Inestroza Paguada v. Choate et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-03970-STV
JESUS MARIA INESTROZA PAGUADA,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHNNY CHOATE; et al,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Order of Reference [#20],
entered on January 20, 2026, and the parties’ unanimous consent to disposition of this
action by a United States Magistrate Judge [#18]. 	Petitioner Jesus Maria Inestroza
Paguada is in the custody of the Aurora Detention Center. [#1 at ¶ 1] On December 11,
2025, Petitioner commenced this action through counsel by filing an Application for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Id.] The Court has carefully reviewed
the filings to date, and the applicable case law, and has determined that oral argument
would not materially assist the Court in reaching a disposition. For the following reasons,
the Court GRANTS the Petition IN PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner 	is a 	citizen 	of Honduras who entered the United States without
inspection in 1996. [#1 at ¶¶ 6, 25] He has resided in the United States since that time
and, prior to his arrest, lived in New Jersey. [Id. at ¶ 48] On May 10, 2025, Petitioner was
driving to work when he was stopped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
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officers at a traffic light in Trenton, New Jersey. 	[Id. at ¶ 49] 	ICE officers identified
Petitioner as someone who was undocumented and arrested him. 	[Id.] 	Petitioner was
charged with being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as someone who
entered the United States without inspection, and was placed in removal proceedings
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. [Id. at ¶¶ 7] Those proceedings remain pending. [#19 at
3] 	Petitioner was originally detained at Delaney Hall in Newark, New Jersey, but was
transferred in June 2025 to the Aurora Detention Center in Colorado, where he is now
detained. [#1 at ¶ 50]
ICE initially designated Petitioner as subject to discretionary detention under
Section 236(a)1 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”). 	[##1-2 (marking
Petitioner as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled”
rather than “an arriving alien” on the Notice to Appear upon Petitioner’s arrest); 1-3
(marking “ICE has determined that you are subject to discretionary detention under INA
§ 236(a)” on the Notice of Custody Determination)] 	On July 9, 2025, Petitioner had a
hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) who held that Petitioner was a danger to others
and a flight risk.2 [#1-5 at 2] According to Petitioner, this determination was based on an
outstanding warrant related to an arrest in 1997 that he believed had been dismissed.
[#1 at ¶ 53]
1 Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226,
and Section 235 of the INA is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 	The Court refers to these
provisions as Sections 1225 and 1226.
2 Oddly, the check-the-box form for release or detention offers only one option for
detention: “Respondent poses a danger to others and is a flight risk in the alternative.”
[#1-5] It does not give the IJ the option to declare that: (1) the respondent is a flight risk
but not a danger to others, or (2) the respondent is a danger to others but not a flight risk.
[Id.] And, obviously, not all individuals who are a flight risk are also a danger to others,
and vice versa.
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On October 3, 2025, after the outstanding warrant was successfully nolle prossed,
an IJ granted Petitioner’s motion to reconsider his bond. [#1-6 at 2] The same day the
IJ granted Petitioner’s motion to reconsider bond, however, the IJ concluded that the
immigration court lacked bond jurisdiction because Petitioner was detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1225. [#1-7 at 2] In reaching this decision, the IJ relied upon the decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of Yajure-Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216
(BIA 2025) [Id.]
On November 26, 2025, Petitioner filed another bond request based upon the
decision 	in 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	v. 	Santacruz, 	5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 	2025 	WL
3288403 (C.D. Cal (Nov. 25, 2025), amended and superseded on reconsideration, 2025
WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). [#1 at ¶ 54] On December 8, 2025, the IJ denied
this request, concluding that there were no materially changed circumstances and that
the Central District of California’s judgment in Maldonado Bautista did not issue class-
wide relief affecting the Yajure-Hurtado decision. 	[#1-8 at 4] 	On December 24, 2025,
Petitioner filed a fourth bond motion, which was denied on February 4, 2026 for lack of
jurisdiction. [#21 at 2]
Petitioner filed this habeas action on December 11, 2025, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241. [#1] Petitioner brings two claims for relief under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. [Id. at ¶¶ 57-68] First, he alleges that Respondents violated the INA
and the Central District of California’s Order in Maldonado Bautista by subjecting him to
mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). [Id. at ¶¶ 57-64] Second, he alleges
a violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment based on
Respondents’ alleged failure to provide him a bond hearing. [Id. at ¶¶ 65-68] Petitioner
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seeks an order directing Respondents to either immediately release him or to provide an
individualized bond hearing. [Id. at 14]
II. 	LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The INA governs all aspects of immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. In
1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”) which substantially amended the INA. 	Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423-25
(2009) (outlining the changes to the statute). Relevant here, IIRIRA added the expedited
removal 	proceedings of 	Section 1225 	as an 	alternative 	mechanism 	for 	removing
noncitizens from the United States alongside the existing Section 1226 and Section
1229a proceedings. 	See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 106-
107 (2020)); see also Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-3688-SKC-SBP, 2025
WL 3718159, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025).
A. 	Removal Proceedings
“The usual removal process—commonly referred to as Section 240—involves an
evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, where a noncitizen may attempt to show
that he or she should not be removed.” 	Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *2
(quotations omitted). 	“These are adversarial proceedings where noncitizens have the
right to hire counsel, examine the evidence against them, present their own evidence,
and cross-examine witnesses.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)-(B)). 	“These
proceedings are recorded, often take months to resolve, and upon a decision by an
immigration judge, are appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 	Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1, 1240.15). 	“The BIA order is, in turn, appealable to a U.S. Court of
Appeals.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
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“The second process provides for expedited removal [pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)]. Under this provision, noncitizens who satisfy two criteria may be subject to
expedited removal.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)). 	“Under the first criterion, the
noncitizens are ‘inadmissible’ to the United States because they either lack proper entry
documents or they engaged in fraud or willfully misrepresented a material fact on their
application for admission.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	“The second criteria
provides that the noncitizens fall into at least one of two categories: (1) they are ‘arriving
in the United States,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (‘Arriving [Noncitizen] Provision’); and or
(2) they ‘have not been admitted’ or paroled into the United States and have ‘not
affirmatively shown’ to an immigration officer's satisfaction that they have been ‘physically
present in the United States continuously for [a] 2-year period immediately prior to the
date of the determination of inadmissibility[,]’ id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (‘Designation
Provision’).” Id. “In contrast to the usual removal process, ‘the expedited removal order
is usually issued within a few days, if not hours.’” Id. (quoting Make the Rd. New York v.
Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025)). “In these
proceedings, noncitizens typically have no opportunity to review the evidence against
them or prepare a defense.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(2)(iii)). 	“And there is almost no opportunity for judicial review.” 	Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)).
B. 	Detention Pending Removal
The 	INA 	provides 	two 	options 	for 	detaining 	noncitizens 	pending 	removal
proceedings. Id. First, Section 1225 authorizes the government to inspect, detain, and,
if appropriate, remove applicants for admission. 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225). 	“Section
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1225(b) requires the detention of two groups of ‘applicants for admission.’” 	Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2)). 	“To the first grouping, § 1225(b)(1) . . . applies to noncitizens
who (1) are inadmissible because they lack proper documentation or because they
engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentations in their applications, and (2) fall within the
‘Arriving [Noncitizen] Provision’ or the ‘Designation Provision.’” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II)). “To the second grouping, § 1225(b)(2) applies ‘in the case of [a
noncitizen] who is an applicant for admission, [where] the examining immigration officer
determines that [the noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled 	to 	be admitted.’” 	Id. 	(citing 8 U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added)).
“Noncitizens detained under § 1225, no matter which grouping, are not entitled to bond
hearings.” Id. (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018)).
Second, Section 1226 authorizes the arrest and detention of noncitizens “pending
the outcome of removal proceedings.” 	Id. at *3 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289).
Unlike Section 1225(b), Section 1226 generally provides for individualized custody
determinations, including the possibility of release on bond (except where mandatory
detention under Section 1226(c) applies).3 	A person “cannot be subject to both
3 Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of [noncitizens] who may not be
released under § 1226(a).” 	Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *5 (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis omitted). “Under this subcategory, noncitizens who
fall ‘into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist
activities’ are not eligible for release and must be detained without bond.” 	Id. (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289). 	“Importantly, the plain text of section 1226(c) requires
detention for certain noncitizens who are ‘deportable’ (meaning they were previously
admitted to the United States) as well as certain noncitizens deemed ‘inadmissible’
(meaning they have not been admitted to the United States).” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v.
Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
2025)) (emphasis omitted).
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mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226.” 	Lopez
Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).
After the enactment of the IIRIRA, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) promulgated regulations clarifying that individuals who entered the United States
without inspection generally were not considered detained under Section 1225, but
instead were subject to detention under Section 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited
Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants
for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly
referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
redetermination.”). 	Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has explained that
Section 1226(a) “sets out the default rule” governing detention of noncitizens already
present in the country pending removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89; see
also Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *6 (“the default discretionary bond
procedures in § 1226(a) apply to noncitizens who are (1) present in the United States
without having been admitted or paroled, and (2) have not been implicated in any of the
enumerated crimes set forth in § 1226(c)” (citing Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-
05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025))); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
(The Attorney General may release a noncitizen on bond “[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (c).”).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates
that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28
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U.S.C. § 2241. 	This includes “[c]hallenges to immigration detention.” 	Soberanes v.
Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004). The individual in custody bears the burden
of proving that their detention is unlawful. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
The threshold question before the Court is purely statutory.4 Petitioner contends
that he is detained subject to Section 1226 and is thus entitled to a custody determination.
[#1 at ¶¶ 13, 43] 	Respondents maintain that Petitioner remains an “applicant for
admission” under Section 1225 and that his detention is governed by Section 1225(b).5
[#19 at 4-6] Respondents believe their interpretation of the statutory scheme is supported
by the text of the statute, the legislative history, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the statute in Jennings. [#19 at 7-11] The Court disagrees.
Respondents are detaining Plaintiff pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A). [#19 at 1]
As outlined above, “for section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met—
4 Petitioner cites to Maldonado Bautista and contends that he is a member of the Bond
Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista and is therefore entitled to relief pursuant
to the declaratory judgment entered in that action. [#1 at ¶ 2-4] Respondents argue that
Maldonado Bautista does not have any preclusive or binding effect in this District and
does not control the outcome of this case. [#19 at 12-14] The Court need not resolve the
parties’ dispute regarding the scope or preclusive effect of that decision. 	Instead, the
Court proceeds to independently analyze whether Petitioner’s detention arises under
Section 1225 or Section 1226 and resolves the present petition on that basis.
5 The Court notes that the arrest materials reflect that Petitioner was initially detained
pursuant to Section 1226. 	[See ##1-2, 1-3] 	By the October 3, 2025 hearing, however,
Respondents were proceeding on the basis that Section 1225 governed his detention.
[See #1-7] Respondents do not explicitly state that a formal re-designation occurred, nor
do they identify when or on what basis such a change was made. Instead, their present
position assumes the applicability of Section 1225 despite the initial Section 1226
designation reflected in the arrest materials. 	[See generally #19] 	But “settled law
precludes the Government from switching gears to argue [Petitioner] is now somehow
subject to § 1225(b)(2).” Diallo v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-3548-SKC, 2026 WL 237296, at
*2 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2026) (citing Patel v. Crowley, No. 25 CV 11180, 2025 WL 2996787,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2025)). To the extent Respondents contend that Section 1225 now
governs Petitioner’s detention pursuant to a changed designation, the argument is likely
waived and, in any event, as detailed herein, is ultimately unpersuasive.
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in particular, an examining immigration officer must determine that the individual is: (1) an
applicant for admission; (2) seeking admission; and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” Facio v. Baltazar, No. 25-CV-03592-CYC, 2025 WL 3559128, at
*2 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2025) (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass.
2025)). Here, the seeking admission element has not been satisfied.
The Supreme Court has defined “applicant for admission” as “an alien who ‘arrives
in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted.’” Jennings,
583 U.S. at 287 (quoting § 1225(a)(1)). And courts have explained that an “applicant for
admission . . . doesn't require an application of any sort. All that's needed is presence
without admission—in other words, it applies to the great number of undocumented
immigrants who currently live here.” 	Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *4
(quoting J.G.O. v. Francis, No. 25-CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
28, 2025)). Thus, the Court would tend to agree with Respondents that the first element
of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies here—Petitioner is present in the United States without
admission.
But, 	even 	accepting 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission, 	Section
1225(b)(2)(A) requires more—it requires the applicant to be “seeking admission.” 	Id. at
*3; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In other words, being an “applicant for admission”
does not necessarily equate to an individual “seeking admission”—the first and second
elements of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) are distinct elements. Both the structure of the statute
and basic principles of statutory interpretation compel this conclusion.
Section 1225(a)(1) creates a legal status: “An alien present in the United States
who has not been admitted . . . shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” 	This
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Section defines which noncitizens are considered “applicant[s] for admission.” 	Section
1225(b)(2)(A), on the other hand, sets forth the manner for detaining certain applicants
for admission. 	Specifically, that Section provides: “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be
detained.” If “applicant for admission” was synonymous with “alien seeking admission,”
the 	“alien 	seeking 	admission” 	language 	is 	superfluous. 	If 	the 	two 	terms 	were
synonymous, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) could have been written: “in the case of an alien who
is an applicant for admission, if the examining officer determines that [such alien] is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” If the two
terms were synonymous, there would be no need to use the second term “alien seeking
admission.” And courts presume that Congress does not include superfluous language
in its statutes. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is a cardinal principle
of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if
it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” (quotations omitted)). 	Thus, the use of both phrases reflects Congress’s
decision to require more than mere admission status to trigger mandatory detention under
Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
And contrary to Respondents’ argument, Jennings does not collapse the two
elements and, indeed, supports the Court’s conclusion that an “applicant for admission”
does not equate to an individual “seeking admission.” 	The Jennings Court described
Section 1225 as governing “applicants of admission.” 	583 U.S. at 287-88. 	It did not
analyze the “seeking admission” language or hold that all “applicants for admission” are
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necessarily “seeking admission” at all times. The only reference to “seeking admission”
appeared in the statement: “In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).”
Id. at 289. Thus, if an applicant is actively “seeking admission,” then Section 1225 applies
to that applicant. 	Yet, in the same paragraph, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
that the Government “may detain certain aliens already in the country pending the
outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
Section 1226, not Section 1225(b)(2)(A), is the catchall provision that applies to those
aliens already in the country pending the outcome of their removal proceedings.
Consistent with this analysis, courts have held that the “‘seeking admission’
[element] requires a noncitizen to continue to want to go into the country.” 	Aleman
Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *4 (quoting J.G.O., 2025 WL 3040142, at *3) (emphasis
in original). 	“Under this plain language, § 1225(b)(2)(A) cannot apply to Petitioner
because you can't go into a place where you already are.” Id. (quotation omitted) (finding
Section 1225 inapplicable to a petitioner who had resided in the United States for over
ten years). And recent decisions in this district have held that individuals who have lived
in the United States for a significant period, like Petitioner, are not “seeking admission”
under the statute. See, e.g., Facio, 2025 WL at *1-2 (finding petitioner not to have been
“seeking admission” because ICE detained him 28 years after he entered the United
States) (collecting cases). 	“[B]ecause section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to those
noncitizens who are actively seeking admission to the United States, it cannot, according
to its ordinary meaning, apply to persons who have already been residing in the United
States for several years.” Id. at *2 (quotations omitted) (collecting cases).
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Here, Petitioner entered the United States in 1996, where he has resided since
that time. [#1 at ¶¶ 6, 49] He was apprehended 29 years later while in the country. [Id.
at ¶¶ 48-49] 	Under these circumstances, the Court finds that he was not “seeking
admission” within the ordinary meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A).6
Under the plain language of the statute, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention
is governed by Section 1226(a). To hold otherwise would collapse the statutory distinction
between Sections 1225 and 1226 and render Section 1226 largely superfluous as applied
to noncitizens who entered this country without inspection. 	Because Section 1226
applies, Petitioner is entitled to the custody procedures provided by that statute.7 Failure
to conduct a hearing within the strictures of Section 1226 may result in this Court
immediately ordering Petitioner’s release.
As a final point, Respondents argue that even if Petitioner is entitled to a bond
hearing under Section 1226(a), his request is moot because he has already appeared
before an IJ, who denied bond, and because Petitioner was granted a subsequent
custody redetermination hearing that as of filing had not yet been scheduled. [#19 at 2]
6 Moreover, as explained earlier, upon his arrest, Petitioner was not placed in expedited
removal proceedings under Section 1225(b)(1), but was instead placed in full removal
proceedings under Section 1229a. [Id. at ¶ 7] This further confirms that Section 1225(b)’s
mandatory detention framework does not govern Petitioner’s custody.
7 Petitioner requests immediate release from custody or, alternatively, an individualized
bond hearing. 	[#1 at 15] 	The Court deems the latter to be appropriate in this case
because Petitioner does not challenge the arrest itself, just the detention under Section
1226(a). Section 1226(a) authorizes a noncitizen's detainment only pursuant to a warrant
issued by the Attorney General. 	Although some courts—including at least one in this
District, see Diallo, 2026 WL 237296, at *3—have suggested that a warrantless arrest
under Section 1226(a) may, in certain circumstances, provide an independent basis for
release, Petitioner does not challenge the legality of his initial arrest in this action. Rather,
Petitioner contests only the statutory basis for his continued detention and the absence
of a bond hearing. Accordingly, the Court need not address whether the arrest itself would
entitle Petitioner to relief.
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This argument is unavailing. The prior denials were based on the IJ’s determination that
it lacked jurisdiction to grant Petitioner bond. [## 1-6, 1-7, 1-8] And at the subsequent
custody redetermination hearing bond was denied based on this same jurisdictional
conclusion. [See #21 at 2] Accordingly, the Court does not find Petitioner’s request for a
bond hearing, conducted pursuant to Section 1226, to be moot.8
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED:
(1) that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[#1] is GRANTED;9
(2) Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) within SEVEN DAYS of the date of this Court's order;
(3) Respondents shall file a status report within TEN DAYS of the date of this
Court's order to certify compliance. The status report shall include if and when
the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
denied, the reasons for the denial; and
(4) Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and to preserve the Court's
jurisdiction, Respondents SHALL NOT REMOVE Petitioner from the District of
Colorado or the United States unless or until this Court or the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit vacates this Order.
8 Because the Court grants relief on statutory grounds, it declines to reach Petitioner’s
Fifth Amendment claims. 	If Respondents fail to provide a bond hearing consistent with
Section 1226(a), Petitioner may renew his constitutional arguments.
9 To the extent Petitioner's Counsel seeks an award of attorney's fees, she must file a
separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules of Practice for this District.
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DATED: March 5, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
s/Scott T. Varholak
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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