R.K. et al v. Cedar Springs Hospital, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge William J. Martínez
Civil Action No. 25-cv-1552-WJM-MDB
ERIC J. KELLY, by and through his Special Conservator on behalf of R.K.,
M.K., and
J.M.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CEDAR SPRINGS HOSPITAL, INC.,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cedar Springs Hospital, Inc.’s Objections
to the Magistrate Judge’s Order at Dkt No. 140 (the “Objection”). (ECF No. 144.) Plaintiffs
R.K., by and through his Special Conservator Eric J. Kelly, M.K., and J.M. (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) responded. (ECF No. 147.) Defendant did not file a reply.
For the reasons set forth below, the Objection is overruled.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual background of this case
from its Order Overruling Objection and Adopting the February 13, 2026 Recommendation
of United States Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell. (ECF No. 153.)
As relevant here, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel (“Motion”), seeking production of
documents within W.D.’s (“the Older Boy’s”) patient file “that contain witness statements,
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 7

2
reports investigating the sexual assault incident, and incidents of prior abuse by [the Older
Boy] that demonstrate his dangerous nature and the facility’s awareness of such,” which
Defendant was withholding as noted in its Privilege Log. (ECF No. 109 at 1; see ECF No.
109-1.) On April 14, 2026, Judge Dominguez Braswell held a hearing on the Motion.
(ECF No. 140; see ECF No. 148.) She granted in part and denied in part the Motion.
(ECF No. 140 at 1.) Judge Dominguez Braswell found that the Older Boy’s patient file was
subject to physician-patient privilege and thus denied the Motion in part to the extent
Plaintiffs sought to compel the production of the same. (Id.)
But Judge Dominguez Braswell granted the Motion in part as to certain information
stored in the MIDAS system, an information database that Defendant uses. (Id. at 2.) She
found the MIDAS system is “dual purposed,” meaning it “store[s] incident information, not
just for the purpose of submitting it to a PSO or a quality management program, but also
for the purpose of satisfying obligations to government entities, reporting on insurance
claims, supporting investigations, and tracking incidents as part of Defendant’s own
internal policies and practices.” (Id.) Judge Dominguez Braswell concluded that Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 25-3-109 and the Patient Safety Quality Improvement Act (“PSQIA”),
42 U.S.C. § 299b-21 et seq., were thus inapplicable to the MIDAS information system.
(Id.) But she also concluded that one section of the system, the Analysis Tab, enjoys
PSQIA protections, and should thus be excluded from production. (Id.) Thus, Judge
Dominguez Braswell ordered “Defendant to produce relevant and responsive materials
housed in all parts of the MIDAS system, except the Analysis Tab.” (Id.)
Defendant only objects to that portion of Judge Dominguez Braswell’s order
“instruct[ing] Defendant to disclose some of the information in the MIDAS system . . . .”
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 7

3
(ECF No. 144 at 1.) “Defendant does not object to the remaining portions of the Order,
including that [the Older Boy’s] patient file and the ‘Analysis Tab’ of the MIDAS system are
privileged and not subject to disclosure.” (Id. at 8.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“Discovery is a nondispositive matter . . . .” Hutchison v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566
(10th Cir. 1997). When reviewing an objection to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive
ruling, the Court must affirm the ruling unless it finds that the ruling is “clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Ariza v. U.S. West
Commc’ns, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 131, 133 (D. Colo. 1996). The clearly erroneous standard
“requires that the reviewing court affirm unless it on the evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow
Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
“contrary to law” standard permits “plenary review as to matters of law,” 12 Wright &
Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3069 (3d ed., Apr. 2026 update), but the Court will
set aside a magistrate judge’s order only if it applied the wrong legal standard or applied
the appropriate legal standard incorrectly, see Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 239 F.
Supp. 2d 1219, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2022). In short, “[b]ecause a magistrate judge is afforded
broad discretion in the resolution of non-dispositive . . . disputes, the court will overrule the
magistrate judge’s determination only if [her] discretion is abused.” Ariza, 167 F.R.D. at
133.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that Judge Dominguez Braswell erred in ordering that records in
the MIDAS system, with the exception of records under its Analysis Tab, be produced. It
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 7

4
contends that information is protected by Colorado’s quality management privilege. The
Court disagrees.
Under Colorado law, “any records, reports, or other information of a licensed or
certified health-care facility that are part of a quality management program designed to
identify, evaluate, and reduce the risk of patient or resident injury associated with care or
to improve the quality of patient care shall be confidential information.” Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 25-3-109(3). Such “records, reports, and other information . . . shall not be subject
to subpoena or discoverable or admissible as evidence in any civil or administrative
proceeding.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-109(4); see Simpson v. Cedar Springs Hospital, Inc.,
336 P.3d 180, 183 (Colo. 2014) (discussing quality management privilege). But there are
several exceptions to this prohibition:
(a) Any civil or administrative proceeding, inspection, or
investigation as otherwise provided by law by the department of
public health and environment or other appropriate regulatory
agency having jurisdiction for disciplinary or licensing
sanctions;
(b) Persons giving testimony concerning facts of which they
have personal knowledge acquired independently of the quality
management information program or function;
(c) The availability, as provided by law or the rules of civil
procedure, of factual information relating solely to the individual
in interest in a civil suit by such person, next friend or legal
representative. In no event shall such factual information
include opinions or evaluations performed as a part of the
quality management program.
(d) Persons giving testimony concerning an act or omission
which they have observed or in which they participated,
notwithstanding any participation by them in the quality
management program;
(e) Persons giving testimony concerning facts they have
recorded in a medical record relating solely to the individual in
interest in a civil suit by such person.
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 7

5
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-109(4). In Colorado, the party claiming a privilege has the burden
of establishing it applies. See Hartmann v. Nordin, 147 P.3d 43, 51 (Colo. 2006).
Here, Defendant has failed to establish that Judge Dominguez Braswell clearly
erred in concluding that the quality management privilege does not protect the information
in Defendant’s MIDAS system. Because Defendant does not object to the portion of Judge
Dominguez Braswell’s order as to the Analysis Tab, which Judge Dominguez Braswell
concluded enjoys PSQIA protection, the Court does not reach that issue. Instead, the
Court focuses its analysis on whether the rest of the information in the MIDAS system is
privileged under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-109.
Defendant argues that the MIDAS system is entirely privileged, “without regard to
whether or not it is used for multiple purposes.” (ECF No. 144 at 4.) Defendant
specifically argues that “the [quality management] privilege only requires that the protected
information be ‘related to’ or ‘part of’ a quality management program.” (Id. at 5.) On the
contrary, some of the MIDAS system is “part of” the quality management program, while
the rest of the MIDAS system is not.
As Judge Dominguez Braswell pointed out, “much of the information stored in the
MIDAS system is dual purposed.” (ECF No. 140 at 2.) Defendant’s arguments broaden
the scope of the quality management privilege by positioning the entire MIDAS system as
privileged information rather than whichever portions of it are part of its quality
management program. Judge Dominguez Braswell found that the PSQIA and the quality
management privilege are “inapplicable to much of the information in MIDAS.” (Id.
(emphasis added).) It follows then, that much of that information is not “part of a quality
management program” and thus cannot be covered by the quality management privilege.
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 7

6
Moreover, Defendant does not explain how using the MIDAS system “for the
purpose of satisfying obligations to government entities, reporting on insurance claims,
supporting investigations, and tracking incidents as part of Defendant’s own internal
policies and practices” should be protected by the quality management privilege. (Id.)
Such information is not “part of a quality management program designed to identify,
evaluate, and reduce the risk of patient or resident injury associated with care or to
improve the quality of patient care,” so such portions of the MIDAS system do not fall
under the quality management privilege. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-109(3) (emphasis
added). Thus, Judge Dominguez Braswell correctly ordered the production of that
information.
Defendant also takes issue with Judge Dominguez Braswell drawing from a prior
case, Estate of Cannett v. Wellpath, LLC, No. 23-cv-1211-DDD-MDB (ECF No. 125),
where she conducted a thorough analysis distinguishing between single purpose and dual-
purpose systems under the PSQIA. What is at issue in the Objection concerns the quality
management privilege, and not the PSQIA. Indeed, Defendant notes that Estate of
Cannett “was constrained only to the PSQIA, and did not analyze [Colo. Rev. Stat.]
§ 25-3-109 or related caselaw.” (ECF No. 144 at 3 n.1.) Because Defendant does not
assert that the information in the MIDAS system should receive PSQIA protection, the
Court need not consider Estate of Cannett to rule on the Objection.
Judge Dominguez Braswell noted that the quality management privilege includes
several exceptions, “some of which apply here.” (ECF No. 140 at 2 n.1.) Judge
Dominguez Braswell did not specify which exceptions apply. (See ECF No. 144 at 5.)
Defendant contends that none of the statutory exceptions apply. (ECF No. 144 at 5–6.)
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 7

7
But having concluded that the quality management privilege is inapplicable in the first
instance, it necessarily follows that the Court need not determine which of the exceptions
listed under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-3-109(4) apply.
The Court finds and concludes Defendant has failed to show that Judge Dominguez
Braswell erred, let alone clearly erred, in granting in part and denying in part the Motion.
Therefore, the Court will overrule the Objection.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Defendant’s Objection (ECF No. 144) is OVERRULED;
2. 	As set forth in the Scheduling Order entered by Judge Dominguez Braswell
(ECF No. 154), the parties’ Joint Status Report remains due on September 10, 2026.
Dated this 9th day of September, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
______________________
William J. Martínez
Senior United States District Judge
Case No. 1:25-cv-01552-WJM-MDB Document 156 filed 09/09/26 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 7