USA v. State of Colorado et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge Gordon P. Gallagher
Civil Action No. 25-cv-01391-GPG-KAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF COLORADO,
JARED POLIS, Governor of Colorado, in his official capacity,
COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
PHILIP WEISER, Attorney General of Colorado, in his official capacity,
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
DENVER CITY COUNCIL,
MIKE JOHNSTON, Mayor for the City and County of Denver, in his official capacity,
DENVER SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, and
ELIAS DIGGINS, Sheriff of Denver, Colorado, in his official capacity,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are three motions: Motion to Dismiss by State of Colorado, Governor
Jared Polis, and Attorney General Philip Weiser (D. 37); Defendant Colorado General Assembly’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against it Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (D. 38); and
City and County of Denver’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (D. 39). 	The Court
GRANTS all three motions for the following reasons.
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I. BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from the enactment of state and local so-called “sanctuary laws” in
Colorado (D. 31). 1 Plaintiff, the United States of America, challenges four enacted Colorado state
bills (House Bill 19-1124, Senate Bill 21-131, Senate Bill 21-1100, and Senate Bill 25-276) and
two Denver municipal laws (Denver Executive Order No. 142 and Denver Ordinance No. 940-17)
that, broadly speaking, limit the use of state resources for federal immigration enforcement
purposes and seek to protect the rights and personal information of immigrants in Colorado.
Plaintiff argues that, because the Constitution vests supreme authority over immigration in the
Federal Government, these laws violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (D. 31).
Count one asserts that the challenged laws are both implicitly and expressly preempted by federal
immigration laws (id. at ¶¶ 89–92). 	Count two asserts that the challenged laws unlawfully
discriminate against the Federal Government by “singl[ing] out federal immigration officials,
expressly and implicitly, for unfavorable and uncooperative treatment” (id. at ¶ 95). Count three
asserts that Defendants’ enforcement of the challenged laws impermissibly “effects direct
regulation of the Federal Government” (id. at ¶ 99).
Defendants – the State of Colorado, Jared Polis, the Colorado General Assembly, Philip
Weiser, the City and County of Denver, Denver City Council, Mike Johnston, the Denver Sheriff
Department, and Elias Diggins – filed three separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims (D. 37;
D. 38; D. 39). Defendants argue that the laws are not implicitly or expressly preempted by federal
law, Plaintiff has failed to identify a comparator for its discrimination claim, and the complaint
fails to state how Defendants are directly regulating the Federal Government, instead relying on
1 In its complaint, Plaintiff refers to the challenged laws as the “Sanctuary Laws” (D. 31 at ¶ 3).
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conclusory statements (D. 37; D. 39). 	Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s overall proposed
interpretation and application of the Supremacy Clause violates the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution (D. 37 at 22; D. 39 at 12).
II. THE CHALLENGED LAWS
Plaintiff challenges each of the named state and local laws in their entirety, but its
arguments focus on provisions falling into three general categories: (1) limitations on state and
local collection and disclosure of individuals’ personal information for federal immigration
enforcement purposes; (2) limitations on state and local detention of individuals for federal
immigration enforcement purposes; and (3) limitations on state and local officials facilitating
federal immigration official access to state and local facilities and individuals detained in state and
local facilities.
A. Limitations on state collection and disclosure of individuals’ personal information
for federal immigration enforcement purposes
The challenged state laws prohibit state probation offices from providing individuals’
personal information to federal immigration authorities (C.R.S. § 24-76.6-103); prohibit state
agencies from disclosing or making accessible personal identifying information for federal
immigration enforcement purposes (C.R.S. §§ 24-74-103–107); and impose limitations on state
agency collection of personal identifying information and third party access to state agency records
(id.). The terms “personal information” and “personal identifying information” as they are used
in these laws refer to information that may be used to identify a specific individual, such as name,
date of birth, social security number, home or work contact information, and family or emergency
contact information. C.R.S. §§ 24-76.6-101 and 24-74-102(1). Denver Executive Order No. 142
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ordered the Denver Sheriff Department to stop seeking federal funds that require gathering and
disseminating national origin, immigration, or citizenship status information of individuals held in
Denver jails. The Executive Order also ordered the City Attorney’s Office to educate and train
city employees on the limitations around collecting and sharing personal information with federal
immigration enforcement officials, in line with state and local laws.
B. 	Limitations on state and local detention of individuals for federal immigration
enforcement purposes
The challenged laws prohibit both state and local law enforcement officials from arresting
or detaining individuals on the basis of a civil immigration detainer or administrative warrant2 –
i.e. without a judicial warrant. 	C.R.S. § 24-76.6-102; Denver Revised Municipal Code § 28-
253(d). Detaining includes denying or delaying an individual’s release from custody. C.R.S. § 24-
76.6-102(2)(a). 	The state laws also prohibit state governmental entities from entering into or
renewing agreements to detain individuals for federal civil immigration purposes; prohibit state
governmental entities from entering into agreements to detain individuals in privately owned or
operated immigration detention facilities; and limit the allocation of state funds to privately owned
immigration detention facilities. 	C.R.S. §§ 24-76.7-101–103. 	The Denver Revised Municipal
Code §§ 28-250, 28-251 (Denver City Ordinance) also prohibits the use of city funds or resources
to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws as well as any contractual agreement
2 A civil immigration detainer is a “request” that state or local law enforcement advise the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) prior to releasing someone in their custody so that DHS can arrange to assume custody. 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(a). “DHS may also request, but not require, that custody be extended by a period not to exceed 48 hours, ‘in
order to permit assumption of custody by the Department’” (D. 31 at ¶ 29 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)). An
administrative warrant is a grant of authority to federal immigration officers to arrest and detain an individual pending
a decision on whether the individual is to be removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Unlike a criminal
warrant, it is not signed by a federal judge or magistrate judge. See id.
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involving the city that would commit any employee to assist in the enforcement of federal
immigration laws. Denver Revised Municipal Code §§ 28-250, 28-251.
C. Limitations on state employees facilitating federal immigration official access to
state and local facilities and individuals detained in state and local facilities
On both a state and local level, the challenged laws require that before a state or local law
enforcement official may coordinate an interview between federal immigration authorities and an
individual incarcerated in a state jail or custodial facility, the detained individual must be advised
that the interview is being sought by federal immigration authorities, the individual has the right
to decline, remain silent, and speak to an attorney, and anything the individual says may be used
against him or her in subsequent proceedings, including in federal immigration court. C.R.S. § 24-
76.6-102; Denver City Ord. No. 940-17. The Denver Ordinance further bars federal immigration
authorities access to city and county jails “for the purpose of conducting investigative interviews
or any other purpose related to the enforcement of federal immigration” without a judicial warrant.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Additionally,
the complaint must sufficiently allege facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an
entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed; however, a complaint may be dismissed
because it asserts a legal theory not cognizable as a matter of law. Forest Guardians v. Forsgren,
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478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007); Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (D. Colo.
2004). A claim is not plausible on its face “if [the allegations] are so general that they encompass
a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” and the plaintiff has failed to “nudge [the] claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 	In assessing a claim’s plausibility, legal
conclusions contained in the complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth. 	See Kansas
Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). 	The standard, however,
remains a liberal pleading standard, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes
a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme Law of the Land … any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 	U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2. 	The Supremacy Clause undoubtedly prevents states from contradicting or obstructing the
federal immigration scheme, Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012), but it does not
go so far as to compel state assistance. The decision to implement the federal immigration scheme
is reserved to the states according to the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 	See Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). 	However, the basis for Plaintiff’s claims is an
interpretation of Congress’s authority to regulate immigration that would compel state assistance.
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted. See
United States v. Illinois, 796 F.Supp.3d 494, 532 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (holding that similar state
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“sanctuary laws” in Illinois are protected by the Tenth Amendment, “even if those policies frustrate
the federal government’s civil immigration efforts.”); United States v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d
329, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that similar “sanctuary laws” in New York reflected the state’s
“decision to not participate in enforcing civil immigration law – a decision protected by the Tenth
Amendment . . . Finding that these same provisions constitute discrimination or impermissible
regulation would provide an end-run around the Tenth Amendment.”) (hereafter, New York
N.D.N.Y).
The Tenth Amendment declares all “powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. Thus, “[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution,
the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power
is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)
(hereafter, New York). 	In the Tenth Circuit, courts begin a Tenth Amendment analysis by
determining “if the authority to act has been delegated by the Constitution to Congress.” Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs, Fremont Cnty., Colorado v. United States E.E.O.C., 405 F.3d 840, 847 (10th Cir.
2005) (quoting Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000). If the answer is
yes, then Congress may act pursuant to Article I, but if the answer is no, then the power is deemed
to have been reserved to the states. Id.
The Constitution confers upon Congress “broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 394. “This authority rests, in part, on
the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign
nations.” Id. Pursuant to this authority, the Federal Government has enacted an extensive statutory
and regulatory scheme for the governance of immigration status, which includes inspection,
investigation, arrest, detention, and removal of individuals found to be unlawfully present in the
United States. See id. at 395; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1231. Nothing in this
Order pretends to affect that complex regulatory scheme.
However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the Constitution does not confer upon
Congress the power to compel states to implement federal regulatory programs. Printz, 521 U.S.
at 925 (“[T]he Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or
executive action, federal regulatory programs.”). Our nation was founded on a system of “dual
sovereignty” in which “citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other.” Id. at 928 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 	To preserve such a system, state legislatures
must necessarily be free to govern according to the interests and will of their constituents, not
Congress. 	See id. at 920 (“The Constitution thus contemplates that a State’s government will
represent and remain accountable to its own citizens.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 162 (“While
Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate
concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”); Murphy v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453, 471 (2018) (“[C]onspicuously absent from the list of
powers given to Congress [in the Constitution] is the power to issue direct orders to the
governments of the States.”). And at the heart of representative governance is the “allocation of
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scarce resources among competing needs and interests.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999)
(“Today, as at the time of the founding, the allocation of scarce resources among competing needs
and interests lies at the heart of the political process.”). If Congress were authorized to dictate the
allocation of state resources, the balance of power contemplated by our Constitution would be
upended. Id. (“When the Federal Government asserts authority over a State’s most fundamental
political processes, it strikes at the heart of the political accountability so essential to our liberty
and republican form of government.”). Therefore, it is clearly established that Congress does not
have the power to dictate the allocation of state resources, such as by compelling states to bear the
cost of enforcing a federal regulatory program. As the Supreme Court stated in New York, “[i]f
state residents would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to problems
other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose to have the Federal Government
rather than the State bear the expense of a federally mandated regulatory program.” 505 U.S. at
168.
According to these principles, state implementation and enforcement of the federal
immigration scheme is necessarily voluntary. This conclusion is further supported by the language
and text of the federal immigration laws that Plaintiff cites in its complaint. For example, federal
law permits the federal government to contract with state and local governments to further federal
immigration enforcement but does not require such. 	8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g), 1103(a)(11)(b).
Additionally, a civil immigration detainer is explicitly a “request” to state or local law
enforcement. 	8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). 	Likewise, administrative warrants are issued by a federal
agency rather than a judge, which multiple courts have held to mean that state and local
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cooperation is voluntary. See Galarza v. Szalcyzk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014); United States
v. California, 921 f.3d 865, 887 (9th Cir. 2019).
Yet Plaintiff’s claims seek to effectively mandate Colorado expend state resources to
implement the federal immigration scheme. First, holding that the limitations on collection and
disclosure of individuals’ personal information violates the Supremacy Clause would require
Colorado and Denver to allow officials to spend time on the clock collecting and sharing
information with the Federal Government (see D. 63 at 26 (“But if the federal government can
require that state and local employees be permitted to spend their official time and resources
sharing information with it, then the federal government wrests control of those employees’ job
duties from the state and local governments that employe them.”)). Not only would this outcome
compel Colorado and Denver to “bear the expense” of the federal civil immigration scheme by
forcing them to pay officials performing functions solely for the purpose of a federal regulatory
program, it would also remove authority over these officials from Colorado and Denver to the
Federal Government. 	This is exactly the result contemplated and rejected in Printz, where the
Supreme Court struck down a federal statute commanding state officers to conduct background
checks pursuant to a federal regulatory program. 521 U.S. 898. The holding in Printz was clear:
the 	Constitution 	does 	not 	grant 	Congress 	the 	authority 	to 	“dragoon” 	state 	officers 	into
administering federal law. Id. at 928.
Second, holding that the prohibition on state and local officials arresting or detaining
individuals pursuant to civil immigration detainers or administrative warrants violates the
Supremacy Clause would require Colorado and Denver to allow use of law enforcement time,
resources, and custodial facilities to arrest and hold individuals purely for federal civil immigration
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purposes. Again, this would directly force Colorado and Denver to bear the cost of enforcing the
federal immigration scheme and remove their authority to determine the proper allocation of state
resources. 	The same is true for the challenged laws prohibiting governmental entities from
contracting with the Federal Government to detain individuals for federal immigration purposes
and imposing limitations on the allocation of state resources to privately-owned immigration
detention facilities. 	Striking these laws down would require Colorado to permit use of state
facilities and funds for federal immigration purposes. Additionally, because detainers contain an
information sharing component (requesting that state officials notify DHS when an individual is
eligible for release), requiring compliance would result in Congressional conscription of state and
local employees for the same reasons as with the information sharing provisions discussed above.
Similarly, holding that the limitations on federal immigration official access to city and
county jails for interview and immigration enforcement purposes violates the Supremacy Clause
would require the city and county of Denver to allow the Federal Government access to and use
of its facilities for federal immigration purposes.3 Aside from the fact that the Constitution does
not explicitly enumerate Congressional power to commandeer state and local facilities for federal
purposes and that such commandeering imposes a financial burden on state and local governments,
the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted to proactively forbid federal physical occupation of
state and local property without just compensation. See Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S.
519, 527 (1992) (“The government effects a physical taking [] where it requires the landowner to
submit to the physical occupation of his land.”); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24,
3 The court in Illinois held that because the language of federal immigration laws permits but does not require
“allow[ing] federal immigration officials access to detainees held in state facilities,” there was no “hook” for the
United States’ preemption argument with respect to providing access to individuals in detention for state and local
offenses to facilitate ICE interviews. Illinois, 796 F.Supp.3d at 530–531 (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410).
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31 (1984) (“[I]t is most reasonable to construe the reference to “private property” in the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as encompassing the property of state and local governments when
it is [taken] by the United States.”).
Finally, holding that the requirement that state and local officials inform detained
individuals of certain rights before coordinating an interview with federal immigration officials
violates the Supremacy Clause and would impermissibly shift authority over these officials from
Colorado and Denver to the Federal Government. In contrast to Plaintiff’s other arguments that
would have the Court require Colorado and Denver to allow state and local officials to engage in
certain conduct, Plaintiff’s argument here would prohibit Colorado and Denver from requiring
officials to engage in certain conduct. 	In both instances, Plaintiff seeks to usurp control over
Colorado and Denver officials by dictating what the officials can and cannot do. The difference
between Congress “command[ing] ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition” is
an “empty” distinction. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474 (holding that a federal statute prohibiting state
authorization of sports gambling violated the Tenth Amendment because it “unequivocally
dictate[d] what a state legislature may and may not do”). The Federal Government does not have
the power to direct the Colorado legislature or Colorado state and local officials in such a fashion.
See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (“We have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”).
For these reasons, holding in favor of Plaintiff on any of its claims would result in allowing
Congress to conscript Colorado and Denver resources to implement the federal immigration
scheme. But Colorado and Denver have the right to refuse to expend their resources to implement
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a federal regulatory program. Therefore, any holding in favor of Plaintiff would run afoul of the
Tenth Amendment, and the Court need not discuss Plaintiff’s preemption, discrimination, or
federal regulation arguments.4
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss by State of Colorado, Governor Jared Polis, and
Attorney General Philip Weiser (D. 37); Defendant Colorado General Assembly’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claims Against it Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (D. 38); and City and
County of Denver’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (D. 39) are GRANTED. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.
DATED March 31, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
Gordon P. Gallagher
United States District Judge
4 Two other district courts, in Illinois, 796 F.Supp.3d 494 and New York N.D.N.Y., 810 F.Supp.3d 329, faced with
similar claims from Plaintiff regarding state “sanctuary laws” have extensively analyzed Plaintiff’s preemption,
discrimination, and direct regulation arguments. 	Both courts dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, finding no express or
implied preemption, Plaintiff failed to identify a valid comparator as needed for its discrimination claim, and no direct
regulation of the federal government.
This Court his fully reviewed those very thorough opinions, issued by the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins (N.D. Ill.)
and the Honorable Mae A. D’Agostino (N.D.N.Y). This Court is wholly in accord with those courts and adopts their
analysis and reasoning. While this Court is aware that Judge Jenkins and Judge D’Agostino sit in different Circuits,
that bears little relevance in this circumstance because much of the foundation of their analysis is based in the United
States Constitution and interpretation thereof by the United States Supreme Court (as opposed to Circuit-specific law)
and is thus stare decisis for all Circuits. And the state and local laws and ordinances challenged in each case are
substantially similar across all three cases.
While agreeing with the analysis of both Judges Jenkins and D’Agostino, I found the Constitutional bar presented by
the Tenth Amendment dispositive of all matters and determined that further discussion of that topic was warranted.
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