1:24-cv-03512 | Omnilex

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-03512-CNS-STV
KRISTEN CROOKSHANKS, as parent and next of friend of a minor on behalf of C.C.;
MINDY SMITH, as parent and next of friend of a minor on behalf of E.S.;
NAACP–COLORADO–MONTANA–WYOMING STATE AREA CONFERENCES; and
THE AUTHORS GUILD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ELIZABETH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
ORDER
This is a book-removal case stemming from the Elizabeth School District (the
District) in Elizabeth, Colorado. The District voted to permanently remove 19 books from
its school libraries, including titles such as The Kite Runner and The Bluest Eye—books
that had been in District libraries for years. Students of the District, parents of students,
the local NAACP chapter, and authors of the removed books have challenged their
removal on First Amendment grounds.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. ECF No. 9.
Defendant responded, ECF No. 25, and Plaintiffs replied, ECF No. 28. Also pending is
Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence supporting their preliminary
injunction motion. ECF No. 27. Plaintiffs responded, ECF No. 30, and Defendant replied,
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ECF No. 31. For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to
exclude, and it GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The District is
ordered to immediately return the books to the library shelves, and it is enjoined from any
conduct that violates this order.
I. BACKGROUND
A. 	Removed Books
In August 2024, the Board of Education (the Board) for the District identified 19
books that it stated were too sensitive to be in the District’s libraries. 1 ECF No. 25 at 7–9.
The Board removed these books from the District’s libraries and displayed them in the
Board’s office so that community members could weigh in on whether they thought the
books should be returned to the District’s libraries and added to the Sensitive List 2 or
permanently removed from District libraries. Id. The Removed Books are:
(1) 	The Hate U Give by Angie Thomas;
(2) 	Beloved by Toni Morrison;
(3) 	The Bluest Eye by Toni Morrison;
(4) 	The Kite Runner by Khaled Hosseini;
(5) 	You Should See Me in a Crown by Leah Johnson;
(6) 	#Pride: Championing LGBTQ Rights by Rebecca Felix;
(7) 	George (now published and referred to as Melissa) by Alex
Gino;
(8) 	It’s Your World—If You Don’t Like It, Change It by Mikki
Halpin;
(9) 	The Perks of Being a Wallflower by Stephen Chbosky;
1 In referring to the Removed Books, the parties sometimes refer to 18 Removed Books, and in other places,
they refer to 19 Removed Books. Compare ECF No. 1, ¶ 67 (“In total, eighteen books (the ‘Removed
Books’) were taken out of ESD libraries.”), with ¶ 190 (“The Elizabeth School District, acting through its
Board, removed at least nineteen books from ESD libraries in a narrowly partisan or political manner
because the Board disagrees with the ideas or views contained in those books.”). It appears the District
removed the nineteenth book—Redwood and Ponytail—a month after removing the first 18. ECF No. 9 at
10. For consistency, the Court will refer to the 19 books collectively as the Removed Books.
2 A book’s inclusion on the Sensitive List means that, if a student tries to check it out, their parents will
automatically be notified. Parents can also prohibit their children from checking out all books on the
Sensitive List. ECF No. 9 at 4.
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(10) 	Thirteen Reasons Why by Jay Asher;
(11) 	Looking for Alaska by John Green,
(12) 	Nineteen Minutes by Jodi Picoult;
(13) 	Crank by Ellen Hopkins;
(14) 	Glass by Ellen Hopkins;
(15) 	Fallout by Ellen Hopkins;
(16) 	Identical by Ellen Hopkins;
(17) 	Burned by Ellen Hopkins;
(18) 	Smoke by Ellen Hopkins; and
(19) 	Redwood and Ponytail by K.A. Holt.
ECF No. 9 at 4. For 25 days, the Removed Books were displayed in the Board’s office,
with passages pre-marked in each book that the Board found troubling. Id. The Board
provided forms that parents could fill out following review of a particular Removed Book.
Id. The form provided two options: (1) “this book should be Returned to the library and
listed on the sensitive topic list,” or (2) “this book should be Removed from the library
collection.” Id. (citing ECF No. 9-8 (Elizabeth School District’s Book Review Form)). There
was no option on the form to return the books to school libraries and leave them off the
Sensitive List. Id.
B. 	Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs include current District students who intended to browse and check out
the Removed Books from their school libraries but have not been able to do so since the
Board removed them. ECF No. 9 at 10.
Plaintiff C.C. is a junior at Elizabeth High School who spends much of her free time
reading and browsing books in the school library. Id. (citing C.C. Decl.). She states that
she wants to check out the Removed Books from her school library but is unable to do
so. Id. at 11.
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Plaintiff E.S. is in preschool at Running Creek Elementary and uses the school’s
library to borrow books. Id. (citing Smith Decl.). His mother brings this action on his behalf,
stating that she intends for E.S. and his younger sister to attend elementary, middle, and
high school in the District and is concerned that her children are unable to read the
Removed Books. Id.
Plaintiff NAACP - Colorado–Montana–Wyoming State Area Conference (NAACP)
has members who are parents of students in the District who use their school library to
discover new information and explore a wide array of ideas and viewpoints. Id. at 11–12
(citing Prescott Decl.). Like C.C., the parents state that their children intended to use the
school library to access information about race, racism, LGBTQ history, gender identity,
and other topics that are important to them. Id. at 12.
Finally, Plaintiff the Authors Guild includes authors whose books were removed
from District libraries because, according to Plaintiffs, of the viewpoints expressed in the
books. Id. Authors Guild member Ellen Hopkins wrote Crank, Glass, Fallout, Identical,
Burned, and Smoke to help teenagers navigate difficult situations and express her views
on the perils and realities of addiction, abuse, and promiscuity. Id. (citing Hopkins Decl.).
Authors Guild member Angie Thomas wrote The Hate U Give to express her views on
racism, police misconduct, and the value of teenagers using their voices to advocate for
people and causes they care about. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 81–82. Authors Guild member Alex
Gino wrote George (now published and referred to as Melissa) which offers an authentic
portrayal of a child navigating gender identity while addressing themes of courage, self-
discovery, acceptance, and friendship. Id. (citing Gino Decl.). Authors Guild member John
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Green wrote Looking for Alaska to express his views on loss, grief, and intimacy, and to
share his views with teenagers who may be experiencing death and grief for the first time.
ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 103–04. Authors Guild member Jodi Picoult wrote Nineteen Minutes to
help young adults feel seen and express her views on the consequences of teasing and
failing to stand up against bullying. Id., ¶¶ 106–08. According to Plaintiffs, because the
Board disagrees with these authors’ viewpoints and worldviews, the authors believe that
they can no longer share their views with District students. Id. at 13 (citing Hopkins Decl.
and Gino Decl.).
C. Defendant Elizabeth School District
The District educates approximately 2,600 students across four traditional public
schools. ECF No. 25 at 1. The District’s schools includes Running Creek and Singing Hills
Elementary Schools, Elizabeth Middle School, and Elizabeth High School. Id. Each of the
District’s four traditional public schools has its own library. Id. at 3.
The District is governed by a five-director Board of Education (the Board). The
Board directors at the relevant time were Rhonda Olsen (President), Heather Booth (Vice
President), Mary Powell (Secretary), Mike Calahan (Treasurer), and Jonathan Waller
(Assistant Secretary/Treasurer). Id. Dan Snowberger is the District’s superintendent and
was unanimously appointed to the position by the Board on March 13, 2023. Id. at 2.
Finally, Kim Moore is the District’s Chief Academic Officer. Id. at 4 n.2.
II. PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction requiring the Removed Books to be returned
to District libraries and enjoining the Board from continuing to remove books because of
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their disagreement with the ideas and viewpoints contained in the books. ECF No. 9 at 2.
In support of their motion, Plaintiffs provide the following:
x Declarations from C.C. Ms. Crookshanks, Ms. Smith, Ms.
Prescott, Ms. Hopkins, and Alex Gino;
x District memorandum dated August 12, 2024, concerning “9.7
Library Sensitive Topic Protocol and Book Lists,” which lists the
19 “Temporarily Suspended Books,” and the various books on
the “Sensitive Topic Draft Book List”;
x The District’s Book Review Form (blank and completed forms);
x Various emails between Superintendent Snowberger, Board
directors, and other District employees; and
x Various emails between Board directors and interested citizens
(e.g., graduates of the District, grandparents of District students,
etc.).
The District objects to each of these exhibits and moves to exclude them. ECF No.
27. In the alternative, the District asks the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing—applying
the Federal Rules of Evidence at this early stage—in resolving these objections.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes courts to enter preliminary
injunctions and issue temporary restraining orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)–(b). “District
courts have discretion over whether to grant preliminary injunctions.” Free the Nipple-Fort
Collins v. City of Fort Collins, Colorado, 916 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2019). “A district
court’s decision crosses the abuse-of-discretion line if it rests on an erroneous legal
conclusion or lacks a rational basis in the record.” Id.
A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must show (1) a likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence
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of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that
the injunction is in the public interest. Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1257 (10th
Cir. 2015). The movant must demonstrate that “all four of the equitable factors weigh in
its favor,” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 539 F. App’x 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2013), and the
movant’s “failure to prove any one of the four preliminary injunction factors renders its
request for injunctive relief unwarranted.” Vill. of Logan v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 577 F.
App’x 760, 766 (10th Cir. 2014). “Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies
requiring that the movant’s right to relief be clear and unequivocal.” Planned Parenthood
of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1223 (10th Cir. 2018).
The Tenth Circuit specifically disfavors injunctions that will (1) alter the status quo,
(2) mandate an affirmative act by the defendant, or (3) afford all the relief that the movant
could expect to win at trial. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004).
A request for disfavored injunctive relief “must be more closely scrutinized to assure that
the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in
the normal course.” O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court first addresses the District’s motion to exclude before turning to
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
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A. The District’s Motion to Exclude Evidence (ECF No. 27)
1. The District’s Evidentiary Objections
The District contends that Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence is inadmissible for a variety
of reasons, but it primarily objects on hearsay grounds. The Court is not persuaded.
Even if the Federal Rules of Evidence applied at this stage (as explained below,
they do not), many of the District’s objections are plainly baseless. For example, the
District objects to its own employees’ and Board directors’ emails as hearsay:
Email from Superintendent Snowberger to
Director Powell, dated August 5, 2024, and
remainder of email thread.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from Director Booth to [redacted],
dated August 19, 2024, and remainder of
email thread (Same objection for Exhibit 11
& 12).
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from Director Powell to Director
Booth, dated September 8, 2024, and
remainder of email thread.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from Director Powell to [redacted],
dated September 8, 2024.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from Superintendent Snowberger to
J. Maher, dated August 19, 2024.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from President-Director Olsen to
Superintendent Snowberger and M.
Seefried, dated September 5, 2024, and
remainder of email thread.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from M. Seefried to Chief Academic
Officer Moore, dated September 11, 2024.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
Email from Chief Academic Officer Moore
to P. Slade, dated September 10, 2024.
Inadmissible hearsay.
FRE 802.
ECF No. 27 at 19–23 (objections taken verbatim from the District’s motion). Statements
by Superintendent Snowberger, Board directors, Chief Academic Officer Moore, and
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other District employees are not hearsay; under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D),
these are opposing party statements that are excluded from the definition of hearsay. 3
Moreover, Plaintiffs point out that many of their exhibits are not offered to establish
the truth of the matter asserted. ECF No. 30 at 4. And they argue that the book review
forms (even if they were being offered for the truth asserted in them) are business records
under Rule 802(6). Id. at 4–5. The District ignores these arguments as well.
At its core, many of the District’s objections lack any legal basis, and the Court
does not anticipate the District raising similarly meritless objections in the future.
However, a very small number of objections have merit. It is true that some of the exhibits
not written by a District employee or Board director contain hearsay or otherwise may be
speculative. Courts in this District, however, have held that “hearsay statements . . . are
fair game” at the preliminary injunction stage. EIS Ultimate Holding, LP v. Huset, No. 23-
CV-02324-GPG-MDB, 2024 WL 4472008, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2024) (citing Willey v.
Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Trustees, 680 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1268 (D. Wyo.
2023) (observing that “a court may consider affidavits based on hearsay when evaluating
requests of preliminary injunctions”), and Shea v. Ditech Fin. LLC, 208 F. Supp. 3d 380,
382 (D. Mass. 2016) (“The Court may also rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence,
including hearsay, in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction.”)).
In sum, the Court overrules the District’s evidentiary objections at this stage.
3 That these are opposing party statements should have been obvious to the District’s counsel. But even
so, Plaintiffs raise this argument in their response, ECF No. 30 at 4, and Defendant abandons the argument
by completely ignoring it in its reply.
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2. The District’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing
The District, in the alternative, asks the Court to hold an evidentiary hearing on
Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence applying the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court declines
to do so for at least four reasons.
First, Tenth Circuit caselaw is clear on this issue: “The Federal Rules of Evidence
do not apply to preliminary injunction hearings.” Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d
1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We must be mindful, therefore, as the Supreme Court has
cautioned, that ‘a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures
that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.’”
(quoting University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981))). If the Court
granted the District’s request, it would need to delay a ruling on Plaintiffs’ preliminary
injunction motion while the parties prepared their various witnesses and then hold a
multiday hearing. In addition to the delay, such a hearing would amount to a trial on the
merits—something the Tenth Circuit has counseled against. See id. (“[I]t bears
remembering the obvious: that when a district court holds a hearing on a motion for
preliminary injunction it is not conducting a trial on the merits.”). Applying these
elementary principles leads to one conclusion: the District’s request to hold an evidentiary
hearing and apply the Federal Rules of Evidence at this stage would be improper.
Second, as will be seen below in granting Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion,
the Court largely relies on the District’s own statements in determining that Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits. The Court has already explained why the District’s
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hearsay objections to these statements are baseless, and thus an evidentiary hearing on
these statements would be a waste of time. 4
Third, in its reply, the District goes far beyond the bounds of what it argued in its
motion to exclude (and what Plaintiffs addressed in their response brief). Take, for
example, the District’s contention that Plaintiffs are seeking a mandatory injunction, and
thus arguing that the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence is heightened here.
ECF No. 31 at 4. This is the first time the District raises this issue, which is curious
because Plaintiffs make clear in their preliminary injunction motion that they “seek a
preliminary injunction in order to preserve the status quo—when all of the Removed
Books were available in ESD libraries.” ECF No. 9 at 14. It is Plaintiffs’ position that,
because their motion merely seeks to return the Removed Books to District libraries, “the
preliminary injunction in this case does not require defendant[] to do something that they
were not doing during the last uncontested period.” Id. (quoting Evans v. Fogarty, 44 F.
App’x. 924, 928 (10th Cir. 2002)). Defendant does not address this issue at all in its
response, ECF No. 25, nor in its motion to exclude, ECF No. 27. Thus, arguing a new
issue in a reply separate and apart from the preliminary injunction briefing is improper.
Fourth, the District makes factually incorrect statements in its reply brief. For
example, the District mischaracterizes the evidence Plaintiffs rely on as simply the
statements by “parents of two students, the head of the local NAACP chapter, and select
members of another trade group,” and “not of the School Board members.” ECF No. 31
4 The Court may have reached a different conclusion had the District objected on foundation or authenticity
grounds, but it did not—it only objected on hearsay grounds.
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at 1. Not so. Plaintiffs cite countless statements from Board directors throughout their
preliminary injunction motion. See ECF No. 9 (extensively citing statements from the
Board President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant
Secretary/Treasurer).
To be sure, the District’s argument for an evidentiary hearing has some support:
“most courts hold that when the written evidence reveals a factual dispute, an evidentiary
hearing must be provided[.]” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2949
Procedure on Application for Preliminary Injunction (3d ed.) (citing cases from the
Eleventh Circuit and others but not the Tenth Circuit). However, whether “the facts are
bitterly contested,” Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 320
F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2003), is not so obvious here. On one hand, the District is not
disputing that the books were removed from the library shelves. On the other, the District’s
motivation for removing the books is in dispute. The latter appears to go to the merits of
the dispute and not the underlying facts. Or said a bit differently, the key underlying facts
here are not bitterly contested.
Further, in the more recent cases, the factual dispute was more germane to the
injunctive relief. In Moon v. Med. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 577 F. App’x 934 (11th Cir. 2014),
for example, the issue was whether former employees were violating restrictive covenants
in an employment agreement.
To reach its conclusion in [granting the preliminary injunction],
the district court made extensive factual findings. In fact, the
district court’s order—which [the defendant] drafted—includes
almost five pages of factual findings. However, many of these
facts are disputed by the parties’ conflicting affidavits. For
example, the Plaintiffs dispute whether they competed in the
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restricted 	area, 	whether 	they 	solicited 	[the 	defendant’s]
customers, 	and 	whether 	[the 	defendant’s] 	customer
relationships were substantial.
Id. at 939 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). In the Court’s view, the factual
disputes highlighted by the Eleventh Circuit in Moon are plainly distinguishable from the
facts of this case.
Similarly, in Four Seasons Hotels And Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., Four
Seasons accused the defendant of gaining unauthorized access to the Four Seasons
computer network and thus proprietary and confidential materials located on the network.
320 F.3d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2003). The Four Seasons filed an emergency motion for
an ex parte temporary restraining order, seeking to prevent the defendant from accessing
its computer network. Id. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit faulted the district court for not holding an evidentiary hearing when the
“facts surrounding the alleged unauthorized computer use [were] in dispute.” Id. As with
Moon, the Court finds the factual dispute in Four Seasons distinguishable from the instant
case because here, there is no dispute that the District has removed the books from the
libraries.
* * *
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at this stage, the District’s
motion to exclude is denied.
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B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 9)
The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ motion and reply, the District’s response, and
the various exhibits and affidavits attached to the parties’ briefings. ECF Nos. 9, 25, 28.
The Court considers the four requirements governing a preliminary injunction below and
concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing that a preliminary
injunction is warranted.
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Before a court may issue a preliminary injunction, the movant must establish a
substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of its claims. Prairie Band of Potawatomi
Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001). However, “the determination of
a motion for a preliminary injunction and a decision on the merits are different.” Valdez v.
Applegate, 616 F.2d 570, 572 (10th Cir. 1980).
a. Status Quo
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs argue that they “seek a preliminary injunction in order
to preserve the status quo—when all of the Removed Books were available in ESD
libraries.” ECF No. 9 at 13. Thus, according to Plaintiffs, this is not a disfavored injunction
that requires them to satisfy a higher burden. Id. The District does not respond to this
argument. See generally ECF No. 25.
“To determine whether an injunction is mandatory or prohibitory, [courts] look at
the substance of the injunction and compare it to the status quo ante—i.e., the ‘last
uncontested period preceding the injunction.’” Evans, 44 F. App’x at 928–29 (quoting
Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 269 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir.
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2001)). In Dominion Video, the Tenth Circuit held that a preliminary injunction requiring
the defendant to take affirmative action to activate satellite television subscribers was not
mandatory. 269 F.3d at 1155 (“EchoStar asserts that the injunction forces it to take
affirmative action to activate new Dominion subscribers. The injunction, however,
prohibits EchoStar from refusing to activate new Dominion customers on the same terms
and conditions previously applicable.”). The court explained that the requested injunction
did “not compel [the defendant] to do something it was not already doing during the last
uncontested period preceding the injunction.” Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ requested relief is not a disfavored injunction. First,
the District offers no response to this argument and thus waived its opposition. Second,
as in Dominion Video, Plaintiffs’ requested injunction does not require the District to do
something that it was not already doing during the last uncontested period—return the
Removed Books to the District libraries’ shelves so that students can peruse them and
borrow them if desired. Third, a preliminary injunction during the pendency of these
proceedings will not provide substantially all the relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled.
See ECF No. 1 at 45–47 (seeking permanent injunction, past and future pecuniary and
non-pecuniary losses, declaratory relief, and attorney fees).
For these three reasons, the heightened burden for mandatory injunctions does
not apply.
b. First Amendment Rights at Stake
Plaintiffs argue that the students’ interest in accessing books in their respective
school libraries is constitutionally protected. ECF No. 9 at 14–21. The District disagrees,
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arguing that the District library curation decisions are government speech immune from
First Amendment scrutiny. ECF No. 25 at 12. Caselaw does not support the District’s
position, and therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the
Colorado Constitution protect the right to receive information and ideas. 5 Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas. This freedom (of speech and press) .
. . necessarily protects the right to receive . . . . This right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” (internal citations and
quotations omitted)); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1051, 1054
(Colo.), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 29, 2002) (the “First Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects . . . the right to receive information and ideas,” and that right
is extended under the Colorado Constitution, which “provides broader free speech
protections than the Federal Constitution”). This protection is heightened in public
schools. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (“The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools.” (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
The District’s argument—that its decisions as to the library contents are
government speech immune from First Amendment scrutiny—finds little support in the
5 Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution is titled Freedom of Speech and Press and provides that “[n]o law
shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak, write or publish
whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and in all suits and
prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the
court, shall determine the law and the fact.”
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caselaw. Courts generally hold that the placement and removal of books in public school
libraries is not government speech. GLBT Youth in Iowa Sch. Task Force v. Reynolds,
114 F.4th 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the Supreme
Court has not extended the government speech doctrine to the placement and removal
of books in public school libraries.”); id. at 668 (“[I]t is doubtful that the public would view
the placement and removal of books in public school libraries as the government
speaking.”). This makes sense.
Take, for example, a high school library that includes Hitler’s manifesto Mein
Kampf. No one would seriously argue that placing this book in a school library constitutes
government speech. See id.; see also PEN Am. Ctr., Inc. v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
711 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1331 (N.D. Fla. 2024) (“[T]the fact that the traditional purpose of a
library is to provide information on a broad range of subjects and viewpoints, the Court
simply fails to see how any reasonable person would view the contents of the school
library (or any library for that matter) as the government’s endorsement of the views
expressed in the books on the library’s shelves.”); id. (distinguishing cases cited by the
school “because the speech embodied in a library collection is materially different from
the speech embodied in government-sponsored parades, prayers, art exhibits, and
monuments on public property”); Virden v. Crawford Cnty., Arkansas, No. 2:23-CV-2071,
2024 WL 4360495, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 30, 2024) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not
extended [the government speech] doctrine to the placement and removal of books in
libraries.”).
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The District also relies on Moody v. NetChoice, LLC for the proposition that
“expressive activity includes presenting a curated compilation of speech originally created
by others.” 603 U.S. 707, 728 (2024). To be sure, NetChoice held that the “First
Amendment offers protection when an entity engaging in expressive activity, including
compiling and curating others’ speech, is directed to accommodate messages it would
prefer to exclude.” Id. at 731 (emphasis added). Or stated in another way, an “entity
‘exercis[ing] editorial discretion in the selection and presentation’ of content is ‘engage[d]
in speech activity.’” Id. (quoting Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 674 (1998)). Although compelling, the Court is not persuaded that NetChoice
requires a different outcome. NetChoice had nothing to do with government speech—it
concerned states’ power to control whether and how third-party social-media posts are
presented to other users. Id. at 717.
The Court rejects the District’s invitation to extend government-speech precedents
by applying NetChoice or its other cited authority to the facts at hand—something the
Supreme Court has expressly discouraged. Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 235 (2017)
(“[W]hile the government-speech doctrine is important—indeed, essential—it is a doctrine
that is susceptible to dangerous misuse. If private speech could be passed off as
government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval, government could
silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints. For this reason, we must
exercise great caution before extending our government-speech precedents.” (emphasis
added)).
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The Court holds that it is Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights at stake—not the
District’s.
c. Plaintiff-Authors’ First Amendment Rights
Plaintiffs argue that the District violated the Authors Guild Plaintiffs’ constitutional
right to share their books free from undue viewpoint-based censorship. ECF No. 9 at 21–
25. The District offers no response to this narrow argument. Regardless, the Court agrees
with Plaintiffs.
Authors have a right to share their books and ideas, and this right is protected
under the First Amendment. Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(“The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The authors of the First
Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but
they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the
right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it.” (internal
citation omitted and emphasis added)); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64
n.6 (1963) (“The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the circulation
of books as well as their publication, and the direct and obviously intended result of the
Commission’s activities was to curtail the circulation in Rhode Island of books published
by appellants.” (internal citation omitted)).
d. Whether the District’s Book Removal Violated
the Students’ First Amendment Rights
The District first argues that Plaintiffs have not made a clear showing of likely
success on the merits because a school library’s curation decisions are government
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speech immune from First Amendment scrutiny. ECF No. 25 at 12. The Court has already
rejected that argument. But the District goes on, arguing that, even if the District’s curation
decisions are not government speech, the three-justice plurality opinion in Pico on which
Plaintiffs rely is nonprecedential and doctrinally stale. Id. at 13. Instead, the District argues
that the Court must proceed under the rubric for curricular-related speech established in
Hazelwood. Id. The Court addresses the Pico and Hazelwood decisions in turn and then
analyzes whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits under both frameworks.
i. Supreme Court’s Pico Decision
Plaintiffs rely on the plurality opinion of Justice Brennan in Board of Education,
Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). The case
involved a school district’s decision to remove nine books from the school library. Id. at
856. Pico, however, produced seven opinions, none of which garnered a majority.
Justice Brennen announced the judgment of the court in a plurality joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens. Pico, 457 U.S. at 855. The plurality held that school
boards “may not remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike
the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,’” Id. at 872 (quoting
W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
Justice Blackmun joined in the plurality with the exception of one part and wrote
separately to clarify his First Amendment analysis. Id. at 875. Justice Blackmun disagreed
with the plurality’s assertion that school children have a “right to receive information.” Id.
at 87–79. He instead focused on the state’s denial of access to ideas. Id. at 879 n.2 (“In
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effect, my view presents the obverse of the plurality’s analysis: while the plurality focuses
on the failure to provide information, I find crucial the State’s decision to single out an idea
for disapproval and then deny access to it.” (emphasis added)). In Justice Blackmun’s
view, the Court should hold that “school officials may not remove books for the purpose
of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when
that action is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas involved.” Id. at
879–80 (“It does not seem radical to suggest that state action calculated to suppress
novel ideas or concepts is fundamentally antithetical to the values of the First
Amendment. At a minimum, allowing a school board to engage in such conduct hardly
teaches children to respect the diversity of ideas that is fundamental to the American
system.”). The school board must “be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Id. at 880 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
Justice White concurred in the judgment but favored delaying the announcement
of a legal rule until the trial court established the reasons behind the school officials’
decision to remove the books. Id. at 883. He did not reveal what standard he would use
in judging the constitutionality of a school board’s decision to remove certain books from
school libraries.
It is well-established that a plurality opinion is not binding on this Court. United
States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1976) (“A mere plurality pronouncement
of this type does not have the binding effect that [the defendant] argues for. A trial court
does not necessarily err when it does not follow a rule promulgated by only three Justices
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of the Supreme Court.”), vacated on other grounds, 430 U.S. 925 (1977). Because Pico
failed to announce a legal rule blessed by five justices, the precedential value of Pico has
perplexed courts for years, including in the recent years. PEN Am. Ctr., 711 F. Supp. 3d
at 1331 (“The applicable legal standard for evaluating alleged First Amendment violations
in the school library context is not entirely clear . . . .”).
Thirty years ago, a district court in this Circuit observed that,
[w]hat clearly emerges from the Pico decision is that the trial
court must determine the motivation of the school officials in
removing the book. Five of the justices in Pico agreed that
some motivations would be unconstitutional. The plurality
found the motivations unconstitutional if school officials
“intended by their removal decision to deny respondents
access to ideas with which [the officials] disagreed, and if this
intent was the decisive factor in [the removal] decision.” Pico,
457 U.S. at 871. Removal may be permissible if based on
vulgarity or “educational suitability.” Id.
Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, Johnson Cnty., Kan., 895 F. Supp. 1463, 1468–69 (D.
Kan. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, according to Case, Pico “must be used as a starting
point,” as this is the “only Supreme Court decision dealing specifically with removal of
books from a public school library.” Id. at 1469; see also Campbell v. St. Tammany Par.
Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Even though the constitutional analysis in the
Pico plurality opinion does not constitute binding precedent, it may properly serve as
guidance in determining whether the School Board’s removal decision was based on
unconstitutional motives. . . . [The Fifth Circuit has never suggested] that the Pico plurality
does not provide useful guidance in determining the constitutional implications of
removing books from a public school library.”); PEN Am. Ctr., 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1331
(stating that the “common theme” in all of the potentially relevant First Amendment school-
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library cases “(e.g., Pico plurality, Hazelwood, nonpublic forum) is that school officials
cannot remove books solely because they disagree with the views expressed in the books
but that they can make content-based removal decisions based on legitimate pedagogical
concerns . . .”).
The District asks the Court to ignore the Pico plurality because, under Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), 6 the controlling opinion belongs to Justice White,
who concurred in the judgment but did not join any portion of Justice Brennan’s plurality
opinion. ECF No. 25 at 15 (citing Campbell, 64 F.3d at 189) (“Justice White’s concurrence
in Pico represents the narrowest grounds for the result in that case.”)). That may be true,
but the District ignores that Campbell and other courts have decided that Pico still
provides useful guidance in book-removal cases. Campbell, 64 F.3d at 189 (Pico “may
properly serve as guidance in determining whether the School Board’s removal decision
was based on unconstitutional motives”).
The District goes on to copy the bulk of Justice White’s concurrence, ECF No. 25
at 16, but it omits a key portion of the short concurrence: Justice White preferred to return
the case to the district court to determine why the school board removed the books. Pico,
457 U.S. at 883 (“When findings of fact and conclusions of law are made by the District
Court, that may end the case. If, for example, the District Court concludes after a trial that
the books were removed for their vulgarity, there may be no appeal.”). If Justice White
was “entirely agnostic on whether the First Amendment imposes any constraints on book-
6 Marks instructed that, when “a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgment[ ] on the narrowest grounds.” 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
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removal decisions made by public-school libraries” as the District argues, ECF No. 25 at
16, his preference to remand the case for further factfinding on the school board’s
motivations would be pointless.
Like the cases outlined above, the Court finds that Pico remains a useful starting
point in determining the constitutionality of the District’s book-removal decision.
ii. Supreme Court’s Hazelwood Decision
The District argues that the Court should defer to the Board’s book-removal
decision under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). ECF No.
25 (arguing that Hazelwood bars Plaintiffs’ claims because school boards have
“maximum deference over curricular and school-sponsored speech”). There, the
Supreme Court held that school districts are entitled to exercise broad discretion in the
management of curricular affairs “so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 273. Hazelwood concerned a school official’s
“editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the
school’s journalism curriculum.” Id. at 262. The Court held that school officials may
exercise greater control over student expression that is a part of the school curriculum.
Id. at 270–72.
The Tenth Circuit has cautioned courts not to read Hazelwood too narrowly by
applying it only to activities conducted as part of the traditional school curriculum. Fleming
v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 924 (10th Cir. 2002). The Fleming court
read the definition of “school-sponsored” speech to mean “activities that might reasonably
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be perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school and that involve pedagogical concerns.”
Id.
If the speech at issue bears the imprimatur of the school and
involves pedagogical interests, then it is school-sponsored
speech, and the school may impose restrictions on it so long
as those restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. The imprimatur concept covers
speech that is so closely connected to the school that it
appears the school is somehow sponsoring the speech.
Id. at 924–25. Fleming further counsels that the “level of involvement of school officials in
organizing and supervising an event affects whether that activity bears the school’s
imprimatur.” Id. at 925.
iii. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed Under Either Standard
Regardless of the standard the Court applies, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.
Under the Pico framework, the Court looks to the District’s stated motivations
behind removing the 19 books. Plaintiffs argue that the District’s motives were clear: the
District removed the books based on the authors’ and books’ viewpoints and political
ideologies. Plaintiffs point to emails and public statements from Board directors and other
District employees. The Court highlights some of those below—concluding that the
District’s decisive factor in voting to permanently banish the Removed Books was
because the District disagreed with the views expressed in the books and to further their
preferred political orthodoxy.
First, in emails between the Board directors and Superintendent Snowberger,
Director Heather Booth commented, “[w]e need to be cautious about the way we frame
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our stance on politics in our schools. While I completely agree that we must keep politics
out of the classroom and shield our students from partisan influences, it’s equally
important to remember that our commitment to conservative values was a key aspect of
our campaign.” ECF No. 9-9 at 3 (emphasis added). She went on to write,
It’s crucial that as we navigate these discussions, we remain
mindful of the promises we made and the values we pledged
to support. By doing so, we can maintain our integrity and
ensure that our actions align with the expectations of those
who elected us. As I like to say “we need to keep politics out
of the classroom and away from the kids”. However
conservative values are exactly what we are and plan to
continue to bring into the district.
Id. (emphasis added). In response, Superintendent Snowberger stated, “I’m not opposed
to the change, Heather. This has been what we’ve spoken about since I’ve been hired so
it’s just important that I know how the board wants to frame this. I certainly will take the
boards direction.” Id. at 2. President-Director Rhonda Olsen then responded to the group
stating, “Our vision for the district could be considered by some to be conservative based.
We were very vocal about getting a superintendent and legal representation with
conservative values . . . .” Id.
Second, in an email between Director Booth and a graduate of the District, Director
Booth justified the book removal, stating that, “[a]s an elected official committed to
conservative values for our children, I feel a strong obligation to honor the promises made
during my campaign.” ECF No. 9-10 at 2 (copying the entire Board).
Third, in a back-and-forth between Director Mary Powell and Director Booth,
Director Powell explains why she waffled on whether #Pride - Championing LGBTQ
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Rights and You Should See me in a Crown should be removed or just marked sensitive.
ECF No. 9-12 at 3–4.
I voted “Move to Sensitive List and move up to EHS” on #Pride
because this book is largely a history of LGBTQ, and doesn’t
totally try to indoctrinate. But, just the overall topic is going to
tend to that regardless. I also thought it would be a good thing
to show some openness to other viewpoints, as long as it isn’t
indoctrinating.
I voted same on “Crown” because while it has some racist
overtones, they are just the main character handling them.
About halfway through you find out she is a lesbian. There is
another prom contestant who is also, and they form a
relationship. There isn’t anything graphic other than
discussing a kiss that I saw, and it is not the central theme of
the book at all. I thought the story was overall a good one of
empowerment for black students - this is a very successful
girl. There is also some good general friend support, etc. in
the story.
So, that is my reasoning, and Jon and Mike joined me in that
vote. HOWEVER, if you and Rhonda strongly feel they should
be REMOVED, I will change my vote on these two to
REMOVE.
Id. (emphasis added). Director Booth responded, “[p]ersonally, LGBTQ is only regarding
sexual preference which doesn’t belong in any school. . . . Our constituents will not be
happy about us returning any of these books. That is who we are beholden to.” Id. Director
Powell then responded, with Superintendent Snowberger and others copied, stating that
she and President-Director Olsen “talked, and I have changed my vote on these two to
REMOVE. I talked to both Jon and Mike and they also agree on REMOVE. Therefore, all
board votes for the 18 books are to REMOVE.” Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 7
7 The District attempts to distance itself from Director Booth, stating that she resigned from the Board on
January 13, 2025, and did not vote to permanently remove books from the library. ECF No. 25 at 1 n.1, 8
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Fourth, Director Powell emailed an unknown recipient stating that she supported
removing “the LGBTQ book and [] You should see me in a Crown.” ECF No. 14 at 2.
Convinced by Directors Booth and Olsen, Director Powell justified these removals
because “they both have gender identity ideology in them, and do we really want that out
there at all?” Id.
Fifth, a parent of a District student emailed President-Director Olsen complaining
about Redwood and Ponytail by K.A. Holt. ECF No. 9-16 at 2–3. The parent’s chief
complaint was about the book’s LGBTQ content. Id. Copying Superintendent
Snowberger, Ms. Olsen responded, “[t]hank you so much for bringing this to our attention.
The review of the library books to ensure age appropriate content is a new process for
the district and we really appreciate it when parents bring to our attention any items that
may have been missed. I will request that the book be removed from the library for further
review.” Id. at 2.
These five examples strongly suggest that the District’s motivations behind
removing the 19 books is blatantly unconstitutional under Pico and other precedents. 8
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (school boards “may not remove books from school library
shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their
n.7, 26 n.12. But the Board voted on September 9, 2024, to “permanently remove” the books. Id. at 8. Thus,
even if Director Booth missed the September 9, 2024 meeting, she was still on the Board, and, even
assuming that she did not vote (her correspondence suggests otherwise), her emails makes clear which
way she intended to vote, and President-Director Olsen appeared to acknowledge Director Booth’s
“remove” vote.
8 Plaintiffs also cite several statements from publicly held board meetings attacking the content and views
expressed in the Removed Books that easily could be characterized as political and partisan in nature. See,
e.g., ECF No. 9 at 3 nn.3, 8 n.4–6, 19 nn.7–10, 23 n.12 (Vice President Booth stated that the Board was
instituting its new book protocols because the current Board members were elected “on these values to
keep your (the majority) values in mind of this community, and that is what we are going to do”).
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removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion’” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)) (Brennen, J. plurality opinion);
Campbell, 64 F.3d at 189 (Fifth Circuit finding that Pico “may properly serve as guidance
in determining whether the School Board’s removal decision was based on
unconstitutional motives”); PEN Am. Ctr., 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1331 (Supreme Court
precedent in Pico and Hazelwood is that “school officials cannot remove books solely
because they disagree with the views expressed in the books”).
The District’s conclusory argument that it “easily satisfies” the Pico plurality
standard “because it is not withholding access to the titles at issue for narrowly partisan
or political reasons,” ECF No. 25 at 13, is belied by the District’s stated reasons in these
five examples and during live Board meetings. Moreover, the District argues that schools
need flexibility to fulfill their educational mission. Id. at 20. But the Board has made clear
that they are acting to fulfill the pledge to carry out their conservative agenda—not an
educational mission.
The District next argues that it removed some of the books not to prescribe partisan
orthodoxy but because they contain “sexually explicit and vulgar content.” ECF No. 25 at
27. But again, the contemporaneous statements expressly state otherwise. For example,
Secretary Powell explained to the Board directors that in You Should See Me in a Crown,
“[t]here isn’t anything graphic other than discussing a kiss that I saw.” ECF No. 9-12 at 3.
And she explained that #Pride: Championing LGBTQ Rights “is largely a history of
LGBTQ, and doesn’t totally try to indoctrinate. . . . I also thought it would be a good thing
to show some openness to other viewpoints, as long as it isn’t indoctrinating.” Id.
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(emphasis added). Still, the Board—including Secretary Powell—voted to remove these
books because of the viewpoints expressed in the books. At this stage, the Court puts
much more weight on the contemporaneous statements made by the Board than it does
on the after-the-fact declarations prepared with counsel’s advice. 9
For example, President-Director Olsen states that “I did not vote to remove any of
the 19 disputed titles from the school district’s libraries because of the ‘ideas,’ ‘viewpoints,’
or ‘worldviews’ contained or expressed in any of those books.” ECF No. 25-3, ¶ 14. In
light of the various emails and statements before the Court, the Court finds that her and
the other directors’ post hoc justifications plainly are pretextual. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,
356 F.3d 1277, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Although we do not second-guess the
pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator’s goal, we would be abdicating our judicial
duty if we failed to investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern was
pretextual. . . . [W]e may override an educator’s judgment where the proffered goal or
methodology was a sham pretext for an impermissible ulterior motive.”).
The District also suggests that Plaintiffs cannot prevail because it allowed parents
to weigh in on Removed Books. ECF No. 25 at 26. This argument does not help the
District. First, the Board pre-selected and highlighted alleged inappropriate content in the
books. True, many parents completed forms indicating that they wanted the books to be
removed because the views expressed in the books did not align with their partisan,
9 See Fairbanks Cap. Corp. v. Kenney, 303 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (D. Md. 2003) (a district court “must weigh
and evaluate the evidence” when ruling on a preliminary injunction); Devan Designs, Inc. v. Palliser
Furniture Corp., No. 2:91CV00512, 1993 WL 283256, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 21, 1993) (“In the context of
preliminary injunction, the court necessarily must weigh the evidence in order to determine the likelihood of
success on the merits. In the context of summary judgment, such weighing of evidence is, of course,
impermissible.”).
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political viewpoints. 10 For example, one parent of a high school student wrote that #Pride
should be removed because “LGBTQ themes do not belong in our public schools.” ECF
No. 9-13 at 1. And a middle school parent wrote that “middle school students are too
young to be exposed to the pride movement, same sex marriage, stonewall riots and
pride parades.” Id. at 3. Others commented that You Should See Me in a Crown should
be removed “because of it[]s CRT [critical race theory] undertones and homosexual
storyline.” Id. at 10.
That parents want to remove books for partisan reasons does not permit
government officials to do the same. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 872. Even assuming, as
the District suggests, that the majority of parents wish to remove certain books based on
their conservative beliefs, the First Amendment “offers sweeping protection” for those
authors and readers who may adhere to the minority view. “In fact, it is the minority view,
including expressive behavior that is deemed distasteful and highly offensive to the vast
majority of people, that most often needs protection under the First Amendment.” Bible
Believers v. Wayne Cnty., Mich., 805 F.3d 228, 243 (6th Cir. 2015) (collecting Supreme
Court cases including Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (recognizing the
First Amendment rights of Ku Klux Klan members to advocate for white supremacy-based
political reform achieved through violent means) and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
405–06 (1989) (recognizing flag burning as a form of political expression protected by the
First Amendment)). “Any other rule ‘would effectively empower a majority to silence
10 Of course, parents also argued the opposite: that books should be returned to the book shelves. See,
e.g., ECF No. 9-13 at 22 (arguing that the book removal is “not welcoming to anyone who is not white,
straight, and politically conservative”).
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dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections,’ and the government might be
inclined to ‘regulate’ offensive speech as ‘a convenient guise for banning the expression
of unpopular views.’” Id. (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 26 (1971)).
The District’s arguments under the Hazelwood standard fall short as well.
Hazelwood asks whether the activity at issue “might reasonably be perceived to bear the
imprimatur of the school and that involve pedagogical concerns.” Fleming, 298 F.3d at
924. If it does, then the speech is “school-sponsored speech” that may be immune from
First Amendment scrutiny. Id.; see generally Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S.
550, 553 (2005). The District cannot make this showing.
To start, the District has provided no persuasive authority that merely maintaining
a book on a school library shelf constitutes school-sponsored speech. “The imprimatur
concept covers speech that is so closely connected to the school that it appears the
school is somehow sponsoring the speech.” Id. at 925. Given the District’s stated position
concerning the Removed Books, there is no chance that anyone will connect the views
expressed in the Removed Books to the District. Stated a tad bit differently, no reasonable
person would assume that the District is sponsoring the speech or views contained in the
Removed Books.
Further, the District’s book-removal decision is not “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Again, the District’s conclusory
argument that the Board’s removal decisions here “easily clear the reasonable relation to
a legitimate pedagogical concern” bar, and that “no Board director voted to remove any
of the 18 books based on the viewpoint expressed therein,” ECF No. 25 at 9, 20, is plainly
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contradicted by the District’s own statements. Other than pretextual declarations, at this
stage, there simply is no reason to believe that the books were removed because of
vulgarity, age-inappropriateness, or for legitimate pedagogical concerns; the Board’s own
emails 	strongly 	suggest 	that 	the 	book 	removal 	was 	motivated 	by 	the 	directors’
“commitment to conservative values.” The Court questions what could be more partisan
or political than removing books to further the Board’s self-described conservative values.
The District cites no authority suggesting that a school board may remove books to further
their political orthodoxy—something the Pico plurality expressly said not to do. Pico, 457
U.S. at 870 (school boards “rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content
of their school libraries . . . [b]ut that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan
or political manner”).
The facts of Hazelwood and Fleming also are plainly distinguishable. Hazelwood
involved the regulation of speech in a high school newspaper that was published by
students in a journalism class. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264. No reasonable person would
dispute that a school newspaper published in a journalism class and supervised by a
journalism teacher is part of a school curriculum—making it fundamentally different than
a book in a school library. Id. at 271 (indicating that school curriculum activities extent to
“school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school . . . whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting”).
And Fleming involved a teacher-initiated and school-sponsored project where,
following the Columbine school shooting, the high school invited students to paint tiles to
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install in the halls of the school. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920. The Tenth Circuit found that
the tiles bore the school’s imprimatur given the school’s involvement in the project. Id. at
931. A library book, however, bears no such imprimatur. Unlike in Fleming, there is little
to no “level of involvement of school officials.” The District even suggests that it was
unaware that some of these books had resided in their libraries for years, ECF No. 25 at
3, strongly indicating that maintaining books in a school library is not part of the District’s
curriculum.
* * *
In sum, Plaintiffs have shown that the District removed the 19 books based on the
authors’ and books’ content and viewpoints on issues such as race, sexual orientation,
gender identity, LGBTQ content, and to promote the Board’s self-proclaimed
“conservative values.” This finding is especially true with respect to Plaintiffs’ allegations
under the Colorado Constitution. The District focuses entirely on the federal Constitution
but completely ignores Plaintiffs’ argument that they are likely to succeed under both the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the
Colorado Constitution. As previously noted, the Colorado Supreme Court has consistently
afforded broader First Amendment protections under the Colorado Constitution. Tattered
Cover, 44 P.3d at 1054 (“[O]ur state constitution provides more expansive protection of
speech rights than provided by the First Amendment.”).
At this stage, the Court must conclude that the District’s “decisive factor” in
removing the books was “because it found them objectionable in content and because it
felt that it had the power, unfettered by the First Amendment, to censor the school library
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for subject matter which the Board members found distasteful.” Minarcini v. Strongsville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (further pointing out that neither the
state nor the school board “was under any federal constitutional compulsion to provide a
library for the [s]chool or to choose any particular books,” but once “having created such
a privilege for the benefit of its students, however, neither body could place conditions on
the use of the library which were related solely to the social or political tastes of school
board members”). It is unconstitutional—under both the federal and Colorado
Constitutions—to remove books from a school library merely because the District
“disagree[s] with the views expressed in the books.” 11 PEN Am. Ctr., 711 F. Supp. 3d at
1331. Such ideological justifications for removal fail under all the potentially relevant First
Amendment standards. It remains to be seen whether Plaintiffs will be able to prove their
allegations with respect to each of the challenged books at trial, but at the preliminary
injunction stage, Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing that they are likely to
succeed on the merits of their claims. 12
11 The Court’s ruling does not prohibit the District from removing books based on legitimate pedagogical
concerns. See PEN Am. Ctr., 711 F. Supp. 3d at 1331. As the District rightly argues, a school board could
remove a collection of Playboy magazines in a school library (although it is hard to imagine Playboys ever
reaching a public school library) and likely could remove a collection of books “promoting frauds—like
Holocaust denial, that life in North Korea compares favorably to life in the Unites States, or that the Apollo
11 moon landing was faked—or overt racism.” ECF No. 25 at 22. These issues are fundamentally different
from the instant issue before the Court. But the Court rejects the District’s argument that Hazelwood allows
school boards to remove books to promote self-proclaimed conservative values. See id.
12 Plaintiffs argue that, if Pico does not provide the proper framework, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), would apply. ECF No. 9 at 22–23; ECF No. 28 at 7–8;
see Hardwick ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 435 n.11 (4th Cir. 2013) (in a free-speech clothing
case brought by a student, the Fourth Circuit observed that, “we must continue to adhere to the Tinker test
in cases that do not fall within any exceptions that the Supreme Court has created until the Court directs
otherwise”). The District does not respond to this argument. The Court is not convinced that Tinker provides
the correct framework, but the Court would find that Plaintiffs would prevail under this standard. Tinker
provides that school “officials may not restrict speech based on ‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance’ or a ‘mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.’” Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 37 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tinker,
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e. Whether the District’s Book Removal Violated the
Author Guild Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights
The District argues that the authors’ viewpoint discrimination claims fail because
the District’s libraries are not a public forum for the authors’ expression. ECF No. 25 at
27. Even if the Court treats the library as a nonpublic forum, the District’s actions still
violate the authors’ First Amendment rights. “To be consistent with the First Amendment,
the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker’s
viewpoint and must otherwise be reasonable in light of the purpose of the property.”
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added). As discussed
above, the Board’s emails strongly suggest—if not expressly admit—that the exclusions
were viewpoint-based. The authors have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of
their First Amendment claim.
f. Standing to Challenge the Removal of You Should
See Me in a Crown, #Pride, and It’s Your World—If
You Don’t Like It, Change It
The District argues that none of the Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
removals of You Should See Me in a Crown, #Pride: Championing LGBTQ Rights, or It’s
Your World—If You Don’t Like It, Change It because these three works were only found
in the middle school library, and none of the Plaintiffs attend Elizabeth Middle School.
393 U.S. at 508–09). Students’ First Amendment rights cannot be abridged “unless the school reasonably
forecasts it ‘would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
operation of the school,’ or ‘impinge upon the rights of other students.’” Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–
06). Not only does the District point to no substantial disruption caused by the Removed Books, but it also
removed the books based on the District’s perceived “unpopular viewpoints” contained in the books.
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ECF No. 25 at 11–12. 13 Plaintiffs argue that the NAACP has standing to sue on behalf of
its members because the organization’s members intend for their children to have access
to the Removed Books. ECF No. 28 at 2–3. They also argue that, even if some NAACP
members have moved their children to new schools following the policy changes, “the
‘opportunity’ to return [a student] to her home district, in addition to alleviating [] ongoing
feelings of marginalization, is surely a ‘tangible benefit’ sufficient to confer standing.” Deal
v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2018).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the removal of You
Should See Me in a Crown, #Pride: Championing LGBTQ Rights, or It’s Your World—If
You Don’t Like It, Change It. Although none of the Plaintiffs attend Elizabeth Middle
School, the mother of Plaintiff E.S. intends for E.S. and his younger sister to attend
Elizabeth Middle School, which is the only middle school in the District. ECF No. 9-3
(Smith Decl.), ¶¶ 3–5. And Portia Prescott, the local NAACP president, states that “[s]ome
NAACP members removed their children from Elizabeth schools because of the District’s
decision to remove books from their school libraries.” ECF No. 9-4, ¶ 9. She provided an
example of one member, who had a fifth grader enrolled in Running Creek Elementary,
who saw the removal of books as a manifestation of racism in the District, prompting her
to unenroll her child from the elementary school. Id. If that fifth grader returns to the
District, presumably it will be at the start of the next school year, at which point the student
would be enrolled at Elizabeth Middle School as a sixth grader. Consistent with the Fourth
13 The Court observes that, beyond disputing Plaintiff NAACP’s standing to challenge these three Removed
Books, the District does little to address the NAACP’s claims in its response. Critically, it does not contest
that the NAACP has standing to sue on behalf of its members.
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Circuit’s reasoning in Deal, the opportunity for students to return to their home district is
a tangible benefit sufficient to confer standing.
* * *
It is clear and unequivocal to the Court that Plaintiffs have established a substantial
likelihood of prevailing on their substantive claims at trial, and therefore, this factor weighs
in favor injunctive relief.
2. 	Irreparable Harm
“Irreparable harm” means that the claimed injury “must be both certain and great”;
it is not enough to be “merely serious or substantial.” Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians,
253 F.3d at 1250 (citation omitted). Generally, a harm is not irreparable when the losses
may be compensated by monetary damages. See Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348
F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003). The movant must show that the “injury complained of
is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent
irreparable harm.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); Greater Yellowstone Coal.
v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003) (showing irreparable harm is “not an
easy burden to fulfill”).
The “Supreme Court has instructed that ‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Verlo v.
Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1127 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976)). Stated differently, where “First Amendment rights are violated, irreparable
injury is presumed.” Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1182–
83 (D. Colo. 2001) (citing Utah Licensed Bev. Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1076 (10th
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Cir. 2001)); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen an
alleged constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of
irreparable injury is necessary.” (citation and quotations omitted)).
Plaintiffs argue that the presumption of irreparable harm applies because their First
Amendment rights are implicated. ECF No. 9 at 25. The District argues that Plaintiffs are
not harmed “as each of the previously removed books is now available for them to read,
browse, or check out in the library from which it was taken.” ECF No. 25 at 28. The District
also argues that Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of
irreparable harm. Id. at 29.
The Court finds that there is a presumption of sufficient irreparable injury to warrant
preliminary injunctive relief, and it rejects the District’s delay argument.
First, Plaintiffs’ (the students’, parents’, NAACP members’, and authors’) First
Amendment rights clearly are implicated, so the presumption applies. Second, the
District’s proposed remedy—to put the removed books back in the libraries and make
them available only to Plaintiffs, NAACP members, and NAACP members’ children—is
no remedy at all. ECF No. 25 at 10 (on the same day the District filed its opposition brief,
the District states that it “decided to place copies of each of the 19 titles that the School
Board voted to remove in the library from which they were taken[, and t]hese titles are
available only to C.C., E.S., or any student who is either a member of the NAACP [] or
who has a parent or guardian who is a member of the NAACP”). As Plaintiffs point out,
such compelled disclosure would be an improper restraint on Plaintiffs’ freedom of
association and could chill potential litigants. See NAACP v. State of Ala. ex rel.
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Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“It is hardly a novel perception that compelled
disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a
restraint on freedom of association . . . .”). The Supreme Court “has recognized the vital
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.” Id. “To
overcome the deterrent effect on associational rights resulting from compelled disclosure
of membership lists, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest, and a
substantial relationship between the material sought and legitimate governmental goals.”
In re First Nat. Bank, Englewood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115, 117 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 461–64). The District has not attempted to make this showing.
There are other problems with the District’s proposed remedy. To start, the District
has made clear that the removal process is ongoing. ECF No. 9-14 at 2 (Superintendent
Snowberger expressly stating that additional books may be “removed based on further
discussion between members of the community and the Board of Education” anytime
books are “brought to the attention of the district throughout the year by staff or parents”);
ECF No. 26 (answer), ¶ 149 (admitting that book-removal process is ongoing). The
District ignores this argument in its response.
More fundamentally, courts have held that a “[r]estraint on protected speech
generally cannot be justified by the fact that there may be other times, places or
circumstances for such expression.” Pratt v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 831, Forest Lake, Minn.,
670 F.2d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 1982). Thus, it “makes no difference for purposes of the First
Amendment” that the “books in question have not been removed from the Library, but
rather have simply been relocated . . . .” Virden, 2024 WL 4360495, at *4.
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Counts v. Cedarville School District is instructive. 295 F. Supp. 2d 996 (W.D. Ark.
2003). There, all Harry Potter books were moved to an area of the school library that was
inaccessible unless students had parental permission to check them out. Id. at 1001. In
rejecting the school’s justifications for relocating the books, the district court found it
important that the plaintiff could not “simply go in the library, take the books off the shelf
and thumb through them—perhaps to refresh her mind about a favorite passage—without
going through the permission and check-out process is a restriction on her access. Thus,
. . . such restrictions . . . amount to impermissible infringements of First Amendment
rights.” Id. at 1002. The District’s proposed remedy fares no better.
The same analysis applies with greater force under the Colorado Constitution. See
Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1053–54. The Colorado Supreme Court has said that,
“because our state constitution provides more expansive protection of speech rights than
provided by the First Amendment, it follows that the right to purchase books anonymously
is afforded even greater respect under our Colorado Constitution than under the United
States Constitution.” Id. at 1054 (emphasis added). The Court sees no reason why this
protection would not apply to students’ ability to check out books at a school library without
disclosing their association with this lawsuit or the NAACP.
Finally, the District argues that Plaintiffs delayed longer than they should have in
seeking this injunction. This argument has some merit, but given the considerations
involved—parents and students had to weigh their constitutional rights against the
consequences of suing the District, which could include public shaming and humiliation—
the Court does not find the delay unreasonable. ECF No. 28 at 15 (citing various Plaintiff
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declarations). This is not a run-of-the-mill business dispute; a brief glance at the District’s
internal correspondence shows that this is a politically charged issue. See, e.g., ECF No.
9-9 (Board President discussing commitment to conservative values); ECF No. 9-12
(Board Director stating that LGBTQ literature “doesn’t belong in any school” and the
District’s “constituents will not be happy about us returning any of these books”); ECF No.
9-13 (various book review forms from parents using strong language in opposition to
ideas contained in certain Removed Books). Thus, such a delay in this situation does not
signify a lack of injury.
* * *
Consistent with the above analysis, this factor, like the last, weighs in favor of
injunctive relief.
3. Balance of Hardships
“To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the movant has the burden of showing
that ‘the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the injury to the other party under the
preliminary injunction.” Barrington v. United Airlines, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1113 (D.
Colo. 2021) (quoting Heideman, 348 F.3d at 1190). As discussed above, when a
government actor denies an individual a constitutional right or protection, the resulting
injury is inherently serious. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373; Verlo, 820 F.3d 1127; 11A Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.2 (3d ed.) (“[W]hen
plaintiff is claiming the loss of a constitutional right, courts commonly rule that even a
temporary loss outweighs any harm to defendant and that a preliminary injunction should
issue.”).
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Quite the opposite, any injury to the District is minimal. The District contends that
the District “would be forced to purchase, catalog, and re-shelve the removed titles,” and
that a preliminary injunction “would leave the District unable to make decisions regarding
the curation of its school libraries until the end of this litigation.” ECF No. 25 at 30. This
argument fails.
The District has stated that “each of the previously removed books is now available
for [Plaintiffs] to read, browse, or check out in the library from which it was taken.” ECF
No. 25 at 28. It is thus not clear that the District would be forced to purchase any books.
And the alleged harm of having to catalog and re-shelves books is, quite frankly, absurd:
librarians do this regularly each time a patron returns a book. Finally, it would be less
burdensome to the District to return to Removed Books to the book shelves for students
to peruse on their own time without any involvement from school librarians. Under the
District’s plan, a librarian must take several steps to ensure that a student is permitted to
check out a Removed Book, such as verifying a student’s affiliation to this lawsuit or
verifying a student’s parent’s membership in the NAACP (which can change at any time).
Restoring the Removed Books to school library shelves will cause no injury to the
District. See Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 684 (D. Me. 1982)
(Defendants failed to show that restoring 365 Days to the school library pending decision
on merits of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims would cause them comparable injury to
Plaintiffs). Even if it did, the Court finds that the District’s concerns are outweighed by
Plaintiffs’ constitutional protections.
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Plaintiffs have shown that the balance of harms favors granting their requested
injunctive relief. Factor three weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
4. 	Public Interest
Finally, in considering whether Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief is in the public
interest, courts often find that “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of
a party’s constitutional rights.” Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins,
Colorado, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1134–35 (D. Colo. 2017), aff’d, 916 F.3d 792 (10th Cir.
2019) (quoting Connection Distrib., Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)); Loc.
Org. Comm., Denver Chapter, Million Man Mar. v. Cook, 922 F. Supp. 1494, 1501 (D.
Colo. 1996) (“[A]s far as the public interest is concerned, it is axiomatic that the
preservation of First Amendment rights serves everyone’s best interest.”). So too here.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the fourth factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’
injunctive relief.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to
exclude. ECF No. 27. And finding that Plaintiffs have satisfied the four prerequisites for a
preliminary injunction, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 9. 14 Pending a final
14 This order does not call into question a school’s “legitimate power to protect children from harm.” Brown
v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 (2011). But as Justice Scalia explained, that power “does not
include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.” Id. Nor does this order
address the scope of a school district’s discretion over certain curricular matters. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S.
at 273; but see Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 (“We conclude by noting that the Hazelwood analysis does not
give schools unbridled discretion over school-sponsored speech. A number of constitutional restraints
continue to operate on public schools’ actions, such as the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and substantive due process.”). The Court merely finds that school
library books are not part of the mandatory curriculum—even when applying a broad definition of school
curriculum. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 (warning against defining “school curriculum” activities too narrowly).
As Plaintiffs rightly point out, no student is required to read every book in the library, ECF No. 9 at 15. and
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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case No. 1:24-cv-03512-CNS-STV Document 35 _ filed 03/19/25 USDC Colorado
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-03512-CNS-STV
KRISTEN CROOKSHANKS, as parent and next of friend of a minor on behalf of C.C.;
MINDY SMITH, as parent and next of friend of a minor on behalf of E.S.;
NAACP—COLORADO-MONTANA-WYOMING STATE AREA CONFERENCES; and
THE AUTHORS GUILD,
Plaintiffs,
V.

ELIZABETH SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

ORDER

This is a book-removal case stemming from the Elizabeth School District (the
District) in Elizabeth, Colorado. The District voted to permanently remove 19 books from
its school libraries, including titles such as The Kite Runner and The Bluest Eye—books
that had been in District libraries for years. Students of the District, parents of students,
the local NAACP chapter, and authors of the removed books have challenged their
removal on First Amendment grounds.

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. ECF No. 9.
Defendant responded, ECF No. 25, and Plaintiffs replied, ECF No. 28. Also pending is
Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence supporting their preliminary

injunction motion. ECF No. 27. Plaintiffs responded, ECF No. 30, and Defendant replied,

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

2
ECF No. 31. For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to
exclude, and it GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The District is
ordered to immediately return the books to the library shelves, and it is enjoined from any
conduct that violates this order.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Removed Books
In August 2024, the Board of Education (the Board) for the District identified 19
books that it stated were too sensitive to be in the District’s libraries. 1 ECF No. 25 at 7–9.
The Board removed these books from the District’s libraries and displayed them in the
Board’s office so that community members could weigh in on whether they thought the
books should be returned to the District’s libraries and added to the Sensitive List 2 or
permanently removed from District libraries. Id. The Removed Books are:
(1) The Hate U Give by Angie Thomas;
(2) Beloved by Toni Morrison;
(3) The Bluest Eye by Toni Morrison;
(4) The Kite Runner by Khaled Hosseini;
(5) You Should See Me in a Crown by Leah Johnson;
(6) #Pride: Championing LGBTQ Rights by Rebecca Felix;
(7) George (now published and referred to as Melissa) by Alex
Gino;
(8) It’s Your World—If You Don’t Like It, Change It by Mikki
Halpin;
(9) The Perks of Being a Wallflower by Stephen Chbosky;
1 In referring to the Removed Books, the parties sometimes refer to 18 Removed Books, and in other places,
they refer to 19 Removed Books. Compare ECF No. 1, ¶ 67 (“In total, eighteen books (the ‘Removed
Books’) were taken out of ESD libraries.”), with ¶ 190 (“The Elizabeth School District, acting through its
Board, removed at least nineteen books from ESD libraries in a narrowly partisan or political manner
because the Board disagrees with the ideas or views contained in those books.”). It appears the District
removed the nineteenth book—Redwood and Ponytail—a month after removing the first 18. ECF No. 9 at
10. For consistency, the Court will refer to the 19 books collectively as the Removed Books.
2 A book’s inclusion on the Sensitive List means that, if a student tries to check it out, their parents will
automatically be notified. Parents can also prohibit their children from checking out all books on the
Sensitive List. ECF No. 9 at 4.
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(10) Thirteen Reasons Why by Jay Asher;
(11) Looking for Alaska by John Green,
(12) Nineteen Minutes by Jodi Picoult;
(13) Crank by Ellen Hopkins;
(14) Glass by Ellen Hopkins;
(15) Fallout by Ellen Hopkins;
(16) Identical by Ellen Hopkins;
(17) Burned by Ellen Hopkins;
(18) Smoke by Ellen Hopkins; and
(19) Redwood and Ponytail by K.A. Holt.
ECF No. 9 at 4. For 25 days, the Removed Books were displayed in the Board’s office,
with passages pre-marked in each book that the Board found troubling. Id. The Board
provided forms that parents could fill out following review of a particular Removed Book.
Id. The form provided two options: (1) “this book should be Returned to the library and
listed on the sensitive topic list,” or (2) “this book should be Removed from the library
collection.” Id. (citing ECF No. 9-8 (Elizabeth School District’s Book Review Form)). There
was no option on the form to return the books to school libraries and leave them off the
Sensitive List. Id.
B. Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs include current District students who intended to browse and check out
the Removed Books from their school libraries but have not been able to do so since the
Board removed them. ECF No. 9 at 10.
Plaintiff C.C. is a junior at Elizabeth High School who spends much of her free time
reading and browsing books in the school library. Id. (citing C.C. Decl.). She states that
she wants to check out the Removed Books from her school library but is unable to do
so. Id. at 11.
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of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s favor; and (4) that
the injunction is in the public interest. Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242, 1257 (10th
Cir. 2015). The movant must demonstrate that “all four of the equitable factors weigh in
its favor,” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, 539 F. App’x 885, 888 (10th Cir. 2013), and the
movant’s “failure to prove any one of the four preliminary injunction factors renders its
request for injunctive relief unwarranted.” Vill. of Logan v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 577 F.
App’x 760, 766 (10th Cir. 2014). “Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies
requiring that the movant’s right to relief be clear and unequivocal.” Planned Parenthood
of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1223 (10th Cir. 2018).
The Tenth Circuit specifically disfavors injunctions that will (1) alter the status quo,
(2) mandate an affirmative act by the defendant, or (3) afford all the relief that the movant
could expect to win at trial. Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 2004).
A request for disfavored injunctive relief “must be more closely scrutinized to assure that
the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in
the normal course.” O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court first addresses the District’s motion to exclude before turning to
Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.
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restricted area, whether they solicited [the defendant’s]
customers, and whether [the defendant’s] customer
relationships were substantial.
Id. at 939 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). In the Court’s view, the factual
disputes highlighted by the Eleventh Circuit in Moon are plainly distinguishable from the
facts of this case.
Similarly, in Four Seasons Hotels And Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., Four
Seasons accused the defendant of gaining unauthorized access to the Four Seasons
computer network and thus proprietary and confidential materials located on the network.
320 F.3d 1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2003). The Four Seasons filed an emergency motion for
an ex parte temporary restraining order, seeking to prevent the defendant from accessing
its computer network. Id. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. Id. The
Eleventh Circuit faulted the district court for not holding an evidentiary hearing when the
“facts surrounding the alleged unauthorized computer use [were] in dispute.” Id. As with
Moon, the Court finds the factual dispute in Four Seasons distinguishable from the instant
case because here, there is no dispute that the District has removed the books from the
libraries.
* * *
Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at this stage, the District’s
motion to exclude is denied.
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17
caselaw. Courts generally hold that the placement and removal of books in public school
libraries is not government speech. GLBT Youth in Iowa Sch. Task Force v. Reynolds,
114 F.4th 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the Supreme
Court has not extended the government speech doctrine to the placement and removal
of books in public school libraries.”); id. at 668 (“[I]t is doubtful that the public would view
the placement and removal of books in public school libraries as the government
speaking.”). This makes sense.
Take, for example, a high school library that includes Hitler’s manifesto Mein
Kampf. No one would seriously argue that placing this book in a school library constitutes
government speech. See id.; see also PEN Am. Ctr., Inc. v. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
711 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1331 (N.D. Fla. 2024) (“[T]the fact that the traditional purpose of a
library is to provide information on a broad range of subjects and viewpoints, the Court
simply fails to see how any reasonable person would view the contents of the school
library (or any library for that matter) as the government’s endorsement of the views
expressed in the books on the library’s shelves.”); id. (distinguishing cases cited by the
school “because the speech embodied in a library collection is materially different from
the speech embodied in government-sponsored parades, prayers, art exhibits, and
monuments on public property”); Virden v. Crawford Cnty., Arkansas, No. 2:23-CV-2071,
2024 WL 4360495, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 30, 2024) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not
extended [the government speech] doctrine to the placement and removal of books in
libraries.”).
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33
contradicted by the District’s own statements. Other than pretextual declarations, at this
stage, there simply is no reason to believe that the books were removed because of
vulgarity, age-inappropriateness, or for legitimate pedagogical concerns; the Board’s own
emails strongly suggest that the book removal was motivated by the directors’
“commitment to conservative values.” The Court questions what could be more partisan
or political than removing books to further the Board’s self-described conservative values.
The District cites no authority suggesting that a school board may remove books to further
their political orthodoxy—something the Pico plurality expressly said not to do. Pico, 457
U.S. at 870 (school boards “rightly possess significant discretion to determine the content
of their school libraries . . . [b]ut that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan
or political manner”).
The facts of Hazelwood and Fleming also are plainly distinguishable. Hazelwood
involved the regulation of speech in a high school newspaper that was published by
students in a journalism class. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 264. No reasonable person would
dispute that a school newspaper published in a journalism class and supervised by a
journalism teacher is part of a school curriculum—making it fundamentally different than
a book in a school library. Id. at 271 (indicating that school curriculum activities extent to
“school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
imprimatur of the school . . . whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting”).
And Fleming involved a teacher-initiated and school-sponsored project where,
following the Columbine school shooting, the high school invited students to paint tiles to
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38
Circuit’s reasoning in Deal, the opportunity for students to return to their home district is
a tangible benefit sufficient to confer standing.
* * *
It is clear and unequivocal to the Court that Plaintiffs have established a substantial
likelihood of prevailing on their substantive claims at trial, and therefore, this factor weighs
in favor injunctive relief.
2. Irreparable Harm
“Irreparable harm” means that the claimed injury “must be both certain and great”;
it is not enough to be “merely serious or substantial.” Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians,
253 F.3d at 1250 (citation omitted). Generally, a harm is not irreparable when the losses
may be compensated by monetary damages. See Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348
F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003). The movant must show that the “injury complained of
is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent
irreparable harm.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); Greater Yellowstone Coal.
v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2003) (showing irreparable harm is “not an
easy burden to fulfill”).
The “Supreme Court has instructed that ‘[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms,
for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Verlo v.
Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1127 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976)). Stated differently, where “First Amendment rights are violated, irreparable
injury is presumed.” Bioganic Safety Brands, Inc. v. Ament, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1182–
83 (D. Colo. 2001) (citing Utah Licensed Bev. Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1076 (10th
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43
Quite the opposite, any injury to the District is minimal. The District contends that
the District “would be forced to purchase, catalog, and re-shelve the removed titles,” and
that a preliminary injunction “would leave the District unable to make decisions regarding
the curation of its school libraries until the end of this litigation.” ECF No. 25 at 30. This
argument fails.
The District has stated that “each of the previously removed books is now available
for [Plaintiffs] to read, browse, or check out in the library from which it was taken.” ECF
No. 25 at 28. It is thus not clear that the District would be forced to purchase any books.
And the alleged harm of having to catalog and re-shelves books is, quite frankly, absurd:
librarians do this regularly each time a patron returns a book. Finally, it would be less
burdensome to the District to return to Removed Books to the book shelves for students
to peruse on their own time without any involvement from school librarians. Under the
District’s plan, a librarian must take several steps to ensure that a student is permitted to
check out a Removed Book, such as verifying a student’s affiliation to this lawsuit or
verifying a student’s parent’s membership in the NAACP (which can change at any time).
Restoring the Removed Books to school library shelves will cause no injury to the
District. See Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 684 (D. Me. 1982)
(Defendants failed to show that restoring 365 Days to the school library pending decision
on merits of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims would cause them comparable injury to
Plaintiffs). Even if it did, the Court finds that the District’s concerns are outweighed by
Plaintiffs’ constitutional protections.
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44
Plaintiffs have shown that the balance of harms favors granting their requested
injunctive relief. Factor three weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.
4. Public Interest
Finally, in considering whether Plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief is in the public
interest, courts often find that “it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of
a party’s constitutional rights.” Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins,
Colorado, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1134–35 (D. Colo. 2017), aff’d, 916 F.3d 792 (10th Cir.
2019) (quoting Connection Distrib., Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir. 1998)); Loc.
Org. Comm., Denver Chapter, Million Man Mar. v. Cook, 922 F. Supp. 1494, 1501 (D.
Colo. 1996) (“[A]s far as the public interest is concerned, it is axiomatic that the
preservation of First Amendment rights serves everyone’s best interest.”). So too here.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the fourth factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’
injunctive relief.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to
exclude. ECF No. 27. And finding that Plaintiffs have satisfied the four prerequisites for a
preliminary injunction, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 9. 14 Pending a final
14 This order does not call into question a school’s “legitimate power to protect children from harm.” Brown
v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 794 (2011). But as Justice Scalia explained, that power “does not
include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.” Id. Nor does this order
address the scope of a school district’s discretion over certain curricular matters. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S.
at 273; but see Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 (“We conclude by noting that the Hazelwood analysis does not
give schools unbridled discretion over school-sponsored speech. A number of constitutional restraints
continue to operate on public schools’ actions, such as the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and substantive due process.”). The Court merely finds that school
library books are not part of the mandatory curriculum—even when applying a broad definition of school
curriculum. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 920 (warning against defining “school curriculum” activities too narrowly).
As Plaintiffs rightly point out, no student is required to read every book in the library, ECF No. 9 at 15. and
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Case No. 1:24-cv-03512-CNS-STV Document 35 _ filed 03/19/25 USDC Colorado
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trial on Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction or other resolution, the Court orders
the District to return the Removed Books to their respective libraries no later than March
25, 2025, and the District is enjoined from removing additional books because the District
disagrees with the views expressed therein or merely to further their preferred political or
religious orthodoxy. '°

DATED this 19th day of March 2025.

BY THE COURT:

Chartott¢ Ns
harlott¢ N. Sweeney
United District dudge

as the District acknowledges, eight of the 19 Removed Books have never been checked out, ECF No. 25
at 10, which plainly shows that those books are not part of any curriculum.

'5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that a “court may issue a preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper
to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”
Plaintiffs argue that a security is not necessary here because the District will not suffer any undue harm if
the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF No. 9 at 29. The District offers no response and therefore concedes
that security is unwarranted in this instance. Accordingly, the Court will not require Plaintiffs to post security.

Crookshanks et al v. Elizabeth School District

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