Butler v. Burning Man Project et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02045-SBP
JACK BUTLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
BURNING MAN PROJECT,
DAVE WELLHAUSER, and
RANGER HAZELNUT, a/k/a JANE DOE,
Defendants.
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Jack Butler originally brought this action in the Jefferson County, Colorado,
District Court against Defendant Burning Man Project (“Burning Man”), Dave Wellhauser, and
“Ranger Hazelnut,” whom Defendants identify as Stephanie Vesik. The matter is before the court
on Plaintiff’s motions to amend his complaint and to remand the case to state court. ECF No. 13
(“Motion to Remand”); ECF No. 30 (“Motion to Amend”); ECF No. 30-1 (“Proposed Second
Amended Complaint”). Also before the court is Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. ECF No. 2. All parties have
consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States magistrate judge to conduct all
proceedings in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ECF No. 23 (consent form); ECF
No. 24 (Order of Reference).
The court has carefully considered the Motions and associated briefing and finds that oral
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argument would not materially assist in the resolution of these matters. For the reasons set forth
below, the court respectfully DENIES the Motion to Remand, GRANTS the Motion to Amend,
and DENIES the Motion to Transfer without prejudice to refiling.
I. 	Background
According to the current complaint in this matter, Plaintiff resides in Colorado. First
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 5 ¶ 1. He alleges that, on an unspecified date, a woman accused
him of raping her—a “false accusation,” Plaintiff contends, that she subsequently retracted. Id.
¶ 7. Although not clearly articulated in the First Amended Complaint, other information in the
docket reflects that the alleged assault occurred at a Burning Man event in Bailey, Colorado.
Motion to Remand ¶ 1; Wellhauser Declaration, ECF No. 33-1 ¶ 3. At the time of the incident,
Plaintiff was volunteering as a “Black Rock Ranger.” Wellhauser Decl. ¶ 3.1 Other Rangers
investigated the woman’s accusation, allegedly in a manner “that violated the written policies of
the Burning Man Project” and Plaintiff’s privacy rights. Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
On April 3, 2024, Plaintiff brought suit in Jefferson County District Court against
Burning Man, Mr. Wellhauser, and Ms. Vesik, raising various claims under Colorado state law.
ECF No. 4. On July 25, 2024, Defendants removed the case to this court and simultaneously
moved to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1; Motion to Transfer, ECF No. 2. On August 26, 2024,
1 Mr. Wellhauser describes the Black Rock Rangers as “a volunteer group that participates in
Burning Man events.” Wellhauser Decl. ¶ 3. For additional context only, the court observes that
the Rangers identify themselves as “a cross-section of the Burning Man community who
volunteer some of their time in the community as non-confrontational mediators” during Burning
Man events. See https://www.rangers.org/rangers.v2/who.html, last visited March 21, 2025.
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Plaintiff filed the Motion to Remand, in which he argues that jurisdiction in this court is lacking
because there is not complete diversity among the parties and because removal allegedly was not
accomplished within the thirty-day timeframe set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Motion to
Remand at 4-5. Defendants counter that complete diversity of citizenship exists, conferring
jurisdiction in this court, and that removal was timely. ECF No. 18 at 2-6.
On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend,2 in which he seeks to add as
a defendant an entity called “Elsewhence.” Plaintiff describes Elsewhence as a Colorado limited
liability company owned and registered by Mr. Wellhauser under the name “Elsewhence.com.”
Motion to Amend at 2. Defendants argue that the proposed amendment is both futile and driven
by “a bad-faith attempt to avoid federal jurisdiction,” thus violating the prohibition on fraudulent
joinder set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). ECF No. 33 at 3.
II. 	Analysis
A. 	Citizenship of Mr. Wellhauser and Elsewhence
The core issue underlying both the Motion to Remand and the Motion to Amend is
whether the presence of Mr. Wellhauser and Elsewhence in the case destroys diversity
2 In his reply brief in support of the Motion to Amend, Plaintiff suggests that he is authorized to
amend his pleading as a matter of course, and without filing a motion, because Defendants have
not yet responded to the pending complaint. ECF No. 36 at 2. That statement is at odds with
Plaintiff’s pursuit of a motion to amend and also does not accurately reflect the record here or the
parameters of Rule 15. See Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), (a)(2) (allowing amendment “once as a
matter of course” in certain circumstances, while all other amendments require either “the
opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave”) (emphasis added). It is apparent from the
face of the operative complaint—entitled a “First Amended Complaint”—that at least one prior
amendment has occurred. Therefore, the court proceeds to assess the merits of the Motion to
Amend, which is the procedural mechanism by which Plaintiff must obtain an amendment over
Defendants’ opposition at this stage of the case.
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jurisdiction. The evidence before the court confirms that it does not.
1. 	Legal Standards
To begin with the legal principles governing diversity, “diversity jurisdiction exists only
if no plaintiff and no defendant are citizens of the same state—that is, there must be ‘complete
diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.’” Middleton v. Stephenson, 749 F.3d 1197,
1200 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005)). “When
diversity jurisdiction is the basis for removal, diversity must exist both at the time the action is
filed in state court and at the time the case is removed to federal court.” Woods v. Ross Dress for
Less, Inc., 833 F. App’x 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp.,
L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570-71, 574 (2004) (other citations omitted)).
“For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a person is a citizen of a state if the person is
domiciled in that state.” Middleton, 749 F.3d at 1200. “And a person acquires domicile in a state
when the person resides there and intends to remain there indefinitely.” Id. (citing Crowley v.
Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1983); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 48 (1989) (“[D]omicile is established by physical presence in a place in connection with a
certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there.”)). Thus, “domicile, not residency
or mailing address, is determinative of citizenship.” Pac. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Poirier, No. 18-cv-
00880-PAB, 2018 WL 4697323, at *1 (D. Colo. June 27, 2018) (citing Whitelock v. Leatherman,
460 F.2d 507, 514 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[A]llegations of mere ‘residence’ may not be equated with
‘citizenship’ for the purposes of establishing diversity.”)); see also Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48
(“Domicile is not necessarily synonymous with ‘residence,’ and one can reside in one place but
be domiciled in another.”) (citations omitted).
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In evaluating domicile, the court may consider factors that include a litigant’s “residency,
work address, vehicle registration, and ownership of real property in a particular state[.]”
Ordonez v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 18-cv-02906-PAB, 2018 WL 6075251, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov.
21, 2018) (citation omitted). But while these factors “are indicative of domicile, they are not
conclusive.” Id. (citing Middleton, 749 F.3d at 1200-01 (stating that courts should “consider the
totality of the circumstances” to determine a party’s domicile)). Therefore, “[c]ourts typically
consider several other factors in determining a party’s citizenship,” which can include “place of
employment or business” and “driver’s license and automobile registration[.]” Id. (quotation and
citation omitted).
In the case of an unincorporated limited liability company like Elsewhence, “a[n] LLC
‘takes the citizenship of all its members.’” Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co., LLC v. Hess Bakken
Investment, II, LLC., 887 F.3d 1003, 1014 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Siloam Springs Hotel,
L.L.C. v. Century Sur. Co., 781 F.3d 1233, 1234 (10th Cir. 2015)); see also Siloam Springs
Hotel, 781 F.3d at 1238 (“[T]his court must reject Century Surety’s request to determine the
citizenship of Siloam Springs by reference to its state of organization and the state of its primary
business operations and, instead, joins all other circuits that have considered the matter in
concluding Siloam Springs takes the citizenship of all its members.”) (citation omitted). In
response to the court’s order to identify all members of Elsewhence and to clarify the citizenship
of each of those members, Defendants state that Elsewhence “has one member, Dave Wellhauser.
Mr. Wellhauser is a citizen of the state of New York.” ECF No. 38 at 1.
“[A] party invoking diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Middleton, 749 F.3d at 1200. Based on the evidence presented,
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Defendants have satisfied their burden to show that both Mr. Wellhauser and Elsewhence are
citizens of the state of New York.
2. 	Evidence Concerning Citizenship
To begin with Mr. Wellhauser’s citizenship, Defendants represented in the Notice of
Removal that Mr. Wellhauser “is a citizen and resident of the State of New York.” Id.
¶ 17 (citing Affidavit of Service affirming service on Wellhauser in Buffalo, New York, on June
6, 2024). In the Motion to Remand, Plaintiff purports to dispute the point based “on information
and belief” that Mr. Wellhauser was a resident of Colorado when Plaintiff filed his complaint in
Jefferson County District Court on April 3, 2024. Id. at 4. Plaintiff asserts that “Wellhauser is
only temporarily sojourning in New York, intends to return to Colorado, and therefore . . . was at
the time of filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint and remains a resident of Colorado.” Id. Plaintiff
further states, without reference to documentary evidence, that “(1) Defendant Wellhauser owned
a home in Colorado at the time of filing; (2) Defendant Wellhauser’s daughter lived in Colorado
at the time of filing; (3) Defendant works as a FedEx driver and held a Colorado driver’s license
at the time of filing.” Id.
Defendants present evidence contradicting each of these points. They submit a document
titled “Sellers Statement of Settlement,” generated by Land Title Guarantee Company and signed
by Mr. Wellhauser as the “Seller,” reflecting a sale of property located on Mallard Lane in
Brighton, Colorado, on July 26, 2023—more than eight months before Plaintiff initiated this
action in Jefferson County District Court. ECF No. 18-2. Defendants also provide a “First
Payment Notification” from 1st Priority Mortgage, Inc., in Williamsville, New York, stating that
Mr. Wellhauser’s first monthly mortgage payment on a residential property in Buffalo, New
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York, was due December 1, 2023. ECF No. 18-3.
As for Plaintiff’s speculation about Mr. Wellhauser’s residence based on the fact that one
of his daughters lived in Colorado when the Complaint was filed, Motion to Remand at 4, the
court discerns no basis for drawing conclusions about an individual’s domicile based on the
residence of an adult child. In any event, Defendants do not dispute that one of Mr. Wellhauser’s
daughters lived in Colorado at the time, but they explain that another daughter actually lives with
Mr. Wellhauser in Buffalo, and that his mother also resides in Buffalo “nearby” him. ECF No. 18
at 4. Finally, Defendants submit a copy of a New York State commercial driver’s license issued
to Mr. Wellhauser on July 30, 2024, which lists the same address in Buffalo, New York, as noted
on the 1st Priority Mortgage document.
Based on the evidence presented by Defendants, which is unrefuted by the speculative
assertions of Plaintiff, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden to show that Mr.
Wellhauser was domiciled in the state of New York—and therefore was a citizen of New York
for purposes of evaluating the diversity question—when Plaintiff initiated this action in state
court on April 3, 2024, and when the case was removed to this court on July 25, 2024.
This conclusion likewise resolves the citizenship question as to Elsewhence, because Mr.
Wellhauser is its sole member, and Elsewhence assumes his New York citizenship. See, e.g.,
Siloam Springs, 781 F.3d at 1234. The court is not persuaded to reach a different result based on
Plaintiff’s submission of an undated document from the website of the Colorado Secretary of
State identifying Mr. Wellhauser as the registered agent for Elsewhence at a street address in
Denver. See ECF No. 22-1. Plaintiff has not attempted to explain Mr. Wellhauser’s connection to
this address, and the court has found that Defendants have come forward with sufficient evidence
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to meet their burden to establish that Mr. Wellhauser has in fact been domiciled in New York at
all times relevant here.
In short, neither Mr. Wellhauser nor Elsewhence are citizens of Colorado, and their
presence in this litigation does not destroy diversity.
B. 	Motion to Remand
In the Motion to Remand, Plaintiff asserts that the case must be remanded because Mr.
Wellhauser is a citizen of Colorado, thus negating diversity jurisdiction,3 and because the Notice
of the Removal was not timely filed. Motion to Remand at 3-6. The court has disposed of the
first issue in finding that both Mr. Wellhauser and Elsewhence are citizens of New York.
With respect to the alleged untimeliness of the removal to this court, a party seeking to
remove an action to federal court is required to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which sets a
deadline for the filing of a notice of removal. That notice must either be filed within thirty days
of the date on which the defendant is served with a complaint or, if the basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction does not appear on the face of the complaint, within thirty days of the
defendant’s receipt of any other filing that clearly establishes a basis for federal jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), (3). Under the “last-served defendant rule,” the deadline for removal
runs thirty days after the latest-served defendant is served. Id. § 1446 (“If defendants are served
at different times, and a later-served defendant files a notice of removal, any earlier-served
defendant may consent to the removal even though that earlier-served defendant did not
3 The parties do not dispute that diversity of citizenship exists among Plaintiff, a resident of
Colorado; Ms. Vesik, a resident of Oregon; and Burning Man, a California nonprofit corporation.
See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 14, 15, 18.
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previously initiate or consent to removal.”). “A removal that does not comply with the express
statutory requirements is defective, and the court may, upon request, remand the case to state
court.” Goncharova-Souder v. Gen. Shale Brick, Inc., No. 22-cv-02528-MDB, 2023 WL
3494213, at *3 (D. Colo. May 17, 2023) (citing Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F.3d 757, 759 (10th Cir.
2006) (“The two categories of remand within § 1447(c) . . . are remands for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure.”)).
“There is a presumption against removal jurisdiction . . . and the party seeking removal
has the burden of proof to establish jurisdiction.” Anderson v. Lehman Bros. Bank, 528 F. App’x
793, 795 (10th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). In light of this presumption, courts “strictly
construe removal statutes and procedural requirements.” Casey v. Williams Prod. RMT Co.,
599 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1251 (D. Colo. 2008); see also Fajen v. Found. Rsrv. Ins. Co., 683 F.2d
331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982) (“Removal statutes are to be strictly construed and all doubts are to be
resolved against removal.”) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Defendants collectively removed the case on July 25, 2024, seventeen days after
Ms. Vesik, the last-served defendant, was served on July 8, 2024. ECF No. 18-2 at 2; see also
ECF No. 18-1 ¶ 5 (noting acceptance of service by defense counsel on behalf of Vesik on July 8,
2024). Thus, Defendants removed this case within thirty days of service on Ms. Vesik, and since
the earlier-served defendants—Mr. Wellhauser on June 15, 2024, and Burning Man on June 27,
2024—it was timely. ECF No. 6 (Burning Man and Wellhauser affidavits of service).
To sum up, because removal was timely and the requisite diversity jurisdiction exists
here, the court respectfully DENIES the motion to remand.
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C. 	Motion to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that unless an amendment is allowed as a
matter of course, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent
or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 further directs that courts should “freely
give leave when justice so requires.” Id. “The purpose of the Rule is to provide litigants the
maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural
niceties.” Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations
omitted). A court may deny a motion to amend on the grounds of “undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, [or] futility of [the] amendment.” Hasan v. AIG Prop. Cas. Co., 935 F.3d 1092,
1101-02 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “The party
contesting the motion to amend has the burden of proving that the amendment should be refused
on one of these bases.” Openwater Safety IV, LLC v. Great Lakes Ins. SE, 435 F. Supp. 3d 1142,
1151 (D. Colo. 2020).
Here, Defendants assert that amendment to add Elsewhence as a party is both futile and
made for the bad-faith purpose of depriving this court of jurisdiction. As for the contention
concerning bad faith, the court has determined that Elsewhence’s presence as a diverse defendant
does not destroy jurisdiction. The court thus takes up the futility question and finds that
amendment should be allowed.
In the Motion to Amend, Plaintiff asserts that Elsewhence is a proper defendant in this
case because that entity sponsored the Burning Man event, “which is the locus of the conduct
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that serves as the basis for Plaintiff’s claims” in this litigation. Motion to Amend ¶ 1 (stating that
“Plaintiff’s counsel has recently been informed” of information about Elsewhence’s connection
to the event). In the Proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he woman
who accused Plaintiff of rape (who has subsequently retracted that false accusation) made that
accusation to persons attending the Elsewhence event, and those persons repeated that accusation
to Elsewhence personnel including Defendant David Wellhauser . . . who in turn reported the
accusation to the Burning Man Project Black Rock Rangers[.]” Id. ¶ 8. Further, Plaintiff
contends, “Elsewhence Agents are selected, trained and their conduct disciplined and rewarded
by Defendant Elsewhence in a manner that creates liability for Elsewhence under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the tortious actions that ground Plaintiff’s claims in this Complaint.” Id.
¶ 9. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff proposes to bring a claim for “violation of privacy
rights” against Elsewhence. Id. ¶¶ 30-34.
Defendants urge that amending the pleading to name Elsewhence is futile because
Plaintiff has “failed to adequately allege any facts to support his allegations that Elsewhence
violated his privacy rights” and that Plaintiff “fails to proffer any . . . evidence” showing “a
reasonable likelihood that Wellhauser communicated the [rape] allegation to the Rangers for
malicious intent purposes and that he knew that would have no useful information concerning the
circumstances surrounding the rape allegations.” ECF No. 33 at 6-7. For these reasons,
Defendants argue, the proposed amended pleading “would be subject to dismissal.” Id. at 7.
Initially, in focusing on a supposed failure to “proffer . . . evidence,” it is not clear that
Defendants correctly describe the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Strauss v. Angie’s List, Inc., 951 F.3d 1263, 1267
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(10th Cir. 2020) (“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential
evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s . . . complaint
alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. We accept all well-
pled factual allegations as true and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.”) (quoting Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010)). To be
sure, “an amendment is futile ‘if it would not survive a motion to dismiss.’” Salim v. ADX
Warden, No. 22-cv-03374-CNS-STV, 2024 WL 5400719, at *2 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2024)
(quoting Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-00043-WYD-KLM,
2013 WL 6676157, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2013), and citing Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d
892, 901 (10th Cir. 2004)), recommendation adopted sub nom. Salim v. AUSA_SDNY Off.,
2025 WL 460956 (D. Colo. Feb. 11, 2025) .
However, it is also the case that judges in this District have repeatedly recognized that, in
most situations, “futility arguments are better addressed” in the context of full briefing—motion,
response, and reply—on a motion to dismiss. Godfrey v. United States, No. 07-cv-02165-MSK-
MEH, 2008 WL 80302, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2008); see also, e.g., Electro-Mechanical Prods.,
Inc. v. Alan Lupton Assocs. Inc., No. 22-cv-00763-PAB-SP, 2023 WL 5152627, at *3 (D. Colo.
July 10, 2023) (recognizing that “[d]enying a motion to amend based on futility is uncommon in
this District and usually involves claims that are facially unsupported in the proposed
amendment”). Defendants do not discuss the voluminous authority in this District expressing
reticence to deny motions to amend on futility grounds. See ECF No. 33 at 6 (citing cases from
the District of New Jersey and the District of Iowa).
Defendants point to no facial defect in the proposed pleading or other clear justification
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for finding futility at this juncture. Instead, their arguments delve into the specifics of the
pleading and call upon the court to conduct a detailed examination of Plaintiff’s allegations and
to make a particularized plausibility determination. These underdeveloped merits arguments are
more appropriately addressed on a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court respectfully rejects Defendants’ futility arguments as premature.
Moreover, Rule 15(a) requires the court to consider whether there was undue delay or
dilatory motive. Here, the court finds none. On November 20, 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel
represented that he had “recently been informed that the Burning Man Project sponsored event
‘Elsewhence’ that took place in Bailey, Colorado and which is the locus of the conduct that
serves as the basis for Plaintiff’s claims, is operated by a Colorado Limited Liability Company
owned and registered by Defendant David Wellhauser under the name ‘Elsewhence.com’”)
(citing to ECF No. 30-2, a printout from the Colorado Secretary of State website).
The conclusion that amendment should be allowed is further bolstered by the lack of any
showing of prejudice to Defendants. Prejudice is the “most important factor in deciding a motion
to amend the pleadings,” Minter, 451 F.3d at 1207, and “[c]ourts typically find prejudice only
when the amendment unfairly affects the defendants ‘in terms of preparing their defense to the
amendment.’” Id. at 1208 (quoting Patton v. Guyer, 443 F.2d 79, 86 (10th Cir. 1971)). “Most
often, this occurs when the amended claims arise out of a subject matter different from what was
set forth in the complaint and raise significant new factual issues.” Id. Here, it is apparent that
adding the sponsor of the Burning Man event—a limited liability company of which a current
Defendant is the sole member—does not implicate significant factual issues. Defendants,
notably, have not argued that they would be prejudiced by an amendment, nor can the court
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discern any prejudice in this context.
For these reasons, the court respectfully rejects the argument that amendment should be
denied on futility grounds. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) directing this
court to “freely give leave when justice so requires,” the court respectfully GRANTS the Motion
to Amend.
III. 	Motion to Transfer Venue
The court respectfully DENIES without prejudice Defendants’ motion to transfer this
case to the Northern District of California. ECF No. 2. Defendants may refile the motion, if they
deem appropriate, directed to the Second Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, the court respectfully ORDERS as follows:
(1) The Motion to Remand, ECF No. 13, is denied;
(2) The Motion to Amend, ECF No. 30, is granted; and
(3) The Motion to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 2, is denied without prejudice to timely
refiling that motion after the Second Amended Complaint is docketed. Plaintiff shall file a clean
version of the Second Amended Complaint within three (3) business days of this Order.
It is further ORDERED that a telephonic status conference is set for April 7, 2025, at
1:00 p.m., in Courtroom A502, on the fifth floor of the Alfred A. Arraj United States Courthouse
located at 901 19th Street, Denver, Colorado. The parties shall attend by calling 571-353-2301,
Guest meeting ID- 868150043. All attendees shall please mute their phone when not speaking
and not use speaker phone.
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DATED: March 28, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
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