Wilfong v. TTEC Services Corporation

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-01076-CNS-KAS

DEREK WILFONG, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,
V.
TTEC SERVICES CORPORATION,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff Derek Wilfong moves for conditional certification of his proposed collective
action, expedited opt-in discovery, and Court-authorized notice to potential opt-in
Plaintiffs. ECF No. 18. Defendant TTEC Services Corporation opposes. ECF No. 33. For
the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff's motion.

|. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff initiated this action as a collective action against TTEC, alleging that TTEC
has a practice and policy of not paying its nonexempt employees for all hours worked,
including overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. ECF No. 1, § 1.
In particular, Plaintiff complains that TTEC failed to compensate its customer service

representatives for the time required to boot up, login, and shut down their computers and

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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phone systems. Id., ¶ 28. Plaintiff pursues his claims as the Representative Plaintiff, on
behalf of himself and others similarly situated. He brings his suit under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Id., ¶¶ 1, 3.
B. 	The FLSA – Conditional Certification in the Tenth Circuit
The FLSA governs how certain employers must compensate employees for
minimum wage and overtime. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–07. The statute requires covered
employers to pay employees for all hours worked and, in most cases, to provide overtime
compensation for work beyond 40 hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a).
Overtime compensation must be paid at one and a half times the employee’s “regular
rate” of pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). The FLSA defines an “employer” as “any person acting
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. . . .” 29
U.S.C. § 203(d).
Section 216(b) of the FLSA allows private individuals to seek damages for
minimum wage and overtime violations, providing that
[a]n action to recover the liability [for unpaid minimum wages
or unpaid overtime compensation] may be maintained against
any employer . . . in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs may proceed collectively, 1 which allows “plaintiffs the
advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources.”
1 As Judge Wang has aptly explained, a “collective action under the FLSA is an animal distinct and separate
from a class action that proceeds under Rule 23.” Peterson, 2018 WL 3470604, at *1. Thus, like Judge
Wang and other courts in this District, the Court favors the use of “collective” rather than “class,” when
referring to the FLSA collective.
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Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989) (interpreting the Age
Discrimination 	in 	Employment 	Act 	of 	1967 	(ADEA), 	which 	expressly 	incorporates
enforcement provisions of the FLSA). Plaintiffs seeking to join an FLSA collective action
must affirmatively opt in. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to
any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.”).
In Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corporation, the Tenth Circuit approved a
two-step process, known as the “ad hoc approach,” for determining whether putative
collective action members are “similarly situated” to the named plaintiff. 267 F.3d 1095,
1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that § 216(b) does not define the term similarly
situated). Under the ad hoc approach, the trial court “require[s] nothing more than
substantial allegations that the putative class members were together the victims of a
single decision, policy, or plan.” Id. at 1102 (quoting Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp.,
175 F.R.D. 672, 678 (D. Colo. 1997)). The court may rely on the “allegations of the
complaint 	and 	any 	supporting 	affidavits 	filed 	by 	the 	plaintiff.” Peterson 	v. 	Nelnet
Diversified Sols., LLC, No. 17-CV-01064-NYW, 2018 WL 9662030, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb.
2, 2018) (citing Brown v. Money Tree Mortgage, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 676, 680 (D. Kan. 2004)).
The standard for conditional certification is a “lenient” one, which “typically results in class
certification.” Warren v. MBI Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-00800-RM-STV, 2020 WL
5640617, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2020) (citing and quoting Norwood v. WBS, Inc., No.
15-cv-00622-MSK-KMT, 2016 WL 7666525, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2016)). Still, the
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movant must demonstrate that opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated. Peterson, 2018 WL
9662030, at *3.
During the second stage of the ad hoc approach—typically after discovery and
often triggered by a motion to decertify—the court applies a stricter standard to determine
whether the case should proceed as a collective action. Id. In particular, the court “reviews
several factors, including ‘(1) disparate factual and employment settings of the individual
plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to
each plaintiff; (3) fairness and procedural considerations; and (4) whether plaintiffs made
the filings required by the [the statute] before instituting suit.’” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103
(quoting Vaszlavik, 175 F.R.D. at 678). Numerous courts in this District have applied the
ad hoc approach in considering whether plaintiffs can move forward collectively under the
FLSA. See, e.g., Morris v. MPC Holdings, Inc., No. 20-cv-2840-CMA-NYW, 2021 WL
4124506, *2 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2021); Buffington v. Ovintiv USA Inc., No. 20-cv-2477-RM-
STV, 2021 WL 3021464, *2–4 (D. Colo. July 16, 2021); Green v. Perry’s Rest. Ltd, No.
21-cv-23-WJM-NRN, 2022 WL 16744795, *3 n.4 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2022); Peterson, 2018
WL 9662030, at *3. Trial courts generally avoid considering the merits of the underlying
collective action in making certification decisions. Buffington, 2021 WL 3021464, at *2
(citing Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988)).
Here, Defendant argues that the Court should deviate from the ad hoc approach
and 	apply 	a 	stricter 	standard 	endorsed 	by 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	in 	Swales 	v. 	KLLM
Transportation Services, L.L.C., 985 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2021). ECF No. 33 at 2–5. The
Swales court held that the ad hoc approach runs counter to the FLSA. See Swales, 985
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F.3d at 434–43. The panel explained that “a district court should identify, at the outset of
the case, what facts and legal considerations will be material to determining whether a
group of ‘employees’ is ‘similarly situated.’ And then it should authorize preliminary
discovery accordingly.” Id. at 441. “[A]ddressing these issues from the outset aids the
district court in deciding whether notice is necessary. And it ensures that any notice sent
is proper in scope—that is, sent only to potential plaintiffs.” Id. at 442.
Like other courts in this District, the Court respectfully declines to deviate from the
ad hoc approach endorsed by the Tenth Circuit. See Green, 2022 WL 16744795, *3 n.4
(rejecting the defendant’s invitation to follow Swales); Morris, 2021 WL 4124506, *2
(same); Buffington, 2021 WL 3021464, *2–4 (same); Fuentes v. Compadres, Inc., No. 17-
CV-01180-CMA-MEH, 2018 WL 2126840, at *2 (D. Colo. May 9, 2018) (finding that “this
Court is bound by long-standing Tenth Circuit precedent mandating the application of the
two-step conditional certification process for collective actions brought under the FLSA.”
(citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1105)).
C. 	Notice to the Conditional Class
As stated earlier, the FLSA mandates that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff
to any [collective] action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party
and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
A court may authorize a plaintiff to distribute notices and opt-in consent forms to potential
collective action members to ensure that they are informed of the lawsuit. Hoffmann-La
Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1989). “The overarching policies of the
FLSA’s collective suit provisions require that the proposed notice provide accurate and
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timely notice concerning the pendency of the collective action, so that [potential plaintiffs]
can make informed decisions about whether to participate.” MacDonald v. Covenant
Testing Techs., LLC, No. 18-cv-02290-NRN, 2019 WL 1755282, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 18,
2019) (quoting Whitehorn v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 445, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)); Levine v. Vitamin Cottage Nat. Food Mkts. Inc., No. 20-cv-00261-STV,
2020 WL 6546734, at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 6, 2020) (“Notice to FLSA collective action
members must ‘contain accurate information concerning the collective action so that
potential plaintiffs can make informed decisions as to their participation.’” (quoting Armijo
v. Star Farms, Inc., No. 14-cv-01785-MSK-MJW, 2015 WL 13310426, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec.
14, 2015)). An FLSA notice should describe the nature of the collective action and provide
recipients with the opportunity to opt in by submitting a consent form.
An FLSA notice should describe the nature of the FLSA collective action and offer
the recipient the opportunity to opt in to the action by filing a consent form. Bowling v.
DaVita, Inc., No. 21-CV-03033-NYW-KAS, 2023 WL 6443879, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 3,
2023). The notice “should also advise recipients of their right to be represented by counsel
for the original plaintiff, to obtain independent representation, or to participate pro se,”
and it should also explain “certain rights of an ‘opt-in’ plaintiff, including the right not to be
bound by a settlement that the original plaintiff advocates.” Id. (quoting Pena v. Home
Care of Denver, LLC, No. 19-cv-00069-CMA-NYW, 2019 WL 5577947, at *2 (D. Colo.
Oct. 29, 2019)).
The Court has “broad discretion regarding the details of the notice sent to potential
opt-in plaintiffs.” Lindsay v. Cutters Wireline Serv., Inc., No. 17-cv-01445-PAB-KLM, 2018
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WL 4075877, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 2018) (citing Hoffmann-LaRoche, 493 U.S. at 171).
This discretion requires a court to ensure that the notice is “fair and accurate,” but the
discretion does not extend so far as to permitting a court to alter the plaintiff’s proposed
notice “unless such alteration is necessary.” Bowling, 2023 WL 6443879, at *2 (quoting
Creten-Miller v. Westlake Hardware, Inc., No. 08-2351-KHV, 2009 WL 2058734, at *2 (D.
Kan. July 15, 2009)).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff moves for conditional certification of the following collective:
All former and current customer service representatives, and
persons with jobs performing substantially identical functions
and/or 	duties 	to 	customer 	service, 	employed 	by 	TTEC
Services Corporation in the United States at any time between
[three years from date of this order] and the present.
ECF No. 37-1. As of the date Plaintiff filed his motion for conditional certification, five
individuals have consented to join this action as opt-in Plaintiffs. ECF No. 18 at 2; ECF
No. 18-3 (declarations of the five opt-in Plaintiffs); ECF No. 33 at 1. One opt-in Plaintiff,
Samantha Heuerman, has since withdrawn her consent. ECF No. 47.
A. 	Whether Plaintiff has made substantial allegations that the putative
class is similarly situated
The Court first looks at Plaintiff’s complaint to consider whether he has made
substantial allegations that the putative class is similarly situated. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at
1103. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
(1) 	That the putative FLSA collective members were all employed
by TTEC as customer service representatives or in positions
performing the same or substantially identical functions or
duties as customer service representatives and were subject
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to the same policies and procedures, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 20–21,
61;
(2) 	That each member was classified as a nonexempt employee
id., ¶ 23;
(3) 	That each member was paid an hourly wage, id., ¶ 24;
(4) 	That each member was scheduled to work 40 hours per week
but regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, id., ¶¶
25–27;
(5) 	That TTEC subjected the members to the same policies and
practices of only paying them 	for work performed while
completely logged in to TTEC’s computer systems, software
applications, and phone system, id., ¶¶ 28–48; and
(6) 	That the members regularly worked more than 40 hours per
workweek, and the unpaid work was in addition to the 40 or
more hours they worked while clocked-in for their scheduled
shift, id., ¶¶ 35, 44, 50.
Plaintiff supports these allegations with sworn declarations from Plaintiff and the
four opt-in Plaintiffs. ECF No. 18-2 (Decl. of Plaintiff); ECF No. 18-3 (Decl. of Bennett,
Davis, Decicco, and Knox). Each individual claims that they are similarly situated and
were subject to the same practice and policy, stating that they all were (i) employed by
TTEC Services Corporation as (ii) TTEC customer service representatives who (iii)
regularly worked more than 40 hours per week without being paid overtime and who (iv)
spent time each workday shutting down and logging out of the computer systems,
software applications, and phone systems without being compensated for that time.
Defendant opposes conditional certification, making three broad arguments. ECF
No. 33 at 5–10. The Court addresses each in turn. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
allegations and the declarations are conclusory and that “none of the opt-ins provide any
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estimate 	of 	how 	many 	hours 	they 	actually 	worked 	per 	week, 	or 	of 	how 	much
uncompensated or undercompensated time they allegedly worked in a day or week.” Id.
at 5–7. Defendant goes on to argue that “Plaintiff and the opt-ins worked under different
managers, worked on different client contracts, and used different applications, programs,
systems, and startup/shutdown processes depending on their client, team, and manager.”
Id. at 7. The Court is not persuaded.
Although it is true that the opt-in Plaintiffs did not provide a specific estimate of
how many hours they actually worked per week, each declared that they regularly worked
more than 40 hours per week. And true, the declarations for each opt-in Plaintiff are nearly
identical, which the Court does not condone. But there is nothing to suggest that the opt-
in Plaintiffs are not being truthful. Nor does Defendant dispute that each opt-in Plaintiff is
a customer service representative. See ECF No. 33 at 1. Finally, whether the opt-in
Plaintiffs had different managers and worked on different client contracts is more
appropriate for the decertification stage. See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103 (explaining that
district courts should analyze the “disparate factual and employment settings of the
individual plaintiffs” in the second stage (citation omitted)); Kovacs v. G4S Secure Sols.
(USA) Inc., No. 20-CV-3180-RMR-KMT, 2022 WL 1402097, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 18, 2022)
(“Defendant here raises factual arguments regarding the individual circumstances of each
potential opt-in plaintiff. While such arguments may become relevant at the second stage
of the certification process, the Court does not consider them here. At this stage, the
Court need only consider the substantial allegations of the complaint, including any
supporting affidavits.” (citing Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102)); Coldwell v. RiteCorp Env’t
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Prop. Sols., No. 16-CV-01998-NYW, 2017 WL 4856861, at *4 (D. Colo. July 20, 2017) (“It
is not necessary, at this step in the process, to consider the exact factual setting of the
policy—for example, the coworkers involved, the managers involved, the number of hours
worked overtime, and the exact implementation of the unwritten policy.” (citation and
quotation omitted)).
Second, Defendant argues that, because some (but not all) of the opt-in Plaintiffs
signed arbitration agreements, certification would be inappropriate. ECF No. 33 at 8.
Relying on caselaw from the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, Defendant urges the Court
to address the issue at the notice stage. Id. at 9 The Court declines to do so. Whether
members of the putative FLSA collective “are subject to arbitration agreements should be
raised at the second stage of the certification analysis.” Judd v. Keypoint Gov’t Sols., Inc.,
No. 18-cv-00327-RM-STV, 2018 WL 7142193, *12 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2018); Beattie v.
TTEC Healthcare Sols., Inc., 1:18-cv-03098-RM-NRN, 2019 WL 2866559, *1 (D. Colo.
July 3, 2019) (“The fact that some Plaintiffs will be compelled to arbitrate their claims
individually does [not ]establish grounds for denying them notice.”). Moreover, courts in
this District and elsewhere have held that the issue of arbitration generally is irrelevant to
the “similarly situated” inquiry. Judd v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., Inc., No. 18-CV-00327-RM-
STV, 2018 WL 4383037, at *11 (D. Colo. July 30) (“Courts have held that the execution
of arbitration agreements by some opt-in plaintiffs is not an indication that those plaintiffs
are not similarly situated to the named plaintiffs who did not sign such agreements.” (citing
Williams v. Omainsky, No. 15-0123-WS-N, 2016 WL 297718, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 21,
2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CV-00327-RM-STV, 2018 WL
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7142193 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2018)); id. (citing Guzman v. Three Amigos SJL Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 3d 516, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he fact that some of the contracts have arbitration
provisions . . . [does not] create any differences between plaintiffs and other [potential
plaintiffs] with respect to whether defendants violated the FLSA.”)).
Third, Defendant argues that certification should be limited to employees on the
Nissan North America team in Ohio, where Plaintiff worked, or, at minimum, relevant
employees who worked for TTEC in Ohio. ECF No. 33 at 10. The Court again disagrees.
Courts in this District “routinely allow company-wide notice at this stage of litigation . . . .”
Gordineer v. Rocky Mountain Offender Mgmt. Sys., No. 12-CV-1212-JLK, 2013 WL
179327, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 17, 2013) (collecting cases); see also Smith v. Pizza Hut,
Inc., No. 09-CV-01632-CMA-BNB, 2012 WL 1414325, at *6 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2012)
(rejecting the defendant’s request to geographically limit the class to the locations where
the plaintiff and opt-in plaintiffs were employed; the “fact that delivery drivers from every
region have not yet opted into this action does not mean that a nationwide class cannot
exist”).
Moreover, Plaintiff and the opt-in Plaintiffs declared that they talked with other
customer service representatives and attended video conferences during which others
complained to trainers and supervisors about the same unpaid work. Defendant argues
that the Court should not consider such hearsay statements. ECF No. 33 at 5–7. This
cannot be. “Courts within the Tenth Circuit have relied upon a plaintiff’s discussions with
others to find that there are substantial allegations that the plaintiff(s) and the putative
opt-in plaintiffs were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Stallings,
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2018 WL 1250610, *3 (collecting cases). Holding Plaintiff to the Federal Rules of
Evidence standards at the notice stage would fail to consider that Plaintiff has not yet
been afforded an opportunity, through discovery, to test the factual basis for his case. As
one court said, the “fact that plaintiff has not yet identified the co-workers with whom he
spoke is not a bar to first stage conditional certification, as plaintiff is not required to prove
his claim at this stage.” Sharp v. CGG Land (U.S.) Inc., No. 14-CV-0614-CVE-TLW, 2015
WL 222486, at *3 and *2 n.4 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2015) (explaining that the notice stage
requires a plaintiff to provide “substantial allegations, not evidence, that the potential class
members are similarly situated” (quotation omitted)).
In sum, the Court rejects Defendant’s three arguments and finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations, his declaration, and the opt-in Plaintiffs’ declarations, taken together, are
sufficient to warrant conditional certification under the FLSA. Each Plaintiff stated that
they are (or were) TTEC customer service representatives subject to the same pay
practice. The Court thus has no trouble concluding that Plaintiff has carried his minimal
burden at the notice stage of asserting “substantial allegations that the putative class
members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Thiessen, 267
F.3d at 1102.
B. 	Whether Notice is Sufficient
Plaintiff also moves the Court to approve his proposed notice. See ECF No. 37-1
(revised notice addressing some of Defendant’s concerns). He asks the Court to permit
notice via email and regular mail. ECF No. 18 at 15.
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Defendant raises 12 objections to the (initial) proposed notice. ECF No. 33 at 11–
15. The Court has already rejected some of Defendant’s objections (e.g., whether
individuals allegedly subject to arbitration agreements should receive notice, whether
notice should be limited to Ohio workers, etc.). And for other objections, Plaintiff has
revised his proposed notice in response to Defendant’s objections. See ECF No. 37-1.
Still, Defendant asks the Court to allow the parties to negotiate certain language in the
notice. ECF No. 33 at 13. In some instances, such as Plaintiff’s characterization of
Defendant’s position, the Court finds Defendant’s request reasonable. See Jibowu v.
Target Corp., 492 F. Supp. 3d 87, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (ordering parties to negotiate
revised 	language 	where 	notice 	“does 	not 	contain 	sufficient 	language 	expressing
[Defendant]’s position”); Morris, 2021 WL 4124506, *4 (orderings parties to “confer in an
attempt to agree on the form of the reminder notice”).
Moreover, the Court is also persuaded by Defendant’s argument that the notice
should state that some collective members may be subject to arbitration agreements
precluding 	their 	participation 	in 	the 	lawsuit. 	See 	Daniel 	v. 	Stericycle 	Inc., 	No.
320CV00655RJCDCK, 2022 WL 16758227, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 11, 2022) (approving
reference to arbitration agreements in FLSA notice collective definition). The Court also
finds this request reasonable. In at least one place in the revised notice, Plaintiff states
that “[y]ou also have a right to join this action. . . .” ECF No. 37-1 at 2 (but in other places,
qualifying that potential opt ins have a right to join if they are “eligible to participate”). But
that may be wrong if some employees entered valid arbitration agreements. Thus, without
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at least mentioning that some employees may be subject to arbitration agreements, the
Court cannot conclude that the “notice is fair and accurate.” 2
Accordingly, although the Court generally finds that the notice is fair and accurate,
the Court directs the parties to engage in a good-faith meet-and-confer to address the
above issues and objections. After the meet-and-confer, Plaintiff shall submit a revised
proposed notice within 14 days of this Order. Should any objections remain, the parties
shall file position papers setting forth the disputes and their arguments, not to exceed
three pages, within 14 days of this order. 3
C. 	Whether Opt-In Discovery is Appropriate
Through a single interrogatory, Plaintiff seeks the name, address, phone number,
email address, and employment dates of all former and current customer service
representatives within the last three years. ECF No. 18 at 14; ECF No. 18-4 (Interrogatory
No. 1). Defendant objects, arguing that the Court should consider whether some opt-in
Plaintiffs are barred from receiving notice prior to granting conditional certification. ECF
No. 33 at 15. The Court finds that opt-in discovery is appropriate.
Courts in this District routinely order defendants to produce this basic information
to facilitate the notice process. See Green, 2022 WL 16744795, *6; Beattie, 2019 WL
2 As explained above, the Court will not address the binding nature of the arbitration agreements until the
second stage. However, should Plaintiff request expedited ruling on the issue in light of this order, he should
file a notice withdrawing his motion to stay briefing on Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. ECF No.
39. Upon receiving that notice, the Court would set a briefing schedule on Defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration. ECF No. 38.
3 Plaintiff seeks to issue notice to potential opt ins by email and regular mail. Defendant opposes, arguing
that regular mail is sufficient. In this case, the Court sees no reason why Plaintiff should be limited to
providing notice by regular mail. See Beattie v. TTEC Healthcare Sols., Inc., No. 1:18-CV-03098-RM-NRN,
2019 WL 2866559, at *2 (D. Colo. July 3, 2019) (permitting notice by e-mail and text message as well as
by regular mail).
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2866559, *3. Accordingly, Defendant shall respond to Plaintiffs single interrogatory within
14 days of this order.*
V. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, the Court makes the following rulings:

(1) Plaintiffs motion for conditional certification, expedited opt-in
discovery, and Court-authorized notice to potential opt-in
Plaintiffs, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part;

(2) The parties are ordered to meet-and-confer on a revised
notice; and

(3) Defendant shall respond to Plaintiffs opt-in discovery
consistent with this order.

DATED this 21st day of February 2025.

United States District sGdge

4 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not seek to notify potential opt-in Plaintiffs via phone call. The Court
thus fails to see why Plaintiff is entitled to the last known phone number for each customer service
representative. Defendant, therefore, need not provide this information.

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