Webb v. Martin County et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24–cv–02705–NYW–MDB
WILLIAM JAROD WEBB,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA,
WILLIAM SNYDER, Sheriff, Martin County, Florida, in his official capacity,
NICOLE J. WALTERS, Detective, individually,
JOSEPH DECKARD, Sergeant, individually, and
JOHN DOE(S), Martin County Deputies,
THOMAS BAKKEDALH
KAITLIN LUSTGARTEN
DAVID J. LUCERO
JEFF CHOSTNER
JOHN BUDENSIEK
JON DOES, Pueblo County Deputies,
Defendants.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Governor’s Warrant
([“Motion to Quash”], Doc. No. 45) and Motion for Limited Discovery ([“Discovery Motion”],
Doc. No. 40) (collectively, the “Motions”). Defendants have not responded to the Motions, but
the Court finds additional briefing unnecessary to resolve them. For the following reasons, the
Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash be DENIED and DENIES Plaintiff’s
Discovery Motion.
Case No. 1:24-cv-02705-NYW-MDB Document 54 filed 11/26/24 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 6

2
Motion to Quash
In the Motion to Quash, Plaintiff asks the Court to quash Martin County’s “Governor’s
Warrant” for his arrest. Much of the Motion is a redux of arguments previously made by Plaintiff
(see Doc. Nos. 7: 18) and considered by the Court (see Doc. No. 43). However, the Motion to
Quash emphasizes a new argument, namely that Plaintiff’s health is endangered by his
confinement and will be further adversely affected by any extradition. (Doc. No. 45 at 1–2.)
Plaintiff says his high blood pressure has been poorly treated during his detention leading to
“dangerously high blood pressure levels that pose an immediate and grave risk of a blood clot,
stroke, heart attack or death.” (Id. at 1.) He further states his “severe hemorrhoids and ... anal
fissure” have gone untreated during his detention. (Id.) Plaintiff argues he is at a “grave risk” if
forced to endure “extended bus travel over 2,000 miles” without “access to adequate food,
medical attention, or living conditions suitable to manage his health needs.” (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff also introduces a seemingly new claim that Pueblo County Judge Michelle
Chostner, “the daughter of [Defendant] District Attorney Chostner, ruled against Plaintiff in two
habeas corpus petitions without granting hearings.” (Doc. No. 45 at 2–3.) According to Plaintiff,
this alleged “clear conflict of interest undermines the fairness and impartiality of the
proceedings.” (Id. at 3.)
As the Court has noted, Plaintiff’s previous attempts to quash the warrant for his arrest
are barred by Younger. (See Doc. No. 43.) Similarly, Plaintiff’s new arguments do not provide
for an exception to Younger. See Peters v. United States, 2024 WL 3086003, at *4 (10th Cir.
June 21, 2024) (“Courts have recognized exceptions to Younger abstention: the prosecution ‘was
(1) commenced in bad faith or to harass, (2) based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional
Case No. 1:24-cv-02705-NYW-MDB Document 54 filed 11/26/24 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 6

3
statute, or (3) related to any other such extraordinary circumstance creating a threat of
‘irreparable injury’ both great and immediate.’” (quoting Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1064
(10th Cir. 1995))); see also Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d at 1064 (“[T]he exceptions to Younger
only provide for a very narrow gate for federal intervention.”).
Plaintiff’s health-related argument is best categorized as an “other extraordinary
circumstance” argument, and the Court will analyze it as such. Plaintiff’s health aliments should
be taken seriously, but Plaintiff has not demonstrated a “great and immediate” threat to his health
if the criminal prosecution proceeds. See Peters v. United States, 2024 WL 3086003, at *4 (10th
Cir. June 21, 2024) (“[T]he plaintiff bears a ‘heavy burden’ to show an exception applies.”
(quoting Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997))). Specifically, the Court does
not see any medical information or clear indication that Plaintiff faces a serious risk either
currently or in the immediate future. At most, Plaintiff makes general allegations of poor medical
treatment, and surmises that travel could exacerbate his current conditions, but Plaintiff does not
offer any details about the poor medical treatment, and his speculative statements that he would
be subject to poor conditions during extradition are made without support. This does not satisfy
the heavy burden of the exception.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s conflict of interest argument is conclusory at best. Even assuming an
alleged conflict could form the basis of an exception—perhaps under the bad faith exception—
Plaintiff provides no explanation as to how the alleged relationship between the Judge and the
District Attorney have compromised his criminal proceedings, or how the alleged relationship is
tied to bad faith or an effort to harass Plaintiff. The Court cannot afford relief based on
conclusory statements and speculation.
Case No. 1:24-cv-02705-NYW-MDB Document 54 filed 11/26/24 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 6

4
Accordingly, the Court recommends the Motion to Quash be denied.
Discovery Motion
In the Discovery Motion, Plaintiff says that on October 22, 2024, the Pueblo County
District Court granted Plaintiff’s “Motion for Comprehensive Request for Production of
Documents and Things” and ordered the Pueblo and Martin Counties to produce “all relevant
materials necessary to prepare a defense in Plaintiff’s case.” (Doc. No. 40 at 1.) However, as of
the filing of the Discovery Motion the counties are yet to produce the requested materials. (Id.)
Plaintiff now asks the Court to compel Pueblo County and Martin County to turn over the
discovery materials. (Id. at 3.) However, Courts in this district have declined to intervene in
discovery disputes in state proceedings on Younger grounds, see, e.g., Maynard v. Colorado
Supreme Ct. Off. of Att’y Regul. Couns., 2009 WL 2982863, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 2009)
(declining to compel the product of certain documents which were the subject of a discovery
dispute in an ongoing attorney disciplinary matter), and the Court sees no reason to deviate
here.1
Accordingly, the Discovery Motion is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Governor’s Warrant (Doc. No. 45) be
DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Limited Discovery (Doc. No. 40) is DENIED.
1 The Court notes Plaintiff says he has also filed a motion to compel in Pueblo County District
Court (Doc. No. 40 at 1–2), demonstrating Plaintiff has an adequate state court forum to
adjudicate the discovery issue.
Case No. 1:24-cv-02705-NYW-MDB Document 54 filed 11/26/24 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 6

5
ADVISEMENT TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen days after service of a copy of the Recommendation, any party may
serve and file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995). A
general objection that does not put the district court on notice of the basis for the objection will
not preserve the objection for de novo review. “[A] party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo
review by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop.
Known As 2121 East 30th Street, Tulsa, Okla., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Failure to
make timely objections may bar de novo review by the district judge of the magistrate judge’s
proposed findings and recommendations and will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a
judgment of the district court based on the proposed findings and recommendations of the
magistrate judge. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1999) (a district court’s
decision to review a magistrate judge’s recommendation de novo despite the lack of an objection
does not preclude application of the “firm waiver rule”); One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at
1059-60 (a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be both
timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate
review); Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyo. Coal Ref. Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir.
1995) (by failing to object to certain portions of the magistrate judge’s order, cross-claimant had
waived its right to appeal those portions of the ruling); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342,
1352 (10th Cir. 1992) (by their failure to file objections, plaintiffs waived their right to appeal
Case No. 1:24-cv-02705-NYW-MDB Document 54 filed 11/26/24 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 6

6
the magistrate judge’s ruling). But see Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th
Cir. 2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review).
Dated this 26th day of November, 2024.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
Maritza Dominguez Braswell
United States Magistrate Judge
Case No. 1:24-cv-02705-NYW-MDB Document 54 filed 11/26/24 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 6