Brelo (PS) v. Biden et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
RICHARD BRELO,
Plaintiff,
v.
JO BIDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Case No. 2:24-cv-429-HCN
Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
United States District Judge
On June 17, 2024, the Plaintiff, Richard Brelo, filed this pro se prisoner civil-rights
action from the Mesa County Detention Facility in Grand Junction, Colorado. Although there are
some inconsistencies in his enumeration of the defendants, it appears that Mr. Brelo purports to
sue “Jo Biden,” Utah’s governor, all truck stops in Utah and America (and perhaps Love’s, Pilot,
Flying J, and Petro specifically as well),1 all public officials in America (current and former,
except former President Carter) and their employees, and all attorneys. Dkt. No. 6 at 1, 6–7. He
may also assert claims against “all . . . psychologist[s,] psychiatrist[s, and] [psychi]atric nurses,”
“all police officers,” “all news media,” “all governors” “who know this whole story” “of Brelo v.
USA[,] Obama[, and] Trump,” the “Morman church,” “Grand Junction Police Officers Wien[,]
Kent[, and] Lopez,” the “Chief of Police [in] Grand Junction,” “Doctor Cowell[,] Mesa County
1 It is unclear whether Mr. Brelo intends to sue Loves, Pilot, Flying J, and Petro—which
are presumably companies that franchise the numerous truck stops that use their names—as well
as all truck stops in Utah and America, or whether he lists these companies by way of
enumeration or illustration—i.e., to make clear that the truck stops he seeks to sue comprise (or
at least include) all truck stops affiliated with these companies.
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Psychologist,” “State Public Defender . . . Rebecca Barrett,” the “Mesa County Sheriff,” “Judge
Henderson,” “Magistrate Judge Matthew Harlin,” “Attorney Carisa Acker [in] Grand Junction,”
and the “Mesa County District Attorney.” Id. at 2, 3–4, 6. Elsewhere in the Complaint, Mr. Brelo
also “moves” for relief against “George Bush and Jeb Bush defendants for all attack on twin
towers crimes,” the “State of Colorado to not forc[ibly] medicate me,” “Meda County Detention
Facility to provide me with paper[,] pen[s,] envelopes[, and] postage,” the “US Marshal to seize
5 pleadings in [Judge] Henderson[’s] court,” the “Government to give me 1 million dollar
reward” and to provide “witness protection under Patriot Act,” and the “U.S. Military to protect
me.” Id. at 4–5. As the court understands the Complaint, however, the only allegations arguably
related to Utah are the following:
(a) that Utah’s governor potentially knows the “story of Brelo v. USA[,] Obama and
Brelo v. Trump treason cover up of terrorist plot [Mr. Brelo] stopped in Denver 2008
against Obama Biden,” id. at 6;
(b) that Mr. Brelo “has been to 25 Morman churchs [sic] with this whole story” and
accuses these entities of “acts of treason under tax free status,” id. at 2; and
(c) (perhaps) that Love’s, Pilot, Flying J, and Petro price gouge American citizens and
throw citizens who are homeless off their property, id.
Having screened the Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court determines
that Mr. Brelo’s motion for final judgment is premature and that he has neither asserted any
plausible (or even potentially plausible) claim against a defendant in Utah, nor alleged that “a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [a valid] claim occurred” in Utah. 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b) (federal venue statute).
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I.
Shortly after filing the complaint, Mr. Brelo filed a document styled as a “Motion for
Million Dollar Reward.” Dkt. No. 9 at 1. In the motion, Mr. Brelo seeks not only this reward, but
also an order placing him in witness protection. Attached to that motion as an “exhibit” is a
longer document containing what appear to be several motions: a “Motion For Farreta hearing”
in Denver County Probate Court, a “motion for new Attorney” in Mesa County Court,” and
finally a “notice to court” in the District of Utah that the plaintiff “submits pleading in Denver
Probate Court [in] Forced medication case 24 MH 510” and has “served” “doctors Salem and
Work and hospital Administrator by personal name” on May 10, 2024. Dkt. No. 9-1 at 1–8.
To the extent Mr. Brelo seeks final relief, his motion is premature. The Defendants have
not yet been served and will not be served until the screening process is complete and a court
determines that Mr. Brelo has asserted a plausible claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Once
served, the Defendants will have an opportunity to file a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12. If the Defendants choose not to do so or the court denies the motion, Rule 8(b)(1) requires
the Defendants to then file an answer “stat[ing] in short and plain terms [their] defenses to each
claim asserted against [them]; and admit[ting] or deny[ing] the allegations asserted.” At that
point and no earlier, Mr. Brelo may seek judgment on the pleadings. See Rule 12(c).
Alternatively, Mr. Brelo may await discovery and then seek summary judgment. See Rule 56.
If Mr. Brelo’s motion is instead interpreted as a request for preliminary equitable relief,
such as a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, Mr. Brelo has not come close to
making a “clear showing that [he] is entitled to such” “an extraordinary remedy.” Winter v.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). His motion is accordingly
denied without prejudice.
II.
After carefully reviewing the complaint, the court has been unable to find any allegation
of an affirmative link between a state actor within Utah and a plausible violation of Mr. Brelo’s
civil rights. According to the Complaint, Mr. Brelo brings this suit against state or local officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). See Dkt. No. 6 at 7. Section 1983 provides a private right of action only against
defendants who act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State.”). And a claim under Bivens can lie only against a defendant who acts “under a claim of
federal authority.” 403 U.S. at 394. It follows that Mr. Brelo may only assert claims in this suit
against government actors.
The only government actor listed, Utah’s governor, is alleged to have done nothing more
than know about a treasonous “cover up of terrorist plot [Mr. Brelo] stopped in Denver 2008
against Obama Biden.” Dkt. No. 6 at 6. This assertion does not meet the threshold for alleging
that Utah’s governor violated any of Mr. Brelo’s federal rights. After all, a plaintiff bringing
claims under Section 1983 may not receive relief “without first satisfying the personal-
participation requirement. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant ‘personally
participated in the alleged constitutional violation’ at issue.” Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F.
App’x 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir.
2018)).
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The other two named defendants in Utah are not government actors; they are instead the
“Morman church” and (perhaps) Love’s, Pilot, Flying J, and Petro.2 To be sure, Mr. Brelo argues
that “church[e]s should be under color of federal law” as they are “tax exempt under
Government to serve com[m]unity and God,” and that “truck stops [act] under [color of] state
law” because they are “licensed under state law.” Dkt. No. 6 at 4. This will not do. A religious
organization’s exemption from certain taxes does not render that entity a federal actor—if it did,
such exemptions would be difficult to square with the Establishment Clause. Cf. Walz v. Tax
Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that such exemptions do not
violate the Establishment Clause). And to the extent Mr. Brelo’s argument regarding truck stops
applies to Love’s, Pilot, Flying J, and Petro—each of which presumably franchise numerous
truck stops in Utah—it is clear that a truck stop’s licensure does not make it a state actor. Cf.
2 To the extent Mr. Brelo also purports to sue all truck stops in Utah, Nevada, and
elsewhere in America, he appears to attempt to sue a defendant class. Mr. Brelo also purports to
name several other defendant classes: “all . . . public officials,” “all judges,” “all attorneys,” etc.,
at least some of whose members surely reside in Utah.
Whether defendant classes are permitted under the Federal Rules is unsettled law. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Board of Educ. Of Romeo Cmty. Sch., 709 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir. 1983)
(concluding that the Rules “contemplate[] certification of a plaintiff class against a single
defendant, not the certification of a defendant class”); Henson v. East Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d
410, 417 (7th Cir. 1980) (similar). In all events, Mr. Brelo would need to move to certify these
classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23—and the court would need to grant that
motion—before his suit could proceed against members of these classes.
Although the undersigned would be a member of more than one of these defendant
classes, if certified, that fact does not preclude the undersigned’s assignment to this case or the
issuance of this order. Because none of these classes has been certified, the undersigned is not a
party to the action at this time. Further, if “all Article III judges have an interest in the outcome”
of a case, the rule of necessity, “a well-settled principle at common law” dating to the fifteenth
century, requires an otherwise disqualified judge to hear the case that “cannot be heard
otherwise.” United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 212–13 (1980).
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Szymonik v. Connecticut, 807 Fed. App’x 97, 102 (2nd Cir. 2020) (holding that a license to
practice law does render every attorney a state actor).
In short, Mr. Brelo has stated neither a valid Section 1983 claim nor a valid Bivens claim
against any defendant in the District of Utah. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1). Nor has he stated any
claim for which “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [that] claim”
occurred in the District of Utah. Id. § 1391(b)(2). Unless “there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought,” it follows that venue is not proper in this district.3 Id. §1391(b)(3).
When filing this Complaint, the Plaintiff appears to have been incarcerated in Colorado;
and the “substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to [a potentially valid] claim,” id.
§ 1391(b)(2), appear to have occurred, if at all, in the District of Colorado, see Dkt. No. 6 at 2–5.
A district court “may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought” if “the convenience of parties and witnesses” or “the interest of justice”
demand. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
3 After arguing that the Church and the truck stops act under color of law, Mr. Brelo
states in passing that “if not, both [are] sued under d[iversity] jurisdiction for discrimination of
homeless[,] a class of people under the Civil Rights Act.” Dkt. No. 6 at 4. The court understands
this allegation to pertain only to the truck stops he apparently seeks to sue as a class (and perhaps
to Love’s, Pilot, Flying J, and Petro as well), who he alleges have had the “homeless t[h]rown
out of truck stops and no trespassed from property.” Dkt. No. 6 at 2. (The Church’s misdeeds
being limited to “Acts of Treason.” Id.) But the invocation of this court’s diversity jurisdiction
would require that Mr. Brelo allege the citizenship of the truck stop defendants he seeks to sue.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990). Mr. Brelo has not
done so.
If instead Mr. Brelo’s discussion of the “Civil Rights Act [of 1965]” is understood to
invoke this court’s federal question jurisdiction under Section 1331 apart from his Section 1983
and Bivens claims, Mr. Brelo has wholly failed to allege any specific claim, let alone to link the
putative defendants to each element the claim.
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Docket Number 9, Motion for the Million Dollar Reward is accordingly DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE and this action is TRANSFERRED to the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
United States District Judge
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