Winter v. Platte Valley School District RE-7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO
MATTHEW WINTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
PLATTE VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-7,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Platte Valley School District RE-7’s
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint [Docket No. 11]. Defendant Platte Valley
School District RE-7 (the “District”) moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) to dismiss the disability-discrimination claims brought against it under federal
and Colorado law. Docket No. 11. Plaintiff Matthew Winter filed a response, Docket
No. 15, and the District filed a reply. Docket No. 16. The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
I. BACKGROUND 1
Matthew Winter was an employee of the District, a school district in Weld County,
Colorado from August 2021 until May 4, 2023. Docket No. 9 at 1-2, ¶¶ 1, 12. Mr.
Winter worked as a technology aide. Id. at 2, ¶ 15. This role involved duties such as
1 The following facts are taken from Mr. Winter’s amended complaint, Docket No.
9, and are presumed true for the purpose of ruling on the District’s motion to dismiss.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 16

2
assessing computers and documenting service needs via a ticketing system, solving
printer issues, fixing student and teacher laptops, and cleaning machines. Id. at 4-5,
¶¶ 30-31, 43, 45-46, 48.
At the beginning of his employment, Mr. Winter made his supervisor, Mike Jakel,
aware of his disabilities and asked for accommodations. Id. at 3, ¶ 17. Mr. Winter’s
disabilities include “major depression, complex PTSD, epilepsy, and bipolar disorder.”
Id. at 7, ¶ 62. These conditions substantially limit Mr. Winter in one or more major life
activities. Id. Due to his disabilities, Mr. Winter has difficulty remembering things and
has trouble with tasks that have a sequence unless he has written instructions to help
him remember. Id. at 1, ¶ 3. Mr. Winter requested that Mr. Jakel provide him with
accommodations for his disabilities, including a “blue screen shield,” noise-cancelling
headphones, and written instructions for procedures with multiple steps. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 4-5.
Mr. Jakel responded, apparently mockingly, by asking “[c]an you lift 80 pounds?” Id. at
3, ¶ 20. In response to request for written instructions, Mr. Jakel told Mr. Winter that he
“he did not have time to write things down for [Mr. Winter] and [Mr. Winter] needed to
‘figure it out.’” Id., ¶¶ 22-23. Mr. Winter alleges that his accommodation requests were
“ignored,” id. at 2, ¶ 6, or “brushed off and not met.” Id. at 3, ¶ 19.
Mr. Jakel would state to Mr. Winter that he was tired of the “way you note things”
in the ticketing system. Id. at 4, ¶ 28. Mr. Jakel first stated that Mr. Winter’s tickets did
not contain enough information. Id., ¶ 30. Later, Mr. Jakel said, in one meeting, that
the tickets contained too much information. Id., ¶ 33. These ticket-writing issues were
not, however, mentioned in Mr. Winter’s single performance review. Id., ¶ 29. On one
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 16

3
occasion, Mr. Jakel embarrassed Mr. Winter by making him follow up with a student for
more information on a technical issue. Id., ¶ 34.
Mr. Winter’s colleagues unlocked his office door and intruded on Mr. Winter’s
mental health treatment sessions. Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 36-38. Mr. Winter never saw anyone
interrupt the meetings of his colleagues. Id. at 5, ¶ 39. Mr. Winter’s colleagues were
unfriendly to him and greeted him in a different manner than they did other people. Id.,
¶ 40. Mr. Winter did not receive recognition for his good ideas, while his colleagues
received recognition for their good ideas. Id., ¶¶ 41-44.
On May 4, 2023, Mr. Winter met with Mr. Jakel and Dr. Jeremy Burmeister, the
District’s superintendent. Id. at 6, ¶ 49. At that meeting, Mr. Winter was informed that
his contract would not be renewed at the end of the school year, and that Mr. Winter
could either resign or be terminated at the end of May. Id., ¶¶ 51-52. Mr. Jakel said
that the District was terminating Mr. Winter because Mr. Jakel was “tired of how your
tickets are.” Id., ¶ 52. Mr. Winter initially said he would stay until the end of May, but
then said that he wanted to think about his decision. Id., ¶ 53. On May 7, 2023, Mr.
Winter decided that he would not stay until the end of May. Id., ¶ 54.
Mr. Winter filed an administrative discrimination charge on August 8, 2023 and
received a right-to-sue notice on February 14, 2024. Id., ¶¶ 57-58. Mr. Winter filed the
present action in state court on March 28, 2024. Docket No. 1-2 at 1. The District filed
a notice of removal with this Court on April 23, 2024. Docket No. 1. Mr. Winter filed an
amended complaint, which is the subject of the District’s motion to dismiss, on April 29,
2024. Docket No. 9.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 16

4
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint must allege enough factual matter that, taken as true, makes
the plaintiff’s “claim to relief . . . plausible on its face.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671
F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “The ‘plausibility’ standard requires that relief must plausibly follow from the
facts alleged, not that the facts themselves be plausible.” RE/MAX, LLC v. Quicken
Loans Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1168 (D. Colo. 2018) (citing Bryson v. Gonzales, 534
F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008)). Generally, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (alterations omitted). A court, however, does not need to
accept conclusory allegations. See, e.g., Hackford v. Babbit, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th
Cir. 1994) (“[W]e are not bound by conclusory allegations, unwarranted inferences, or
legal conclusions.”).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not shown – that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quotations
and alterations omitted); see also Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190 (“A plaintiff must nudge [his]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible in order to survive a motion to
dismiss.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). If a complaint’s allegations are “so
general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then
plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191 (quotations omitted).
Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat forgiving, “a complaint still
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 16

5
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bryson, 534 F.3d at
1286 (alterations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The District seeks to dismiss Mr. Winter’s claims for discrimination on the basis
of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and for discrimination on
the basis of disability under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”). Docket No.
11 at 1.
A. The Nature of Mr. Winter’s Claim
The Court must first determine what claim or claims Mr. Winter brings in this
case. Mr. Winter captions his first count “Discrimination on the Basis of Disability-
CADA,” Docket No. 9 at 6, and his second count “Discrimination on the Basis of
Disability-ADA.” Id. at 8. Mr. Winter also mentions at several points in his complaint
that the District did not grant his accommodation requests. See, e.g., id., ¶ 77. 2
The elements of an ADA discrimination claim are 1) the plaintiff was a disabled
person within the meaning of the ADA, 2) the plaintiff was qualified, with or without
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of his job, and 3) the
plaintiff was discriminated against because of his disability. Herrmann v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 21 F.4th 666, 678 (10th Cir. 2021); Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1014 (10th
Cir. 2020). The elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim are 1) the plaintiff was a
disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, 2) the plaintiff was qualified, with or
2 The amended complaint states that Mr. Winter “brings claims for . . . retaliation
in violation of ADA and CADA.” Docket No. 9 at 2, ¶ 10. While Mr. Winter’s original
complaint, Docket No. 3, included retaliation claims, id. at 8, 10-11, the amended
complaint does not.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 16

6
without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of his job, 3) the
plaintiff requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation, and 4) the defendant refused
to accommodate his disability. Aubrey, 975 F.3d at 1006.
The Court finds that Mr. Winter alleges discrimination claims based on the
captions to his two counts. See Docket No. 9 at 6, 9. The Court also finds that Mr.
Winter alleges failure-to-accommodate claims. Although Mr. Winter does not caption a
section of the complaint with this claim, he alleges that he was disabled, Docket No. 9 at
8, ¶ 75, that he was otherwise qualified, id., ¶ 76, that he requested accommodations,
id. at 3, ¶¶ 17, 22, and that the accommodation request was denied. Id., ¶¶ 20, 23.
Moreover, the District appears to agree that Mr. Winter’s complaint attempts to allege a
failure-to-accommodate claim. Docket No. 11 at 12-15; Docket No. 16 at 8-9.
B. ADA Discrimination Claim
When a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, 3 a court looks
to the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), to evaluate disability discrimination claims arising under the ADA. See Lincoln
v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1192 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying framework to an ADA
3 Mr. Winter’s response argues that he can prevail under either a direct or indirect
theory of discrimination. Docket No. 15 at 1, 5-7. Direct evidence of discriminatory
animus shows that a plaintiff “was terminated because of [his] disability.” Herrmann, 21
F.4th at 679. Cases where plaintiffs have successfully brought direct discrimination
claims generally involve either a facially discriminatory policy or an employer making an
express statement that the employee’s disability is the basis for an adverse employment
action. Id. at 678-79 (collecting cases). Mr. Winter has not alleged that the District had
any facially discriminatory policy. He has not alleged any express statements by his
supervisors or co-workers about his disability other than the vague allegation that “[i]n
the course of his employment . . . Mr. Winter has been subjected to demeaning
comments related to his disability.” Docket No. 9 at 2, ¶ 16. Nor does he allege that the
District cited his disability as the reason for terminating him. As such, the Court finds
that Mr. Winter has not pled a case of direct discrimination.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 16

7
claim). The full framework only applies at the summary judgment stage. See McNellis
v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 116 F.4th 1122, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2024); Barrett v. Salt
Lake Cnty., 754 F.3d 864, 867 (10th Cir. 2014). But the Court still begins at the first
step of the McDonnell Douglas framework – analyzing the prima facie elements of a
discrimination claim – because, “[w]hile the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that
Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in [his] complaint, the elements of each alleged
cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.”
Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515
(2002)).
For an ADA claim brought under an indirect theory of discrimination, Mr. Winter
must allege that he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA, that he was qualified,
with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of his job,
and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Aubrey,
975 F.3d at 1014. 4 First, the District argues that Mr. Winter’s claim should be dismissed
because Mr. Winter fails to adequately plead that he is a person with a disability as
defined by the ADA. Docket No. 11 at 7-8. Second, the District asserts that Mr. Winter
does not plead facts to show that he suffered an adverse employment action either
through constructive discharge or through a hostile work environment. Id. at 8-11.
Third, the District argues that, even if Mr. Winter has pled a prima facie discrimination
case, the District has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action under the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 11-12. The Court will address the
4 Neither side addresses the question of whether Mr. Winter was qualified to
perform the essential functions of his job. As a result, the Court will not address this
element.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 16

8
first two arguments. The Court will not address the District’s argument regarding the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action because that step of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See
McNellis, 116 F.4th at 1137-38; Barrett, 754 F.3d at 867.
1. 	Person with a Disability Recognized by the ADA
The District argues that Mr. Winter has not properly alleged that he falls within
the ADA’s definition of a person with a disability. Docket No. 11 at 7-8. Specifically, the
District argues that Mr. Winter “does not allege what major life activity or activities are
impacted by his alleged disabilities, or to what extent.” Id. at 7. The District further
claims that, while Mr. Winter did state that his disability limits him in essential functions
because of his trouble with remembering things, “he does not connect the job functions
with a major life activity, and does not explain how the requested accommodations are
necessary to perform an essential job function.” Id. The District argues that two of the
accommodations Mr. Winter allegedly asked for – a blue screen shield and noise-
cancelling headphones – seem unrelated to Mr. Winter’s alleged difficulties with
remembering tasks and following sequences. Id. at 7-8.
For this element, a plaintiff must state facts suggesting he is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA. Johnston v. Hunter Douglas Window Fashions, Inc., 715 F. App’x
827, 830 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The law defines “major life activities” as
including, but not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 8 of 16

9
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id.
§ 12102(2)(A). Both the amended complaint and the parties’ motions suggest that the
only question here is whether Mr. Winter falls within the statute’s first definition of
“disability.” See, e.g., Docket No. 9 at 7, ¶ 62; Docket No. 11 at 7-8.
To plead a claim under the first definition – “actual impairment” – Mr. Winter must
1) assert that he has a recognized impairment; 2) identify one or more appropriate
major life activities; and 3) allege that the impairment substantially limits one or more of
those activities. See Felkins v. City of Lakewood, 774 F.3d 647, 650 (10th Cir. 2014)
(citing Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Mr. Winter does not, however, have to provide a “precise” description of how the
impairment impacts the major life activity. See Grote v. Beaver Express Serv., LLC,
2013 WL 4402822, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing Allen v. SouthCrest Hosp., 455
F. App’x 827, 832 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)).
The Court finds that Mr. Winter has satisfied the requirement to allege a
recognized impairment by pleading that he suffers from “major depression, complex
PTSD, epilepsy, and bipolar disorder.” Docket No. 9 at 7, ¶ 62; see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (discussing recognized ADA impairments including major depressive
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, epilepsy, and bipolar disorder).
For the second and third prongs, the Court finds that Mr. Winter has satisfied the
requirement to allege one or more major life activities that his disability substantially
limited. Mr. Winter alleges that he “has difficulty remembering things[ ] and has trouble
doing tasks that have a sequence.” Docket No. 9 at 1, ¶ 3. He alleges that when he
“began having trouble remembering the order of operations, he asked Mr. Jakel if he
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 9 of 16

10
could write directions down and to have patience with him while completing tasks.” Id.
at 3, ¶ 22. In his response to the District’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Winter seems to imply
that his impairments limit the major life activity of “working.” Docket No. 15 at 6. The
District argues that the holding of Allen, 455 F. App’x at 833-835, defines a “working”
impairment as one that would keep Mr. Winter from performing a broad class of jobs.
Docket No. 16 at 2-3. The District states that Mr. Winter has not alleged such a
limitation. Id. But, although Mr. Winter did not make such an allegation explicit, most, if
not all, modern jobs require an ability to perform tasks that have a sequence to them.
The Court finds that Mr. Winter’s allegations here plausibly allege that he suffers the
kind of impairment that would limit his ability to perform a broad class of jobs.
Moreover, the complaint plausibly alleges impairment of at least two other major
life activities listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A): concentrating and thinking. Docket No. 9
at 3, ¶ 18 (“[Mr. Winter] has difficulty remembering things[ ] and has trouble doing tasks
that have a sequence.”). Mr. Winter does not have to provide a “precise” description of
his impairments’ impact on his major life activities. See Allen, 455 F. App’x at 832 n.5.
Here, he alleges how his impairments limit his ability to handle sequence-based tasks,
Docket No. 9 at 3, ¶ 18, and has identified various job duties he had, such as computer
maintenance and repair, see, e.g., id. at 5, ¶ 48, that are obviously sequence-based.
The Court therefore finds that Mr. Winter has adequately pled that he is a person with a
disability covered by the ADA.
2. 	Adverse Employment Action
Mr. Winter must allege that he suffered an adverse employment action because
of his disability. Aubrey, 975 F.3d at 1014. The District argues that Mr. Winter did not
suffer an adverse employment action. The District identifies two possible theories of an
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 10 of 16

11
adverse employment action – hostile work environment and constructive discharge –
and argues that Mr. Winter has not alleged sufficient facts to support either theory.
Docket No. 11 at 8-11. The Court finds that neither side addresses the because-of-his-
disability portion of the element. As a result, the Court will address only the adverse-
employment-action part of the element.
a. 	Hostile Work Environment
The District argues that Mr. Winter was not subjected to a hostile work
environment and that allegations of co-workers and supervisors being unfriendly,
unhelpful, and inconsiderate do not rise to the legal standard of a hostile work
environment. Docket No. 11 at 8-10. Mr. Winter’s response does not address this
argument. The Court agrees with the District that, to the extent that the complaint
discusses this issue, see Docket No. 9 at 2, 5, ¶¶ 16, 40-44, the facts alleged do not
suggest that the work environment was one “permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or persuasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Williams v. FedEx
Corp. Servs., 849 F.3d 889, 897 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Penry v. Fed. Home Loan
Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998)).
b. Constructive Discharge
The District argues that Mr. Winter was not constructively discharged because he
voluntarily resigned and because he failed to show that it would have been intolerable to
remain employed. Docket No. 11 at 10-11. When an employee faces a choice solely
between voluntary resignation and certain termination, that employee has been
constructively discharged. Burks v. Oklahoma Publ’g Co., 81 F.3d 975, 978 (10th Cir.
1996) (“an employee can prove a constructive discharge by showing that she was faced
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 11 of 16

12
with a choice between resigning or being fired”). Mr. Winter’s amended complaint
alleges that his supervisor told him that the District would not be renewing Mr. Winter’s
contract and that “[w]e’ll give you two options: you can resign today, or we’ll do it at the
end of May.” Docket No. 9 at 6, ¶¶ 51-52. Mr. Winter therefore faced the choice of
either voluntary resignation or certain termination. Thus, under Burks, Mr. Winter has
properly alleged constructive discharge.
The District also argues that, even if Mr. Winter does allege constructive
discharge, his claim should be dismissed because he has failed to allege a continued
right to employment. Id. at 11. A continued right to employment is not, however, an
element of a constructive discharge claim. See Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555
(2016) (“A claim of constructive discharge therefore has two basic elements. A plaintiff
must prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point where a
reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign. . . . [Second] he
must also show that he actually resigned.”). The Court therefore rejects the District’s
argument and will deny the District’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA discrimination
claim.
C. ADA Failure-to-Accommodate Claim
For a failure-to-accommodate claim, Mr. Winter must allege 1) he was disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, 2) he was otherwise qualified for his job, 3) he
requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation, and 4) the District refused to
accommodate his disability. See Aubrey, 975 F.3d at 1006. The Tenth Circuit has
explained that “[e]stablishing a prima facie claim is not onerous.” Id. (citing Osborne v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015)).
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 12 of 16

13
The Court has already found that Mr. Winter alleged that he was disabled and
that neither side addressed the “otherwise qualified element.” The District does not
argue that it provided Mr. Winter with an accommodation so the Court will address only
whether Mr. Winter alleged that he requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation.
The ADA explains that
[A] “reasonable accommodation” may include – (A) making existing facilities used
by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Inherent in the reasonable accommodation requirement is an
obligation for the employer and employee to engage in an interactive process. Aubrey,
975 F.3d at 1007. The point of the dialogue is to determine the scope of the employee’s
disability and whether there is a reasonable accommodation that would permit the
disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the job. Id. The interactive
process begins when an employer provides notice to his employer of his disability and
associated limitations. Dansie v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 42 F.4th 1184, 1193 (10th Cir.
2022).
While there are no magic words that an employee must use, any request for
accommodation must be “sufficiently direct and specific, giving notice that [the
employee] needs a special accommodation. Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC, 830
F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In Foster, the Tenth Circuit held that
the plaintiff’s statement to managers that “I've got surgery scheduled – going to see the
doctor [ ] and schedule surgery for Friday,” id. at 1182, could constitute a sufficient
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 13 of 16

14
request for accommodation even though the employee did not specifically say he was
seeking an accommodation. Id. at 1188-89.
Here, Mr. Winter alleges that he suffers from “major depression, complex PTSD,
and bipolar disorder.” Docket No. 9 at 8, ¶ 75. He alleges that, because of these
disabilities, he “has difficulty remembering things, and has trouble doing tasks that have
a sequence, without written instructions to help him remember.” Id. at 3, ¶ 18. He
claims that he informed his supervisor, Mr. Jakel, of his disabilities and asked for
“necessary accommodations,” id., ¶ 17, including “purchasing a blue screen shield,
noise cancelling headphones and written instructions.” Id. at 8, ¶ 77. Mr. Winter does
not allege why he requested a blue screen shield and noise-cancelling headphones as
necessary accommodations to address memory issues and sequencing issues.
However, he does allege that, when he “began having trouble remembering the order of
operations, he asked Mr. Jakel if he could write directions down and have patience with
him while completing tasks.” Id. at 3, ¶ 22. Mr. Winter alleges that he received two
responses from Mr. Jakel regarding his accommodation requests: once, Mr. Jakel
responded “[c]an you lift 80 pounds?” and the other time Mr. Jakel stated that “he did
not have time to write things down for [Mr. Winter] and [Mr. Winter] needed to ‘figure it
out.’” Id., ¶¶ 20, 23. Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Mr. Winter has
properly alleged that he requested the accommodation of having his supervisor write
things down for him.
Mr. Winter must also allege that the requested accommodation was reasonable.
Aubrey, 975 F.3d at 1006. Whether an accommodation is reasonable turns on “the
facts of each case taking into consideration the particular individual's disability and
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 14 of 16

15
employment position.” Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017). “A
proposed accommodation is not reasonable on its face if it would not enable the
employee to perform the essential function at issue.” Osborne, 798 F.3d at 1267
(citation omitted). While the Court finds that Mr. Winter fails to sufficiently allege the
reasonableness of the blue screen shield and the noise-cancelling headphones, the
Court finds that Mr. Winter has sufficiently alleged why written instructions would help
him perform the essential functions of his job. The Court also finds this request to be
reasonable. Mr. Winter alleges that he has difficulty with sequence-based tasks and
that his job involved such tasks. Docket No. 9 at 3, ¶ 18. Moreover, the difficulty and
cost of providing the requested accommodation – writing down instructions – appears
relatively low. Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Winter has properly alleged that he
requested a reasonable accommodation. The Court will deny the District’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s ADA failure-to-accommodate claim.
D. CADA Claims
Mr. Winter brings claims for disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate
under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402. Docket No. 9
at 6-8, ¶¶ 60-72. Colorado state employment discrimination claims are analyzed under
the same standards as federal law. Colo. C.R. Comm’n v. Big O Tires, Inc., 940 P.2d
397, 399-400 (Colo. 1997); Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1219 (10th Cir.
2010) (noting, in the context of a disability discrimination claim, that Colorado and
federal law apply the same standards). The Court has already found that Mr. Winter
has stated plausible claims under federal law; therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Winter
has stated the analogous claims under Colorado law. The Court will deny the District’s
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 15 of 16

16
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Platte Valley School District RE-7’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint [Docket No. 11] is DENIED.
DATED March 20, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
_________________________
Case No. 1:24-cv-01131-PAB-TPO Document 30 filed 03/20/25 USDC Colorado
pg 16 of 16