearing Petitioner received was constitutionally inadequate. And there is no indication
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that the only bases on which Petitioner’s detention would be justified (flight risk or danger
to the community) are present here. In light of this, Respondents fail to identify any statute
authorizing Petitioner’s prolonged detention at this time.
iv. 	Based on the Safeguards Granted to SIJ Beneficiaries, Congress
Likely Intended for SIJ Beneficiaries to Be Exempted From Removal
on the Same Grounds Respondents Now Invoke
Finally, Petitioner argues that the grounds on which Respondents pursue his
removal are improper because they are based on conduct that pre-dates Petitioner’s
receipt of SIJ status and which Congress has exempted from consideration. ECF No. 1
¶¶ 65, 149. Aside from addressing this point as part of their jurisdictional challenge,
Respondents fail to address the merits of Petitioner’s contention or acknowledge how the
bases of Petitioner’s removal weighs on the legitimacy of his continued detention. See,
e.g., Series 17-03-615, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 935.
Respondents are detaining Petitioner in pursuit of, and pending the resolution of,
his removal proceedings, ECF No. 10-1 ¶ 19, and identify two violations of the INA for
which they argue that Petitioner is removable: 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for “entry
without inspection,” and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for not being “in possession of a
valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid entry
document” at the time of his application for admission into the United States. See ECF
No. 10-1 ¶¶ 21, 26. But Congress has explicitly provided that, for SIJ beneficiaries, those
grounds for inadmissibility “shall not apply.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h) (emphasis added). This
means that, under the INA, such allegations cannot support Petitioner’s removal because
Congress has “automatically exempt[ed] SIJ designees from a set of generally applicable
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grounds of inadmissibility,” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§
1255(h)(2), 	1182(a)), 	including 	both 	sections 	that 	Respondents 	now 	invoke: 	§
1182(a)(6)(a) and § 1182(a)(7)(A). See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) (providing that “paragraphs
(4), (5)(A), (6)(A), (6)(C), (6)(D), (7)(A), and (9)(B) of section 1182(a) [(Inadmissible
Aliens)] of this title shall not apply” when determining an SIJ status beneficiary’s eligibility
for admission as an immigrant to the United States); see also Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d
at 163 (“[T]he INA exempts SIJ designees from inadmissibility based on the lack of ‘valid
entry document[s],’ —the very ground on which the Government alleges Petitioners are
eligible for expedited removal.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)).
To be clear, the Court is not offering an opinion on the validity of Respondents’
decision to renew Petitioner’s removal proceedings, and it is not (and cannot) now order
Respondents to terminate those proceedings. However, the Court must interrogate the
validity of those proceedings because Petitioner’s detention is incident to them. That
Respondents have initiated Petitioner’s removal based on conduct exempted by the INA
further underscores the illegitimacy of Petitioner’s detention and demonstrates that
Respondents cannot establish the necessity of depriving Petitioner of his constitutionally
protected rights.9
9 The Court is aware of the cases Respondents cite to support their argument that noncitizens with SIJ
status are not exempt from removal proceedings, but neither are binding on this Court, and the Court finds
them otherwise unpersuasive. See ECF No. 10 at 21 (citing Cortez-Amador v. Att’y Gen., 66 F.4th 429, 433
(3d Cir. 2023); Doe v. Moniz, No. 1:25-CV-12094-IT, 2025 WL 2576819, at *8 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 2025)).
For one, Petitioner is not challenging the fact that the government has reinitiated its removal proceedings,
as noted above. However, in the Court’s view, these decisions neglect to give sufficient weight to
Congress’s intent behind creating the SIJ program in the first place. In Cortez-Amador, the Third Circuit
focused on the language in Section 1255(h), which “expressly states that a noncitizen with [SIJ status] shall
be deemed to have been paroled for purposes of subsection (a) of that section, i.e., for adjustment of status
to a legal permanent resident only.” Cortez-Amador, 66 F.4th at 433 (emphasis added). The court in Doe,
2025 WL 2576819, at *8, relied on the rationale in Cortez-Amador to reach the same conclusion. Though
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C. Procedural Due Process
In addition to his substantive due process rights, Petitioner argues that his
prolonged re-detention and the IJ’s placement of the burden on him at his § 1226(a) bond
hearing violated his procedural due process rights. See generally ECF No. 1 § II. This
argument is well taken. Respondents argue otherwise and cite to decisions from the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to argue that the burden of proof was properly placed
on Petitioner and not the government at his bond hearing. ECF No. 10 at 4 (citing Matter
of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 38; see also Matter of Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1111-14
(BIA 1999)). Although BIA decisions may be binding on Immigration Courts, they do not
override the constitutional protections granted to noncitizens.
“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due
process of law in [removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)
admittedly reliant on the statutory text, this interpretation is at odds with the greater statutory scheme
enacted by Congress to protect SIJ beneficiaries. But “[s]tatutory language ‘cannot be construed in a
vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424,
438 (2016) (citing Roberts v. Sea–Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 102 (2012)) (emphasis added); see
also id. at 438–39 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s plain text statutory interpretation as an “implausible reading
of the statute” and looking at both the text of the statute “as a whole and with respect to” the specific
provision in question to avoid an unintended, “topsy-turvy approach”). To premise the removal of an SIJ
beneficiary on the same inadmissibility grounds that Congress expressly exempted from consideration
when determining whether an SIJ beneficiary is eligible to apply for an adjustment of status and receive
even greater benefits as an LPR is at odds with Congress’s goal of providing SIJ beneficiaries with “the
opportunity to apply for special immigrant classification and lawful permanent resident status, with [the]
possibility of becoming citizens of the United States in the future.” Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990); see also Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163 (“Congress established SIJ
status in 1990 in order to ‘protect abused, neglected or abandoned children who, with their families, illegally
entered the United States’”) (citing Yeboah, 345 F.3d at 221). Moreover, this reasoning ignores the fact
that, as noted above, a noncitizen may only apply for an adjustment of status if they remain physically
present in (and are not removed from) the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(a); 8
C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(B). Accordingly, it is this Court’s position that although “the Government may
ultimately remove an individual with SIJ status from the country,” “the way in which the Government seeks
to remove them must adequately take stock of their SIJ status,” Del Cid, et al., v. Bondi, No. 3:25-CV-
00304, 2025 WL 2985150, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025), which Respondents fail to do here.
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(citation omitted). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333, (1976) (quotation omitted). As discussed above, in the context of a § 1226(a)
bond hearing, this means that there must be a finding that a noncitizen is a flight risk or a
danger to the community before they are detained in connection with their removal
proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Although the Tenth Circuit has not opined on whether
the burden of proving or disproving those factors is properly placed on the government or
the noncitizen, respectively, the Court agrees with other courts in this district, as well as
other circuit courts nationwide, “that allocating the burden to a noncitizen to prove that he
should be released on bond under § 1226(a) violates due process as it assigns the risk
of error to the party with the greater interest in their individual liberty as balanced against
the Government's interests.” Diaz-Ceja, 2019 WL 2774211, at *10; see also Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842,
851 (2d. Cir. 2020).
Both common sense and the mechanics of the immigration system support this
conclusion. For one, requiring a noncitizen to prove that they are not a flight risk and not
a danger to the community is an inherently more difficult burden to meet than proving the
affirmative because, “[a]s a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative.” Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960); see also Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 31
(“[P]roving a negative (especially a lack of danger) can often be more difficult than
providing a cause for concern.”). Indeed, the government is far better positioned to prove
their case than a detained noncitizen given that there is no right to counsel in immigration
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proceedings and that by virtue of their detention, the noncitizen has “little ability to collect
evidence.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201 (2013). In light of this, any risk of
erroneously depriving a noncitizen of their constitutionally protected liberty is reduced by
assigning the burden to the government, which has “substantial resources to deploy.”
Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 853 (citations omitted). Shifting the burden of proof to the
Government to justify continued detention also “promotes the Government's interest . . .
in minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose.”
Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854 (2d Cir. 2020).
Moreover, placing the burden on the government is consistent with Supreme Court
decisions that have repeatedly held that the government must bear a high burden of proof
to justify its interest in person’s continued civil detention. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 364, 368 (1997) (upholding involuntary civil commitment of individuals
convicted of sex offenses where the statute provided “strict procedural safeguards”);
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (“due process places a heightened
burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the individual interests at stake”)
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80–83 (1992);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–52
(1987).10
10 As the Second Circuit recognized, that these Supreme Court precedents are unrelated to immigration
detention is immaterial because “the ‘constitutionally protected liberty interest’ in avoiding physical
confinement, even for [noncitizens] . . . , [is not] conceptually different from the liberty interests of citizens
considered in” other cases concerning civil immigration detention. Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 856 (internal
quotation and citations omitted).
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The parties disagree as to the proper test to apply and determine whether holding
a § 1226(a) bond hearing where Petitioner bore the burden was sufficient to protect his
due process rights. However, the Court is persuaded that by applying the three-factor
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as Plaintiff suggests and
as other circuit courts have done, supports the conclusion that doing so violated Plaintiff’s
procedural due process rights. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th 19; Velasco Lopez, 978
F.3d 	842. 	In 	Mathews, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	stated 	that 	determining 	whether 	an
administrative 	procedure 	is 	“constitutionally 	sufficient 	requires 	analysis 	of 	the
governmental and private interests that are affected.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citation
omitted). The Court articulated three factors to consider in making such an assessment,
including (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. “The ultimate
balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-
type procedures must be imposed upon administrative action.” Id. at 348.
Applying the facts now before the Court to the Mathews factors supports the
Court’s 	decision. 	First, 	it 	is 	undisputed 	that 	the 	private 	interest 	affected 	by 	the
government’s action is significant: Petitioner’s liberty is at stake. This is “the most
significant liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco
Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). And “[i]t is
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clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection.” Jones, 463 U.S. at 361. Petitioner has already been
detained for over six months, and this is not the first time Petitioner was placed in
immigration-related detention.11 Accordingly, this factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor, which looks at “the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or 	substitute 	procedural 	safeguards,” 	Mathews, 	424 	U.S. 	at 	335, 	also 	weighs 	in
Petitioner’s favor. As discussed above, the government is in a far better position to bear
the burden at a § 1226(a) bond hearing. The government, with its extensive resources
and expertise in immigration law, is better equipped to properly collect and present
evidence that would allow an IJ to determine whether Petitioner is a flight risk or danger
to the community. Moreover, Respondents do not propose any additional or substitute
procedural safeguards under which Petitioner’s rights may be better protected. Under
such circumstances, it is far more probable that an IJ would reach an erroneous
conclusion (as the IJ likely did here, in light of the ORR’s previous finding) when it placed
that burden on Petitioner.
Finally, the third Mathew factor, which considers “the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335,
also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. First, as a practical matter, it is likely that a government
11 As previously discussed, Petitioner was also held in government custody until 2021 when he was
ultimately released without a finding that he was a danger or flight risk.
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attorney would attend any bond hearing and prepare and marshal evidence of any
possible danger or flight risk, regardless of which party bore the burden. Requiring that
the government affirmatively present its position and evidence is unlikely to change that.
Second, the government has not (and likely cannot) articulate any interest in ensuring the
detention of noncitizens who are neither dangerous nor a risk of flight. To the contrary,
and as the Second Circuit found, “shifting the burden of proof to the Government to justify
continued 	detention 	promotes 	the 	Government’s 	interest—one 	we 	believe 	to 	be
paramount—in minimizing the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves
no purpose.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854. This is particularly true where, as here,
Petitioner’s 	pending 	asylum 	application 	and 	SIJ 	status 	prevent 	his 	immigration
proceedings from moving forward.
Analysis of each of the Mathews factors thus weigh in Petitioner’s favor. In light of
“the ongoing infringement of the [Petitioner’s] liberty interest and the strong tradition of
placing the burden justifying civil detention on the government, the ‘balance between
individual and government interests requires that the burden of justifying petitioner's
continued detention falls upon the government,’ . . . [to] ‘demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that petitioner’s ongoing detention is appropriate to protect the
community and ensure petitioner's appearance at future proceedings.’” Rodriguez v.
Perry, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911, 920 (E.D. Va. 2024) (citing Haughton v. Crawford, 221 F.
Supp. 3d 712, 717 (E.D. Va. 2016)); see also Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 35 (concluding
that the burden should be placed on the government at bond hearings and that analysis
of the Mathews factors establishes that, “the private interest affected is commanding; the
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risk of error from [placing the burden of proof on the noncitizen] is substantial; and the
countervailing governmental interest . . . is comparatively slight”) (citation and alterations
omitted). The government’s failure to bear that burden at Petitioner’s June 2025 bond
hearing violated Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights.
D. Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action Under the APA
In addition to his constitutional challenges, Petitioner challenges Respondents’
detention and reinitiation of his removal as violating the APA. ECF No. 1 ¶ 78–81. Under
the APA, a court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,” that is
“contrary to constitutional right [or] power,” or that is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C). Petitioner
argues that (1) Respondents’ pursuit of his removal directly contracts the protections
afforded to him by the INA, including those enacted to ensure SIJ beneficiaries can remain
in the United States to apply for an adjustment of status, id. ¶ 78; and (2) pursuing
Petitioner’s removal based on actions he took (and of which the government was aware)
before he was granted SIJ status is arbitrary and capricious, including because the
actions of two DHS sub-agencies—ICE and USCIS—are directly contradictory, id. ¶ 81.
For their part, Respondents do not directly address Petitioner’s arguments made in
support of his APA claim. Instead, Respondents contend that any claim that Petitioner’s
removal would violate the APA is not yet ripe. See ECF No. 10 at 19–20. Respondents’
failure to grapple with the implications of Petitioner’s SIJ status once again dooms its
opposition. See, e.g., Series 17-03-615., 785 F. Supp. 3d at 935. The Court agrees with
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Petitioner that ICE’s actions in pursuit of Petitioner’s removal are arbitrary, capricious,
and contrary to law for three reasons.
First, by placing Petitioner in removal proceedings and attempting to remove him
from the United States, Respondents seek to erode the numerous protections to which
Petitioner is entitled as a SIJ beneficiary. Under the INA, an SIJ beneficiary must be
present, and remain present, in the United States to retain their SIJ status. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27)(J). Removal constitutes a direct attack on that status because effectuating
Petitioner’s removal to Honduras would automatically revoke his SIJ status. Respondents’
pursuit of this de facto revocation of Petitioner’s SIJ status flies in the face of federal
regulations which provide that “SIJ status, once granted, may not be revoked except ‘on
notice,’ and upon the [g]overnment’s compliance with a series of procedural safeguards:
The Secretary of Homeland Security must find ‘good and sufficient cause’ for revocation;
the agency must provide notice of intent to revoke; and the SIJ designee must be given
the opportunity to present evidence opposing revocation.” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at
163–64 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.2; 7 USCIS Policy Manual, pt. F, ch. 7
(Mar. 21, 2018)). SIJ beneficiaries also have appeal rights for any adverse ruling. Id. at
164 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(d)). Despite this, Petitioner has received no such process,
and Respondents do not even attempt to justify (and in fact, barely acknowledge) that the
pursuit of Petitioner’s removal now flies in the face of these protections and constitutes
arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	agency 	action 	that 	directly 	contradicts 	the 	due 	process
procedures granted to SIJ beneficiaries. See Gen. Chem. Corp. v. U.S., 817 F.2d 844,
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846 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“internally inconsistent and inadequately explained” agency action
is “arbitrary and capricious”).12
Second, 	and 	relatedly, 	pursuing 	Petitioner’s 	removal 	directly 	contradicts
Congress’s purpose in providing SIJ status—which is to provide noncitizens like Petitioner
an opportunity to remain in the United States to pursue an adjustment of status and
permanent residence. As discussed above, pursuing Petitioner’s removal before he is
even eligible to apply for an adjustment of status “summarily strip[s]” Petitioner’s SIJ-
related rights. Osorio-Martinez., 893 F.3d at 178–79. Respondents’ pursuit of Petitioner’s
removal, which fails to “adequately take stock of [his] SIJ Status,” constitutes agency
action contrary to law and is thus presumptively arbitrary and capricious. Del Cid, 2025
WL 2985150, at *4.
Finally, Respondents’ pursuit of Petitioner’s removal via ICE, despite USCIS
granting Petitioner SIJ status, is directly contradictory and thus arbitrary and capricious.
Both ICE and USCIS are sub-components of a single agency: DHS. See Hohner v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., No. CV 16-7967-GW(PLAX), 2018 WL 1942540, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
8, 2018) (“Both CBP and ICE, along with the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), are now components of DHS.”) (citation omitted). As other courts have
observed, it is “peculiar that the DHS grants . . . relief pursuant to the SIJ statutes while
12 Although Petitioner does not currently have a final order of removal, if any such order is issued before
Petitioner receives the procedural safeguards that Congress intended to accompany a revocation of SIJ
status, such removal would likely constitute another violation of Petitioner’s procedural due process rights
and a violation of the APA. See, e.g., Han v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 24-CV-1221
(JGK), 2025 WL 1808854, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2025) (“Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it
departs from Congress’s intent[.]”) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
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another agency within DHS, [ICE], simultaneously pursues removal. These seemingly
opposing positions within the Executive Branch raise questions about the arbitrary and
capricious nature of such actions and highlight ‘inconsistencies between DHS’ decision
to grant [Petitioner’s] SIJ status and to initiate his removal’ simultaneously.” Joshua, 439
F. Supp. 3d at 680. Petitioner’s case here raises the same peculiarities and, like in
Joshua, there is, at the very least, an “incompatibility between removal [and] the statutory
rights” granted to Petitioner as an SIJ beneficiary. Id. Moreover, in light of the extensive
procedural safeguards granted to SIJ beneficiaries, it is impossible to reconcile the
discrepancy between ICE and USCIS’s actions, which further bolsters the conclusion that
DHS’s renewal of Petitioner’s removal is arbitrary and capricious and provides no
legitimate basis for detaining Petitioner in connection his removal proceedings. See, e.g.,
id. at 679–80 (declining to decide petitioner’s APA claim at the time, but noting that the
“inconsistencies between DHS’ decision to grant [petitioner’s] SIJ status and to initiate his
removal” establishes that petitioner raises a claim that is “likely” to succeed “on the merits
under the APA based on potentially arbitrary and capricious actions”); Gen. Chem. Corp.,
817 F.2d at 846 (“internally inconsistent and inadequately explained” agency action is
arbitrary and capricious).
E. Petitioner’s Request for Immediate Release
As relief for Respondents’ numerous violations, Petitioner requests that the Court
order his immediate release from detention. ECF No. 1 at 60. Respondents argue that
even if Petitioner’s rights have been violated, the proper remedy is to order a new bond
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hearing before an IJ where the government bears the burden of proof, rather than order
Petitioner’s immediate release. ECF No. 10 at 16–17.
But Respondents’ argument ignores that Petitioner was previously found not to be
a flight risk or a danger to the community when he was released from ORR custody in
2021. See ECF No. 1-4. Moreover, requiring Petitioner to remain in detention until he is
able to receive another bond hearing only prolongs Petitioner’s unlawful detention, which
this Court cannot permit. At this point, because it has already been determined that
Petitioner is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and because Petitioner
has already been held in immigration detention for over six months, the Court finds that
Respondents’ violations of Petitioner’s rights are best remedied by ordering Petitioner’s
immediate release from immigration detention. See Cruz Valera v. Baltazar, 2025 WL
3496174, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 5, 2025) (immediately releasing petitioner from detention
where petitioner had previously been released on bond).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, and Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release
Petitioner from immigration detention with no conditions of supervised release. Because
Petitioner has received the requested relief, his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
And/Or Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 2, is DENIED AS MOOT. Respondents are further
ordered to file a status report within SEVEN DAYS of this order to certify compliance.
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DATED this 13th day of January 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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